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Abstract 
This thesis uses a discursive approach to examine psychiatric understandings of gender 
and schizophrenia in clinical encounters between professionals and patients. Chief 
reasons for undertaking the research were an unease about the concept of schizophrenia 
and a lack of attention to interactive psychiatric contexts in feminist work on gender and 
madness. This study attempts to move beyond explanations of schizophrenia as a label or 
social product to analyse the intersections between femininity, masculinity, and 
schizophrenia accomplished within psychiatric/patient interactions. Drawing on case 
conference discussions in a British psychiatric unit, I argue that the interplay between 
locally accomplished power and the broader mandate of community care produces 
co-existing relations of benevolent psychiatry/responsible patient, and supervisory 
psychiatry/ untrustworthy patient, and considerable professional persuasion and patient 
resistance at this local level. Within these relations, understandings of femininity and 
(masculine) personhood produce a plurality of meanings of emotion, activity, and 
(in)dependence. The experiences of patients and their significant others are fluid and 
complex resources (re)configured in gendered relational terms to inform the restoration of 
lives and definitions of trouble. 
The central argument is that schizophrenia is not applied as a label but operates largely as 
a background understanding. Professional assumptions about schizophrenia, not gender, 
inform discourses of responsibility, consumerism and supervision, whereas professional 
discourses of femininity and (masculine) personhood intersect with understandings of 
schizophrenia to differentiate and delimit restoration to purpose and autonomy. But 
professionals' understandings of femininity and masculinity, not schizophrenia, inform 
definitions of trouble: negative understandings of femininity are associated with blame 
and change; those of masculinity with excusing and unchangeability. Contemporary 
psychiatry is more concerned with encouraging self-regulation and restoring lives than 
straightforward social control and gender conformity. But gender understandings remain 
salient to contemporary psychiatry and, in relation to schizophrenia, gender 
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Introduction 
Standard psychiatric histories of schizophrenia suggest that Kraepelin's concept of 
"dementia pracox" marked the initial recognition of schizophrenia at the end of the 
nineteenth century, although it is often claimed to have existed throughout history, and the 
term schizophrenia itself was introduced by Bleuler in 1911 (Kendell 1975; Wing 1978; 
Andreasen & Carpenter 1993; Bleuler 1991). Today schizophrenia is regarded as the core 
concept of modern psychiatry (Marshall 1990), a "disturbance" characterised by "positive" 
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations and "negative" symptoms such as 
affective flattening and avolition (American Psychiatric Association (APA) 1994: 273-5). 
While a range of statistical imbalances between women and men in the area of mental 
disorder are well established (Chesler 1974; Allen 1986; DoH 1995; Busfield 1996), 
schizophrenia is said to affect women and men in fairly equal numbers (APA 1987; 1994; 
Kohen 2000; Scott 2000; Ussher 2000), ' giving it a gloss of gender neutrality. However, 
differences between women and men are not necessarily ones of "magnitude" (Smith 
1975a: 109) and gender effects may be hidden beneath statistical associations (Holstein 
1987). In the last two decades mainstream psychiatric research on schizophrenia has 
shown a growing interest in sex/gender differences (Bardenstein & McGlashen 1990; 
Torrey et al 1991; Lewis 1992; Takei et al 1992; Zolese 2000). This research produces 
something of a paradox whereby psychiatric research and classification (APA 1987; 1994) 
is replete with gender differentiations while schizophrenia retains its gloss of gender 
neutrality and the relevance of gender to schizophrenia at the level of clinical practice 
remains largely unknown. 
My interest in the relationship between gender and schizophrenia was initially aroused by 
Chesler's (1974) classic study of women and madness and her thesis that psychiatry holds 
a double standard of mental health for women and men whereby the female sex-role is 
viewed as inherently deviant. In this account, schizophrenia is a label applied by 
psychiatry to women who reject their female role and men who act out "feminine" 
behaviours. A range of research provides support for Chesler's contention that clinicians 
hold different conceptions of female and male mental health (Broverman et al 1970; 
' It has recently been suggested that the incidence of schizophrenia for women could be lower than for men 
or decreasing (Castle et al 1993; Kendler & Walsh 1995) although this could be an artefact of who comes to 
psychiatric attention, or differential responses to treatment (Prior 1999; Zolese 2000). 
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Abramowitz et al 1973; Brodsky & Holroyd 1981; Jones & Cochrane 1981; Swenson & 
Ragucci 1984; Waisberg & Paige 1988), and that women and men who deviate from their 
gender-roles may be diagnosed as schizophrenic (Cheek 1964; McClelland & Watt 1968). 
But there appears to be some unease about the status of the concept of schizophrenia in 
Chesler's work producing conceptual problems and contradictions which are echoed in 
later feminist literature on women and schizophrenia (Al-Issa 1980; Barnes & Maple 
1992), and perhaps played out in a tendency within the feminist literature to make general 
claims about an association between women and madness while seldom including 
schizophrenia in the analyses (e. g. Stephenson & Walker 1981; Gorman 1992; Prior 
1999). In effect, schizophrenia appears to be a problematic presence in feminist analyses 
(what is madness, who is mad? ) and a convenient absence (labelling is on firmer ground 
when associated with depression, anxiety and general unhappiness). Moreover, it is not 
clear whether Chesler's account holds good for contemporary psychiatry in the era of 
community care (Allen 1986; Busfield 1989; 1996). The unease or disquiet about the 
status of schizophrenia in feminist writings, and the claim by some writers that 
schizophrenia is not particularly relevant for a feminist analysis (Busfield 1988; Pugliesi 
1992; Russell 1995), increased rather than diminished my interest. 
At the same time I was becoming increasingly interested in discursive approaches to 
researching social and psychological phenomena, particularly discourse analysis (DA) 
developed within the social study of science and social psychology (Gilbert & Mulkay 
1980; 1984; Woolgar 1980; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Edwards & Potter 1992; Wetherell 
& Potter 1992). Rather than language being the means for describing, labelling, or 
reflecting a real world, discursive approaches' reconceptualise language as constitutive of 
social realities. The interest here lay in the way discursive approaches offer a different 
focus and open up different kinds of questions. On this basis, what schizophrenia and 
gender mean will be constituted and negotiated within discourses and according to the 
contexts of their production. A small but growing body of literature has taken this 
approach (broadly understood) to explore discourses of gender and madness (e. g. Allen 
Z Discourse analysis is a term used for a range of approaches including Foucauldian archaeology/genealogy 
(Foucault 1971; 1972; 1973; 1990), and conversation analysis (Sacks 1972; 1974; Atkinson & Heritage 
1984; Schegloff 1987; 1997), as well as the approach above. There are some common assumptions about 
language and knowledge shared by these approaches but also some important differences. 
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1987; Showalter 1987; Hepworth & Griffin 1990; 1995; Ussher 1991; Malson 1995; 
1998) but there is largely a focus on categories where women predominate (such as 
hysteria and anorexia nervosa)' and on textual materials. ' My interest at the outset, 
therefore, was to use a discursive approach to investigate psychiatric discourses of gender 
and schizophrenia and in an interactive psychiatric context. 
In the 1980s Chesler's thesis of a sexist psychiatry lost ground to the alternative 
explanation that mental distress is the product of the stress and oppression women 
experience in patriarchal society (e. g. Smart 1976; Lipshitz 1978; Oakley 1982; Belle 
1990; Mind 1995; Bostock 1997; Holmshaw & Hillier 2000). This explanation was 
influenced by early feminist writings on the stress and anxiety experienced by women in 
their roles as housewives and mothers (Friedan 1963; Bernard 1972), and is underpinned 
by a large body of epidemiological research (e. g. Gove & Tudor 1972; Gove & Geerkin 
1977; Kessler & McRae 1981; 1982; Thoits 1986; Prior 1999; Thorbjornsson 2000). 
However, as with the literature on sexist psychiatry, the argument that mental distress is 
the social product of stress and oppression in a sexist society makes a general claim about 
the association between women and madness largely based on milder disorders, implicitly 
replicating the unease about what madness is and who is mad. In turn, the small feminist 
literature that has focused explicitly on schizophrenia (Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; Barnes 
& Maple 1992) adds little to the general explanations and fails to illuminate why the same 
kinds of experiences produce different kinds of distress. 
Broader issues of gender, power and language traverse these fields of feminist literature 
where there has been a focus chiefly on women, rather than femininity and masculinity, 
and the assumption of a stable identity underlying characterisations of "women". Reliance 
on the concept of patriarchy and gender as a "role" has produced an oversimplified picture 
of male villains and female victims (Stacey & Thorne 1985; Busfield 1996). These 
concepts of gender and power are underpinned by conceptualisations of language in terms 
of labelling and/or realism. As a result, on the one hand, notions of characteristics 
associated with femininity (such as dependence and emotion) are assumed to have 
' Notable exceptions are Allen's (1987) focus on psychiatric court reports and Lunbeck's (1994) analysis of 
psychiatric case records. 
° However Malson (1995) and Hepworth & Griffin (1995) interviewed women with anorexia and healthcare 
professionals respectively. 
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singular meanings and, on the other hand, the diversity of women's experiences tend to be 
reduced to fit the stress-oppression-patriarchy equation (Busfield 1988). Furthermore, 
there is a tendency to "switch" (Hacking 1995: 67) between explanations of schizophrenia 
as social product or social constructions producing conceptual confusions (Sedgwick 
1982), and often a failure to clarify the relationship between labelling and oppression. 
In terms of our understanding of the relationship between gender and schizophrenia, the 
potential complexity and diversity of psychiatric understandings of characteristics such as 
dependency, emotion, and activity in relation to schizophrenia are underplayed and not 
well understood. There is little consideration of how patients' experiences are formulated, 
negotiated, and gendered within language in general and in clinical contexts in particular. 
We have little idea how psychiatric understandings of femininity may be produced in 
relation to understandings of masculinity and schizophrenia. And it is not clear how 
psychiatric power unfolds within clinical encounters in this era of community care. 
The relevance of gender and conceptualisation of language in anti-psychiatric and societal 
reaction accounts of schizophrenia raise further issues. These accounts contest the 
meaningfulness of schizophrenia as a mental disorder: it is "problems in living" (Szasz 
1973: 21; 1974; 1976); a label for residual rule-breaking (Scheff 1966; Rosenhan 1973); 
the understandable response to contradictory family interaction (Laing & Esterson 1964); 
or reaction to a mad society (Laing 1967). In general terms, schizophrenia is viewed as 
behaviour that breaks social rules with mainstream psychiatry acting as agents of social 
control through their conceptualisation and treatment of such behaviours. The writings of 
Szasz (1976) in particular are suggestive of the potential salience of gender to psychiatric 
understandings of schizophrenia, in terms of dependence, incompetence, employability 
and femininity. But gender is underdeveloped in Szasz' account and it is not apparent how 
these understandings might be constituted, by psychiatrists in interactive contexts with 
patients. Moreover these accounts are not very informative about the factors and 
processes underlying psychiatric control. Rosenhan (1973) suggests that the past and 
s The notion of social construction has been applied to a wide number of diverse approaches from labelling 
theory to discursive approaches such as Foucault (1971; 1972; 1973; 1990) and Potter & Wetherell (1987; 
1992). 
6 This is not to say that more informative accounts are not available. For example, Goffman (1968) charts in 
detail the "moral career" of the mental patient. But neither gender nor schizophrenia are the focus of his 
account and he specifically excludes those treated outside the asylum. Similarly, Emerson & Messinger 
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present experiences of patients will be interpreted in the light of psychiatric 
understandings of schizophrenia but we have little idea how understandings of femininity 
and masculinity might inform such interpretations. In effect, it is not clear how psychiatry 
names and labels certain behaviours as schizophrenia or whether they even do apply 
labels such as schizophrenia within clinical encounters in the way anti-psychiatric theories 
suggest. 
A discursive approach offers a productive avenue for investigating the issues raised in the 
feminist and sociological literatures. Language is reconceptualised as constitutive of 
schizophrenia in a broader and more complex way than the social construction/labelling 
approaches above. What schizophrenia means is socially produced within discourses that 
vary across time and place. Thus the focus changes to the ways that different 
understandings of schizophrenia are constituted in particular contexts and there is no 
"switch" between language as constructing and reflecting the "real". Such a 
conceptualisation of language facilitates a reconceptualisation of gender as a relational 
and contextual discursive production; gender is conceived as a fluid category created 
through social interaction in specific contexts, rather than having an essential or stable 
meaning. Such a conception can incorporate the assumption that gender is interrelated and 
interdependent, that is, "through gender relations two types of persons are created: men 
and women" but what gender means will be produced in specific social contexts (Flax 
1987: 628). As such gender becomes a doing rather than a being (Davies 1996). ' This 
reconceptualisation overcomes problems associated with concentrating solely on women 
and focuses attention on the contexts in which psychiatry produces meanings of 
femininity and masculinity in relation to schizophrenia. This conceptualisation of 
language also provides the basis for reconceptualising experience as a "linguistic event", 
constituted and negotiated, interactively and inter-subjectively, within language (Scott 
1992: 34; Weedon 1997). Reconceptualising experience in this way enables consideration 
of how patients' experiences are formulated and negotiated in relation to schizophrenia, 
and to femininity and masculinity, during psychiatric interactions. 
(1977) provide a general but detailed framework for understanding how relational troubles are defined and 
responded to by troubleshooters. 
This conceptualisation of gender has theoretical affinities with some postmodern/postructuralist feminism 
(Nicholson 1990; Butler 1990; 1994; Butler & Scott 1992; Ilekman 1990; Weedo'n 1997). 
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However, questions related to gender and experience in psychiatric interactions should 
also attend to the power relations within which they are constituted: gender relations are 
an effect of power (Flax 1987; Davies 1996) and what comes to count as a valid 
experience will be determined by the power relations between psychiatric professionals 
and patients (Scott 1992; Weedon 1997). Differing conceptions of contemporary 
psychiatric power have implications for whether formulations of gender and experience 
will be imposed, encouraged, negotiated or contested in clinical interactions. If 
contemporary psychiatric power is conceived as a top-down, hierarchical power (Chesler 
1974; Szasz 1976), relations will be those of powerful psychiatrists and subjugated 
patients; psychiatric professionals will have the authority to impose their understandings 
of femininity, masculinity, and experience, and patients' attempts to contest these 
definitions are likely to be met with imputations of pathology (Goffman 1968). 
Alternatively, Foucault (1979; 1982; 1984; 1990) conceives power as mainly productive 
rather than repressive, and as relational so that resistance is present in every power 
relation. On this basis psychiatry is viewed as a "persuasive discipline" (Lunbeck 1994) 
which aims to restore patients to purpose, autonomy, choice and responsibility (Miller 
1986; Rose 1986a; 1989). However, we do not know whether psychiatric notions of 
purpose and autonomy may be shot through with gender differentiated understandings, 
nor is it clear how a rearranged professional power is managed within clinical encounters 
and where points of resistance may occur (Kitzinger 2000). This also has implications for 
understanding how individuals' histories and current experiences may be shaped and 
played out in terms of understandings of gender and schizophrenia and notions of "care" 
(Banton et al 1985; Ussher 1991; Gorman 1992; Fisher 1997; Graham 1997). Moreover 
an increasing concern for and legislation towards patients' rights may constrain psychiatric 
actions and interactions (Gostin 1975; 1983; Jones 1980; 1993), producing a greater 
potential for negotiation and contestation of meanings of schizophrenia, gender and 
experiences. As such, negotiation, resistance, and contestation can become opaque in 
Foucauldian analyses (Kitzinger 2000). 
However, these frameworks of psychiatric power are based on theoretical/textual analyses 
rather than "the encounters of treatment, the power relations that are displayed" (Banton et 
al 1985: 191). Conversation analysis (CA) focuses on the way social order is produced 
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and managed as an interactional accomplishment (Sacks 1972; 1974; Atkinson & Drew 
1979; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Schegloff 1987; 1997). From this perspective, 
psychiatric power and patient resistance are "micropolitical achievements... produced in 
and through actual turns of talk" (Mellinger 1995: 394) rather than structured or 
determined by broad discourses. However the CA notion of external factors as 
interactional resources can underplay the extent to which broader discourses may come 
into play at the local level. 
Therefore I have situated my methodological approach within DA (Potter & Wetherell 
1987; Edwards & Potter 1992; Wetherell & Potter 1992; Widdicombe 1995; Potter 
1996a; 1996b; Edwards 1998). 8 I combine a Foucauldian understanding of power at the 
micro-level with attention to the interactive context of language-in-use. I focus on a 
"naturally" occurring psychiatric/patient interactive context: that is, a context in which 
interactions occur whether a researcher is present or not. I attend to the way broader 
discourses and institutional practices come into play, at the local level, and how locally 
produced social order and meanings are accomplished and resisted. This analytic 
approach enables consideration of the power relations displayed in clinical encounters and 
the implications for structuring gender relations and experiences in relation to 
schizophrenia. Underlying this approach are feminist aims, based on a concern for 
women's lives and a desire to elucidate the conditions of those lives (Wilkinson 1988; Gill 
1995; Busfield 1996). 
An important tenet of CA is that analysts should stay within the bounds of what is 
relevant to interactional participants (Schegloff 1992; 1997; 1998). Taking participants' 
relevance seriously, particularly in relation to gender understandings, has generated 
considerable debate in CA and DA in recent years (e. g. Schegloff 1997; 1998; Frith 1998; 
Stokoe 1998; 2000; Wetherell 1998; Billig 1999; Kitzinger 2000; Speer & Potter 2000; 
Speer 2001; Edley 2001; Stokoe & Smithson 2001), and has a number of advantages for a 
feminist analysis of gender and schizophrenia in a psychiatric context. It can demonstrate 
the way professionals' understandings of femininity, masculinity and schizophrenia are 
e It should be noted that within DA incudes various orientations ranging from Foucauldian inspired analyses 
(e. g. Parker 1992) through to analyses close to CA (e. g. Widdicombe 1993; 1995). Moreover, Potter 
(1996a; 1996b) and Edwards (1998) have moved closer to a CA approach whereas Wetherell (1998) has 
remained largely within the DA approach outlined in Wetherell & Potter 1992. 
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produced within the talk, rather than having essential meanings, ground the analysis in 
participants' own understandings, and thus provide an effective political critique 
(Widdicombe 1995; Kitzinger 2000). However, gender understandings (and 
schizophrenia) may operate as background relevancies (Garfinkel 1967; Zimmerman 
1998) without being explicitly named within psychiatric talk (West & Zimmerman 1987; 
Ochs 1992; Schegloff 1997; Frith 1998; Hopper & LeBaron 1998; Kitzinger 2000). 
Therefore I attend to instances where gender and schizophrenia are explicitly oriented to 
within interactions and I take account of instances where they are relevant in non-obvious 
ways. 
The site for the research is a psychiatric unit in South East England and the materials for 
analysis are audiotaped talk and notes of discussions between psychiatric professionals, 
patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and their significant others in a type of case 
conference called the "Care Programme Approach" (CPA). As I discuss more fully in 
chapter two, the "ever-present" issue of access (Rachel 1996: 124) and the way it is 
interwoven with ethics in this setting sets constraints on the research and analytic 
processes and also raises questions about how relevance and micro/macro notions of 
power are framed when participants define the extent of context for the researcher. 
However, in comparison with large bodies of CA/DA work on medical encounters (e. g. 
Cicourel 1987; Silverman 1987; West 1990; ten Have 1991; Coupland et al 1994; Gill & 
Maynard 1995) and (psycho)therapeutic interactions (e. g. Labov & Fanshel 1977; Davis 
1986; Buttny 1990; 1996; Burman 1995; Edwards 1998), relatively little research has 
been undertaken on psychiatric/patient interactions (Scheff 1968; Wootton 1977; Barrett 
1988; Mehan 1990; Bergmann 1992; Hak 1992; Soyland 1994; Hak & de Boer 1995; 
Mellinger 1995), 9 particularly in Britain and since the 1983 Mental Health Act. 
Therefore my aim is to use the discursive approach outlined to analyse contemporary 
psychiatric/patient interactions in a British psychiatric unit with a specific focus on 
discussions with and about patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The feminist 
literature on gender and madness, and the sociological literature on schizophrenia and 
contemporary psychiatric power leave a number of questions unaddressed. The research 
9 With the exception of Wootton (1977), all of the cited research was conducted in America, The 
Netherlands, Australia or Germany. 
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presented here represents a small contribution to filling some of these gaps and towards 
the discursive literature on psychiatric/patient interactions. My specific aims are: 
1. To investigate how understandings of femininity and masculinity are constituted and 
negotiated in relation to schizophrenia during psychiatric professionals' interactions with 
patients in case conferences. Focusing on interactions in psychiatric case conferences 
provides an opportunity to explore discussions about treatment, discharge and on-going 
care in the community, and enables consideration of the way gender is made relevant as 
an accomplishment within interactions. A focus on femininity and masculinity overcomes 
problems with concentrating on women, and enables investigation of the 
interrelationships between femininity and masculinity, and their intersection with 
understandings of schizophrenia. 
2. To explore how psychiatric/patient relations unfold within clinical encounters with a 
dual focus on power and resistance as local interactional accomplishments and the way 
broader discourses and institutional practices come into play at the local level. This dual 
focus will enable me to consider how contemporary psychiatric power works at the level 
of local encounters and the implications for structuring gender understandings and 
experiences: in particular, whether professionals enforce gender conformity or restore 
lives to purpose and autonomy, and who has the authority to determine what counts as a 
valid experience. 
3. To analyse experience as an interactional resource and accomplishment. Focusing on 
the way experiences are formulated interactively allows consideration of how patients' 
biographies and current experiences, and experiences between patients and significant 
others, including notions of "care", are negotiated and contested during 
professional/patient interactions, and in relation to understandings of gender. 
4. To explore how schizophrenia is made relevant in professional/patient discussions 
about treatment, future care and activities, and relationships between patients and 
significant others. The focus here is on the extent to which schizophrenia is named and 
applied as a label, or operates as a background understanding which organises 
professionals' understandings of patients and their experiences 
My main objective is to fashion a discursive analysis of the intersections between 
femininity, masculinity and schizophrenia produced within contemporary 
psychiatric/patient relations at the local level of clinical encounters. Within CPA 
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interactions, how do professional discourses of governance and control, and the 
management of locally accomplished power and broader mandates structure the 
intersections between gender and schizophrenia? How do professional understandings of 
gender and schizophrenia intersect with discourses of responsibility, choice and 
supervision, plans for restoring patients' lives, and definitions of trouble, blame and 
change? 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
In Chapter One, I provide a literature review of feminist approaches to gender/women and 
schizophrenia, and psychiatric and critical accounts of schizophrenia, with a focus on 
issues of gender, power and language. I explore problems with feminist accounts of 
labelling and/or oppression in terms of their focus largely on women, a top-down theory 
of power and a conceptualisation of language as labelling or reflecting the "real". I outline 
the mainstream psychiatric account of schizophrenia, and alternative understandings 
provided by anti-psychiatric and societal reaction theory focusing on the relevance of 
gender and conceptualisations of schizophrenia within these accounts. I draw on 
discursive approaches to gender and madness to reconceptualise language, gender and 
experience. 
Chapter Two outlines the methodological approach I will use. The first half of the chapter 
is organised around questions of how to approach the analysis of power and gender. I 
consider how gender relations and experience are implicated in power relations and 
explore three approaches to contemporary psychiatric power, drawing on insights from 
Foucauldian, conversation (CA), and discourse (DA) analytic approaches. I discuss the 
CA criterion of participants' relevance, particularly in relation to gender, and draw out the 
implications for the research. From these discussions I delineate a discourse analytic 
scheme for investigating the research questions. The second half of the chapter examines 
the constraints of access and ethics which occur when researching a psychiatric context 
and the implications for the research and analytic process. 
Chapter Three initiates the analytic core of the thesis and is concerned with the discursive 
constitution of psychiatric practices and professional/patient relations in CPA meetings, 
providing a framework for the chapters that follow. I investigate discourses which 
constitute power relations between psychiatric professionals and patients, considering the 
extent to which contemporary psychiatric power is concerned with governmentality or 
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social control. I discuss the interplay between practices and relations as situational 
accomplishments and the incorporation of broader legislative concerns within 
interactions. And I examine the intersections between professionals' understandings of 
schizophrenia, and discourses of responsibility, choice and supervision. 
In Chapter Four, I continue the focus on power with an investigation of patients' 
resistance and professionals' reassertions of psychiatric power at the local level. I discuss 
how patients appropriate and reformulate psychiatric discourses to resist the plans and 
assessments of the professionals. I assess the extent to which psychiatric control of 
decision-making and assessment is disrupted, and the effect in terms of practical 
outcomes for patients. I continue the exploration of power and resistance as interactional 
accomplishments and the impact of wider legislative and rights discourses. I go on to 
examine points of reassertion of psychiatric power, in response to patient resistance, 
focusing on the intra-professional post-meeting, and the extent to which professionals' 
understandings of schizophrenia and gender are resources for reasserting authority. 
Chapter Five focuses more closely on professionals' gender understandings through 
consideration of professional/patient discussions about restoring patients' lives. I 
investigate the discourses deployed to position patients as insufficiently purposeful, 
drawing out how professionals' gender understandings inform their problematisations and 
solutions. I explore how patients' experiences are shaped and gendered within clinical 
encounters according to the activity of restoring lives. I assess whether contemporary 
psychiatry is more concerned with restoring lives than gender conformity, and the extent 
to which professionals' gender understandings inform notions of purposes and 
autonomies. And I consider the intersections between professionals' assumptions about 
schizophrenia, gender understandings and the restoration of patients' lives. 
Chapter Six examines gender understandings and experiences as interactional 
accomplishments through investigating how discourses of "care" and experiences between 
patients and significant others are negotiated within meetings. I consider how carers 
experiences of care are shaped, interrelated with those of patients and gendered within 
interactions. I explore what care means in this setting and whether professionals reinscribe 
notions of caring as a traditionally feminine activity. In particular, I focus on 
professionals' definitions of trouble, blame and change, tracing configurations through the 
course of meetings. I examine how patients and significant others, and the experiences 
between them, are configured in gender relational terms to give sense to definitions of 
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trouble and to accomplish blamings, excusings and decisions regarding who should 
change. And I weigh up whether understandings of femininity and masculinity or 
schizophrenia are the major resource informing professionals' definitions. 
In the conclusion, I summarise and draw together the main arguments of the thesis. I 
include a feminist comment on the findings and suggest some future directions in which 
the research could be taken 
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Chapter One 
Locating the Gender/Schizophrenia Relationship within Accounts of 
Madness: Issues of Gender, Power, and Language 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the academic literature concerned with the relationship between 
psychiatric understandings of gender and schizophrenia. Statistical imbalances between 
women and men in the area of mental disorder are well-established: more women than 
men are admitted and readmitted to psychiatric hospitals (DoH 1995); more women 
receive treatment for psychological problems from General Practitioners and health 
centres; and women are more often treated with psychotropic drugs (Chesler 1974; Allen 
1986; Busfield 1996). ' There are also diagnostic differences: women are more likely to be 
diagnosed as suffering from depression, affective psychoses, and neuroses, whereas more 
men are diagnosed as alcoholic, or as having drug related disorders (DoH 1995; Prior 
1999; Kohen 2000). However, this is not the case for schizophrenia which is said to affect 
women and men in fairly equal numbers (American Psychiatric Association 1987; 1994; 
Kohen 2000; Scott 2000; Ussher 2000), giving it a gloss of gender neutrality. 
In the first part of the chapter, I outline two interrelated feminist approaches to 
gender/women and schizophrenia which focus on labelling and oppression in the form of 
"sexism" within psychiatry and/or "sexism" within "patriarchal society". I raise problems 
about the concepts of power, gender and language underpinning this work, and the focus 
largely on women. Power is conceived in terms of a monolithic patriarchy producing a 
simplified power relation of male villains and female victims which does not consider 
how power relations may be more differentiated and complex. In turn, gender is mainly 
conceptualised as "women" leaving exploration of the interrelations between femininity, 
masculinity, and schizophrenia largely unexplored. I argue that the conceptualisation of 
language in terms of labelling and/or as reflecting the real world produces conceptual 
difficulties over what madness is and who is mad, exemplified by schizophrenia, and a 
"switching" between labelling and realism in explanations. Furthermore, there is a 
separation between language and experience which precludes consideration of the ways 
' However, changing definitions of mental disorder may mean that the claim that women "always dominate 
psychiatric statistics is... no longer accurate" (Prior 1999: 2) 
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experiences are given meanings within language and interactions. This literature does not 
focus on clinical contexts, nor is it evident how relevant gender understandings continue 
to be for a contemporary psychiatry which is largely concerned with community care. 
The second part considers psychiatric and critical accounts of schizophrenia. I argue that 
despite very different and polarised explanations, neither approach is entirely gender-blind 
and both are suggestive that gender is potentially salient to psychiatric understandings of 
schizophrenia in clinical contexts, despite its distributional gloss of gender neutrality. 
However, in psychiatric accounts power is absented, gender is assumed to be an obvious 
difference and language simply describes a real world. In contrast, in anti-psychiatric and 
societal reaction theories power is once again conceptualised in terms of powerful 
psychiatrists and powerless patients, gender is underdeveloped and language becomes a 
relatively straightforward means of labelling and thus constructing schizophrenia. I 
suggest that these forms of social construction' are not particularly enlightening about the 
ways in which this occurs. 
In the final section I draw on discursive approaches to gender and madness, and 
schizophrenia to provide reconceptualisations of language and gender, and to raise further 
questions regarding experience. I argue that discursive approaches afford a more complex 
analysis of psychiatric understandings and enable a reconceptualisation of language as 
constitutive of social reality in a broader and more comprehensive way than earlier 
notions of social construction. This conception of language refuses the "switch" between 
language as constructive and reflective. It also facilitates a reconceptualisation of gender 
as a contextual and discursive (re)production. I emphasise that gender should be 
understood as relational, consisting of two interdependent and interrelated parts, women 
and men. The separation between language and experience, discussed in the first section, 
re-emerges here and I argue for an approach which dissolves this separation; experiences 
should be understood as constituted within interactive and inter-subjective contexts. I 
conclude with the main question for my thesis: How are gender understandings negotiated 
in relation to schizophrenia during psychiatric interactions with patients? 
2A wide range of work in the social sciences has been termed "constructionism", from labelling theory and 
anti-psychiatry through to Foucauldian and other discursive approaches. Thus the term can mean very 
different things in different approaches (Potter 1996b). Some of these differences will be discussed through 
the course of the chapter. 
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1. Gender/Women and Schizophrenia: Sexist Ps cy hiatry or Sexist Society? 
Distributional anomalies have informed work in the field of gender/women and madness, 
where the primary focus has been on women and on categories where women 
predominate. In contrast, there is only a small body of literature explicitly focusing on 
gender/women and schizophrenia. In this section I discuss two major approaches in this 
field, contrasting explanations of sexist psychiatry, or madness as social construct, with 
those of sexist society, or madness as social product. 
1.1 Sexist Psychiatry 
The higher incidence of mental distress in women is viewed as primarily due to sexism 
within psychiatry where there is a double standard of mental health for women and men. 
There is a basic asymmetry in the way female and male sex-roles are conceived and 
responded to by psychiatry (Chesler 1974). The female sex-role is viewed as inherently 
deviant so that women may be regarded as mentally disturbed whether they conform to or 
deviate from the female stereotype, whereas men are only viewed as deviant if they 
behave in feminine ways. Women who reject the female role are usually diagnosed as 
schizophrenic, as are men who act out feminine behaviours such as dependency or 
passivity. Schizophrenia, it is argued therefore, is a label applied to women and men who 
deviate from their conditioned gender-roles (Chesler 1974; Al-Issa 1980; Barnes & Maple 
1992), although these writers are primarily concerned with women. This double standard 
is said to dominate psychiatric theories and treatments. In particular psychoanalytic 
theorists and therapists are said to present marriage and motherhood as necessary for 
women's happiness and mental health. In therapy, women are in an unequal relationship 
where they are dominated by a (usually) male authority figure who "helps" them to come 
to terms with their female role (Chesler 1974). 3 
'Chesler's indictment of psychoanalytic theories and therapies has become increasingly problematic during 
the last two decades. Some writers have condemned traditional psychoanalytic therapy as an unequal power 
relationship with oppressive aims and outcomes (Rubin 1975; Ussher 1991). But since the 1970s, feminist 
revisions of psychoanalytic theory and practice have produced a much more complex view (Smith 1975b; 
Lipshitz 1978; Hare-Mustin 1981; Eichenbaum & Orbach 1983; Penfold & Walker 1983; Irigaray 1985; 
Elliot 1992; Gorman 1992). The success of feminist therapy in achieving its aims has been questioned 
(Lipshitz 1978; Allen 1986) but the argument is that therapy does not necessarily have to oppress women. 
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This account stresses the role of psychiatry in mediating the sexism in wider society 
through its evaluation and treatment of women, and the part that schizophrenia plays in 
enforcing sex-role conformity. A range of feminist writers have broadly supported 
Chesler's thesis, ' although many writers do not include schizophrenia in their analyses 
even though their claims are for a general association between women and madness. This 
raises the question of what kinds of madness writers are talking about, and who is mad. 
According to Chesler there are very few mad women in Western cultures: they may be 
unhappy, powerless and self-destructive, but they are not mad. Only a small number of 
women experience "genuine states of madness" (Chesler 1974: xx). However, the 
distinction between "genuine" madness and unhappiness, and the role of psychiatry in 
producing this difference, is not clearly drawn (Chamberlin 1994). It would seem that 
schizophrenic women are truly mad but this differentiation does not sit easily with the 
tenor of Chesler's general thesis. Is psychiatry "genuinely" labelling these particular 
women? And why should rejecting the female role produce real madness while 
conformity does not (Russell 1995)? In attempting to delineate between the "real" and the 
"not real", Chesler produces an uneasy synthesis of labelling theory and surveys of extant 
mental disorder. 
As such there appears to be an underlying unease about what madness is and who is mad, 
as exemplified by schizophrenia. It then becomes questionable that general explanations 
of labelling hold good for all kinds of madness (Sedgwick 1982). When schizophrenia is 
included, as in Chesler's case, it leads to conceptual problems and contradictions. It would 
seem that schizophrenia is irrelevant' or inconvenient for a feminist analysis: a 
problematic presence (what is madness, who is mad? ) and a convenient absence (labelling 
is on firmer ground when associated with depression, anxiety and general unhappiness). 
In addition, feminist analyses have been chiefly or wholly focused on women, raising two 
further problems. Firstly, conceptual underpinnings in terms of "women" have become 
° Psychiatry individualises, internalises and pathologises women's protests at their social situation (Smith 
1975b: Stephenson & Walker 1981; Barnes & Maple 1992; Russell 1995). Psychiatrists over-medicalise 
women's lives obscuring issues of oppression and unhappiness (Prior 1999). And male experts in the 
nineteenth century viewed femininity and madness as synonymous (Ehrenreich & English 1979), a view that 
continues today (Gorman 1992). Masculine-biased assumptions are also encoded into diagnostic criteria of 
disorders such as Self-Defeating Personality Disorder and Premenstural Dysphoric Disorder, which could be 
applied to virtually all women, illustrating the difficulty of being a normal woman (Caplan 1987; 1995). 
For example, Russell (1995) makes this argument. 
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increasingly problematic for feminist/gender theorising. Analyses which focus on 
"women" as their subject(s) tend to assume: an essential, stable subject lying beneath 
different characterisations; a common identity that can provide a universal basis for a 
feminist project; and often a universal structure of oppression that produces a common 
(subjugated) experience. However, if we take seriously the idea that sex and gender are 
socially constituted, there is no "doer behind the deed" (Butler 1990: 25; Foucault 1980a; 
1990; Riley 1988; Jacobus et al 1990; Bailey 1993; Hood-Williams 1996; Kitzinger 
1999), then woman as a category and subject of feminism becomes highly problematic. ' 
Furthermore, woman as a category and signifier has not remained stable over time (Riley 
1988). If women's needs and sufferings are therefore not based on a common essence to 
being a woman, but emerge from the ways women are discursively positioned as women, 
then this raises the paradox that in taking the category of women as a stable subject, 
feminism has unintentionally reified the very gender relations it seeks to undermine. 
Secondly, feminist analyses focusing largely or wholly on women leave the 
interrelationships between femininity/masculinity and schizophrenia largely unexplored. ' 
However, at the same time, writers often rely upon an implicit comparison with, or 
assumed knowledge about, men (Busfield 1996). Thus gender as relational is assumed in 
many analyses, that is, that gender consists of two interdependent and interrelated parts, 
women and men (Flax 1987; Davies 1996). But these interrelations are not explicated nor 
fully analysed. 
Research provides some support for the contention that women and men who deviate 
from their gender-roles will be diagnosed as schizophrenic. ' Women with schizophrenia 
6 The problem of assuming that there is a universal category of women is highlighted by the resistance 
encountered by white middle-class feminists from many of those who "should" be part of this category, for 
example women of colour, lesbian women and women from developing countries (Bailey: 1993). 
' However some feminist writers have focused on gender and general accounts of madness. They suggest 
that symptoms and behaviours associated with depression and anxiety (where women predominate) are 
viewed as illnesses by health professionals, whereas alcoholism, drug abuse and personality disorder (where 
men predominate) have been perceived as wrong-doing rather than illness and still have an ambiguous 
status. As a result more women have been channelled towards the psychiatric system, men towards the penal 
system (Prior 1999; Holmshaw & Hillier 2000). However, definitions of mental disorder appear to be 
changing to include behaviours associated with men that used to be viewed as bad rather than mad, and may 
be related to the move to community care and concerns regarding dangerousness and risk to the public 
(Prior 1999). 
$ Sex-role non-conformity in general is likely to be viewed as mentally disordered or similar behaviours 
meet differential responses from health professionals. Women were viewed as more seriously disordered 
than men when they showed "masculine" symptoms such as alcoholism and anti-social behaviour, as were 
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may be more active, aggressive and dominant than normal women while men with 
schizophrenia may be more withdrawn and less active than women with schizophrenia 
and normal men (Cheek 1964). -In addition, women with schizophrenia were more 
assertive than normal women, and men with schizophrenia more "sensitive" than normal 
men on self-image tests suggesting gender-role "alienation" (McClelland & Watt 1968: 
226). However, it is possible that overactive women and passive men are simply more 
likely to be hospitalised. Moreover, while people with schizophrenia may have disturbed 
self-images, "role reversal" is not significant when the normal women for comparison are 
career women rather than housewives (McClelland & Watt 1968: 226). But reliance on 
the language of roles here, and in the feminist literature, is also problematic. It reinforces 
assumptions of consensus, continuity and complementarity (Stacey & Thorne 1985; West 
& Zimmerman 1987; Busfield 1996). Gender is far more basic and pervasive than can be 
captured in the term role or even roles9 (Busfield 1996). Furthermore, the concept of roles 
makes it too easy to underplay or over-simplify issues of power (Stacey & Thorne 1985; 
West & Zimmerman 1987). 10 
Feminist literature, however, adds power to the notion of gender-roles through using the 
concept of patriarchy. But the term patriarchy directly attributes women's oppression to 
men and their actions so that all men everywhere have more power than women and use it 
to oppress them. In this sense it is both reductionist and circular (Poliert 1996). It 
over-emphasises the similarities and irons out all the differences between men, and 
between women based on race, socio-economic class etc. (Bailey 1993; Busfield 1996; 
Poliert 1996). The concept of patriarchy as explanation makes it difficult to accommodate 
the possibility that power may be exercised by some women over other women, or some 
men over other men (Ramazanoglu 1993). While patriarchy may still be useful as a 
descriptive rather than explanatory term (Busfield 1996), " Poliert (1996) argues that it is 
a reductive and confusing term which should be replaced by the concept of gender 
men with "feminine" symptoms of depression or anxiety (Waisberg & Paige 1988). And a similar pattern 
was found in psychiatric emergency room decisions on whether to hospitalise (Rosenfield 1982). However, 
clinicians may only fall back on gender understandings when the mental disorder category is less deviant or 
the symptoms are vague (Billingsley 1977; Dixon et at 1995). 
'Although roles may be assigned to persons on the basis of gender. 
1° These problems are particularly germane to the functionalist notion of roles. The concept does not have to 
be functionalist; in the 1960s interactionists reformulated the notion to make roles more dynamic and 
socially negotiated. However, both conceptualisations underplay issues of power. 
11 It continues to be used by many feminists including some poststructuralist feminists (e. g. Weedon 1997). 
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relations. " 
Thus the feminist account of sexist psychiatry relies upon a top-down hierarchical notion 
of power in which patriarchal male psychiatrists (in theory, if not always in practice) have 
substantial power over passive female patients and use it to pathologise them as a means 
of enforcing gender conformity. Recourse to an overarching concept of patriarchy leaves 
the possibility of complex and differential power relations unexplored and (re)produces an 
over-simplified relation of (female) victims and (male) villains. It is not clear how men 
with schizophrenia would fit into this conception of power relations. Chesler (1974: 38) 
does suggest that "white, wealthy and older men" who show severely disturbed behaviour 
may escape hospitalisation, implying that there may be differentiations between men, 
particularly in terms of class and race. However, such differentiations are not explored in 
relation to men or women. Moreover, power relations between psychiatric professionals 
and patients may have changed along with the move to community care, encapsulated in 
the move from the language of "doctors" and "patients" to that of "providers" and 
"clients"/"users" (Elliott 1997). 13 
However, there is evidence that clinicians do have a double standard of mental health. 
Clinicians' conceptions of male mental health were close to those for adult mental health 
whereas conceptions of female mental health differed markedly. Mentally healthy women 
were thought to be less independent, aggressive and competitive, and more emotional, 
submissive, passive and subjective than mentally healthy men or adults. Moreover, 
characteristics ascribed to mentally healthy men were seen as more socially desirable 
suggesting "a powerful, negative assessment of women. " (Broverman et al 1970: 4). A 
number of studies in a similar vein continue to support the notion of a double standard of 
mental health (Abramowitz et al 1973; Brodsky & Holroyd 1981; Jones & Cochrane 
1981; Swenson & Ragucci 1984; Waisberg & Paige 1988). 14 However, gender 
'Z However, Pollen (1996) proposes a Marxist feminist version of gender relations which is not consistent 
with the "poststructuralist" approach to gender, which will be outlined in the final section. 
" In my own research I shall continue with the terms "doctor", "professional" and "patient", reflecting the 
terms used within the research context. This will be explained in more detail in the following methodology 
chapter. 
14 There is also the question of whether clinicians' gender makes any difference. Labelling theory predicts 
that evaluations will be more severe the greater the social distance between agent of social control and 
rule-breaker (Scheff 1966; Horwitz 1982). However the evidence is equivocal (Broverman et al 1970; 
Abramowitz et al 1973; Billingsley 1977; Stricker 1977; Swenson & Ragucci 1984; Smyth & McFarlane 
1985; Loring & Powell 1988; Miles 1988; Dixon et al 1995). On balance, female clinicians may have the 
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understandings may have shifted over time. Whilst psychiatrists and psychologists 
continue to view adults as more masculine, and adults and men as less emotional than 
women, gender differentiation in terms of aggression and competence may have declined 
(Smyth & McFarlane 1985). 
But it is not clear what characteristics such as (in)dependence mean to clinicians in this 
body of research. For example, the criteria for Dependent Personality Disorder in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd edition, (DSM-III) focus on 
the ways women are likely to express dependency, such as lack of self-reliance and 
self-responsibility. The criteria do not include ways in which men may be dependent, for 
example reliance on others for housework and childcare. Thus women's dependency is 
pathologised whereas men's is not (Kaplan 1983a; 1983b). Or to put it another way, it is 
possible that clinicians have differential understandings of what it means to be 
(in)dependent which are in turn informed by gender understandings, although Kaplan 
lacks empirical evidence for her claim (Kass et al 1983; Williams & Spitzer 1983). 
This points to a deeper problem in terms of the conceptualisation of language 
underpinning the literature on gender/women, schizophrenia and sexist psychiatry. In 
Chesler's thesis, language is the means for labelling and thus the means through which 
mental illness in general, and schizophrenia in particular, is constructed. In this 
conceptualisation, there is no straightforward correspondence between the experiences 
and actions of women and the language used to describe them. However this notion of 
labelling/social construction is not particularly informative (Hacking 1995; Potter 1996b; 
Rose 1999): 
... the language of social construction is actually rather weak. It is not very 
enlightening to be told repeatedly that something claimed as "objective" is 
in fact "socially constructed". Objects of thought are constructed in 
thought: what else could they be? So the interesting questions concern the 
ways in which they are constructed. (Rose 1999: x, emphasis added) 's 
potential to treat other women in a less biased way but this will not necessarily be the case, given their 
(largely male-controlled) training and shared understandings of gender characteristics and behaviours 
(Lipshitz 1978; Gorman 1992). 
" While Rose (1999) is referring largely to studies of science and technology, this criticism applies equally 
to labelling approaches. 
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Such a conceptualisation of language has methodological and theoretical implications. 
When language is conceived as the means for labelling, feminist writers tend to draw on 
research focusing on hypothetical rating scales and case histories, questionnaires and, 
occasionally, interviews. The influential and extensively cited study by Broverman et al 
(1970), outlined above, provides a good example. Firstly, their bipolar scale of 
characteristics such as independent, emotional, aggressive, submissive etc. dichotomises 
differences that may only be a matter of degree (Stricker 1977; Swenson & Ragucci 1984; 
Russell 1995). Secondly, their rating scale is tapping into clinicians' attitudes rather than 
practices and it is unknown whether and how such attitudes may be translated into clinical 
practices (Billingsley 1977; Stricker 1977). Thirdly it assumes a stable attitude towards, 
and a common understanding of the meaning of the object(s) in question (Potter & 
Wetherell 1987). It relies upon such characteristics as independent and emotional having 
relatively simple and singular meanings rather than a complex of meanings. 
At the theoretical level, this conceptualisation of language as (socially) constructing 
madness/schizophrenia tends to sit in an uneasy alliance with an understanding of 
language as describing or reflecting a real world. This leads to conceptual confusions and 
separations between real madness/unhappiness, schizophrenia/mild disorders, sex/gender, 
which tend to undermine arguments regarding the socially constituted character of 
schizophrenia and gender and conceal the potential diversity and complexity of 
psychiatric understandings. 
One final question in this section concerns whether Chesler's account holds good for 
contemporary psychiatry in this era of community care. Allen (1986) claims that 
contemporary psychiatry simply does not operate in the way Chesler describes. Since 
psychiatry has extended out of the hospital into the community, psychiatrists are 
increasingly refusing to use deviance from gender-roles as grounds for psychiatric 
intervention; social coping does not necessitate adjustment to gender-role. In opposition 
to this, Busfield (1989; 1996) contends that the person being assessed is "always a 
gendered subject" (Busfield 1996: 114) and the judgment of performance on gendered 
tasks is likely to be salient. " However, writers are drawing on textual evidence; there is a 
16 Busfield's analysis appears to be aimed at disorders such as depression, phobias and eating disorders, even 
though her claims are general and her analysis of gendered tasks operates at a relatively superficial level 
only. Nevertheless she provides strong support for the argument that gender understandings permeate 
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distinct lack of data from actual encounters between psychiatric professionals and patients 
throughout this literature. 
Despite the problems associated with this literature, in broad terms and on balance it does 
suggest that clinicians hold a negative conception of femininity and are likely to 
pathologise gender deviation in both women and men. Schizophrenia is a key psychiatric 
label in this account, applied to women who are perceived as over-active and assertive, 
and to men who are dependent and passive. The research is also suggestive that 
psychiatric treatment, in terms of restoring patients to their "correct" gender, will be 
oriented towards notions of masculinity in terms of independence, activity and low 
emotionality, and femininity in terms of dependence, emotion and passivity, along with 
concerns related to marriage and motherhood. However we have little idea how 
psychiatric understandings of femininity and masculinity are articulated in relation to 
schizophrenia, particularly during interactions with patients, and in relation to community 
care. Nor what kinds of professional/patient relations are constituted. 
In the following section I discuss an alternative, or additional, approach which argues that 
schizophrenia is the result of the oppression women experience in patriarchal society. I 
suggest that similar problems in terms of conceptualisations of gender, power and 
language arise in this body of literature. 
1.2 Sexist Society 
In the 1980s approaches which argued that sexism within psychiatry is central to any 
explanation of women's madness, lost ground to the claim that the major factor is the 
oppression of women in patriarchal society. This is not only due to empirical support for 
the latter explanation but also to the decline in support for labelling theory. Such an 
explanation is also less threatening to psychiatry and acknowledges women's suffering 
and misery in their daily lives (Busfield 1989). The argument that women's mental 
distress is a product of the oppression they experience in their daily lives is grounded 
largely in concepts of stress and based mainly on epidemiological research. " Early 
contemporary psychiatry. 
" An early study of this sort was conducted by Gove & Tudor (1972). They suggested that there were higher 
levels of mental illness in married women than married men, whilst there were lower rates among unmarried 
women than unmarried men. They linked this with women's position in modem industrial societies which 
was said to have a negative effect on their mental health. The asymmetry in mental disorder statistics was 
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epidemiological work was influenced by feminist writings which highlighted "the 
problem that has no name" (Friedan 1963: 29): the frustration, dissatisfaction, stress and 
anxiety experienced by married women trapped in the housewife role (Bernard 1972). 
A small number of feminist writers have explored the possibility that schizophrenia is the 
result of traumatic events or the stress and oppression associated with the female role 
(Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; Barnes & Maple 1992). For example, Al-Issa (1980) argues 
that the stressful life situations women encounter can produce schizophrenia, and Barnes 
and Maple (1992) suggest that schizophrenia is an understandable response to an 
intolerable situation; they cite a case study of a woman diagnosed with schizophrenia 
whose husband killed their three children and then committed suicide. Some of these 
analyses contain interesting insights regarding women and schizophrenia" but at a 
broader level, these analyses of women and schizophrenia add little to the general claims 
regarding women, madness and stress/oppression. 
A large body of feminist work has drawn on epidemiological research to argue that the 
oppression of women in patriarchal society causes misery, suffering and mental disorder. '9 
A range of epidemiological research provides some support for feminists' arguments that 
mental distress is the (social) product of stresses in women's lives, but the findings are 
mixed and somewhat contradictory20 and there are a number of difficulties associated with 
this body of research. 2' However, while the small literature on women and schizophrenia 
due to the social situation of women and the nature of the feminine role, particularly within marriage 
'a Women may be more likely to have sexual fantasies than men as an escape from the harsh realities of life 
(Al-Issa 1980). Or women may be more likely to experience thoughts of rage as not their own (Barnes & 
Maple 1992). 
19 For example, women's mental distress is caused by their social and economic oppression (Oakley 1982), 
and the strains of marriage and family life (Lipshitz 1978), particularly if they are working-class women 
(Smart 1976). In terms of psychology, madness is construed as the unconscious expression of women's 
anger and desperation about the roles, activities and limited sexuality prescribed for them (Eichenbaum & 
Orbach 1983; Baker Miller 1986). More recently feminists suggest a more differentiated understanding in 
which ethnicity, age, sexuality and even parental status will affect the degree of stress women experience 
(Belle 1990; McBride 1990; Gorman 1992; Mind 1995; Bostock 1997; Holmshaw & Hillier 2000). 
20 For example, differential findings on effects of and interactions between marital status, employment, 
childcare responsibilities, age and ethnicity (Gove & Geerken 1977; Fox 1980; Kessler & McRae 1981; 
1982; Warr & Parry 1982; Reskin & Coverman 1985; Thoits 1986; Prior 1999; Thorbjornsson 2000). 
21 Standard criticisms include employing concepts of mental disorder which exclude personality disorders 
where men predominate and taking insufficient account of the ways concepts of mental disorders and 
categories change over time (Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend 1976); sampling and combining different 
characteristics whilst ignoring others and operationalising these concepts in differing and often problematic 
ways (Warr & Parry 1982; Thorbjornsson 2000); sampling different populations (Cochrane 1983); and 
working with standard indices of stressful life events, excluding experiences that may be particularly salient 
for women (Busfield 1996). 
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adds little to general explanations, feminist analyses of women and general mental 
disorder seldom include schizophrenia, although their claims are for a general association 
between stress/oppression and women's madness. Thus a similar problem to the literature 
on sexist psychiatry occurs with the argument that women's madness is a social product. 
The vast majority of epidemiological studies are based on schedules which focus on 
symptoms related to depression and/or anxiety, or "mild emotional problems", where 
women have tended to predominate, rather than schizophrenia (Thorbjornsson 2000). 
Furthermore, it appears that feminist writers either have made general claims about 
oppression largely on the basis of research on milder disorders, or they have considered 
only the milder, or "female", disorders as relevant22 (with the notable exceptions of 
Al-Issa 1980 and Barnes & Maple 1992). 
In either case the unease about what madness is and who is mad, identified in the 
literature on sexist psychiatry, is replicated here. A problem which was overt in Chesler's 
analysis, is implicit in much of the work on oppression. It can be argued that claims 
regarding stress and oppression are on firmer ground when relating to depression, misery 
and unhappiness rather than the strange thoughts and behaviours associated with 
schizophrenia. This point is acknowledged by Al-Issa who warns that schizophrenia is 
considered to be "an extreme state of madness" (Al-Issa 1980: 71). Therefore, whilst 
connections can be made between the difficulties women experience in their lives and 
depression, anxiety and so forth, it is far less clear whether the same kinds of experiences 
can be linked with schizophrenia, and if so, why the same kinds of experiences should 
produce different kinds of distress. 
This problem is particularly pertinent in Warren's (1987) detailed study of "mad wives" in 
1950's America. She provides a re-analysis of Sampson et al's (1964) interviews with 
husbands of women hospitalised for schizophrenia, and the women themselves. She 
argues that the strain of the female housewife role at that time, the dependency, 
subjugation and isolation, precipitated mental distress which was re-framed within the 
psychiatric hospital as an individual problem. Psychiatric control supplemented and 
reinforced husbands' control of their wives through the focus on the marital relationship 
and the housewife role as key criteria for assessment and discharge. 
ZZ Busfield (1988) and Pugliesi (1992) make this argument. 
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However, there are a number of major problems with Warren's account as a serious 
rendering of the relationship between gender and schizophrenia. Firstly, when the case 
histories of these women were rediagnosed in 1972, most of the women were either 
probably, or definitely not schizophrenic, illustrating the way schizophrenia has been an 
evolving category (Hacking 1995). Secondly, the changes to women's position in Western 
societies since the 1950's (de Ridder 2000), throw doubts on the continuing relevance of 
Warren's account. More importantly, Warren illuminates nothing specific to 
schizophrenia; that is, why were these women diagnosed as schizophrenic rather than, 
say, depressive? Her analysis implies that the same kinds of experiences can produce 
different kinds of distress but we have no idea why. In contrast, Brown & Harris (1978) 
suggest that ongoing difficulties such as three or more young children and lack of paid 
employment are linked with depression in women whereas more immediately disturbing 
events, such as marriage, moving house or bereavement, are linked with the onset, relapse 
or exacerbation of schizophrenia for women and men (Brown & Birley 1968). 23 
If certain experiences of stress are linked with schizophrenia for both women and men, as 
Brown & Birley (1968) suggest, then this highlights further the problem, throughout the 
feminist literature, of focusing only on women 24 Firstly, it is possible that women and 
men experience the same levels of stress, but respond differently. For example, it has been 
suggested that women may be more likely than men to report psychological symptoms 
and to ask for help, " or women and men may have different coping strategies26 and/or a 
differential vulnerability to the same levels of stress. 27 These alternative explanations are 
not without their flaws, 28 and are unlikely to be especially illuminating for schizophrenia 
23 However neither of these studies focuses specifically on gender. 
24 Zlotnick et al (1996) provide similar evidence in relation to depression. They suggest that stressful life 
events and the lack of social support, particularly close friendship, affected depressive symptoms similarly 
for both women and men. 
25 For example, Phillips & Segal 1969; Horwitz 1977; Cooperstock 1981; Jenkins 1985. 
Z6 The suggestion is that women are socialised into "learned helplessness"; they are less able to cope with 
stress because they have less control over their environment and their lives than men (Radloff 1975; 
Cochrane 1983). Men are more likely to engage in distracting active behaviours whereas women are more 
likely to brood, thus amplifying their feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema 1987). 
27 Women may be more psychologically vulnerable and therefore less able to withstand emotional 
disturbances (Kessler 1979; Cochrane 1983). Feminist psychologists provide some support for this view 
(e. g. Eichenbaum & Orbach 1983; Baker Miller 1987). The "vulnerablity-stress model" suggests that 
women's gender-role leads to their greater vulnerability and more stress (Holmshaw & Hillier 2000). 
Za Community surveys of people who had not sought treatment have found no difference between women 
and men in their self-assessment of ill-health (Weissman & Klerman 1981; Jenkins 1985), suggesting that 
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given that it is said to affect women and men in equal numbers. But it is not clear whether 
women experience more stress than men (Alegria & Canino 2000), pointing to one of the 
limitations of feminists' analyses which focus solely on women. Following on from this, if 
the relationship between women and schizophrenia is associated with the stress and 
oppression of the female role, what is the relationship between men and schizophrenia? 
Once again, the interrelations between femininity/masculinity and schizophrenia are left 
unexplored, this time in relation to experiences of stress. 
Furthermore, in focusing on women and the feminine role, this area of literature is 
drawing on the same concepts of sex/gender, roles and the category of women as the 
literature on sexist psychiatry, with the same attendant problems. The notion of patriarchy 
plays a central explanatory role here. The argument that schizophrenia is the product of 
the oppression women experience in patriarchal society involves moving from women's 
experiences to stress, from stress to oppression, and from oppression to patriarchy 
(Busfield 1988). Diverse experiences are equated with stress and in turn a straightforward 
association is presumed between stress and oppression which is not always warranted by 
the data. 29 Moreover, the meaning of oppression and its association with patriarchy is 
mostly assumed rather than defined (Busfield 1988). Thus not only are men's experiences 
largely absented from this approach, but the diversity and complexity of women's 
experiences also tend to be reduced in order to fit within the stress-oppression-patriarchy 
equation 3° In addition, feminist accounts of sexist society rely on a top-down concept of 
power in which patriarchal men (husbands, psychiatrists, employers etc. ) have power over 
women and use it to oppress them. Once again, we are left with the somewhat reductive 
picture of subjugated women and dominant men and the possibility of more differentiated 
power relations is left unexplored. 
women's help-seeking behaviour is only likely to provide, at best, a partial explanation. And, whilst theories 
of vulnerability posit mediating factors between stress and mental distress, they are either largely untested 
(Nolen-Hoeksema 1987) or suggest that all women everywhere (in patriarchal societies) will develop the 
same psychological structures regardless of socio-economic class, ethnicity, or sexuality. Also, as women's 
position in Western societies is changing, they may be becoming more assertive and independent and 
therefore better able to deploy problem-solving strategies when faced with stressful life events (de Ridder 
2000). 
29 Warren's (1987) is a notable exception. 
This is particularly the case in general analyses of women and madness where multifaceted experiences 
are collapsed into aggregate measures of stress (Busfield 1988). 
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However, the explanation that schizophrenia is the (social) product of the oppression that 
women experience in society, is informed by a very different conceptualisation of 
language from that of sexist psychiatry. Here language is assumed to be a straightforward 
medium that describes or reflects a real world of stress and oppression which produces 
schizophrenia. But this understanding of language produces further conceptual confusions 
and separations for feminist researchers. Many writers move between the two 
explanations, even though both approaches appear to be mutually exclusive and 
contradictory: one views women's madness as a social construct, the other as a social 
product (Busfield 1988; 1989). For example, in the case cited by Barnes & Maple (1992), 
(in which they document the traumatic events which led to a woman being diagnosed with 
schizophrenia), they then go on to describe the same woman's difficult and challenging 
behaviour suggesting that women who defy social conventions are more likely to be 
labelled and hospitalised than women who do not. 
Sedgwick (1982) claims that feminist explanations cannot have it both ways: they cannot 
argue that psychiatry is merely labelling women (who are really sane) and that the stresses 
and strains of life as a woman cause madness/schizophrenia. However, whilst these two 
approaches are superficially contradictory, some writers argue that they can be regarded as 
two complementary levels of analysis (Busfield 1988; Pugliesi 1992). Women suffer 
oppression in Western societies due to their structural position and the related identities 
and tasks assigned to them, and psychiatry mediates this sexism by reflecting these 
images of women and enforcing their conformity. 3' But Sedgwick is right to the extent 
that feminist writers have often failed to clarify the relationship between psychiatric 
labelling and experiences of stress and oppression. In many analyses it is not made clear 
whether psychiatry is pathologising women's reasonable actions and behaviours or 
whether it is contributing towards the stresses and strains that drive them mad. In this 
way, feminist analyses often move between a realist and constructionist stance "without 
noticing the switch" (Hacking 1995: 67). In "switching" between realism and 
constructionism, therefore, a further conceptual confusion is produced to add to those 
discussed earlier: oppression/labelling or social production/social construction. 
" Ripa's (1990) examination of nineteenth century case records at the Salpetriere asylum in Paris, and 
Penfold and Walker's (1983) Marxist-feminist analysis provide examples of this kind of synthesis. 
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Further, in conceiving language as a means of directly reflecting experiences another 
conceptual separation occurs, this time between language and experience. This separation 
precludes consideration of the ways the meanings of experiences (of stress, oppression, 
schizophrenia etc. ) are formulated, interactively and inter-subjectively, within language in 
general and in psychiatric/clinical contexts in particular. And it precludes consideration of 
who has the authority to determine what experiences are valid or invalid and thus the 
ways that formulations of what counts as valid experience may be enmeshed within power 
relations (Scott 1992). Al-Issa's (1980) discussion of women with schizophrenia and their 
fantasies is suggestive here. While Al-Issa argues that fantasies are a form of escape for 
women, she goes on to state that such fantasies are viewed as delusions and hallucinations 
by psychiatrists. Thus experiences do not have predefined singular meanings but rather 
what an experience means is played out within a variety of linguistic and interactive 
contexts. And within a psychiatric context professionals may have the authority to 
reformulate the meaning of patients' experiences, as in the Al-Issa example. A top-down 
concept of power and patriarchy would predict that this would be the case. However, if 
power relations are conceived as more complex and differentiated, then the meanings of 
experiences become open to the possibilities of negotiation and contestation. 
Therefore there may be connections between schizophrenia and the difficulties or traumas 
women experience in their daily lives which, in turn, are related to understandings of 
femininity. But, given feminist writers' sole focus on women, the extent to which men 
may be similarly affected by experiences associated with notions of masculinity is not 
clear. Further, if the "switch" between constructionism and realism, experience and 
language, is dissolved, the research is suggestive that experiences may be formulated and 
negotiated within interactive contexts which are enmeshed within power relations. 
However, we do not know how experiences are formulated in relation to understandings 
of femininity and masculinity, and articulations of schizophrenia during psychiatric 
interactions with patients. Nor the extent to which the meanings of experiences are 
negotiated and contested within professional/patient relations. 
In summary, the literature on women/gender and schizophrenia has focused on labelling 
by a sexist psychiatry and/or stress and oppression in a sexist society. However, this 
literature is small in comparison with the large body of feminist work on women and 
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madness, despite many of the claims being for a general association between the two. I 
have suggested that schizophrenia is a problematic presence and a convenient absence, 
reflecting an unease about what madness is and who is mad. Writers' recourse to notions 
of roles and patriarchy results in a top-down hierarchical understanding of power where 
women become victims, men villains, and any sense of more complex and differentiated 
relations is lost. Their focus, largely or solely on women, creates two further problems. 
Reliance on the category of "women" tends to assume a stable, common identity of 
"women" which is difficult to maintain if both sex and gender are viewed as socially 
constituted. Moreover, the focus on women leaves the interrelationships between 
femininity, masculinity and schizophrenia largely unexplored. 
I have argued that these problems are, in turn, underpinned by particular 
conceptualisations of language as constructing or simply describing the world. As writers 
"switch" between the two, conceptual confusions occur which undermine notions of 
schizophrenia and gender as socially constituted, and underplay the potential complexity 
and diversity of psychiatric understandings of characteristics and behaviours such as 
dependency, emotion and activity, and issues of marriage and parenthood. Furthermore, in 
conceiving a separation between language and experience, writers do not consider how 
patients' experiences are formulated and negotiated within language, and power relations. 
In this respect, the literature reviewed has not focused on interactive contexts between 
psychiatric professionals and patients. Nor is it clear what continuing relevance 
psychiatric gender understandings have in the era of community care. 
Therefore the feminist literature on women/gender and schizophrenia leaves a number of 
questions unaddressed. How are understandings of femininity and masculinity negotiated 
in relation to schizophrenia during contemporary psychiatric interactions with patients? 
What kinds of professional/patient relations are constituted? And how are experiences 
negotiated and gendered during professional/patient interactions? 
In this section, I have discussed explanations of the relationship between gender and 
schizophrenia in the feminist literature on women/gender and madness. In the next section 
I turn to the question of gender's relevance to schizophrenia in the existing psychiatric and 
sociological literatures on schizophrenia. 
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2. Psychiatric and Critical Understandings of Schizophrenia 
In this section, I summarise the mainstream psychiatric explanation of schizophrenia and 
alternative understandings provided by anti-psychiatry and societal reaction theory. The 
aim is to provide a brief outline of these differing understandings focusing in particular on 
how schizophrenia is conceived and the relevance of gender within these accounts. 
2.1 Mainstream Psychiatry 
According to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, APA, 1994) schizophrenia is a 
"disturbance" (pg. 273) which is characterised by "positive" symptoms of delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganised speech and grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour, and 
"negative" symptoms of affective flattening, alogia and avolition (APA 1994: 274-5). 
Schizophrenia is most likely to appear between late teens and mid-thirties, although it can 
also begin at a later age (after forty-five years old), and varies in its course with some 
people having acute episodes followed by remission while others remain "chronically ill" 
(APA 1994: 282). But complete recovery is "probably not common" (APA 1994: 282). 
The validity of schizophrenia is underpinned for mainstream psychiatry by research 
establishing a biological basis for the disorder. The strongest evidence is said to come 
from twin, adoption and familial linkage studies which point to a genetic predisposition to 
schizophrenia (Kohn 1972; Townsend 1980; Gottesman & Shields 1982; Metcalfe 1992; 
Andreasen & Carpenter 1993; Cockerham 1996). There is also evidence of biochemical 
changes in the neurotransmitter dopamine (Townsend 1980; Metcalfe 1992; Cockerham 
1996), and structural brain abnormalities believed to be caused either by genetic factors or 
early neurological damage such as birth complications (Townsend 1980; Lewis 1992; 
Metcalfe 1992; Andreasen & Carpenter 1993; Cockerham 1996). But biological and 
genetic factors cannot provide a complete explanation (Bentall et al 1988; Metcalfe 1992) 
and schizophrenia is therefore viewed as occurring within people who are biologically 
predisposed towards it and who are exposed to stressful life events which trigger the 
disorder (Kohn 1972; Metcalfe 1992; Cockerham 1996). However, this should not be 
taken to mean that mainstream psychiatry, maintains a simple adherence to a medical 
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model of schizophrenia. " 
Psychiatric researchers have incorporated sex differences into genetic studies for many 
years, " but in the last two decades psychiatric researchers' interest in sex/gender and 
schizophrenia has grown considerably and sex/gender difference makes its first 
appearance in the American classificatory system in the 1987 edition (APA 1987). Recent 
psychiatric research suggests that there are sex/gender differences in age of onset (Lewis 
1992; Takei et al 1992), course and outcome (Angermeyer et al 1990; Childers & Harding 
1990; Haas et al 1990), premorbid function (McGlashen & Bardenstein 1990; Foerster et 
al 1991; Torrey et al 1991), non-nuclear symptoms (Bardenstein & McGlashen 1990), 
neuropsychology (Addington & Addington 1991; Haas et al 1990), familial risk 
(Goldstein et al 1990) and brain structure (Castle & Murray (1991). Women with 
schizophrenia are said to have a later onset, a better response to drug and family 
treatments, less problems prior to developing schizophrenia and more likelihood of 
having dysphoric and depressive symptoms (Zolese 2000). In addition, high oestrogen 
levels are said to delay onset and improve response to drug treatment and conversely low 
levels exacerbate symptoms (Seeman & Lang 1990). Men may be particularly likely to 
suffer from severe schizophrenia with early onset, negative symptoms and a poor outcome 
which may be due to early neurological damage rather than genetic factors (Castle & 
Murray 1991). Men with schizophrenia are also more commonly involved in substance 
abuse and anti-social behaviour (Lewis 1992). " 
'Z Psychiatrists do not hold a unitary view; for example, Andreasen & Carpenter (1993) outline three 
different conceptual models of schizophrenia. And psychiatrists have long incorporated psycho-social 
factors into their theories and practices (Clare 1976; Wing 1978; 1988; Rose 1986a; Allen 1986; Prior 
1999). Such "eclecticism" suggests that clinicians do not "accept the medical model in a simple and 
straightforward way" (Baruch & Treacher 1978: 227) although some psychiatrists suggest that this 
eclecticism is declining, influenced by the "biological transformation" in the U. S. A. (Thomas 1997: 147). 
" For example, Kendler and Walsh (1995) cite genetic studies as far back as 1928 which reported results 
differentiated by sex. 
34 A pertinent question here might be how issues of social class and race interact with gender and 
schizophrenia. I am aware that there is an extensive body of literature on social class and schizophrenia (e. g. 
Hollingshead & Redlich 1958; Goldberg & Morrison 1963; Turner & Wagenfeld 1967; Dohrenwend & 
Dohrenwend 1969; Kohn 1972; Brenner 1973; Cochrane 1983); and on race and schizophrenia (e. g. Fanon 
1963; Rack 1982; Mercer 1986; Littlewood & Lipsedge 1997). However these literatures are beyond the 
scope of this review. Nevertheless it should be pointed out, firstly, that African/African-Caribbean people in 
Britain are over-represented in the psychiatric patient population in general, are more likely to be formally 
detained under the mental health act and are over-represented in the diagnostic category of schizophrenia in 
particular (Mercer 1986; Littlewood & Lipsedge 1997). Secondly, there is very little discussion of gender in 
the work on social class (Busfield 1996) and gender is "conspicuous by its absence" in transcultural 
psychiatry (Mercer 1986: 292). Thirdly, some writers (e. g. Littlewood & Lipsedge 1997) seem to fall into a 
similar trap to feminist analyses of gender and schizophrenia: it is both stress and psychiatric labelling. 
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The explicit way that recent psychiatric research and diagnostic manuals incorporate 
sex/gender into their delineations of schizophrenia suggests that gender has become 
increasingly relevant to psychiatric understandings of schizophrenia at the 
definitional/research level, but we do not know, from this literature, what relevance 
gender understandings may have for psychiatric practices. This produces something of a 
paradox. While psychiatric research and classification is replete with gender 
differentiations, the widespread belief that schizophrenia affects women and men equally, 
retains its gloss of gender neutrality. However, Smith (1975a: 109) warns that differences 
between women and men are not necessarily ones of "magnitude", and Holstein's (1987) 
study of involuntary psychiatric commitment hearings demonstrates the way gender 
effects may be hidden beneath statistical associations. 
Furthermore, psychiatric research on sex/gender and schizophrenia adheres to a standard 
experimental-scientific approach in which sex/gender is conceived as a straightforward, 
visible, dichotomous difference which makes a useful variable in schizophrenia research. 
As such it is a common sense commonplace category which does not require definition. 
Language here is assumed to be and deployed as a transparent medium, used as the 
pathway to the study of sex/gender and schizophrenia. And consonant with this approach, 
power relations between psychiatrists and patients, psychiatric researchers and their 
subjects are absented. What we are left with, as Haraway (1991) points out, is a "gaze 
from nowhere" (pg. 188). Therefore, we can say that gender understandings are relevant 
to psychiatric researchers' understandings of schizophrenia at the definitional/research 
level but in a largely unknown way, and certainly unknown in relation to clinical 
practices. 
In the following section I turn to the salience of gender in alternative explanations of 
schizophrenia. 
2.2 Anti-Psychiatry and Societal Reaction Theory 
The most well-known alternative explanations of schizophrenia were provided in the 
1960s and early 1970s by the anti-psychiatry movement and societal reaction theorists. 
They contested the meaningfulness of schizophrenia as a mental disorder arguing, in 
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general terms, that schizophrenia is a social construct; it is behaviour that breaks social 
rules. Mainstream psychiatry is criticised for conceptualising and treating such behaviours 
in physiological terms and thus acting as agents of social control. For the purposes of this 
discussion I am particularly interested in drawing out the gender relevancies within these 
accounts, although they are underdeveloped, and to explore the conception of 
schizophrenia, in some accounts, as a label or diagnostic category which organises 
professionals' (and patients') perceptions of patients' experiences and behaviours. 
For example, Szasz (1973; 1974; 1997) argues that people who are termed mentally ill 
have "problems in living" (1973: 21) which are very different from medical/bodily 
diseases. Schizophrenia is the sacred symbol of psychiatry, invented to control (almost 
any) behaviour which is unacceptable and disturbing to others (Szasz 1976). In particular 
he compares the psychiatrist/schizophrenic patient relation within institutional psychiatry 
to the husband/wife relation within marriage,, with schizophrenia as the child and/or 
incompetency and femininity. While he suggests that madness and the asylum became an 
alternative "career" for women in patriarchal society, the schizophrenic/wife is a way of 
life for both women and men. What characterises both relations is that "power is 
distributed and secured in a tight vertical network" (Szasz 1976: 161); a power relation 
which Szasz argues is strengthened, not weakened, by deinstitutionalisation. However, the 
powerlessness and subordination of women in patriarchal society, and madness as a 
potential "career" for women, are only pursued insofar as they further his comparison of 
psychiatry with marriage. The symptoms of schizophrenia are said to be the primary 
symptoms of femininity; incompetence outside the home, dependence on authority and 
family, and unemployability (Szasz 1976: 158). Szasz suggests that both women and men 
can become "wives" to institutional psychiatry, and he raises some interesting questions 
regarding the "femininity" of psychiatric understandings of schizophrenia in terms of 
notions of home, dependence and employability, although these ideas are not developed. 
Labelling or societal reaction theorists (Scheff 1966; Rosenhan 1973) take a rather 
different approach. Schizophrenia is a label applied by agents of social control to residual 
rule-breakers. Through their understanding of general stereotypes of mental illness within 
society, and through the reactions of others, people who have been labelled "mentally ill" 
accept and eventually internalise the social role of a mentally ill person (Scheff 1966). In 
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particular, Rosenhan's (1973) pseudo-patient study suggests that once the label of 
schizophrenia has been applied it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; past and present 
behaviours and experiences are interpreted in the light of and reinforce the label. 
However, gender is not thematic in the work of Scheff or Rosenhan. 35 
While Szasz and societal reaction theorists were not exclusively concerned with 
schizophrenia, Laing focused his critique on schizophrenia. In his early work Laing 
(1960) argued that schizophrenia should be understood as a reaction to relations and 
interactions within the family, in particular a dominant mother and an emotionally 
withdrawn father. He questioned the unintelligibility but not reality of schizophrenia at 
that stage, but by 1964 he was arguing that schizophrenia was a social creation, a 
diagnosis given to people trying to make sense of the senseless situations in which they 
were living (Laing & Esterson 1964). Explanation remained focused upon the family and 
their interactions; schizophrenia was the reaction to contradictory and incomprehensible 
family interactions. In his later work schizophrenia becomes "a successful attempt not to 
adapt to pseudo social realities" (Laing 1967: 57), a strategy for living in the "protection 
racket" of the family and an insane world (pg. 55). 
Throughout his career, the subjects of Laing's work are largely women and girls (Smart 
1976). For the purposes of this discussion, gender issues are omnipresent in this body of 
work: Mrs D's anger towards her husband, the conflicting messages about femininity 
received by daughters from their families, and Mary Barnes' relationship with her (male) 
therapist. Many critics argue that these issues are not developed nor even acknowledged 
so that ultimately Laing reaffirms the power of the male therapist over the passive and 
pathologised female patient while also recirculating the idea that mothers are the main 
cause of their children's problems (e. g. Sedgwick 1982; Showalter 1987; Ussher 1991) 36 
However, Sanity, Madness and the Family (Laing & Esterson 1964) is a powerful account 
 Although the ideas of labelling theory were taken up by feminist writers such as Chesler (1974), as 
discussed in the first section. 
36 It is certainly the case that Laing recirculates and reinforces the notion of the "schizophrenogenic mother" 
in his early work, even though he claims it is schizophrenogenic families, for example: "Peter's" mother is 
squarely blamed and described as self-obsessed; "Julie's" mother is "suffocating" (Laing 1960: 26 & 189). 
And in the 1964 work, for example, "Hazel's" mother is described as "grossly hysterical, giggly, dissociated, 
frigid" (Laing & Esterson 1964: 229). Later, at Kingsley Hall, and despite protestations of no authority 
figures, Mary Barnes' (1972) account suggests that ultimately the male therapists did retain authority over 
their (female) patients. However, in his later work Laing (1967: 93) did become critical of therapists' views 
of mothers "who are always the first to get the blame for everything". 
34 
of the constraints and differential treatment of daughters at that time. The gender issues 
laid out in this work are certainly not developed or fully acknowledged as gender issues, 
but Laing makes it clear that these girls were attempting to develop their autonomy, 
individuality and equal treatment within the family, raising potential relevancies for 
psychiatric understandings of the relationships between femininity, home and family, and 
autonomy. 
In these critical accounts of schizophrenia, the same relation of powerful labelling 
psychiatrist/subjugated labelled patient is produced here as in the feminist literature. 
Moreover, anti-psychiatry and societal reaction theory have lost support in recent years; 
these explanations are often viewed as denying the reality or extent of people's suffering 
(Busfield 1989). This problem is directly related to the conceptualisation of language 
underpinning this body of work. Despite theoretical and political differences these writers 
all argue that schizophrenia is a social construction, but neither Szasz nor Laing pay much 
attention to the factors and processes underlying the regulation and control of those with 
disturbing or incomprehensible behaviour, and Scheff (1966) provides very few instances 
of residual rule-breaking (Busfield 1996). Thus ultimately these social constructionist 
accounts are not very illuminating. While psychiatry names and labels certain behaviours 
as schizophrenia, we have little idea of the ways in which this occurs or even whether 
psychiatrists do apply labels such as schizophrenia within clinical contexts in the way 
labelling theory and anti-psychiatry claim. 
This is not to say that more informative accounts are not available. Goffman (1968) charts 
in detail the "moral career" of the mental patient from "offences against some 
arrangement for face-to-face living" (pg. 125) via various "career contingencies" (pg. 126) 
to the psychiatric ward where the patient is demoralised, discredited and controlled. 1 
Furthermore, any actions and interactions of patients disapproved by psychiatric 
professionals, particularly disruptive or uncooperative behaviour, are likely to be viewed 
by psychiatrists as evidence of pathology. But neither schizophrenia nor gender are the 
focus of Goffman's account and his concentration on total institutions in general, and the 
psychiatric institution in particular, renders its relevance to psychiatric/patient relations in 
" Such "career contingencies" can take on gendered aspects, for example, a wife tolerates her psychotic 
husband until she finds another partner, a rebellious teenage girl becomes unmanageable when the prospect 
of an unsuitable affair arises (Goffman 1968: 126). 
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the era of community care uncertain; he specifically excludes those treated by psychiatry 
outside the asylum. 
Therefore, anti-psychiatric and labelling explanations of schizophrenia have not been 
entirely gender-blind. But gender is either not thematic, or it is underdeveloped within 
these critical accounts of schizophrenia, even when it permeates the work, leaving the 
relevance of gender to psychiatric understandings of and responses to schizophrenia 
unclear. For example, the past and present behaviours and experiences of patients are said 
to be interpreted in terms of schizophrenia (Rosenhan 1973), but we have little idea how 
psychiatric understandings of femininity and masculinity might intersect with such 
interpretive work. And the writings of Szasz and Laing are indicative of relevancies in 
terms of issues around home, family, (in)dependence, employability and femininity but it 
is not apparent how these issues are oriented to by psychiatrists in interactive contexts 
with patients. 
To summarise, mainstream psychiatry understands schizophrenia as a disturbance within 
the person chiefly caused by a genetic predisposition to the disorder in interaction with 
environmental stresses. In contrast, anti-psychiatric explanations present schizophrenia as 
unacceptable behaviour which breaks social rules, or as an understandable response to 
contradictory family interactions or a pathological society, with psychiatrists acting as 
agents of social control. However, understandings of power and gender, although very 
different in these polarised accounts, have circumscribed the kinds of explanations 
provided in similar ways to the literature on gender/women and schizophrenia. Power is 
either absented or conceived as a top-down hierarchical relation of powerful 
psychiatry/powerless patient. In the first case there is no acknowledgement that power is 
implicated in knowledge production, in the second case, once again, consideration of 
potentially more diverse and complex relations is precluded. In turn, gender is an 
assumed, but unexplicated, obvious difference, or it is undertheorised and 
underdeveloped. Both approaches suggest that gender is potentially salient to psychiatric 
understandings of schizophrenia, despite its distributional gloss of gender neutrality, but 
neither illuminates how understandings of femininity and masculinity may be made 
relevant to schizophrenia in clinical contexts. 
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I have argued that these problems are related to the conceptualisations of language 
underlying each approach: language is either a transparent medium for depicting gender 
differences in the category of schizophrenia, or it is a means for labelling disturbing 
persons and thus constructing schizophrenia. Further, the complex ways in which 
psychiatrists may understand and respond to patients' behaviours and experiences (past 
and present) in relation to schizophrenia, such as those related to home, family, 
(in)dependence and femininity, are not explored. Nor are the ways these understandings 
are played out in interactions between psychiatric professionals and patients. In this 
respect it is not clear whether psychiatric understandings of schizophrenia are related to 
notions of femininity such as dependence, home and (un)employability for all patients (as 
Szasz suggests) or whether psychiatrists draw on differential understandings of femininity 
and masculinity (as feminist writers suggest), or whether notions of 
dependence/independence take on subtly different meanings informed by professionals' 
understandings of femininity and masculinity. In addition, it is far from clear whether 
psychiatrists name and apply the label of schizophrenia as straightforwardly as this 
approach implies, nor how this occurs in clinical contexts. Therefore the psychiatric and 
sociological literatures on gender and schizophrenia suggest a reiteration of questions 
raised at the end of the last section, and some additional questions. How is schizophrenia 
articulated in clinical encounters? And how are the past and present behaviours and 
experiences of patients negotiated in relation to psychiatric understandings of gender and 
schizophrenia within interactions? 
In this section, I have discussed gender's relevance to schizophrenia in psychiatric and 
sociological literatures. In the final section, I turn to discursive approaches to gender and 
madness, and schizophrenia. These approaches have different theoretical underpinnings 
and ask different kinds of questions to the previous work reviewed, which facilitate 
reconceptualisations of gender and language and raise further issues related to experience. 
3. Discursive Approaches: Reconceptualising Language and Gender, and 
Revisiting Experience 
In calling this third approach discursive, a caveat is necessary. Discourse analysis is a 
term used for a range of approaches including Foucauldian archaeology/genealogy (e. g. 
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Foucault 1971; 1972; 1973; 1990), the discourse analytic approach developed within the 
social study of science and social psychology (Gilbert & Mulkay 1980; 1984; Woolgar 
1980; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Edwards & Potter 1992; Wetherell & Potter 1992) and 
conversation analysis (e. g. Sacks 1972; 1974; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Schegloff 1987; 
1997). I will be discussing some of the differences between these types of discourse 
analysis in the methodology chapter. However, for the purposes of discussing the 
literature here, there are some common assumptions about language, subjectivity, and 
knowledge shared by discursive approaches. In this section, I discuss feminist discursive 
approaches to gender and madness, discursive38 analyses of schizophrenia and problems 
of experience. The primary focus throughout this section is on language. 
3.1 Discursive Approaches to Gender and Madness 
In the previous sections, I have discussed problems associated with conceiving language 
as a straightforward medium which describes, labels or reflects a real world. In feminist 
discursive analyses language becomes the medium through which different versions of 
social reality are created. As such language is constitutive of those social realities. When 
language is conceived in this way, discourse in the form of talk or texts, becomes the 
topic of analysis rather than being used as a pathway to the study of something else, such 
as stress, oppression or schizophrenia. Accordingly, this approach moves away from 
causal questions of "why" more women than men are mad or labelled as mad, to ask 
"what" knowledges, or discourses, of gender and madness are created in particular social 
and historical contexts. For example, feminist writers taking this approach have suggested 
that madness became feminised in the nineteenth century, symbolised by cultural 
representations of suicidal Ophelia, representing sexuality and emotionality, and 
sentimental Crazy Jane, representing feminine vulnerability and dependency (Showalter 
1987). In twentieth century literature the schizophrenic woman becomes "the symbol of 
linguistic, religious, and sexual breakdown and rebellion" (Showalter 1987: 204). And in 
contemporary psychiatric understandings, pre-menstrual syndrome and post-natal 
depression are associated with discourses of women as biologically unstable, vulnerable 
and inferior (Ussher 1991). 
38 One analysis included here is linguistic rather than strictly discursive. 
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When language is conceived as constitutive of social realities, then subjectivity, our sense 
of ourselves, becomes fragmentary, contradictory and changeable as persons are 
positioned within, produced and reproduced by different discourses and discursive 
practices. This "decentring the subject" challenges and transforms humanist conceptions 
of the person as having a stable, unified, coherent essence (Weedon 1997: 32). The 
question becomes "what" kinds of subjectivities are produced within discourses of gender 
and madness. For example, when the category of manic-depression was covertly gendered 
in terms of "wild women", dementia praecox in terms of "dour men", psychotic women 
were positioned as "out-of-control", psychotic men as stable (Lunbeck 1994: 144 & 149). 
And as the meaning of anorexia nervosa shifts according to the differing contexts of its 
production and reproduction, women are positioned as particular and contradictory kinds 
of subjects, for example, irrational, pathological, conflictual, romantic, self-controlled 
(Bordo 1990; 1993; Hepworth & Griffin 1990; 1995; Malson 1992; 1995; 1997; 1998). 
Discourses also accomplish social actions in the historical and social contexts in which 
they are formulated and deployed; they have practical social effects. For example, when 
women are construed in terms of their inner feelings and as compliant and harmless, and 
men are understood according to their external behaviours and actions, certain practical 
effects occur. As a result of these discourses, women are more likely to be sent into the 
psychiatric system, men into the penal system, even though they have committed the same 
kinds of offences (Allen 1987). 
Therefore when language is reconceptualised, madness in general, and schizophrenia in 
particular no longer has a reality outside of language but rather what schizophrenia means 
is socially produced and reproduced within discourses which vary across time and place. 
Language is constitutive in a broader and more complex way than the social 
construction/labelling approaches reviewed earlier; the focus is on the ways that different 
understandings of madness and gender are constructed. And there is no "switch" between 
language as constructing and reflecting social realities. However, feminist discursive 
analyses of gender and madness have all focused on textual and interview material rather 
than interactive contexts between psychiatrists and patients. 
This reconceptualisation of language suggests a very different concept of gender than in 
the women/gender and schizophrenia literature reviewed in section one. When language is 
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conceived as constitutive, "women" and "gender" no longer have an essential nature or 
meaning. Rather, their meaning is (re)produced within discourses. However, in many 
cases, there is a continuing focus on women and/or categories where women predominate, 
although Allen (1987) and Lunbeck (1994) are notable exceptions. Thus some of the 
problems associated with focusing solely on women, discussed in the first section, 
re-emerge here. From a discursive perspective, it is no longer the case that "women" have 
an assumed essential, stable essence; the category of "women" can become "a site of 
permanent openness and resignifiability" (Butler 1992: 16). And the question becomes 
"how is 'woman' constructed as a category within different discourses? " (Mouffe 1992: 
373). Moreover, some writers claim that there should be a continued concentration on 
women; women are positioned in different discourses which regulate them differently 
from men (Ussher 1991). 
However, this can lead to three problems. Firstly, analysts may rely on an explicit or 
implicit comparison with, and assumed knowledge about men (e. g. Ussher 1991), as in 
the earlier literature on women and schizophrenia (Busfield 1996). Gender as relational is 
simultaneously assumed and unexplored. Secondly, it can result in a somewhat 
over-simplified and misleading picture (e. g. Showalter 1987). For example, when 
nineteenth century representations of men are considered, it is no longer clear that 
madness was the female malady Showalter (1987) claimed it to be (Busfield 1994). 
Thirdly, gender continues to mean women. When this is the case, feminist analysis 
"ironically privileges the man as unproblematic or exempted from determination by 
gender relations (Flax 1987: 629). 
In contrast, a conception of language as constitutive facilitates a reconceptualisation of 
gender as a relational and contextual discursive production. Gender is conceived as a fluid 
category, its meaning created (and recreated) through social action and interaction in 
specific contexts. Such a conception assumes that there will be a relation, that gender is 
interrelated: 
... gender relations are-constituted by and through interrelated parts. These 
parts are interdependent, that is, each part can have no meaning or existence 
without the others... Through gender relations two types of persons are 
created: man and woman. (Flax 1987: 628). 
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But what gender means will emerge in the specific social context in which it is formulated 
and deployed: 
As a practical social relation, gender can be understood only by close 
examination of the meanings of "male" and "female" and the 
consequences of being assigned to one or the other gender within 
concrete social practices. (Flax 1987: 630). 
Further, this conception does not presuppose what that gender relation might be, or 
perhaps that there will be one relation. Gender relations have "no fixed essence" (Flax 
1987: 624), but rather, vary across time and place according to the contexts of their 
production and reproduction (Flax 1987; Davies 1996). In this sense gender is better 
understood as a verb, a doing, rather than a noun, a being (West & Zimmerman 1987; 
Davies 1996). Moreover, the meanings of gender relations are formulated to accomplish 
particular social actions in specific contexts; they have practical social effects, as we saw 
in Allen's (1987) analysis of psychiatric and penal disposals. This conceptualisation of 
gender has certain theoretical affinities with (strands of) postmodernist/poststructuralist 
feminism (e. g. Scott 1986; Nicholson 1990; Butler 1990; 1994; Butler & Scott 1992; 
Hekman 1990; 1997; 1999; Weedon 1997). Reconceptualising gender as a relational and 
contextual discursive production focuses attention on the contexts in which psychiatry 
(re)produces meanings of femininity and masculinity in relation to schizophrenia. And a 
focus on interactive contexts enables consideration of the ways gender is made relevant as 
an accomplishment within interactions (Kitzinger 2000). 
Gender conceived as relational, therefore, overcomes problems associated with 
concentrating solely on women and is consistent with a reconceptualisation of language as 
constitutive of social realities. If language creates social reality including our very sense 
of ourselves then knowledge and truth, including truths about gender, become 
problematised, destabilised and relativised, a prospect that is particularly appealing to 
some feminist researchers (Jacobus et al 1990). However, such a reconceptualisation of 
language leaves feminist analyses grounded in the "reality" of women's lives problematic, 
especially women's accounts, experiences and bodily states. Thus the problem of a 
conceptual separation between language and experience, which was discussed in the first 
section, re-emerges here unresolved in some of the discursive analyses. 
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A number of feminist discursive accounts draw on a variety of literary texts by women 
writers. It is suggested that women should be allowed to "speak for themselves" 
(Showalter 1987: 20; Ussher 1991). But the status of these accounts, vis a vis other texts 
that are analysed, is not made explicit. However, there appears to be an underlying, but 
unexplicated, assumption that women's accounts of their experiences of hysteria, 
schizophrenia, etc., have an intrinsic integrity and truth status which is presumed but not 
explained (e. g. Showalter 1987). A similar difficulty occurs in discussions of women's 
experiences of bodily states. For example, pre-menstrual tension and post-natal 
depression are discourses of women as biologically unstable, vulnerable and inferior and, 
at the same time, women's reproductive biology is real, and a pathway to madness (e. g. 
Ussher 1991). Once again, women's voices are assumed to have a real world validity that 
other discourses do not. 
Therefore some analyses reproduce a separation between language and experience despite 
taking a discursive approach. There is a tension and contradiction between language and 
discursive practices on one hand, and the reality of women's lives and bodily experiences 
on the other, as writers move back and forth between discursively produced "truths" and a 
privileged truth. 39 Basing feminist research on women's experiences and perspectives is 
the central tenet of feminist standpoint theory (e. g. Harding 1986; 1991; 1997; Henwood 
& Pidgeon 1995; Smith 1997). Women's perspectives, grounded in their everyday lives, 
are said to have the potential to generate "less partial and perverse descriptions and 
explanations" (Harding 1991: 127). However, there are dangers in "romanticizing and/or 
appropriating the vision of the less powerful"; seeing "from below is neither easily learned 
nor unproblematic" (Haraway 1991: 191). And it is not entirely clear whether the 
experiences that particular women have, and express, can be generalised to notions of 
"women's experiences" as differences between women proliferate. Moreover, there is no 
necessarily straightforward correspondence between women's experiences and suppressed 
or subjugated knowledges. Women can, and often do draw on dominant (masculinist) 
discourses when speaking about their experiences (Kitzinger & Wilkinson 1997). 
39 More recently a "material-discursive" approach has been posited to allow a synthesis of language and 
bodily experiences (Ussher 1997). But this appears to involve combining notions of physical bodies 
constructed within discourses and "real" material bodies and bodily experiences without any explanation of 
how the "real" and "experiences" can be understood, simultaneously, as constituted within language and 
outside of language. 
42 
Further, there may not be extra-discursive women's experiences waiting to be articulated, 
although some feminists do argue for the existence of unformulated and unspeakable 
experiences (e. g. Cain 1993). Concepts may provide new ways to feel rather than naming 
a feeling or experience already there (Hacking 1992). That is not to say that it is not 
possible to have extra-discursive feelings, such as pain, but as Coulter (1989) points out, 
it is through linguistic and intersubjective social processes that experiential life can be 
conceptualised and made intelligible to experiencers themselves as well as others. Thus 
the intrinsic integrity of women's experiences cannot be presumed in a feminist discursive 
analysis in the way some writers have done; there is no straightforward congruence 
between experience, subjugated/marginalised knowledges and "reality" or "truth". 
Moreover, it is not clear how experiences can be separated from language. If experiences 
are given meaning in language then they have "no inherent essential meaning" (Weedon 
1997: 33). Dissolving the separation between language and experience further rejects the 
"switch" between language as simultaneously constructing and reflecting the "real", and 
focuses attention on the way that "experience is a linguistic event" (Scott 1992: 34). 
This suggests that experiences, including bodily experiences, should be understood as 
constituted and negotiated, interactively and inter-subjectively, within language. 
However, this does not mean that experience is "confined to a fixed order of meaning" 
(Scott 1992: 34). Experiences may not have singular meanings but rather they are likely to 
have a number of meanings or versions which may be contradictory and contested 
(Weedon 1997). For example, in Allen's (1987) analysis; the experiences of offenders are 
(re)formulated by psychiatric professionals to produce various gendered understandings of 
behaviour which support and/or justify disposal decisions. Offenders' experiences are not 
separate from the ways psychiatric professionals understand and respond to offenders' 
lives. However, in Allen's account, which focuses, on court reports, we have a 
(temporarily) solidified version of offenders' experiences, rather than the negotiated 
interactive and possibly contested versions. A reconceptualisation of experience as 
constituted within language suggests that the experiences of patients will be formulated, 
negotiated and perhaps contested in relation to schizophrenia during psychiatric 
interactions with patients. And, given the research reviewed, ` they are also likely to be 
informed by understandings of femininity -and masculinity. ' But reconceptualising 
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language and experience in this way, does not have to mean that a person's distress is "not 
real", nor that people are passive victims. As Hacking (1995) demonstrates in his analysis 
of Multiple Personality Disorder, the distress of the person is real in the time and place in 
which it occurs. It is a culturally sanctioned way of showing and being distressed and an 
option for being and behaving. 
However, the feminist discursive literature is overwhelmingly focused on textual 
materials and largely on categories in which women predominate. Therefore it is not clear 
how patients' experiences may be negotiated in relation to schizophrenia in interactive 
contexts. Very few analysts have taken a linguistic/discursive approach to the study of 
schizophrenia. However, two accounts suggest that schizophrenia is constituted within 
language and interactive contexts, and that the experiences of patients and 
carers/significant others are likely to be important resources in psychiatric 
decision-making. 
The first account focuses on the linguistic interactive context of schizophrenia, although it 
is not a discursive analysis in the strict sense discussed. From this perspective, the 
"grammar" of schizophrenia can only be understood in the contexts of its application 
which is elaborated to mean the interactional domain where people are categorised 
(Coulter 1991: 161). Judgments, which in psychiatric diagnosis separate "delusions" from 
sub-cultural or aberrant (but harmless) beliefs, "hallucinations" from everyday fantasies 
and "thought disorder" from erratic or idiomatic conversation, are based on the exercise of 
common sense in the practical situation of enquiring into peoples' communicative 
behaviours. This exercise requires cultural competence. Thus analyses of texts (such as 
many of those reviewed in the previous section) are viewed as an "abstracted rendition" 
(pg. 170). It is in the context(s) of clinical practice that researchers will understand the 
"logic-in-use" (pg. 167) of the concept of schizophrenia. This argument, therefore, 
provides strong support for the importance of focusing on interactive clinical contexts for 
an understanding of the way schizophrenia is constituted interactively and 
inter-subjectively. 
A more standard discursive approach has been taken to an analysis of a psychiatric 
admission interview between a psychiatrist and a patient, and the same psychiatrist and 
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the patient's carer (Barrett 1988). The analysis documents the "performative and 
transformative power of writing" (pg. 292) and the way the biological and developmental 
history work-ups transform the identity of the patient to past, present and future 
schizophrenic. The analysis of the interaction between the psychiatrist and the carer (the 
patient's mother), demonstrates an important facet of psychiatric clinical work; patients 
are often surrounded by significant others who become involved with psychiatric 
professionals and have to be taken into account in psychiatric interactions and 
decision-making. "Mrs. James" portrayed herself as "caring in spite of the difficulties" 
(pg. 277) and this definition of her experience was accepted by the psychiatrist and 
emphasised in the case record. The mother's account of her experience was crucial in 
obtaining admission for her son. On the other hand, the patient's definition of his 
experience was transformed by the psychiatrist towards the psychiatric definition of 
schizophrenia (Barrett 1988), a process that has also been found to occur in case 
conference summaries (Soyland 1994)40 and psychotherapists' written assessments 
(Ravotas & Berkenkotter 1998). 
These two accounts establish the constituted and negotiated character of schizophrenia 
and its basis within language. They emphasise the importance of focusing on clinical 
contexts and interactions for an understanding of psychiatric discourses of schizophrenia. 
They also suggest that schizophrenia may not simply be a label directly and 
unproblematically applied to patients as anti-psychiatrists and some feminists suggest. 
Here it has a more mediated and uncertain quality; schizophrenia is an exercise in 
common sense, worked-up during the course of interactions and the writing of case 
records. Moreover, the meanings of patients' and significant others' experiences are not 
external to this process. However, gender is not thematic in Coulter's analysis, and is 
problematic in Barrett's. 4' Therefore these accounts cannot answer the question of what 
relevance gender has to schizophrenia in clinical interactions between psychiatric 
professionals and patients. 
0° However these case conferences involved professionals only, not interactions between professionals and 
patients. 
Barrett (1988: '277) describes "Mrs. James" as "highly emotional"' unreflexively drawing on and 
recirculating discourses of mothers as, emotional within his own account without acknowledging or 
problematising what he is (re)producing. 
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In summary, discursive approaches, focusing on talk and texts, enable researchers to ask 
different kinds of questions centred on language, subjectivities and practical effects which 
are historically and socially located and variable. This conceptualisation of language 
provides a broader and more complex approach than earlier accounts of social 
construction. Language is reconceptualised as constitutive of social realities; what 
schizophrenia means is (re)produced within discourses that vary across time and place. 
More than this, it is constituted and negotiated within interactive contexts. This 
conception of language also facilitates a reconceptualisation of gender as a relational and 
contextual discursive production, turning attention towards contexts in which 
psychiatrists produce gendered understandings and thus the interrelations between 
femininity, masculinity and schizophrenia. Further, when language is conceived as 
constitutive the separation between language and experience is difficult to maintain 
conceptually. Rather, experiences are better understood as constituted within language; 
the "switch" between language as constitutive and reflective is dissolved. This does not 
have to mean that personal distress is disregarded or trivialised, nor that people are merely 
passive victims of psychiatric discourses. It does enable consideration of the way patients' 
experiences are formulated and negotiated in relation to schizophrenia during psychiatric 
interactions. But we have little idea how psychiatric understandings of femininities and 
masculinities are accomplished and made relevant to experiences in actual clinical 
interactions with patients. Nor how such gender understandings are related to 
schizophrenia. 
Conclusion 
Feminist research on women/gender and schizophrenia focuses on psychiatric labelling or 
stress and oppression in society. However schizophrenia is largely absent from the large 
body of feminist work on gender and madness, a problematic presence and a convenient 
absence. A conception of power in terms of roles and patriarchy produces a top-down 
hierarchical relation of male villains/female victims. Together with the focus on women, 
this literature does not explore the complexities of differential power relations or the 
interrelations between femininity, masculinity and schizophrenia. There is a "switching" 
between conceptions of language as simultaneously labelling and describing the world 
which underplays the potential diversity of psychiatric understandings of dependency, 
emotion, activity, parenthood and, marriage. A separation between - language and 
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experience is maintained which precludes consideration of the ways experiences are 
constituted within language and power relations. This literature has not focused on 
interactive contexts and the extent to which psychiatric understandings of gender continue 
to be relevant in contemporary psychiatry and community care is not clear. 
Turning to the psychiatric and sociological literatures, schizophrenia is conceived in 
polarised terms of either a real and essentially biological disorder within the person or as a 
social construction, a label applied to behaviour that breaks social rules as a means of 
social control. In these accounts power is either absented or it is conceived in a similar 
way to feminist explanations of powerful psychiatrist/powerless patient. And gender is 
either an obvious difference or it is underdeveloped, although both approaches suggest 
that gender is potentially relevant to psychiatric understandings of schizophrenia, despite 
its gloss of gender neutrality. Critical accounts of schizophrenia tend to treat language as 
a relatively straightforward means for labelling but it is not clear that psychiatry attaches 
the label of schizophrenia in the manner implied, nor how this occurs in clinical contexts. 
It is also not evident whether psychiatric understandings of schizophrenia are related to 
notions of femininity such as dependence, home and unemployability for all patients, or 
whether they are differentiated in terms of femininity and masculinity as the feminist 
literature suggests, but does not fully explore. 
In contrast to the literatures above, discursive approaches offer a different focus centred 
on language, discursive practices, and subjectivities which are historically and socially 
located and variable. When language becomes constitutive of social realities, 
schizophrenia is understood as constituted and negotiated within discourses and the 
contexts of its production. In this conceptualisation there is no "switch" between language 
as constitutive and reflective, offering a broader and more complex approach than earlier 
forms of social construction. Gender is also reconceptualised as a discursive production; 
what gender means will be accomplished according to the contexts in which it is created 
and will have practical social effects. I have argued that gender should be understood as 
relational, made up of two interrelated parts which only have meaning in terms of each 
other, thus allowing a focus on the interrelations between femininity, masculinity and 
schizophrenia. Further, experiences are conceived as interactively and inter-subjectively 
constituted within language, dissolving the separation between language and experience. 
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However, feminist discursive analyses have largely focused on women and categories 
where women predominate, rather than gender relations, and they have all based their 
analyses on texts and interview materials rather than clinical encounters between 
psychiatrists and patients. In contrast, two linguistic/discursive analyses of schizophrenia 
suggest it has a negotiated indeterminate quality rather than simply being a label, 
emphasising the importance of focusing on clinical contexts. But these accounts do not 
focus on gender and it is therefore not apparent how discourses of femininity and 
masculinity interact with understandings of schizophrenia, nor how experiences are 
negotiated and gendered during interactions. 
It is also not clear how contemporary psychiatric power operates within 
psychiatric/patient interactions since the move to community care. We do not know 
whether there continues to be a top-down hierarchical relation as Szasz (1976) claims, 
with professionals imposing their understandings on patients; whether 
professional/patient relations have become more complex with opportunities for patients 
to negotiate and contest psychiatric definitions; or whether contemporary psychiatric 
power should be better understood as "government in liberal society" (Miller 1986: 32). 
In the following chapter I take up the discussion of psychiatric power, considering how 
different understandings of power impact upon questions regarding articulations of gender 
and experience, and I delineate a discursive methodology for addressing these questions, 
with a particular emphasis on issues of power and gender. 
The feminist literature on gender and madness, and the sociological literature on 
schizophrenia leave a number of questions unaddressed. How are gender understandings 
negotiated in relation to schizophrenia during contemporary psychiatric interactions with 
patients? What kind of power relations between professionals and patients are constituted 
in local encounters? How are the past and present experiences of patients and significant 
others negotiated in relation to psychiatric understandings of gender and schizophrenia? 




Researching Interactive Contexts: Contending with Power, Relevance 
and Situational Constraints 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I reviewed the feminist literature on women/gender and schizophrenia, 
and psychiatric and critical accounts of schizophrenia. I discussed and problematised the 
conceptions and assumptions about gender, power and language underlying these 
approaches. I went on to discuss discursive approaches to gender and madness, and 
schizophrenia, arguing that in these approaches language is conceived as constitutive of 
social reality; gender is reconceptualised as a relational and contextual discursive 
production, and experience is similarly reconstrued as interactively and inter-subjectively 
constituted within language. I concluded it is not apparent from the literature how 
discourses of femininity and masculinity interact with understandings of schizophrenia in 
clinical encounters, nor how experiences are negotiated and gendered during interactions. 
It is also not clear how contemporary psychiatric/patient relations unfold within clinical 
interactions. 
This chapter is concerned with delineating a discursive methodology for addressing the 
research questions, with a particular emphasis on issues of power and gender, and the 
impact of researching an interactive psychiatric context on the research process. In the 
first part of the chapter I discuss how gender relations and experiences are implicated in 
power relations, exploring three differing approaches to understanding contemporary 
psychiatric power. I draw out what kind of understandings of power are produced when 
analysis is conducted at the macro level of broad discourses and the micro level of 
situated accomplishments. I argue that it is not evident that psychiatric/patient power 
relations at the local level will be determined by broader discourses, nor that they will be 
wholly situational accomplishments; the nature of contemporary psychiatric/patient 
relations cannot be presumed 'in advance. I go on to discuss participants' relevance, 
particularly in relation to analysing gender, and I argue for the utility of taking the 
conversation analytic (CA) criterion of relevance seriously in the analysis, that is, keeping 
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it within the bounds of what is relevant to the participants. However, I also highlight some 
of the difficulties of analytically demonstrating background relevancies such as gender. 
From these discussions I delineate a discourse analytic scheme that is based on a 
discourse analysis (DA) approach. ' It focuses on a "naturally" occurring interactive 
psychiatric context and combines a Foucauldian understanding of power at the 
micro-level with attention to interactive context. This approach is feminist in its overall 
aims and attempts to keep the analysis within the meanings and orientations of 
participants. 
The second part of the chapter considers the impact of researching an interactive 
psychiatric context on the research process. I discuss the ways that access and ethics are 
interwoven and continually present issues in a setting such as this and exert constraint on 
what constitutes the research context, who participates in the research and what data is 
collected. I suggest that the data should be understood as a product of the ethical 
programme embedded in the institution. I go on to discuss the way features of the research 
context, issues of power and relevance and taking a feminist perspective are addressed 
during the analytic process. And I delineate the decisions and strategies that formed the 
analytic process. I conclude that the methodological and analytic approach adopted allows 
me to address the research questions, considering how power relations are displayed in 
psychiatric/patient interactions, and the ways that gender relations and experiences are 
constituted, negotiated and contested in relation to schizophrenia during clinical 
encounters. 
1. Discourse Analytic Methodologies: Questions of Power and Relevance 
In this section, I discuss how articulations of femininity and masculinity, experiences and 
schizophrenia are implicated in power relations. I draw on arguments from the previous 
chapter regarding the power of psychiatry and compare with a Foucauldian understanding 
of power as "government in liberal society" (Miller 1986: 32), and 'a CA approach to 
power as a situational accomplishment. I raise questions about what kind 'of power 
relations pertain between psychiatric professionals and patients in the era of community 
' Throughout this chapter I refer to the style of discourse analysis developed in the social study of science 
and social psychology as discourse analysis (DA). 
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care, and the significance for analysing gender relations and experiences. I suggest that 
psychiatric power at the local level should be an analytic question and I delineate a 
discursive approach which combines a Foucauldian understanding of power at the 
micro-level with attention to how power and resistance are accomplished within 
psychiatric/patient interactions, and the way that broader discourses may be played out at 
the local level. I go on to discuss the CA criterion of participants' relevance and the 
implications for analysing psychiatric understandings of the relationship between gender 
and schizophrenia, arguing for the utility of taking participants' gender understandings 
seriously in the analysis. 
1.1 Power Relations and Community Care 
In the previous chapter I argued for a reconceptualisation of gender as a relational 
discursive production, articulated in specific contexts to accomplish particular social 
actions. However, gender cannot be understood without a consideration of power; gender 
relations are an effect of power (Davies 1996). There is general agreement amongst 
feminist researchers that gender relations in contemporary Western societies are power 
relations in which women are dominated and oppressed; femininity is constituted as 
devalued and as 'Other' with concomitant practical social effects (Flax 1987; Davies 
1996). However, in some theoretical accounts there is a recognition that there are aspects 
of social life where women are less determined, and where some women may exercise 
power over other women2 (Flax 1987). Further, in terms of mundane everyday interaction, 
women may be "active co-constructors of meaning" as power, oppression and resistance 
are accomplished (Kitzinger 2000: 167). This raises questions about what kinds of power 
relations are constituted (and perhaps resisted) in psychiatric interactions with patients 
and the significance of such power relations for articulations and contestations of gender 
understandings in relation to schizophrenia. 
A similar question arises in connection with formulations and negotiations of the 
experiences of patients and significant others. A conception of experience as constituted 
within language and interaction suggests that experiences are unlikely to have singular 
meanings but rather will have contradictory and potentially contested meanings (Weedon 
1997). On this understanding, experiences are not external to communicative work related 
2 In particular in the intersections between race, class, sexuality, age and geographical location. 
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to schizophrenia (and gender). In other words, any exploration of the ways in which 
experiences are constituted should also attend to the power relations in which they are 
framed: what comes to count as a valid experience, who has the authority to decide and 
how might it be contested? In this respect "what counts as experience is neither 
self-evident nor straightforward; it is always contested, always therefore political" (Scott 
1992: 37). Moreover, literature on psychiatric/patient interactions (Barrett 1988; Mehan 
1990), psychiatric case conference discussions (Soyland 1994), and psychotherapists' 
written assessments (Ravotas & Berkenkotter 1998) suggests that professionals may have 
the authority to impose their definitions "thereby negating the others' experiences" 
(Mehan 1990: 173). However, it is not known whether the same professional/patient 
relations pertain in Britain in this era of community care, nor how gender understandings 
may inform definitions of experience. 
When gender relations and experience are understood as thoroughly enmeshed in power 
relations, the question then becomes what sort of power relations are constituted between 
professionals and patients? And what are the implications for the constitution, 
negotiation, and potential contestation of gender relations and experiences? These 
questions impinge upon what has been called the community care debate: is community 
care an extension of social control, a progressive and humane social philosophy3, 
economic expedience, ' a recognition of patients' rights or an expansion of psychiatry and 
a form of governance? A full discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Instead I will focus upon three alternative conceptions of contemporary psychiatric power 
and their significance for exploring the ways that gender relations and experiences may be 
constituted in relation to schizophrenia during psychiatric interactions with patients. 
' The argument is that the move to community care is a humane progression related to developments in drug 
treatments (which obviated the need for long-term institutional care), and a growing understanding of the 
unsatisfactory conditions within institutions and the negative effects of institutionalisation (e. g. Murphy 
1991; Pilling 1991; Jones 1993; Prior 1999; Zolese 2000), shown in studies of institutional life (e. g. Wing 
1962; Goffman 1968). These changes in psychiatric outlook are said to have concurred with changing public 
attitudes to mental illness (Jones 1994). However, patients were being' discharged from institutions before 
the introduction of new drugs. A range of factors (e. g. administrative changes, changing staff attitudes and 
rehabilitation policies) influenced the move towards decarceration, of which the new drug treatments were 
only one factor (Baruch & Treacher 1978). 
° Scull (1984) suggests that similar arguments regarding treatments and asylum conditions occurred in the 
nineteenth century but did not lead to deinstitutionalisation. He develops an argument that links the 
deinstitutionalisation movement from the 1950s onwards with the rise of "welfare capitalism" (pg. 12). Thus 
the primary determinant, according to Scull, was economic; community care was less costly for government 
than institutionalisation in a time of fiscal crisis. There was a change from segregative methods of social 
control to neglect and repressive tolerance in "newly emerging 'deviant ghettoes"' (pg. 153). 
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The first conception is an extension of feminist explanations of schizophrenia in terms of 
sexist psychiatry, and anti-psychiatric accounts of labelling or societal reaction (e. g. 
Chesler 1974; Scheff 1966; Szasz 1976). In a top-down hierarchical theory of power, 
deinstitutionalistion or community care is simply a means for psychiatry to extend its 
social control out of the asylum and into the community. On this understanding, 
psychiatrists have substantial power and can use it to invoke dominant discourses of 
femininity and masculinity and enforce patients' conformity to them. In turn, psychiatric 
professionals will have the authority to impose their meanings of experiences on patients, 
or reformulate patients' experiences in terms of their understandings of schizophrenia and 
gender relations; attempts to resist or subvert psychiatric power are likely to be met with 
imputations of pathology. This account suggests a straightforward and unambiguous 
relation of powerful psychiatrists/subjugated patients. 
In contrast, Foucault's understanding of power and governmentality suggests a very 
different understanding of power relations between contemporary psychiatry and patients. 
In Foucault's (1979; 1982; 1984; 1990) framework, power can be exercised by officials, 
such as psychiatrists, through institutional and other practices. However power 
understood as capillary, spreading through society from below, is exercised on us all, the 
dominated and the dominant. But power relations may produce concentrations of power 
or cleavages and hence domination (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Whilst power may be 
repressive, such as in the prison or the asylum, it is also and mainly productive, "it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourses. " (Foucault 1984: 61). 
Moreover, Foucault (1990) makes it clear that power is relational so that resistance is 
present in every power relation: 
Where there is power there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power... these 
points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. 
(Foucault 1990: 95) 
Resistance becomes a condition of power's, operation.. Power spreads "through the 
articulation of points of resistance" but it also through resistance that "power is disrupted" 
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(Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 147). However, power is not principally adversarial or 
confrontational, it is: 
a question of government... the way in which the conduct of individuals or 
of groups might be directed. (Foucault 1982: 221) 
In this formulation, power is not exercised in a top-down manner; psychiatry becomes a 
"persuasive discipline" which attempts to engender self-regulation in patients (Lunbeck 
1994: 153). Foucault therefore offers an alternative approach to understanding power; it is 
mainly productive rather than repressive, and dispersed rather than monolithic and 
hierarchical. ' 
Rose (1986a; 1986b; 1989; 1999) and Miller (1986) draw on Foucault's framework of 
power to develop an alternative conception of contemporary psychiatric/patient relations. 
Community care, promoted in the 1959 Mental Health Act (DHSS 1976) and extended in 
the 1983 Act, is related to the modernisation and expansion of psychiatry; 
deinstitutionalisation enabled psychiatry to form a "complex of powers over mental 
health" (Rose 1986a: 83). But rather than reducing psychiatric power and empowering 
patients, professional power has been rearranged leaving relations between professionals 
and patients largely unchanged (Rose 1986b). Nevertheless, contemporary psychiatry 
should not be understood in terms of social control but rather as "government in liberal 
society" (Miller 1986: 32); it seeks to "invest" rather than "suppress" subjectivity (pg. 29), 
encouraging us all to take responsibility for our mental health. The "psychological 
sciences", including psychiatry, are intimately involved in the management of the self in 
modem society (Rose 1989; 1999). Contemporary psychiatry does not aim to "destroy 
autonomy" but to "promote autonomy and encourage the acceptance of responsibility", 
restoring individuals back into purposeful, autonomous, choosing, responsible subjects 
(Rose 1986b: 202; 1989; 1999). In this relation, psychiatric power is exercised over 
patients but it is productive rather than repressive. This conceptualisation of contemporary 
Foucault characterises his methodology in terms of "archaeology" (1971; 1972; 1973) and "genealogy" 
(1979; 1990). Archaeology is concerned with the structure of discourses, the relationships and regularities 
among discourses (or discursive formations) and the transformations and discontinuities of meaning that 
occur. Genealogy is characterised as a"'history of interpretation" (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 108) in which 
there are no underlying essences or laws, no continuous developments or progressions and no deep hidden 
meanings. Genealogy focuses on the relationship between power, knowledge and the body, analysing the 
historical and social processes whereby human beings are produced as objects and subjects. 
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psychiatric power suggests a relation of a persuasive governmental psychiatry/responsible, 
autonomous patient. 
However, it is not clear how gender understandings might intersect with this concept of 
power relations, nor what kinds of gender relations are (re)produced within the psychiatric 
project of restoring lives. We do not know whether gender understandings have become 
less salient as. psychiatry has extended out of the hospital into the community (Allen 
1986) or whether the person being restored is "always a gendered subject" (Busfield 1996: 
114). The literature on women/gender and schizophrenia would suggest that psychiatric 
notions of purpose and autonomy are likely to be shot through with gender differentiated 
understandings of what constitutes purposeful activity and expectations of autonomy; 
discourses of (in)dependence, activity, emotionality, home and employability could all 
have resonance here. Furthermore, while Foucault (1990) conceives resistance as present 
in every power relation, he gives few examples (Soper 1993; Still 1994), and Rose 
(1986a; 1986b; 1989) and Miller (1986) do not explore resistances to contemporary 
psychiatric power. And while power is said to work through individuals (Rose 1989), 
power relations are analysed at the level of legislative, administrative and professional 
discourses; there is no sense within Rose and Miller's work of how a rearranged 
professional power is managed, nor where points of resistance may occur in the 
promotion of patient responsibility and autonomy. In this respect, notions of resistance are 
rendered "opaque" (Kitzinger 2000: 175). 
This is particularly important in terms of understanding the ways past and present 
experiences may be formulated and contested between psychiatrists and patients. It is not 
apparent how individuals' histories and current experiences may be shaped and played out 
in terms of understandings of gender and schizophrenia, nor how notions of "care" are 
understood. ' With language reconceptualised as constitutive of experiences two issues 
arise here. Firstly, how discourses of care may be negotiated and gendered in clinical 
6 Some of the literature on community care as a gender issue is suggestive here. For example, it has been 
claimed that women shoulder the burden of community care, tying them to a traditional caring role whilst 
reinscribing a romantic fantasy of "home" (Banton et al 1985; Showalter 1987; Ussher 1991; Gorman 
1992). Related to this, male carers may receive a different and more positive response from professionals 
than female carers (Fisher 1997). However, the literature on gender and community care tends to 
marginalise the experiences of patients and male carers (Graham 1997; Fisher 1997) whilst relying upon the 
idea of experiences as unproblematically, reflecting the real world, and external to negotiations with 
psychiatric professionals. 
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interactions. And, secondly, how experiences between patients and significant others are 
(re)formulated and contested within interactions. The interrelated nature of patients' lives 
in the era of community care, and the requirement for professionals to take carers and 
significant others into account in CPA meetings, suggests the potential for relational 
understandings. In this respect, a "personal trouble" can be refrained as a "relational one, 
and vice versa" (Emerson & Messinger 1977: 124) as problems become the object of 
professional scrutiny, evaluation and definition (Buttny 1996) and ascriptions of blame 
and change are accomplished (Buttny 1990). It has been suggested that a psychiatric 
diagnosis relieves those close to the patient of blame (Emerson & Messinger 1977; 
Warren 1987) but it is not clear how experiences between patients and significant others 
may be shaped within contemporary psychiatric interactions to define "troubles" and 
allocate blame, nor how understandings of gender and schizophrenia may be relevant to 
these activities. 
Furthermore, an increasing concern for, and legislation towards, patients' rights may have 
constrained psychiatric power and empowered patients, at least to some extent. The 
mental health charity Mind instigated a campaign for mental health reform in the 1970s, 
attempting to constrain the powers of psychiatry through legal safeguards (Gostin 1975; 
1983; Bingley 1983), and the 1983 Mental Health Act did include some significant 
changes. Contra Rose (1986b), Jones (1980; 1993) argues that the legislative framework 
of the 1983 Act may constrain psychiatric actions and interactions and has opened up the 
potential for antagonistic relations amongst professionals and between professionals and 
patients. On this basis contemporary relations between psychiatrists and patients may be 
more ambiguous and negotiated than labelling or Foucauldian accounts have conceived. 
The assumption appears to be that power relations at the local level will be determined by 
broader discourses and/or that the broad discourses which constitute relations will merely 
be reproduced locally. Similarly, experience is understood and analysed as structured at 
the same broad level of meaning (Miller & Rose 1994), with the same problems of 
opacity (Kitzinger 2000); there is little sense of the way different versions of experience 
may be locally negotiated and contested. Some analysts have attempted to link discourses 
produced in localised contexts with specific Foucauldian notions of power, resistance and 
governmentality; to "wed the micro-context of... talk to a more macro analysis" (Fox 1999: 
90)'. But it is not entirely clear how locally produced meanings, situated accomplishments 
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of power, resistance and gender can be mapped onto broader discursive formations, or 
indeed whether they should be. 
The understandings of contemporary psychiatric/patient relations reviewed here are based 
on theoretical/textual analyses rather than clinical interactions. As Banton et al (1985: 
191) point out "there is little analysis of the encounters of treatment, the power relations 
that are displayed". Therefore you cannot presume that contemporary psychiatric power 
works in a top-down fashion, as governmentality, or is constrained by wider discourses of 
patient rights in clinical contexts. We do not know how psychiatric/patient relations 
unfold within interactions themselves, nor how this affects negotiations of gender 
relations, experiences and schizophrenia. 
As such a CA approach to discourse argues that participants "'do' power and 
powerlessness, oppression and resistance" within interactions (Kitzinger 2000: 174). 
Language becomes a social and practical tool which is organised to get things done. ' 
Making sense of everyday social life is a continuous practice and accomplishment, 
contingent upon the context in which it is occurring, and talk is an important part of this 
sense-making activity. ' Conversation analysts (Sacks 1972; 1974; Schegloff & Sacks 
1974; Atkinson & Drew 1979; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Schegloff 1987; 1997) study 
talk-in-interaction as instances of social action in people's ordinary everyday lives through 
which social order is produced and managed as an interactional and situational 
accomplishment. " A central component of conversation is the orderly way in which 
For example, analyses of women in welfare rights groups and women designated as poor mothers by 
welfare professionals explicitly draw on Foucault's conception of resistance and reverse discourses 
(Kingfisher 1996; Croghan & Miell 1998) and Fox (1999) employs the notions of resistance and 
governmentality in her analysis of a cognitive social control programme for violent offenders. 
'An early and influential work in the philosophy of language, by Austin (1962), suggests that language does 
not "mean" in a stabilised way. When people speak they are not just describing or stating something they are 
also doing things with words. Austin (1962) identifies three dimensions of the, "use of language" as 
"locutionary acts", "illocutionary acts" and "perlocutionary acts" (pg. 109). Put very simply, "locutionary 
acts" refer to the sense or meaning of an utterance, "illocutionary acts" to the force (e. g. ordering, 
requesting), and "perlocutionary acts" to what the utterance achieves, such as persuading or justifying. 
9 Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967; Turner 1974) focuses on the practical sense-making activities of 
people in their everyday lives. This activity is viewed as inseparable from the management and organisation 
of mundane activities; as people go about their daily lives they are constantly seeking to understand what is 
going on. Ethnomethodology focuses not only on language use but also on a whole range of practical 
activities for organising and understanding social life, for example, Garfinkel's (1967) study of ""Good" 
Organisational reasons for "Bad" Clinic Records". -- ._W "Analysts focus on the structure and sequential position of utterances within a segment of conversation and 
the way social actions, such as greetings, or getting a phone conversation underway, are accomplished. 
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speakers organise and manage turn-taking in an interaction by the use of "adjacency 
pairs"11 and other sequential orderings. An important part of the analyst's task is to 
demonstrate that "what was going on" is oriented to by the participants in the interaction 
rather than created by the analyst (Atkinson & Drew 1979: 32; Schegloff 1987: 112; 
1997: 184). This approach emphasises the multifaceted, contingent and situated nature of 
discourse where the meaning of talk can change from turn to turn and moment to moment, 
and certainly from situation to situation. 
CA, therefore, focuses on the analysis of discourse at the micro-level of situated 
interaction. This approach to language could explore how schizophrenia is articulated in 
clinical encounters and how the experiences of patients and significant others are made 
relevant and shaped within interactions. The extent to which CA is a useful approach for 
analysing and understanding power, however, especially unequal power relations, is a 
contentious issue. It has been claimed that CA is not concerned with, or is not 
theoretically and analytically equipped to deal with, the conflicts and tensions in social 
life (e. g. Wetherell & Potter 1992; Gill 1996; Billig 1999). As such CA "conveys an 
essentially non-critical view of the world" (Billig 1999: 552) suggesting that it is 
antithetical to political critique in general and feminist analysis in particular. " Or, 
alternatively, that analysts need to extend outside the limits of CA to a broader level of 
"intelligibility" (Wetherell 1998: 403) in order to understand how power works and thus 
provide political critique. 
However, it is not the case that CA cannot attend to power but rather that it does not 
necessarily do so and when it does power and resistance are viewed as "micropolitical 
achievements... produced in and through actual turns of talk" (Mellinger 1995). 13 From this 
perspective psychiatric power is accomplished through a range of interactional moves 
" In adjacency pairs, the first part of an utterance produced by one speaker sets up the range of relevant and 
expected responses by a second speaker, for example, questions - answers, requests - acceptances/rejections, 
accusation - denial/justification/counter-complaint/apology (Atkinson & Drew 1979: 49-50). Further, the 
second part of an adjacency pair may be a preferred response (one of the expected options) or a dispreferred 
response (an unexpected option or no answer at all) (Schegloff 1987). 
'Z This is captured in Speer's (1999: 471) notion of feminism and conversation analysis as an "oxymoron", 
although Speer herself does not subscribe to this view. 
" Bogen & Lynch (1989) provide a good example of resistance as a situational accomplishment in their 
analysis of Oliver North's testimony before the Congressional committee investigating the Iran-Contra 
affair. Through a number of interactional and discursive moves, including reiterating rather than elaborating 
documentary materials, North inverted the relation between interrogator and suspect and resisted the 
committee's attempts to assimilate his testimony into the historical account. 
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which control access to and the distribution of talk (Scheff 1968; West 1984; Burman 
1995; Mellinger 1995). In turn, patients can resist, for example by reconfirming and 
defending claims that have been challenged, setting their own agenda or initiating their 
own interpretations (Mellinger 1995; Burman 1995). Therefore, CA can provide a basis 
for analysing power, and thus be a form of political critique; in this respect it is not 
necessarily antithetical to feminism (Kitzinger 2000). 
On this basis, power and asymmetries in power relations are not structured or determined 
by broad discourses external to local interactions, exerting constraint on individuals at the 
local level, but rather are constituted and made relevant within interactions. When social 
structure is conceived as constituted within local interactions, then it is suggested that the 
distinction between macro and micro levels of context "dissolves" (Speer 1999: 473; 
Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998). Or to put it another way, context external to a particular 
interaction is analysed as "a topic and a resource" within the interaction (Lynch & Bogen 
1996: 259). A CA understanding of power as a situational accomplishment and an 
analytic focus on the fine details of talk, therefore, provides an analytic means for 
exploring the way that power unfolds within psychiatric/patient interactions: how power 
is produced and resisted through talk: 
... it is precisely in the mundane contexts of interaction that institutional 
power is exercised, social inequalities are experienced, and resistance 
accomplished (Widdicombe 1995: 111)14 
However, while analysis can certainly focus on power as a situational accomplishment, 
and on external factors as resources within interactions, simply displacing "structure" onto 
"resource" does not resolve the problem. Nor is it entirely apparent whether such an 
approach will provide a good understanding of the way power works in psychiatric/patient 
interactions and the implications for structuring experiences and negotiating gender 
relations. For example, if professionals or patients include a legal consideration such as a 
reference to patients' rights in an interaction, is this simply a resource deployed as a means 
for getting something done, or a constraint determined by broader "rights" discourses? 
And how are we to understand and analyse institutional practices such as interactions 
14 Widdicombe (1995) puts this approach into practice in her analysis of youth subcultures and identities, 
and Burman (1995) analyses the interaction and power relationship between therapist and client in two 
feminist psychotherapy sessions, although Burman is not a conversation analyst. 
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amongst professionals talking about a patient before and after interactions with the 
patient, and from which s/he is excluded? Are these interactional moves for 
accomplishing and resisting power or are wider referents at play? Therefore, it is not 
evident that psychiatric/patient relations should be analysed wholly as a situational 
accomplishment. 
DA attempts to draw on insights from both Foucauldian and CA approaches. " Potter & 
Wetherell (1987; 1992) have been major proponents in the development of this branch of 
discourse analysis. They acknowledge the influences of both structuralism (de Saussure 
1983) and ethnomethodology/conversation analysis, as well as Austin's (1962) philosophy 
of language, in their 1987 book which lays out their basic approach. Foucault (1980b) and 
Billig (et al 1988; 1991) are added as later influences. From these influences they 
delineate an approach that aims to combine a sensitivity to power relations with a focus 
on the interactive context of language-in-use. They analyse how discourse is constructed, 
the functions it performs and its consequences/effects. 16 Talk is examined for systematic 
patterns and themes which Potter and Wetherell call "interpretative repertoires", the 
"broadly discernible clusters or terms, descriptions and figures of speech" which create 
"versions of actions, self and social structures" (Wetherell & Potter 1992: 90). 
Following CA, the interactive context of language-in-use is one of the main pillars of 
Potter and Wetherell's approach. They suggest that the best kind of material for analysis is 
"everyday, unsolicited talk" (1992: 98), although in practice they make widespread use of 
interview material pointing out the "technical and practical difficulties" (1992: 99) of 
obtaining mundane everyday talk on many of the topics and issues that interest 
researchers. " The second pillar of Potter and Wetherell's approach comes from their 
theorisation of power and ideological practices, drawing on the work of Foucault (1980b), 
Hall (1988; 1992), and Billig (et al 1988; 1991). From Foucault, they argue that discourse 
" This approach has been developed within the social study of science (Gilbert & Mulkay 1980; 1984; 
Woolgar 1980) and social psychology (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Billig et al 1988; Billig 1991; Edwards & 
Potter 1992; Wetherell & Potter 1992). 
16 Discourse can be constructed using various linguistic devices which make it rhetorically persuasive and 
effective, often giving accounts the appearance of disinterest or external constraints thus protecting them 
from the charge that they are false, partial or in the actor's/speaker's interests. 
" However, interviews are said to be conducted in a conversational manner with the interviewer providing 
comments and responses that are more typical of everyday talk than in more formal interview and research 
settings. 
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analysts should explore the discursive processes through which statements/knowledges 
become framed as true or false. They combine these ideas with recent Marxian 
reformulations of ideology (Hall 1988; 1992) to advocate an approach that 
reconceptualises ideology as ideological practices and effects. In this reformulation, not 
all discourses are ideological nor are ideological discourses distinguishable from "truth". 
In this way, Wetherell & Potter attempt to combine "genealogical and ideological modes 
of analysis" (1992: 86). They also draw on Billig's (et al 1988; 1991) work on rhetoric and 
ideology, " suggesting that Billig's formulation allows more prominence for conflicts and 
tensions than is possible within conversation analysis. These ideas are put to work in their 
study of Maori-Pakeha relations in New Zealand where racist discourse is said to have: 
the effect of categorizing, allocating and discriminating between certain 
groups and, in the context of New Zealand, it is discourse which justifies, 
sustains and legitimates those practices which maintain the power and 
dominance of Pakeha New Zealanders. (Wetherell & Potter 1992: 70). 19 
Therefore, DA offers an approach which has the potential to combine important aspects of 
Foucauldian theorising in terms of power with a CA stress on the interactive context of 
language-in-use. It appears to be able to locate broader categories and discourses such as 
gender and professional ideologies in local interactions, thus connecting up the micro 
with the macro. As such it suggests an alternative for conceiving and analysing the way 
power works, how experiences are constituted and gender relations (re)produced within 
psychiatric/patient interactions. From this perspective, attending to broad themes 
(interpretative repertoires) and the details of talk would enable analytic consideration of 
the ways alternative versions of patients' experiences are constructed in relation to 
schizophrenia, and the (potential) versions they are designed to counter, including the 
absence of particular versions or accounts (Billig 1991; Gill 1996). Professional talk can 
be analysed to identify repertoires of professional practices and gender which function to 
18 Billig (et al 1988; 1991) suggests that common sense has a history and is a form of ideology in that it 
reinforces current arrangements of power and domination through repeating taken-for-granted assumptions. 
In this formulation ideology is not false ideas but operates through discourse. 
Wetherell & Potter (1992) identify various interpretative repertoires in Pakeha discourse such as (Maori) 
culture as heritage and as therapy, and community as nation, which are said to justify and maintain the status 
quo, that is the unequal relations between Maori and Pakeha. 
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justify and maintain unequal relations between professionals and patients, women and 
men with schizophrenia. 
However, it is questionable that this formulation of DA remains sufficiently within the 
spirit of either a Foucauldian conception of power or a CA focus on interactive context. 
Firstly, the general reliance on interview material raises the question of whether analysts 
take sufficient account of the interactive context 2° It is also debatable whether the 
interview can be construed as an ordinary, everyday situation; interviews are "particular 
types of social encounters" (Ribbens 1989: 579). Whilst interviewees are likely to draw 
on a variety of discourses, the discourses they use and what they use them for will be 
oriented to the task at hand, that is the interviewer's questions and the interview 
situation, " posing difficulties in "extrapolating from interview talk to activities in other 
settings" (Potter 1997: 150). Given these problems, and the advantages of studying 
naturally occurring talk demonstrated by conversation analysts, Potter and Mulkay's 
(1985) dictum that "naturally occurring data must provide the initial touchstone" (pg. 269) 
should perhaps be taken more seriously. This means focusing on a context in which 
psychiatric/patient interactions are oriented to the business of everyday life which would 
occur whether a researcher was present or not 22 
Moving on to the issue of power, it is not clear that the gains outweigh the "tensions" 
when ideology and genealogy are blended together (Wetherell & Potter 1992: 59). " It is 
also debatable whether the notion of ideology is necessary. Foucault's (1980b; 1982) 
20 For example, of the interview extracts in Discourse and Social Psychology (Potter & Wetherell 1987) and 
Mapping the Language of Racism (Wetherell & Potter 1992), monological extracts far outweigh those that 
include the speech of the interviewer. Thus the role of the analyst/interviewer in the production of the 
discourse is largely absent (Bowers 1988). This is not to say that it is not possible to take the interaction 
between interviewer and interviewee(s) into account, as Widdicombe (1995) demonstrates in her study of 
youth subcultures and identities, but that discourse analysts using interview materials do not always do so, 
making their emphasis on interactive context problematic. 
21 It seems highly likely that a white, middle-class researcher holding a tape-recorder and asking questions 
such as, "was there a time when you wore conventional clothing (. ) or high street fashions? " (Widdicombe 
1993: 98), will be understood as anything other than an interview situation. 
I However, in prioritising naturally occurring talk I am not implying that it is "untouched by human hand" 
(Silverman 1987: 8). --I 
2' Wetherell and Potter appear to manage this tension only by incorporating those aspects of Foucault's 
power/knowledge formulation which will fit their approach and disregarding the remainder. In this respect 
their conceptualisation is much closer to a Marxist view of ideology. When Wetherell and Potter (1992: 
139) argue that Pakeha discourses such as "community as nation" are ideological justification for 
exploitative social relations with the Maori, this sounds very like the classical Marxist notion of ideology 
(i. e. ideas promulgated by the ruling class to sustain their position). 
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conception of power suggests the possibility of a more differentiated analysis; if power 
relations are not "traced down to their actual material functioning" then the "illusion" that 
power only works in a top-down fashion is perpetuated (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 186). 
There is a sense of this "illusion" in Wetherell and Potter's analysis of Maori-Pakeha 
relations. " We can say that power relations are likely to be displayed in the context of 
psychiatric/patient interactions, and I have posed questions about what kinds of relations 
are constituted and how power works in relation to gender, schizophrenia and experience. 
But if power is an analytic question, rather than "already known" (Gill 1996: 148), how 
should it be analysed in psychiatric/patient interactions? 
If it is not clear that power at the local level is either determined by broader discourses or 
wholly a situational accomplishment, then this suggests that in order to understand the 
way that power works in psychiatric/patient interactions an analytic approach is required 
which allows for the twin possibilities that power is accomplished and resisted within 
psychiatric/patient interactions, and that broader discourses may come into play at the 
local level. As such, power becomes a more fundamentally analytic question; 
professional/patient relations are not analysed as "generated ex nihilo" but neither are they 
conceived as wholly determined by "pre-existing factors" (Hutchby 1997: 175-6; Emerson 
1981). " This has a number of implications for research and analytic practice in terms of 
what sort of materials form the basis for analysis and the analytic strategies employed. 
Firstly, the site for research should be a context where I have access to 'naturally' 
occurring encounters between psychiatric professionals and patients, rather than interview 
material. " I have drawn on audiotaped (and some notated) talk between psychiatric 
24 Despite the differences between discourse analytic approaches discussed here, they are less discrete camps 
than some of their proponents claim, and Potter (1997; Speer & Potter 2000) has modified his approach in 
recent years. Within DA, analysts take various orientations ranging from Foucauldian style analyses (e. g. 
Parker 1992) through to analyses inspired by, and close to, CA (e. g. Widdicombe 1993; 1995). As such, 
recent debates between CA and DA should not be "framed as a false dichotomy" (van Dijk 1999: 459; 
Silverman 1998). 
25 Hutchby (1997) draws this conclusion from a CA study of a British television debate show. He traces the 
way relations between the political/professional participants and the studio audience are locally managed, 
building structures of alignment. But he also identifies how participants orient to broader and more 
overarching political affiliations. 
26 Relatively little research has been undertaken on psychiatric/patient interactions particularly in Britain and 
since the 1983 Mental Health Act in comparison with large bodies of CA/DA work on medical encounters 
(e. g. Cicourel 1987; Silverman 1987; West 1990; Fisher 1991; ten Have 1991; Coupland et al 1994; Gill & 
Maynard 1995) and (psycho)therapeutic interactions (e. g. Labov & Fanshel 1977; Davis 1986; Buttny 1990; 
1996; Burman 1995; Edwards 1998). Research on psychiatric/patient interactions has analysed in-take 
interviews (Schell 1968; Barrett 1988; Bergmann 1992; Hak 1992; Hak & 'de Boer 1995; Mellinger 1995), 
an unsuccessful gatekeeping/exit encounter (Mehan 1990), interviews with patients shortly after admission 
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professionals, patients and significant others in a type of case conference called 'The Care 
Programme Approach' (CPA). Interactions from CPA meetings for people with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia enable me to consider what kind of power relations are 
constituted, attending to how locally produced meanings and social order are 
accomplished and the way broader discourses and practices come into play in localised 
contexts. 
However, a caveat regarding notions of 'context' and 'natural' settings is necessary here. In 
general terms "context... is not a self-evident, easy-to-define, and agreed-on thing" (Tracy 
1998); for example, for conversation analysts such as Schegloff (1997) context is invoked 
and accomplished by speakers themselves whereas for other researchers context may 
include the social features of participants (e. g. gender, age), the setting and non-verbal 
actions (Tracy 1998). These distinctions become particularly acute and complex in an 
institutional setting such as a psychiatric unit. What constitutes 'naturally' occurring talk 
and a 'natural' setting for the researcher is less straightforward in a psychiatric setting 
where issues of access and ethics circumscribe the context and thus the boundaries of the 
setting and the talk. In turn, this impinges on notions of what counts as extrinsic and 
intrinsic context and distinctions between micro and macro approaches to power. 
My methodological approach, therefore, is situated within DA but it is oriented to the 
micro-politics of power exercised (and resisted) in the everyday context of social 
interaction. Furthermore, the material for analysis is based on talk in the psychiatric clinic, 
rather than interviews. This is proposed as an analytic scheme for combining a 
Foucauldian understanding of power at the micro-political level with attention to the 
interactive context of language-in-use. In this way I attempt to gain an understanding of 
how power works in the context of psychiatric/patient interactions, and the way that 
experiences and gender relations are negotiated and contested in relation to schizophrenia 
within interactions. Underlying this approach are distinctly feminist aims. In broad terms, 
feminist analysis is based on a concern for women's lives, a desire to elucidate the 
conditions of women's lives and a commitment to social change (Wilkinson 1988; Gill 
and before leaving (Wootton 1977) and case conferences (Soyland 1994). However, with the exception of 
Wootton (1977), all of the cited research was conducted in America, The Netherlands, Australia or 
Germany. Where relevant, some of this work has been discussed in this and the previous chapter. 
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1995; Busfield 1996). But this does not mean that research has to focus solely on women 
(Busfield 1996). Feminist reflexivity explicitly acknowledges these political values and 
commitments and their influence on the research whilst also taking responsibility for the 
(political) consequences of their work (Wilkinson 1988; Gill 1995; Henwood & Pidgeon 
1995). 
In summary, power relations will determine the understandings of gender and the 
meanings of individuals' histories and experiences that are formulated in relation to 
schizophrenia and the extent to which such formulations are imposed, encouraged, 
negotiated or contested. It is not clear whether psychiatric understandings of gender and 
experience will be imposed on patients, or whether gender understandings will inform the 
psychiatric project of restoring lives to autonomy and purpose, or whether patients and 
significant others will contest and reformulate psychiatric discourses. It is also not evident 
that power relations at the local level of psychiatric/patient interactions are fully 
determined by broader discourses, nor that power is wholly a situational accomplishment. 
I have argued that in order to analyse how power works in local psychiatric/patient 
encounters, and thus how gender and experiences are constituted in relation to 
schizophrenia, power should be a fundamentally analytic question. 
I have outlined an analytic approach which combines a Foucauldian understanding of 
power at the micro-level with attention to the interactive context of language-in-use. I 
draw my data from the interactive context of CPA meetings and attend to the ways 
broader discourses and institutional practices come into play at the local level, and how 
locally produced social order and meanings are accomplished and resisted. This approach 
will enable analytic consideration of the complexities of differential power relations 
between psychiatric professionals and patients and the implications for structuring gender 
relations and experiences in relation to schizophrenia during psychiatric/patient 
interactions. However, taking up the discursive approach outlined above raises further 
questions about how gender should be analysed. In the following section I focus on 
whether the analysis can and should remain within the bounds of what is relevant to 
interactional participants. 
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1.2 The Problem of Participants' Relevance 
An important difference between discursive approaches is the extent to which they are 
concerned with the meanings and sense-making activities of speakers themselves. As we 
have seen, a key part of CA is that analysis should stay within the bounds of participants' 
orientations and relevance (Schegloff 1992; 1997; 1998). Participants' relevance, or its 
lack, has implications not only for how gender (and power) is analysed, but also for how it 
is understood to operate in a psychiatric context. In this section I discuss the issue of 
participants' relevance, focusing mainly on issues related to the analysis of gender, 
drawing out why this issue is significant for researching the relationship between gender 
and schizophrenia in a psychiatric context. 
A major tenet of CA is that analysts can and should remain within the boundaries of the 
meanings produced by participants; analysis should be thoroughly grounded in the 
understandings of the participants (Atkinson & Drew 1979; Schegloff 1987; 1992; 1997; 
1998). Following on from this, it is suggested that analysts (and readers) do not need to 
know the (gender) identities of participants in order to make sense of the interaction; what 
is of interest is the relevance of categories for the participants themselves, and the use to 
which they are put within the interaction (Edwards 1998). If analysis is not grounded in 
participants' understandings, then it is argued that it is in danger of becoming 
disconnected from the context of its production producing the potential for "academic and 
theoretical imperialism" (Schegloff 1997: 165). This is not to say that power and gender 
cannot be analysed with a CA approach, but that they need to be "shown" (Schegloff 
1997: 180, italics in original) to be relevant to participants. 7 Moreover, Sacks' (1972; 
1974) work on membership categories and standardized relational pairs may be 
particularly useful for an analysis of gender relations. 8 
27 As Schegloff (1997) demonstrates in his short extract "Chicken Dinner 1 ", categories such as gender can 
be oriented to by participants and thus be relevant to an analysis even when they do not appear to be overtly 
connected to the activity at hand. Analysis can, therefore, elaborate "those forms of conduct by which 
persons 'do' gender" (Schegloff 1997: 182). 
28 Membership categories are common sense equivalent kinds, for example mother, husband. Membership 
categorization devices (MCDs) are collections of categories that go together, for example the MCD "family" 
includes mother, father, child etc.. If one category from an MCD is used then another category from that 
MCD may also be relevant, what Sacks (1972: 219) calls the "relevance rule", e. g. mother is relevant given 
the use of child and vice versa. Categories within a collection may also be paired relationally in 
"standardized ways", e. g. mother-father, husband-wife (Sacks 1972: 37). People not only draw on common 
sense knowledge about activities associated with members of particular categories, e. g. babies cry, but also a 
whole range of characteristics and features that might be expected of particular category members and 
relational pairs. Moreover, a paired relational category "constitutes a locus for a set of rights and obligations 
concerning the activity of giving help" (Sacks 1972: 37). Many membership categories and relational pairs 
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In terms of researching discourses of gender and schizophrenia in a psychiatric context, 
this analytic approach has theoretical and political advantages. I have argued that both 
gender and schizophrenia should be conceptualised as categories whose meanings are 
socially produced within discourses in specific contexts, rather than having essential 
meanings. Moreover, the aim of the research is to explore and elucidate professionals' 
understandings of the relationship between the two. Staying within the bounds of 
participants' understandings, therefore, is consonant with this conceptualisation and aim. 
Such an approach has certain advantages for a feminist analysis; it can demonstrate the 
ways masculinities and femininities, women and men are produced within talk rather than 
existing outside of language, and it can ground analysis in women's (and men's) own 
understandings, a primary goal of feminist analysis (Kitzinger 2000). As such, this kind of 
analysis may provide a more, rather than less, effective political critique than one which 
"elevates the researcher's politics and uses this to guide interpretation" (Widdicombe 
1995: 111), providing strong grounds for taking participants' relevance seriously in this 
analysis. 
However, it may be the case that "not all gendering activity gets indexed explicitly in talk" 
(Hopper & LeBaron 1998: 61; Ochs 1992) and there may be few words that do explicitly 
index gender (Stokoe & Smithson: in press). This presents a problem: if I go beyond the 
understandings of participants, I may be imposing my own meanings and concerns. But if 
I do not, how am Ito analyse instances when participants do not explicitly orient to gender 
or schizophrenia but these understandings may be relevant in non-obvious ways (Frith 
1998; Kitzinger 2000), a circumstance that is likely to occur within psychiatric/patient 
interactions, at least for some of the time? In this respect participants' knowledge of and 
dealings with the social world rely on "ideal types" or typifications, such as woman, 
unemployed person, postal worker, etc., which they draw on in "face-to-face dealings with 
people" (Schutz 1972: 185 & , 
197). As such, gender is an omnirelevant category 
"embedded in a background of relevances that are simply 'there' and taken for granted" 
(Garfinkel 1967: 118), or what Zimmerman (1998: 90) has more recently called a 
"transportable identity". 
are also gender identities suggesting that characteristics, features and obligations associated with them may 
also take on gendered meanings, thus providing a useful basis for a gender analysis grounded in participants' 
understandings. - 
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One way to attempt to solve this problem is to stretch and re-work the meaning of 
relevance to a broader context than that proposed by CA; if analysts understand discourse 
as "the unceasing human activity of making meaning" within a wider "argumentative 
social fabric", then "a more productive sense of... relevance is possible" (Wetherell 1998: 
403). In effect, the analyst becomes a member (of the context/culture in a wider sense of 
the word) and uses her member's knowledge to elucidate participants' understandings. For 
example, I could assume that "everyone knows this is a woman or a man", evidenced by 
participants' use of gendered first names and pronouns, and analyse the interaction and 
discourses accordingly. However, while gender may be an omnirelevance, this is not 
sufficient to claim that the specific activity at hand is associated with professionals' 
gender understandings 29 And while gendered pronouns can show relevance through their 
"noticing" by participants (Hopper & LeBaron 1998), their mundane use does not 
necessarily do so. As such, Wetherell's (1998) proposal only side-steps the problem. If the 
analysis is no longer bound by the participants' relevancies, whose relevance other than 
the analyst's is it? " In bringing in my own cultural knowledge I would be potentially 
privileging and imposing my own understandings and relevance over those of the 
participants, thus overriding the primary aim of the research. 
It has been suggested that it is possible to conduct effective gender analyses without the 
need to go beyond participants' explicit orientations (Speer & Potter 2000; Speer 2001) 3' 
However, relying solely on explicit orientations runs the risk of losing potentially 
important background understandings of psychiatric professionals, with implications for 
the analytic findings. 32 Furthermore, a proposal for a two-step analysis which starts with 
participants' orientations but goes on to include analysts' cultural knowledge (Stokoe & 
29 As Schegloff (1997: 165) points out, a woman can also be "a Californian, Jewish, a mediator, a former 
weaver, my wife, and many other" category terms. 
'o This becomes even more problematic with DA's continuing reliance on interview and focus group 
material, where exchanges are "researcher-prompted" (Schegloff 1998: 415). Now it is not just the case that 
the interaction between interviewer and participant is not fully taken into account, but that the topic is 
"relevant to the... talk as a matter of recipient design" (Schegloff 1998: 415). That is, it is the researcher's 
context and relevance, not the participants'. Moreover, the recent use of focus groups and seminar 
discussions in DA does not get around this problem. 
" However, analysts have generally drawn their materials from interviews, focus groups and student seminar 
discussions where gender topics can be introduced by the researcher, or conversations and media sources 
have been pre-selected for gender relevance, rather than the sort of data and context I am researching. 
92 For example, if professionals' explicitly orient to femininity in relation to a particular activity but their 
background understandings of masculinity are also operating, I could conclude that contemporary psychiatry 
is only concerned with femininity in this context. 
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Smithson, in press) does not overcome the problem of elucidating participants' 
background understandings. 
However relevancies, including gender, can be "manifested without being explicitly 
named or mentioned" (Schegloff 1997: 182; West & Zimmerman 1987; Ochs 1992). It is 
not necessarily the case that participants must overtly and explicitly orient to the category 
of gender in order to demonstrate its relevance (Schegloff 1997: 182, Kitzinger 2000) but 
it is not entirely clear what counts as an orientation, what the status of background 
knowledge is within CA (Stokoe & Smithson, in press) and thus whether and how 
background relevances can be elucidated and demonstrated. Nevertheless this does not 
mean that the criterion of participants' relevance should be abandoned (Kitzinger 2000). " 
But it does have implications for analytic practice and the strategies employed. Taking 
relevance seriously, but recognising that gender and schizophrenia may be operating as 
background relevances for some of the time, suggests that a number of analytic 
approaches are required. I attend to instances where gender and schizophrenia are 
explicitly oriented to by psychiatric professionals, patients and significant others, and I 
look for instances where they are relevant in non-obvious ways. That is, I analyse the 
interactions for professionals' background operative conceptions of gender and attempt to 
show that what is occurring is associated with gender (and/or schizophrenia) and not 
something else. " 
Therefore I aim to keep the analysis within the bounds of what is relevant to the 
interactional participants whilst also elucidating how background relevances, such as 
gender and schizophrenia, may be operating. In this way I aim to gain a fuller 
understanding of how discourses of femininity and masculinity interact with 
understandings of schizophrenia, how experiences are negotiated and gendered during 
" Kitzinger (2000) suggests that background relevances can be shown to be relevant to interactive 
participants without an explicit naming of the category, as demonstrated in Sacks' (1984: 423) discussion of 
Ellen's "sense of innocence". She suggests that Sacks analyses Ellen's story "as an instance of mundane 
ordinary everyday racism-in-action" (pg. 172). While this may not strictly be the case, Sacks certainly does 
explore background relevances to Ellen's "sense of innocence" in terms of her taken-for-granted whiteness 
or ordinariness. 
'a For example, I attend to the way patients' biographies and experiences are made relevant and shaped 
within interactions, and I consider gender understandings as one of a range of potential background 
relevancies for what is occurring. I also draw on Zimmerman's (1998: 90) notion of gender as a 
"transportable identity" to consider whether the gender identities of patients, once invoked and made 
relevant, may continue to have an unrestated background relevance across a stretch of interaction. 
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psychiatric/patient interactions and what sort of power relations are constituted between 
professionals and patients. 
In summary, I have discussed differing analytic orientations to power and participants' 
relevance, issues which are particularly important for an analysis focused upon questions 
of power, gender and experience. From this discussion I have delineated a discourse 
analytic approach which is feminist in its aims and which will enable me to explore the 
questions about psychiatric power, gender, and experience that I have raised. I have 
adopted an analytic approach situated broadly within DA, but with certain modifications 
to the emphases and concerns of some DA work. Firstly, I focus on the interactive context 
of CPA meetings for patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Secondly, power is 
approached as a fundamentally analytic question: I have argued that a Foucauldian 
understanding of power at the micro-level combined with attention to the interactive 
context will allow me to consider the way negotiations, resistances and contestations are 
played out at the local level whilst also allowing for the possibility that broader discourses 
may come into play. Finally, I take relevance seriously, keeping the analysis within the 
boundaries of participants' understandings and concerns. But I also attempt to contend 
with the likelihood that gender, and possibly schizophrenia, will have a background 
relevance which nevertheless needs to be shown to be relevant to participants. This 
methodological approach will enable me to consider how power relations are displayed in 
psychiatric/patient encounters, and the ways that gender understandings and the 
experiences of patients and significant others are produced, negotiated and potentially 
contested in relation to schizophrenia during psychiatric/patient encounters. 
In this section I have delineated a discourse analytic approach which will enable me to 
address the research question of how gender understandings are negotiated in relation to 
schizophrenia during contemporary psychiatric interactions with patients, and related 
questions about power and experience. In the next section, I turn to the research process 
and discuss the issues that arise when research is conducted in the interactive context of a 
psychiatric unit and the implications for data collection and analysis, and understandings 
of intrinsic and extrinsic context. 
70 
2. The Psychiatric Unit as Interactive Context: Doing Access, Ethics and 
Analysis 
Research based on interview material gives analysts considerable control over the 
research context and process in terms of locating the participants they want to research, 
collecting the data they are interested in via some sort of interview schedule and analysing 
the (relatively) orderly data which results. In contrast, researching an interactive context, 
particularly an institution such as a psychiatric unit, raises issues throughout the research 
process: from how you find a suitable setting, and where and how you get access to 
interactions within that setting, to what counts as data and how you analyse it when you 
return from the setting. These dilemmas are similar to those encountered by 
ethnographers: 
... access is not just a matter of walking through the door. It is an ever-present, 
ongoing concern, which includes inventing yourself as an ethnographer 
and deciding what counts as data... It is not just a matter of 'being there' 
and snapping it up, writing it down or photocopying it. You still have to 
work out how to 'be' and where 'there' is... (Rachel 1996: 124). 
In this section, I consider the situational constraints that arise when researching 
interactions in a psychiatric context. In particular, I discuss the "ever-present" issue of 
access and the way it is interwoven with ethics in this kind of setting. These situational 
constraints have implications for: who participates in the research; what kinds of 
interactive data are collected; and how that data is analysed. And they raise broader issues 
of what counts as context and talk, macro and micro. 
2.1 Access and Ethics as Continuous and Interwoven Constraints 
As Silverman (1987) points out, chance factors play an important role in getting research 
started in a medical setting. This was the case for me 35 I first contacted Dr. North, 
consultant psychiatrist at Treetops psychiatric unit, in November 1996 to discuss the 
project. Treetops is attached to a general hospital in the Home Counties of South East 
England and Dr. North is responsible, along with one other consultant psychiatrist, for the 
mental health care of the population of the borough of Worthington, which composes half 
's After sending out a number of exploratory letters to psychiatric institutions, without success, a colleague 
at Brunel University met a, consultant psychiatrist (Dr. North, a pseudonym) at a party, mentioned my 
research, and the consultant expressed an interest. 
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an NHS Trust area. Dr. North's responsibilities cover in-patients on the ward, out-patients 
visiting the psychiatric unit, day patients at the Day Unit, community patients at the 
community mental health centre and residential patients at a hostel. In this section, I trace 
the way that situational constraints of access and ethics are interwoven in this sort of 
setting exerting constraint throughout the research process, and I discuss the implications 
for what kind of context is researched, the sort of data obtained, and who participates in 
the research. 
The first issue to arise, once Dr. North had agreed, in principle, to taking part in the 
research, was what sort of context(s) within the psychiatric unit would provide me with 
interactive data and how I would gain access to that context. The key criteria for the 
research context, dictated by the research questions and analytic approach, were access to 
professional talk about patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and the potential to 
audiotape that talk. However, researchers do not have a free hand in a psychiatric setting, 
and potential contexts were discussed at length with the consultant. The context of CPA 
meetings was agreed for a number of reasons. Firstly, psychotherapy was not routinely 
offered to people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia at Treetops. Secondly, case 
conferences such as CPA meetings are discrete "convenient" events where the researcher 
can assume a less problematic role than, for example, wandering around the wards 
(Silverman 1987: 8-9 ). Thirdly, virtually all patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
are placed on a full CPA at Treetops. As CPAs are scheduled for patients every three to 
six months, a year in the psychiatric unit would, theoretically, give me the opportunity to 
approach all the people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia in this particular catchment 
area. Fourthly, CPAs are organised well in advance providing time to contact staff and 
patients to obtain their consent. They also provided a clear and discrete focus for ethical 
approval from the medical ethics committee. Finally, after discussing possible contexts 
such as group sessions, diagnostic interviews and ward rounds, CPAs were the only 
context I was offered and which met the main criteria. 
Therefore, obtaining access, even, in principle, to an interactive setting - within the 
psychiatric institution was dependent upon a combination of what the consultant deemed 
to be a suitable context, what was available given the, key criteria of the research and. 
ethical considerations regarding obtaining patient and staff consent and ethical approval 
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for the project. As such, access and ethics were major defining factors for what 
constituted a suitable interactive context. This meant that a whole range of other kinds of 
interactions within the institution were placed beyond the bounds of the research, limiting 
the context. As such, practical and ethical considerations constrained what I could do 
from the outset, and if I wanted interactional psychiatric talk I had to work within those 
constraints. Thus the "natural" setting and "naturally occurring talk was defined and 
circumscribed institutionally; the extent of context for research was constructed through 
what I could obtain access to. In turn, what is relevant to participants, and what counts as 
intrinsic or extrinsic (micro or macro) is defined by the degree of access and made visible 
to me accordingly. 
Ethical considerations obviously loom large for a research project in an institution such as 
a psychiatric unit where professionals are bound by their own ethical rules of patient 
confidentiality and informed consent. Moreover, patient groups and mental health 
charities such as Mind have campaigned for greater awareness and watchfulness in these 
areas, which has influenced psychiatric units and the professionals working in them. I was 
therefore entering a setting where an ethical programme was already embedded in the 
institution. Moreover, ethical considerations are heightened in a project focused on people 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who may be vulnerable (Mind 1993; 1994). Patients' 
rights to informed consent and confidentiality were therefore paramount, but the medical 
ethics committee were also concerned that the same rights be extended to professionals 
taking part in the research. I prepared one information leaflet and consent form to be 
given to patients and another for staff (copies of the information leaflets and consent 
forms for patients and staff are in Appendix 1). I based my ethical practice on Mind's 
Policy (1993) and Principles of Confidentiality (Mind 1994) and the British Sociological 
Association's Statement of Ethical Practice (1991). Detailed information on the ethical 
guidelines and practice are in Appendix II. 
When I first approached Dr. North, she made it clear that ethical considerations and 
approval were required for access. It was her suggestion that I speak . to 
Mind, the 
implication being that if they approved the ethical aspects of the research then it would 
probably be acceptable to the managers, staff and ethics committee, which largely proved 
correct. Mind (1993; 1994) have stringent ethical guidelines for practice (rather than 
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research specifically) and strongly advocate informed consent for all patients except in 
exceptional circumstances. From the outset this meant that I had to obtain (properly) 
informed consent from every patient 36 This imperative set constraints by circumscribing 
what and who I could research; patients had to be contacted, have the research explained 
to them verbally and in writing and sign the consent forms before the research took place. 
In practice, this meant that I audiotaped suitable meetings, because interactional events 
had to be scheduled well in advance. And I had a limited view of the psychiatric setting 
because I could only audiotape suitable meetings. Furthermore, I researched meetings 
with suitable patients because they had to be well enough to understand the research and 
give properly informed consent. Thus, the kind of interactive context researched, the sort 
of data obtained, and the participants who took part were all determined largely by the 
situational constraints of access and ethics. And in each case the extent and scope of the 
research was limited as the range of different contexts and interactions within the 
institution, and certain patients (particularly those who were unwell and likely to be 
troublesome to professionals) were placed out of bounds. 
However, having walked "through the door" (Rachel 1996: 124), the issues of access and 
ethics were not "solved", but continued to exert constraints throughout the research 
process. I attempted to approach every patient with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who was 
scheduled for a CPA and whose name I was given. " A few potential patients were lost 
because their CPAs were organised at short notice. I had to strike a balance between 
phoning sufficiently often to keep abreast of upcoming CPAs but not so often that I 
became a nuisance. It had been agreed in consultation with staff that I would approach 
patients via their keyworker or named nurse who would contact the patient, explain the 
research verbally to them, and give them an information leaflet. " On the day of the 
scheduled CPA I would arrive early so that I could answer any questions the patient might 
'a This was not an easy prospect given that people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia are a "particular group 
thought inherently incapable of giving genuine informed consent" (Rogers et al 1993: 7, italics in original). 
"I obtained information about suitable potential patients principally from the two consultants, and 
sometimes from the day unit manager and ward staff. I phoned the consultants at regular intervals and they 
gave me names -and dates,. from their diaries, of forthcoming CPAs for, patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. 
38 As the terms suggest, one professional is appointed as the primary contact for each patient. Keyworkers 
were either community psychiatric nurses or approved social workers for community patients, and 
psychiatric nurses for day: unit patients. Named nurses were appointed for ward patients. The 
keyworker/named nurse has regular contact with the patient and knows her/him well, providing in principal 
a good channel between me and the patient. 
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have about the research and get the consent form signed. In practice it did not work so 
smoothly. Staff were very busy and often did not have the time (or inclination) to go 
through this process. The result was that patients often (but not always) arrived for the 
CPA knowing little about the research and not having seen the information leaflet 39 In 
this respect I often travelled to all of the sites without knowing whether the research 
would actually proceed (and sometimes it did not). 
However, keyworkers and named nurses, by acting as mediators between me and the 
patient, also became sub-gatekeepers. Although all the professionals had given blanket 
consent to the research at the outset, they could facilitate, block or ignore the research in 
practice and thus control access to every patient. Professionals had varied responses to the 
project; some were very positive about the research and went to some lengths to obtain 
patients' consent, some said they wanted to help but in practice never did, and some were 
dismissive. It is difficult to ascertain how helpful/unhelpful professionals were being 
because they were always dealing with a patient who could be "too unwell", "too 
paranoid", "not want a stranger there" and so on, so that I could not know whether it was 
the patient or the professional who was actually saying no. Over my time in the setting 
and from conversations with various professionals, I built up an impression of who was 
supportive of the research and who was not and tentative reasons for this. It appeared to 
be the case that professionals' responses to the research and therefore their 
sub-gatekeeping activities depended on the site, who they saw me as and the extent of Dr. 
North's authority. 
Professionals at the community centre are furthest removed from the hospital and the 
consultants and had the most varied responses 40 As I moved closer to the hospital things 
became easier. On the ward I was introduced by Dr. North as the "research psychologist" 
and ward staff seemed quite happy to approach every patient. I was several different 
people, then, depending on the site and the individual professional; I could be a PhD 
" On many occasions I sat in reception, or a spare room, or even the meeting itself, going through the 
information leaflet and presenting the consent form for signature. 
ao As the manager explained to me, the community mental health team is "more flat in terms of authority" 
and community staff are "more resourceful and autonomous whereas on the ward they are part of a team and 
not able to make decisions". In this respect, whilst the consultants have ultimate responsibility they are not 
closely involved with the day-to-day workings of the community team and only visit the centre for CPAs 
and weekly team meetings. 
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researcher/student, a research psychologist, or Dr. North's "spy" and this seemed to have a 
strong effect on professionals' responses to the research and thus their willingness to 
approach and obtain access to patients. In turn this was coupled with professionals' 
attitudes to Dr. North and the level of her influence at particular sites. " Professionals 
largely invoked ethical reasons for not approaching a patient or for a patient's refusal 
along the lines that my presence would be detrimental to the patient's well-being or 
on-going care. Dr. North's response was that staff were being "over-protective" or, at 
other times, that staff were "paranoid" and felt "threatened". This neatly captures the 
dilemma: on one hand they were acting as ethical guardians and protectors of their 
patients, on the other hand they were invoking ethical discourses to justify their actions. 
Either way, issues of access and ethics intertwined constantly in my dealings with 
professionals and impacted considerably on who participated in the research, adding 
further constraints and limitations. 
However a caveat to what I have said above is necessary. A major problem with a great 
deal of social science research, particularly in a busy medical setting, is why anyone 
should agree to have "an outsider nosing around" (Silverman 1987: 1). All the 
professionals at the psychiatric unit and associated sites were extremely busy, under 
pressure and often had heavy case loads. Whilst I have suggested above that some 
professionals were unhelpful or dismissive, the question is, why should any of them have 
bothered to help at all? As my sponsor, Dr. North had a stake in the research. 42 For the 
other professionals I was mainly a highly peripheral and occasional blip on their screens. 
This is reflected in the sheer number of mundane chasing phone calls I had to make in 
order to track them down if I needed them to contact a patient. If I left messages, they 
rarely phoned me back. And why should they? Apart from the few professionals who 
talked of supporting research and education, what most of the professionals probably 
wanted from me was to go away and let them get on with their work. When it comes to 
" However, whilst some of the community professionals covertly did not seem to want to be involved in the 
research, most of them did eventually participate. This was due to the fact that day unit and ward patients 
were often "revolving door" cases, or were assigned community professionals whilst still on the ward/day 
unit and so community professionals attended day unit and ward CPAs. In these cases the professional on 
the ward/day unit had secured access to the patient for me and community workers were somewhat 
presented with a fait accompli. -. ý. 42 My presence may not have been as "intellectually stimulating" as Dr. North had originally envisaged, but 
she did seem to enjoy discussing the progress of my research in front of the other professionals, and having 
pledged her support at the outset she seemed determined to see it through. 
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why the patients would want me in the meetings, there are likely to be a whole variety of 
reasons. Two patients said that they believed their gender did affect how they were treated 
and wanted to take part for that reason. Two patients were 'sold' the research as 'giving 
something back' and seemed to go along with this. Sometimes it became clear from the 
analysis of the transcript that patients had a particular agenda and perhaps thought that my 
presence could help their case. 43 However it was not always evident why they had agreed. 
Overall, I was asking a lot of these busy professionals and vulnerable patients and offering 
very little, if anything, in return. " 
During the fifteen months I spent in the setting, forty-nine names of potential patients 
were passed to me and sixteen participated; a success rate of approximately one in every 
three potential names. Of those potential participants who did not take part in the 
research, fourteen refused and six patients were not approached. Eight potential 
participants were lost because I was unable to contact the keyworker to make the 
arrangements or on one occasion the keyworker was unable to contact the patient 45 Five 
CPAs were cancelled and to my knowledge were not rescheduled while I was there. More 
detailed information on data sources, participants and background to the psychiatric unit 
and CPAs are in Appendix III. 
Ethical issues continued to constrain my research and access to patients and data in other 
ways. As the British Sociological Association's (1991) ethical guidelines highlight, such 
guidelines do not provide a finite set of principles; dilemmas and choices will arise during 
research. My actions also rested on personal values and responsibility. In the course of the 
research, situations arose where I had to make immediate ethical decisions. This usually 
occurred when my own interests in completing the research conflicted with the situation 
at hand. I was tempted to make small transgressions to secure a particular patient, 
particularly when the research was going very slowly. In the end I did not succumb to 
temptation, feeling a personal responsibility to the patients concerned but I was also fully 
aware that a transgression of the agreed ethical procedures could jeopardise the whole 
project. In this way, ethical considerations were intertwined with access to patients 
For example, one patient wanted to request psychotherapy and a ward patient wanted home leave. "" 
I did suggest on the information leaflets that I hoped the research would increase awareness and 
understanding of professional responses to gender and mental distress, in the long term. But I suspect this 
had little influence on professionals' and patients' more personal and situated responses to the research. ' 
41 All the contact problems occurred at the community centre. 
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throughout the research but my personal ethical responsibilities were underwritten by the 
ethical requirements of the institution. 
In addition, using an audiotape recorder in the meetings added further complications. It 
highlighted the problem of when a meeting begins and ends, for the obvious reason that 
the tape recorder had to be switched on at some point and switched off at another point. 
Although meetings appeared to be discrete events, in practice several meetings were often 
run in sequence; even when there was only one meeting, beginnings and endings were far 
from clear, certainly for the purposes of research. This problem operated at two levels. At 
a mundane level I was a novice in the setting and it took some time to learn the way 
meetings worked 46 But at another level it was an ethical issue. I had been given access to 
audiotape meetings but no one had specified what that meant in practice. Meetings could 
have three parts; there was a period of time in which the patient was present, but some 
meetings also included a pre-meeting (when professionals discussed the case before the 
patient arrived) and/or a post-meeting (when professionals discussed the case after the 
patient had left). I quickly realised that the pre- and post-meetings were rich sources of 
talk amongst professionals where the patient and her/his problems could be formulated in 
different ways in the patient's absence than in their presence. I was invited to the 
pre-meetings and so I asked if I could turn on the tape recorder. Similarly, I remained in 
the room after the patient had departed and left the tape running. 
However, at the third meeting I attended in the community centre, there was no 
pre-meeting; the patient arrived without any preamble and the main meeting began. When 
the main meeting was over and the patient had left, Dr. North immediately asked me to 
turn off the recorder saying "the meeting's over now". But the professionals continued to 
discuss the patient. After the other professionals had left Dr. North said that the 
pre-meetings would have to stop because there had been complaints from the patients' 
organisation. She then said that she did not understand why I wanted to "tape so much" 
when they take so long to transcribe and then, that she was very aware of the tape recorder 
and did not want to say anything "stupid". She added that she can feel quite tense during 
the main meeting because "everything has to be managed properly and the patient handled 
As Atkinson and Drew (1979) show in a formal court setting, and Schegloff and Sacks (1974) 
demonstrate in ordinary conversations, openings and closings are situated linguistic accomplishments. 
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correctly" so after the patient leaves it is a "winding down process" when she can relax 
and be "more informal". 
This was the moment, then, when the beginnings and endings of meetings for research 
purposes had to be agreed upon and I was anxious not to lose the intra-professional 
meetings. I argued that all the different parts of the meeting formed a whole event and I 
needed to capture the whole, and I tried to reassure her about the analysis. She agreed that 
I could tape all parts of the meeting but I left it under her control, saying that if she 
wanted the tape turned off on any particular occasion she should say so and I would 
immediately comply. She never asked me to turn off the tape again. The pre-meetings 
ceased at the community centre but continued at the day unit and on the ward. Officially 
the problem was solved but it continued to reappear with other professionals from time to 
time. 47 Dr. North raised ethical reasons for circumscribing the scale of the audiotape 
recording, on the patients and her own behalf. 48 These ethical issues were directly related 
to how much access I could have and continued at an informal level throughout the 
research. Such issues further constrained what interactional data I collected; when a 
professional asked for the tape recorder to be turned off, interactions were lost. But more 
than this, ethical considerations or justifications became an intrinsic part of what the 
interactive context meant for the purposes of research. Dr. North's request to turn off the 
tape recorder provides a concrete instance of how the boundaries of this setting and the 
talk were defined and circumscribed by the participants, framing what relevancies are 
available to the researcher and what is to count as intrinsic/extrinsic, micro/macro. As 
such, it is not just that participants defined the context and what was relevant within the 
talk, they also defined the context and relevance for the talk. 
In summary, conducting research in an interactive psychiatric context is by no means a 
straightforward process; "doing" - access and ethics in a psychiatric setting has 
methodological implications. In short, the ethical programme embedded in the institution 
constrained what I could do, and if I wanted interactive psychiatric talk I had to work 
47 For example, a community psychiatric nurse asked for the recorder to be turned off during a post-meeting, 
invoking confidentiality. On another occasion the pre-meeting had begun and I had turned on the recorder 
but a social worker , started talking about another patient, realised the tape recorder was running, and 
expressed concern. I left it running but assured her that the conversation would be wiped. 
48 It is one possible effect of my presence there that the issue of pre-meetings was raised and they were 
discontinued at the 'community centre, but I have no way of knowing. 
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within these constraints. In practice, this meant I audiotaped suitable meetings, because 
interactional events had to be scheduled well in advance. I had a limited view of the 
psychiatric setting, because I could only audiotape suitable meetings. I researched 
meetings with suitable patients, because they had to be well enough to understand the 
research and give properly informed consent. I collected what data I could, because access 
was not only influenced by who I was perceived to "be", but also intertwined with ethics 
to govern how I could attend meetings, and which patients I could research. These 
situational constraints impacted upon what constituted the research context, who became 
participants and who did not, and what interactive data was collected and what was not. 
Nevertheless the constraints discussed here should not be regarded merely as evidence of 
the difficulties of obtaining interactive data in contexts such as psychiatric institutions, 
nor as undermining in some way the interactive data which forms the basis of my 
research. Rather, that entering an institutional context and collecting "naturally" occurring 
interactive talk, raises issues and dilemmas that have to be resolved and cannot help but 
impact upon the process and the kind of data collected. Thus the interactional data is very 
much part and product of the institutional setting from which it has been taken. 
In this section, I have discussed the situational constraints of access and ethics which are 
interwoven in a psychiatric context, and the implications for the research process and the 
interactive data collected. In the next section, I outline how the data was analysed after it 
was brought back from the research setting. 
2.2 Analysis 
In this section, I outline the decisions I made and strategies I employed to analyse the 
data, and I consider the ways in which issues outlined in previous sections in terms of 
power and relevance, features of the interactive context and taking a feminist approach, 
are dealt with during the analytic process. 
The first question, when commencing analysis, is a feature of the context I was 
researching: what counts as data? As part of the ethics of the institution, patients had been 
given the option of audiotaping or note-taking. I had eleven audiotaped meetings and five 
in note form. In addition I had conducted semi-structured interviews with five 
professionals at various sites and collected secondary materials such as patient 
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information leaflets and internal documentation. And I had kept a fieldwork diary 
throughout the research process. I decided that the audiotaped material must form the 
primary source of data for analysis but the notes from meetings, which I had taken in 
verbatim form as far as practicable (rather than writing for gist), could also form part of 
the material for analysis. The interviews, secondary sources, and diary were used for 
background information. The audiotapes were transcribed in their entirety using 
transcription conventions based on those commonly used by discourse analysts (e. g. 
Edwards & Potter 1992; Wetherell & Potter 1992; Potter 1996b; Edwards 1997; 
Wetherell 1998; Speer 2001), which in turn are a cut down version of the conventions 
developed by Jefferson (1985) 49 I tried to achieve a balance between notating the main 
features of talk, readability and the amount of time I had available for transcription 
(transcription conventions are in Appendix IV). 
Transcription is also the point at which the names and identifiers of all the participants 
have to be changed. This raises the issue of naming practices and brought into the analysis 
a whole range of dilemmas about ethics, gender, relevance and power. The ethical 
constraints of the research context required that such changes be made, but (re)naming 
participants is also not a neutral activity and brings gender and power issues to the fore. 
Should I neutralise the power and gender connotations of naming, for example using "A", 
"B" etc., so that speakers become "interchangeable", use first names giving an air of 
"informality" which may be at variance with the setting, identify the speakers by their 
positions within the institution, such as "doctor", "patient", etc., (Billig 1999: 553), or aim 
to represent the naming conventions within the psychiatric setting? All of these practices 
have their advantages and disadvantages but I decided to reflect the naming practices 
within the research context. While this produces a "mixed, or unbalanced, code" (Billig 
1999: 553), this imbalance is an intrinsic feature of the setting and conveys the 
relationships which are part of that setting S0 Thus I use the terms doctor and patient, " 
49 However, no set of conventions can provide a neutral or accurate transcription, and the conventions 
chosen depend on the aims and level of the analysis (Edwards & Potter 1992; Potter 1996a), as well as 
practical considerations. In deciding on which conventions to use, I took into account that my focus was on 
interactive talk and participants' orientations and meanings but not on the very fine detail of conversation 
analysis. 
50 Nevertheless, and as I have argued in the first section, such pre-allocated roles and gender names do not in 
and of themselves preclude more differentiated power and gender relations. 
31 Professionals working in the community and at the residential hostel tended to use the term "clients" 
instead of "patients", but the consultants used "patients" regardless of where the meeting was conducted. On 
balance and overall, "patient" was the term most often used by the professionals. 
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patients are given first names, as are the other professionals with the addition of 
identifying roles (e. g. social worker, community psychiatric nurse etc. ). Significant others 
are named according to how they are addressed within the meeting which seemed to vary 
according to age and how long the professionals had known them. I only contravened this 
naming scheme for professionals and patients with non-English names. " I decided to give 
all participants English pseudonyms in order to meet my ethical obligations and ensure 
anonymity. 
Moving on to the analysis itself, DA descriptions of analytic practice often suggest that a 
preliminary stage of analysis involves coding the data S3 However, it is not clear how 
"unwieldy" (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 167) the discourse has to be before such coding 
becomes too difficult and, possibly, counterproductive. The decision of whether to code, 
or not, may be related to the nature of the research context and the kind of data being 
analysed. CPA meetings could have as many as ten participantsS4 interrupting each other 
with introductions, changes, and reintroductions of topics and agendas. It was not 
apparent, then, that coding would be helpful or even possible and I decided that it was not 
practicable or productive for analysing the sort of interactive data I had collected. Instead I 
began analysing the data with intensive reading and re-reading of the transcripts to 
familiarise myself as far as possible with the material. At this stage I also noted passages 
that appeared interesting, given the research questions. From this, I began a detailed 
analysis of all the talk using a number of strategies to aid the analytic process. I looked for 
different kinds of interactional resources and rhetorical devices being deployed within the 
talk, such as three-part lists (Jefferson 1990), 55 disclaimers (Hewitt & Stokes 1975), 56 and 
s2 Nineteen out of thirty-seven professionals, and only three out of sixteen patients were of 
African/African-Caribbean, Asian, or Irish ethnicity. 
 This is described as an "inclusive" process which squeezes "an unwieldy body of discourse into 
manageable chunks" (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 167). It may involve an iterative process of some analysis 
before the coding is done, but the aim is to search for categories informed by the research questions to 
create (overlapping) bodies of "instances" (pg. 167). 
sa Or as few as three participants in a meeting. 
ss Three-part lists serve as a resource for interactants. They can be used for a variety of interactional work 
including signalling completion of a turn of talk, "topic-shifting" and "offense avoidance" (Jefferson 1990: 
79)- note how this in itself is a three-part list! List items and their position within the list, particularly the 
third item, can be manipulated to accomplish actions such as "damning with faint praise", "'discovery' of 
inadequacy", or provide a sense of impartiality on the speaker's part (pg. 78). 
s6 Disclaimers are an "interactional tactic" which are deployed in advance by speakers to preserve situational 
definitions or identities which are likely to be disrupted or discredited (Hewitt & Stokes 1975: 1). For 
example, "credentialing", one of several types of disclaimers, is employed when a speaker is attempting to 
avoid an undesired typification which they know will result, such as "I'm not prejudiced but... " (pg. 4). 
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extreme case formulations (Pomerantz 1986). " These features of talk have been identified 
and developed largely by conversation analysts and provide useful analytic levers for 
understanding how the talk is organised and what it is designed to do. In addition, and 
given the research context and the sort of business at hand, I looked for problematisations: 
who or what was formulated as a problem and what were the proposed solutions 
(Widdicombe 1993). 
At the same time I began to focus in on my research questions. Firstly, I examined the talk 
for the kinds of power relations constituted and displayed between professionals, patients 
and significant others. I considered how power was being accomplished, managed and 
resisted within the talk, looking at who and what was framed as believable and not 
believable (Zimmerman 1974), how participants resisted and how the interaction was 
controlled (Scheff 1968; West 1984; Burman 1995; Mellinger 1995). I examined where 
points of resistance to and subversion of professional power occurred and points of 
reassertion. I took into account what kinds of power relations were constituted, what they 
were designed to accomplish within the meetings in terms of decision-making about 
patients' futures and their practical effects. I also looked for instances where broader 
discourses were oriented to by participants and brought into play, such as rights 
discourses and legal considerations, institutional practices, and noticeable breaks in 
subject matter that were difficult to fully account for within the interactions themselves. 
I went on to consider the way that gender was made relevant to the interactions and 
activities at hand. I began by looking for instances of specific orienting to gender by 
participants, what kinds of gender understandings and relations were produced, what they 
were designed to do and their practical effects. I went on to examine how gender, as a 
background understanding, was relevant in non-obvious ways. I drew on Sacks (1972; 
1974) notion of membership categories and standardized relational pairs and the 
associated characteristics and features, rights and obligations expected of paired relational 
categories, and on Zimmerman's (1998) notion of gender as a "transportable identity". I 
conducted this analysis both at the level of explicit categories and more covert category 
51 Extreme case formulations, such as "everyone", "everything", "nothing", "perfect" are employed to 
legitimise a claim when speakers are "accusing, justifying, and defending" (Pomerantz 1986: 219). They can 
be used to defend challenges to a person's legitimacy, give a sense of objectivity or suggest that a 
phenomenon or behaviour is general and widespread and thus not requiring explanation or accounting for. 
For example, what "everyone" does is not idiosyncratic or due to the speaker's personality. 
83 
understandings to explore how gender was relationally produced within interactions. I 
looked at what kinds of past and present experiences and behaviours of patients and 
significant others were made relevant and shaped within the talk and whether and how 
they became gendered and to what effects. And I considered the extent to which versions 
of experiences were negotiated and contested. Finally, I explored the relationships 
between psychiatric practices, gender understandings, experiences and schizophrenia. I 
looked for instances where schizophrenia was articulated within interactions but, as 
expected, these were relatively rare. This also led me to consider the ways that 
professionals' understanding of schizophrenia could be operating as a background 
relevance. For this task, I considered talk about themes such as medication, relationships 
and employment which I had identified during the analysis. 
During the course of the analysis, I kept an on-going file of promising themes. From this I 
developed a number of potential recurring themes and I formulated conjectures about 
what the main discursive themes were within the talk, and their effects. I then went 
through all the transcripts again looking for confirmations and disconfirmations, or 
deviant cases. When I found instances that did not fit my analytic proposals, I examined 
them again in detail to decide whether they were exceptional in some way, and thus 
exceptions which did not undermine my analytic scheme, or not (Potter & Wetherell 
1987). If they were not, then that part of my analysis had to be reconsidered, rearranged or 
discarded. I often took these 'exceptions' to a discourse group I attended regularly. 
Looking for disconfirmations was particularly important for deciding upon background 
relevancies. In some cases, they could not be satisfactorily confirmed or disconfirmed and 
had to remain at the level of conjecture. While some of these conjectures are included in 
the analytic chapters that follow, they are always marked off as such. Overall the analysis 
was a highly iterative process that continued into the writing-up stage. 
The final issue for analysis is how a feminist approach impacts upon the analytic process. 
The overall aim of the research is to examine psychiatric professionals' gender 
understandings in relation to schizophrenia and, from this, to explicate the conditions of 
the lives of women positioned as women and schizophrenic. This is no less the case for 
focusing on men as well as women. However, contradictory concerns in terms of trust and 
responsibility came to the fore during the research and analytic process. Psychiatry has a 
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highly politicised history and the relative paucity of outsider research in contemporary 
psychiatric institutions, and the responses of some of the professionals in my research, 
suggest that professionals are wary of researchers and the degree to which they may be 
critical of their practices. 
Dr. North opened up the possibility of doing my research at Treetops and supported me 
throughout the research process. On several occasions she made it clear that this involved 
'trust' on her part, setting up the expectation that I would be 'responsible' with the data. 
But, responsible to whom: Dr. North, all the professionals involved, the patients, or the 
women patients in particular? The answer is all of them, but this produces a number of 
potentially competing responsibilities. In practice I found that my sense of responsibility 
fluctuated according to what was happening during the research and the stage of analysis. 
For example, when the research was going too slowly and Dr. North made a special effort 
to get more participants, 58 or one of the professionals took the time and trouble to explain 
the background workings of the institution to me, I felt a strong sense of my 
responsibilities towards Dr. North and the other professionals. On other occasions, when 
patients' versions were undermined during meetings, and when the themes became clearer 
in the analysis, my sense of responsibility shifted towards the patients, particularly the 
women. Therefore, while a feminist approach should include taking responsibility for the 
consequences of the work, it is not always a straightforward matter. This is particularly so 
in the context researched here, where professionals may be made open to damaging 
criticism and all the patients are vulnerable. I have attempted to achieve a balance 
between all these responsibilities while not avoiding a critical approach to analysis and 
keeping in mind that my overall aim is a feminist one. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that gender relations and experiences are thoroughly enmeshed in power 
relations but we do not know whether psychiatric understandings will be imposed on 
patients (and significant others) in clinical encounters, nor whether gender relations will 
intersect with the encouragement of purpose and autonomy, nor is it clear the extent to 
18 On one occasion there was a CPA scheduled at the residential hostel but Dr. North was away and had 
arranged for another psychiatrist, who was not involved in the research, to attend the meeting. The 
consultant went to some trouble to contact the manager of the hostel and arrange for me to include this CPA 
in the research. 
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which patients will contest psychiatric definitions of gender and experiences. As such, 
Foucauldian analyses have tended to elucidate broad legislative and professional 
discourses. In contrast, a CA approach focuses on the sense-making activities of people as 
situational accomplishments; people 'do' power and gender within interactions. DA 
attempts to combine attention to broader discourses and notions of power with analysis of 
language-in-use, although some variants of this approach appear to presume the direction 
of power in advance and pay insufficient attention to the interactive context. I have argued 
that it is not evident that power relations at the local level of psychiatric/patient 
interactions will either be determined by broader discourses, or that they will be wholly 
situational accomplishments. 
Grounding analysis in the meanings and concerns of participants of interaction rather than 
those of the analyst is a key tenet of CA and, I have argued, is a pertinent issue when 
analysing gender, power and schizophrenia at the local level of psychiatric/patent 
interactions. Keeping within the bounds of what is relevant to participants has advantages 
for an analysis with feminist aims, and is consonant with the conceptions of gender and 
schizophrenia underpinning the research. I have discussed potential problems of 
demonstrating participants' relevance when gender and schizophrenia may be operating as 
background understandings and I have outlined some analytic strategies for attempting to 
contend with these problems. 
From these issues and concerns I have delineated a discourse analytic scheme which is 
feminist in its overall aims and is based on a DA approach. I focus on a 'naturally' 
occurring interactive context: Care Programme Approach meetings for patients with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. Power becomes a more fundamentally analytic question: I 
combine a Foucauldian understanding of power at the micro-level with attention to the 
interactive context. This will enable me to take account of negotiations, contestations and 
the accomplishment of power within interactions, and the ways broader discourses come 
into play at the local level. I take participants' relevance seriously: I aim to keep the 
analysis within the bounds of participants' meanings while also contending with 
background relevancies of gender and schizophrenia. 
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However, focusing on a'naturally' occurring interactive psychiatric context carries its own 
demands and limitations, with implications for the research process. Issues of access and 
ethics are 'ever-present' and interwoven in this kind of setting, exerting constraints on 
what constitutes the research context, who participates in the research, and what sort of 
interactive data is collected. As such, the data collected is a product of the institutional 
setting and the ethical programme embedded in it. Features of this interactive context 
re-emerge to influence the analytic process, along with issues of power and relevance. I 
have discussed analytic decisions such as what counts as data, what (re)naming practices 
should be employed and whether to code the data. And I have detailed the analytic 
strategies and processes of analysis. I have also raised the problem of how to balance 
competing responsibilities which ensue when researching a psychiatric context from a 
feminist perspective. 
In this chapter, I have discussed a discursive approach which enables me to address the 
research questions raised at the end of the previous chapter. This methodological and 
analytic approach allows me to consider how power relations unfold in psychiatric/patient 
interactions and the ways that gender relations and experiences are produced, negotiated 
and resisted in relation to schizophrenia during clinical encounters. In the following 
chapters, I turn to the main findings of the research. I begin with a focus on how 
psychiatric practices are constituted and managed in psychiatric case conferences. I 
discuss broader legislative and 'rights' discourses that come into play during interactions 
and illustrate some of the typical features of CPA meetings. And I draw out what kinds of 
professional/patient relations are constituted within interactions. 
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Chapter Three 
Constituting Psychiatric Practices and Professional/Patient Relations: 
Discourses of Benevolence and Responsibility, Supervision and 
Restricted Participation 
Introduction 
The previous chapter delineated a discursive methodology, based on a modified DA 
approach, which combines a focus on the 'naturally' occurring interactive context of Care 
Programme Approach meetings with a Foucauldian understanding of power at the 
micro-level. I argued for a scheme in which power is conceived as a fundamentally 
analytic question; power is analysed as an interactional accomplishment but I also 
suggested that the analysis should take account of points at which broader legislative and 
rights discourses may be oriented to and played out at the local level. I argued for the 
importance of keeping the analysis within the bounds of what is relevant to participants, 
particularly in relation to understandings of gender, and the need to take account of the 
ways that understandings of gender and schizophrenia may operate as background 
relevances within interactions. I went on to discuss the demands of researching an 
interactive psychiatric context and the implications for the research and analytic process. 
This chapter initiates the substantive findings of the research. It is concerned with how 
power relations unfold in local encounters between psychiatric professionals and patients, 
with a particular focus on the discursive constitution of psychiatric practices and 
professional/patient relations. ' In the first part of this chapter I present a background 
discussion of the 1970s 'rights' campaign for mental health reform and the 1983 Mental 
Health Act. I draw on debates surrounding the impact of this campaign and the 1983 Act 
on professional power and relations between professionals and patients (Jones 1980; 
1993; Rose 1986a; 1986b). Beginning with a discussion of the wider legislative 
framework enables me to raise questions regarding psychiatric practices and 
professional/patient relations and, at the same time, provides an understanding of broader 
Professionals also attend to and accomplish intra-professional relations within meetings, but this is less 
directly related to the research questions. Nevertheless relations between professionals are an important part 
of the overall workings of CPA meetings and therefore I provide a background analysis of intra-professional 
relations in Appendix V. 
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contemporary discourses that participants may orient to within interactions. In the main 
body of the chapter I use extracts from Care Programme Approach (CPA) meetings to 
provide an initial understanding of the power relations displayed in local clinical 
encounters. This is intended to provide a framework for the chapters that follow in terms 
of the implications for structuring understandings of gender, schizophrenia and 
experience, and the extent to which such understandings may be imposed, negotiated or 
contested. 
I argue that discourses of psychiatric benevolence and persuasion, and of patient 
responsibility and co-participation constitute a relation of benevolent 
psychiatry/responsible patient; a relation that is reinforced by professional framing of 
compulsion as a last resort and one that is consonant with governmentality rather than 
social control. Nevertheless this is an asymmetrical relation in which professionals 
accomplish superior knowledgeability and final responsibility. I suggest that whilst 
practices and relations are situational accomplishments, professionals also incorporate 
broader legislative concerns into their interactions with patients which are played out in 
terms of formulations of compulsion, voluntarism, "forgetting" and solicitations of 
patients' agreements to these framings. 
The final part of the chapter discusses an alternative relation of supervisory 
psychiatry/untrustworthy patient which is more asymmetrical and, again, points to wider 
concerns related to the mandate of community care. In turn, consumer discourses severely 
restrict patient participation at the same time as they found it. I argue that supervisory and 
consumer discourses indicate the limits of governmental psychiatry for this set of patients. 
The simultaneous encouragement and limitation of self-regulation for patients suggests 
that professionals' background understandings of schizophrenia are informing practices, 
even though it is not articulated as a category. I conclude by drawing out the implications 
of contemporary psychiatric/patient relations for negotiating, contesting or imposing 
gender understandings and the meanings of patients' experiences in local encounters. 
It is generally considered that the 1959 Mental Health Act marked a significant change in 
mentallhealth legislation, repealing all previous legislation (Rose 1986a; Jones 1994). It 
established community care as preferable to hospitalisation and informal admission as 
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preferable to compulsion. While doctors were assigned appreciable powers, particularly in 
terms of treatment without consent, Rose (1986a) argues that this was not a case of 
increasing psychiatric social control given the emphasis on reducing hospitalisation and 
increasing links with other professionals. The Act was viewed as "having been 
enlightened and forward-looking" (DHSS 1976: 1). However, in 1975 the Labour 
government decided to review the 1959 Act because of changes in treatments, services 
and general attitudes to mental illness (Jones 1994). In the same year the mental health 
charity Mind instigated a campaign for mental health reform to constrain the powers of 
psychiatry through legal safeguards. 
Gostin (1975), the legal director of Mind, produced a critique of the 1959 Act together 
with a series of recommendations for changes to the law which would protect the human 
rights of patients. The main planks of Gostin's (1975) critique concerned the imprecise 
criteria for compulsory admissions, limited access to and powers of the Mental Health 
Review Tribunals (MHRTs), intrusive and/or irreversible treatment without informed 
consent and the curtailment of basic rights (such as court access, voting, and sending and 
receiving mail). In short, he argued that the coercive power of psychiatry denied patients 
their most fundamental rights. Gostin (1975) proposed changing the criteria for 
compulsory admissions, ' increasing the powers of the Mental Health Review Tribunals 
(MHRTs)3 and establishing a further independent body (Committee on the Rights and 
Responsibilities of Staff and Residents of Psychiatric Hospitals, CORR) together with an 
advocacy system. ' Finally, he argued that the powers of social workers should be 
increased to enable independent assessment before admission, based on the criterion of 
the least "restrictive setting" for the patient (pg. 37). In effect, MIND and Gostin were 
instigating a "project for a massive displacement of psychiatrists from their clinical 
authority" (Rose 1986b: 188). 
Z Criteria should be changed from "in the interests of his own health and safety or for the protection of 
others" (DHSS 1976: 4) to those of "dangerousness" or "grave disablement" with a caveat regarding 
"treatability" (Gostin 1975: 33-35). 
Powers of MHRTs should be increased to encompass verification of all admissions and automatic reviews. 
CORR would review treatments and safeguard the rights of patients. In particular, it should review what 
Gostin (1975) termed "suspect" treatments (pg. 116), such as surgery, electroconvulsive therapy, hormonal 
treatments and any treatment to which the patient has not given informed and voluntary consent. The 
advocacy system would place an advocate in every hospital. Furthermore, the basic rights of in-patients 
(such as "free expression and association", pg. 111) would also be safeguarded by advocates and CORR. 
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Despite a change of government and some amendments, the Mental Health Amendment 
Bill was passed in 1982 and consolidated into the 1959 Act to create the Mental Health 
Act 1983. In many respects the 1983 Act was a "compromise package" (Jones 1993: 205), 
reflected in Mind's comment that many of their "basic principles have been adopted" but 
"there is still much with which Mind must remain dissatisfied" (Bingley 1983). 
Nevertheless there were some important changes. The powers of MHRTs were increased; 
the time span before patients could apply for review was reduced, automatic reviews for 
formal patients were introduced, and MHRT powers to discharge were increased. An 
independent body, the Mental Health Act Commission, was established to visit and 
interview formal patients and protect their rights. ' The powers of social workers were also 
increased, in line with Mind's recommendations, along with the notion of "least restrictive 
setting", placing a duty on social workers to provide an assessment of the patient prior to 
compulsory admission and an independent judgment regarding whether it is "appropriate 
to make an application" (Jones 1994: 52). The 1983 Act also clarified the issue of consent 
to treatment introducing a three-tier system, ' however, the right of informal patients to 
refuse treatment remained a common law right (Gostin 1983). 
Section 117 of the 1983 Act also places a duty on District Health Authorities in 
conjunction with social services to provide after-care for patients who have been 
compulsorily detained under section 3, but not for all patients, a matter that Gostin (1983) 
raises as a cause for continuing concern. Under this section patients leaving hospital are 
subject to the Care Programme Approach (CPA) which was introduced in 1991 (Jones 
1994). The Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice (DoH&WO 1993) provides 
guidelines for implementing CPAs which place responsibility on the responsible medical 
officer to ensure that a care plan for the patient is established, prior to discharge, in a 
multi-professional discussion which considers and organises "the patient's continuing 
health and social care needs" (DoH&WO 1993: 106). 
While this body was proposed by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and has few powers, Mind claims that 
it "differs remarkably little" from the CORR proposal (Bingley 1983). 
6 Under the new system certain treatments (psychosurgery and hormone implants) require informed patient 
consent and a second opinion (section 57), while other treatments (electroconvulsive therapy and certain 
medications) require patient consent or a second opinion (section 58). While the former requirement covers 
both formal and informal patients, the latter only applies to formal patients, and medication can be 
administered to formal patients for three months without their consent. However, all other treatments can be 
given to formal patients without their consent and sections 57 and 58 can be overridden "if treatment is 
required urgently" (Jones 1994). 
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Feminist writers such as Chester (1974), anti-psychiatrists and societal reaction theorists 
have viewed psychiatry as acting as an agent of social control (Schell 1966; Rosenhan 
1973; Szasz 1973; 1974; 1976; 1997). And, in his chronicle of the "moral career" of the 
mental patient, Goffman (1968) depicts patients as demoralised, discredited and 
controlled within the asylum. While patients can make "secondary adjustments" by 
"working the system" (pp. 186-9), any past or present behaviour can justify a prescribed 
treatment, and disapproved actions and interactions may be assigned a psychiatric label. 
What these approaches have in common is an understanding of psychiatric power as 
hierarchical, with psychiatric professionals wielding considerable power over their 
patients. 
However the recent concern for patients' rights and current mental health legislation raise 
doubts about whether contemporary psychiatric power should continue to be understood 
as a form of social control. Rose (1986b) suggests that there were some significant 
changes in the 1983 Mental Health Act but rather than reducing psychiatric power and 
empowering patients, professional power was rearranged leaving relations between 
professionals and patients largely unchanged: 
... the consequences of rights strategies do not amount to a simple reduction of 
such power, but rather to its reframing and reorganization.. . Rights-based 
strategies do not transform the relations of dominance between professionals 
and those subject to them, but redistribute status, competence and resources 
amongst the professionals of unhappiness. (Rose 1986b: 204 & 209). 
But contemporary psychiatry is said to be a form of "government in liberal society" which 
endeavours to "invest" subjectivity rather than "suppress" it (Miller 1986: 29 & 32). In 
this respect, psychiatry aims to "encourage the acceptance of responsibility", restoring 
individuals to choosing responsible subjects (Rose 1986b: 202; 1989). And, where this is 
not possible, to provide the minimum of support to enable patients to function in the 
community (Miller 1986). 
But Jones (1980; 1993) takes a different stance on what she calls "the new legalism" 
(1993: 197) arguing that civil rights provisions incorporated into the 1983 Mental Health 
Act have only established "rights against" certain abuses for compulsorily detained 
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patients rather than "rights to" professional services for the vast majority of psychiatric 
patients (1993: 213). In this respect, and as detailed above, the new provisions are almost 
entirely applicable to compulsorily detained patients even though the vast majority of 
in-patients are informal. ' As such, the legal approach to mental health is said to have 
hindered access to treatment for many chronic patients and increased the potential for 
conflict rather than co-operation between psychiatric professionals and patients (Jones 
1993). 
Rose's analysis suggests that rights campaigns and the ensuing legislation established a 
distribution of professional power but did not transform relations between professionals 
and patients, although in Rose and Miller's formulations psychiatric power is productive 
rather than repressive. However Jones' argument indicates that the current legislative 
framework may constrain psychiatric actions and interactions and open up potential for 
antagonistic relations between professionals and patients at a localised level. Moreover, 
the Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice suggests that patients should be included as 
co-participants in negotiations and decision-making regarding their future. 
The conceptions of psychiatric power, professional/patient relations and patient 
participation discussed above present a very different view of psychiatric power to that of 
traditional notions of social control. This debate, therefore, raises questions about 
professional power, practices and patient participation in localised psychiatric settings. 
How is professional power managed interactively in local encounters between 
professionals and patients? What kinds of professional/patient relations are constituted? 
And how might schizophrenia be relevant to the power relations displayed? Within CPA 
meetings, psychiatric professionals and patients not only "do things with words" (Austin 
1962) in the sense of blaming, justifying, excusing, etc., participants also "do" psychiatry; 
that is they frame what psychiatric practice is. And in so doing, participants also constitute 
professional/patient relations. I use a range of extracts from CPA meetings to explore the 
ways in which psychiatric practices are framed, looking at issues of persuasion, 
responsibility, supervision and choice (Miller 1986; Rose 1986a; 1986b; 1989), and the 
' For example, in 1989/90 only six and a half percent (17,000) of admissions to hospitals in England were 
compulsory (Jones 1994). However, I was told by the manager that 30% of in-patients at Treetops were 
compulsory admissions (see Appendix III) perhaps reflecting the increasingly "acute" status of in-patients 
since 1989/90. 
93 
points at which broader "rights" discourses (Jones 1993) come into play within local 
interactions. And I draw out what kinds of professional/patient relations are constituted 
within interactions. 
1 Psychiatric Practice as Benevolence: "help" 
"Help" is employed mundanely in meetings to characterise what psychiatric professionals 
do. In each of the three short extracts below, the doctors frame psychiatry in terms of 
"help" (extract 1, lines 5&7, extract 2, line 629, extract 3, line 81). In the first extract, 
Dr. South is opening the main meeting for Natalie, the patient, who has just been 
transferred from another area. This is the first care plan meeting Natalie has had in 
Worthington NHS Trust and with this psychiatric team, and Dr. South is laying out what 
the meeting is for, "this meeting is to bring everyone involved together to discuss how we 
can help you best" (lines 4-5). 
Meeting 10 (main meeting) : Natalie (notes only) 
3 Dr. S.: and Erica you're the keyworker now ((to Natalie)) we met in the 
4 clinic you've been under Crowlake health care and this meeting is to 
5 bring everyone involved together to discuss how we can help you best 
6 ((Natalie hands Dr. South a yellow sheet of paper)) you've brought the 
7 sheet of paper filled in to say what you need help with [. ] ((looks at 
8 what is written on the paper)) so how are you how are things going 
In using "help" in this way, the consultant is framing the meeting, and all the professionals 
in it ("everyone" and "we", line 5) as friendly, helpful, and wishing to do good, the "best" 
they "can" for Natalie. The yellow piece of paper that Natalie hands to the doctor is an 
official sheet which is given to patients and on which they are encouraged to write down 
anything they want to talk about in the meeting, although many patients do not seem to 
use it. Dr. South also presents what Natalie has written on the paper in terms of "help", 
("to say what you need help with", line 7) which extends friendliness and inclusiveness 
("involved", line 5) to Natalie; she has a "say" and her "need" will be taken into account. 
In extract two, Dr. North is closing the main meeting and has signalled in the preceding 
segment that they are finished, "alright well thats good OK", and Diane's husband has 
thanked the doctor for her "help" (text not included here), although this is by no means the 
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first time "help" has been deployed in this meeting. The doctor uses it as a final 
opportunity to reinforce a previous discussion regarding the chain of mediation from 
Diane via Sarah to herself. 
Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane 
627 Dr. N.: so please with regards y'know to encourage Diane to discuss things if 
628 there is a problem make sure that (. ) Sarah knows about it because 
629 y'know if we don't know what the problems are we can't help you 
In two rhetoric of argument constructions she formulates what she and Sarah do as "help", 
which is emphasised. So "if there is a problem" then "make sure that (. ) Sarah knows", 
followed by "if we don't know what the problems are" then "we can't help you". These 
syllogistic arguments suggest that Sarah's knowing about a problem will enable both 
Sarah and Dr. North ("we") to make it better. In this extract helping is made contingent 
upon knowledge. Finally in the third extract, the consultant is using "help" to signal that 
the meeting for Douglas, the patient, is drawing towards a close. 
Meeting 8 (main meeting) : Douglas (notes only) 
81 Dr. S.: anything else you feel you need help with [. ] 
82 Douglas: money ((everyone laughs)) no I think I'm alright 
The extreme formulation, "anything else" implies both that the professionals have already 
given Douglas "help", and perhaps that they can "help" with (almost) anything. Here the 
extent of psychiatric benevolence is given a wide sphere. Douglas' response is interesting 
in that after a noticeable pause he calls her bluff. It is presented as a joke, and everyone 
laughs, but his reply, "money" is telling. It is surely the "anything" that most people short 
of money would truly like help with and it makes fun of Dr. South's previously implied 
claim. 
The ubiquity of framing psychiatric practice as "help" has a low level but nevertheless 
powerful effect which is three-fold. Firstly, it presents psychiatry as a benevolent practice 
which is very far from anti-psychiatric notions of social control and enforced treatment 
(e. g. Laing 1967; Szasz 1973; 1974; 1976; 1997). Secondly, it implies that patients are 
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co-participants to some degree in their treatment and care; they tell the professionals what 
their problems and needs are and the professionals "help" to solve those problems and do 
their best to meet those needs. Thirdly, it also contains the covert implication that patients 
should take some responsibility for their mental health; they should know what their 
problems and needs are and be responsible for bringing them to the attention of the 
professionals, as in the exhortation that Diane should "discuss things" (extract 2, line 
628). The discourse of "help" therefore suggests an initial relation of benevolent 
psychiatry/co-participating, responsible patient. In addition to the low-level discourse of 
"help", practices are framed in terms of what psychiatry does and does not do; psychiatric 
practice involves advice and persuasion, not force. 
2. Advice and Persuasion: "thats my advice... I'm not forcing you" and "in 
the end they did persuade her" 
The benevolence of psychiatric practice is extended and strengthened through discourses 
of "advice" and "persuade", and claims that psychiatry does not "force" patients to do 
things they do not want to do, a framing which patients are entreated to agree with. The 
first extract below is part of a much longer discussion regarding why Diane did/does not 
take her medication. The consultant uses the claim of Diane's husband, George, at line 
451 as an opportunity to pursue the matter further. Diane's attempt to provide a reasonable 
explanation, "I thought I was better" (line 455), enables the doctor to launch into a 
formulation of the proper relationship between professionals and patient. 
Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane 
451 George: she stopped taking the medication doctor= 
452 Diane: =1 stopped taking my [med]ication 
453 Dr. N.: [yes ] yes °ye:: s I kno:: w° (1.0) mm why did you 
454 do that though 
455 Diane: I thought I was better 
456 Dr. N.: °ya::: ° but you should take advice you see Diane you >you know< you 
457 must you must take other peoples advice 
458 Diane: [yes ] 
459 Dr. N.: er the fact that you're better (. ) um (. ) doesn't mean that that you you're 
460 you're going to be better without some tablets 
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Psychiatric professionals are framed as "people" (line 457) who give "advice" (twice, 
lines 456 & 457) and patients like Diane "should" and "must" take that "advice". The use 
of "people" deprofessionalises the "advice" but it is nevertheless clear to whom the doctor 
is referring. As such the deprofessionalisation downplays the power relation between 
professionals and patients and presents psychiatry and psychiatric practices as benevolent 
- it is just people giving advice. It also presents Diane as a consumer of services, someone 
who asks for and takes "advice". However, notions of advice and consumerism are 
interspersed with a large number of command words and "you"s which combine forceful 
exhortation with the suggestion that it is Diane's responsibility to seek and obtain that 
advice, "you should", "you you know", "you must", "you must" (lines 456-457). And the 
closing salvo regarding being "better without some tablets" suggests that Diane is rather 
foolish and does not have the knowledge or understanding to make decisions about her 
treatment; she does not understand that it is the tablets that make her better. It provides 
further justification for the necessity of Diane seeking and taking (expert) advice. 
In the second extract the professionals are discussing Diane in the intra-professional 
pre-meeting. Diane has recently been discharged from hospital and the usual course is for 
patients to attend the day hospital as a step on the way to full community status. However, 
Diane has refused to go to the day hospital. Sarah, the CPN, presents the problem in quite 
forceful terms which suggest that professionals do not "push" a patient to do something 
she "rea::: ll doesn't will not" do. 
Meeting 2 (pre-meeting) : Diane 
59 Sarah (CPN): she shes adamant that she rea::: Ily doesn't will not go to the day unit so 
60 1 didn't push it= 
61 Dr. N.: =oh no it's alri:: ght if she doesn't want to go:: she doesn't have to go_ 
62 thats OK:: um 
In presenting Diane as "adamant" Sarah suggests that pushing Diane to the day unit would 
be forcing her to do something against her will and Dr. North concurs, reframing in terms 
of consumer choice. Diane has a choice and psychiatric professionals do not force patients 
97 
to do things. These two extracts therefore suggest that psychiatric professionals give 
"advice", which patients are responsible for seeking and taking, and they do not force. In 
the following extract these two themes are explicitly juxtaposed as the doctor attempts to 
elicit the patient's agreement that she is not being forced to take her medication. Earlier in 
the meeting Dawn, the patient, has challenged the doctor over what the medication does 
and how long she will be on it and the doctor has said "the next couple of years" (text not 
included here). Now towards the end of the meeting Dawn raises the issue again, 
reframing Dr. North's vague formulation "couple" to the more concrete "TWO years". 
Meeting 7 (main meeting) : Dawn 
360 Dawn: its TWO years 1'm on that drug 
361 Dr. N.: well I've I've said a couple of years yeah but I don't mean (0.6) literally 
362 two years but y'know we're gonna keep on reviewing it every time you 
363 come to the outpatients thats why you've got the appointments so that 
364 you can say what you think about it 
365 Dawn: oh= 
366 Dr. N.: but I mean its not that you're forced to have it its y'know (0.8) 
367 Dawn: yeah= 
368 Dr. N.: =but I think it my advice to you would be to have it for a couple of 
369 years= 
370 Dawn: =a couple of years until it settles down I see= 
371 Dr. N.: =°absolutely thats right" thats my advi:: ce but I mean I hope I'm not 
372 forcing you to have it cos I don't mean that 
373 Dawn: no OK (2.2) 
In effect, Dawn is reorienting to and challenging the doctor's earlier assessment about her 
medication. In a complex response, Dr. North confirms her previous assessment but 
proceeds to downplay her (re)statement with a series of mitigations, "but I don't mean 
(0.6) literally two years", "but... we're gonna keep on reviewing it", "you can say what you 
think about it", and "but... its not that you're forced to have it" (lines 361-4 & 366). These 
mitigations suggest that the doctor has read Dawn's question not as a request for 
confirmation but as a challenge. The mitigations soften the original assertion and work to 
suggest that the medication will be constantly under review, she will have a say, and she 
is not forced to have the medication. As such, Dawn's medication becomes a more 
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inclusive and consultative endeavour. Moreover, the final mitigation at line 366 in terms 
of compulsion is contrasted with an alternative definition of psychiatric practice as 
benevolence; taking medication is a matter of "advice" (line 368), not "force" (lines 366). 
Dawn's response at line 370 is less challenging but somewhat noncommittal; in reiterating 
and adding to the doctor's framing she suggests that she understands what the doctor is 
saying but does not explicitly give her agreement. It appears that the doctor reads it this 
way as she goes on to reiterate the contrast between "force" and "advice", this time framed 
in such a way as to solicit Dawn's agreement that she is not being forced to take the 
medication (lines 371-2). 
The theme of "thats my advice ... I'm not forcing you" 
is not only an explicit formulation of 
psychiatric practice as benevolent counsel that eschews compulsion, but is also deployed 
to solicit the patient's agreement to this understanding. In this and the previous extract 
professionals appear to be incorporating a legal consideration into the interactions; 
patients are not forced to do something against their will, and they are not forced to take 
medication. However, in framing compulsion in this way and soliciting patients' 
agreement that they are not compelled, the question arises as to whether this should be 
understood as an interactional resource, or whether broader legislative and 'rights' 
discourses are being brought into play in these local interactions. In this respect, and as 
discussed in the introduction, while informal and community patients have the common 
law right to refuse treatment, psychiatry does have some recourse to legal force in terms 
of compulsory admission to hospital under sections 2 and 3 of the 1983 Mental Health 
Act. In the next extract, I turn to how professionals present the use of legal force. 
In the following two extracts, professionals are discussing Diane's recent hospitalisation. I 
have chosen these two extracts because the first involves a discussion between the 
consultant and Diane herself, the second between the consultant and another professional 
in the intra-professional post-meeting. In both extracts, "sectioning", the colloquial term 
for compulsory admission, ' is framed as something professionals "have" to do, "we used 
to have to get you on a section" (extract one, lines 434-5), and "she came into hospital 
without having to be sectioned" (extract two, lines 655-6). 
8 'Sectioning' refers to a section of mental health legislation which specifies the criteria for compulsory 
admission. 
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Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane 
432 Dr. N.: so I think we have just gotta get it ri:: ght we've got to get the 
433 medication right and hopefully now Diane you you will come forward 
434 for treatment because I mean in the the (. ) before we used to have to 
435 get you on a section but this time you didn't come in on a section did 
436 you? in the end [you came in yourse:: l 
437 Diane: [no I came in voluntary ] yes= 
438 Dr. N.: =ye:: s and thats much better really if you can () if you can work with 
439 us instead of us trying to chase you y'know? hhhh 
In presenting compulsory admission in terms of "have to", the doctor is framing 
compulsion, the use of legal force, as a last resort; it is a "necessity", the "only available 
course of action" (Emerson 1981: 4-5). This is made clearer by the contrast between "have 
to get you on a section" and "come forward for treatment" (lines 433-5) and between 
"work with us" and "trying to chase you". These contrasts formulate psychiatric practice 
in terms of voluntarism and consensual teamwork, the "first-resort remedies" of preferred 
psychiatric practices, what "should or ought to be done" (Emerson 1981: 3. emphasis in 
original). Making a joke about compulsion at line 439, depicting it in terms of "chasing", 
again underplays the power relation between professional and patient; "chase" sounds 
benign and slightly comic conveying the idea of professionals running around trying to 
catch patients. While the above extract contrasts compulsion with a psychiatric/patient 
relationship in which the patient volunteers ("come forward") and co-participates ("work 
with us"), in the next extract it is contrasted with professional persuasion. 
Meeting 2 (post-meeting) : Diane 
652 Dr. N.: I think Emma White () worked with her quite closely didn't she:: I 
653 think she got to trust Emma 
654 Sarah (CPN): yes 
655 Dr. N.: and because of that she came into hospital without having to 
656 [be sectioned ] 
657 Sarah (CPN): [thats right yeah] 
658 Dr. N.: even though I came there and I thought I was sectioning her because 
659 she >kept on saying no-no-no-no I'm not going into hospital< no no 
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660 no::: nothing wrong with me I'm fine its just things going o: n um but 
661 in the end they did persuade her to go in so I think thats really quite a 
662 good step 
In this extract the last resort of formal admission (lines 655-6) and the preferred practice 
of persuasion (line 661) are sandwiched either side of an extreme depiction of Diane. In a 
three-part list of "she >kept saying no-no-no-no I'm not going into hospital<", "no no no::: 
nothing wrong with me", and "I'm fine its just things going o:: n" (lines 659-60), Diane is 
positioned as extremely uncooperative to the point of downright refusal, as denying that 
there is anything wrong with her, and as attributing any blame for what is happening 
elsewhere. This depiction of uncooperation, denial and possibly lack of insight on Diane's 
part not only adds weight and force to the achievement of professional persuasion, but 
also suggests that, had "sectioning" been the outcome, it would have been necessary and 
justifiable (Emerson 1981). 
The themes of "advice", and "persuade" work to strengthen the framing of psychiatric 
practices as benevolence. Moreover, discourses of "force" and "having to section" suggest 
that compulsion is abstained from whenever possible and only reluctantly employed as the 
last resort. Benevolent and persuasive psychiatry also requires a certain kind of patient 
who takes responsibility for seeking and taking advice, and who volunteers for and 
co-participates in their treatment and care. Discourses of help, advice, and persuasion 
present psychiatric practice as benevolence and constitute a relation of benevolent, 
persuasive psychiatry/responsible, voluntary, co-participatory patient at this localised 
level. This relation suggests that psychiatric practices are more concerned with 
governmentality in local encounters, encouraging patient responsibility (Miller 1986; 
Rose 1986b; 1989), than social control per se (Chesler 1974; Scheff 1966; Szasz 1976). 
Therefore relations of benevolent psychiatry/responsible patient are accomplished within 
interactions; they are not just determined by "pre-existing factors" (Hutchby 1997: 175). 
However, professionals do orient to and incorporate broader legislative concerns into their 
interactions in terms of "force" and "sectioning" and it seems improbable that these 
considerations are simply interactional resources, "somehow generated ex nihilo" 
(Hutchby 1997: 176). For example, the doctor's claims that she is not forcing Dawn to 
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take her medication, and her solicitation of Dawn's agreement, suggest that legislative and 
'rights' discourses are coming into play. While the limits of compulsion (last resort) and 
rights (voluntarism) are invoked and framed interactionally within meetings they suggest 
certain ambiguities regarding the extent of psychiatric power. It is not entirely clear to 
what extent professionals can enforce patient compliance with, for example, medication. 
Compulsory medication for certain community patients has been mooted, but it has not 
been implemented (Jones 1993) and the criteria for admission under sections 2 and 3 of 
the 1983 Mental Health Act mean that "services can take no action until there is 
demonstrable evidence that they are 'sectionable"' (Jones 1993: 239). Moreover, 
"anticipated relapse... is not sufficient" and "detention in hospital should not be used to 
attempt to coerce the patient to accept treatment" (Jones 1994: 21 & 25). Equally, while 
community patients (like informal in-patients) have the common law right to refuse 
treatment (Gostin 1983), it is also not clear the extent to which they can exercise this 
right, in the face of professional pressure. 
Thus, when the doctor claims that she is not forcing Dawn to take the medication and 
solicits Dawn's agreement to this understanding, the uncertain extent and limits of 
professional power and patient rights are played out at this local level. Similarly, the 
framing of compulsion as a last resort, and voluntarism and participation as preferred 
practice, is a practical accomplishment within the interaction. But it is difficult to account 
for these formulations without reference to a wider framework which specifies the "least 
restrictive setting" for patients, and patient involvement in their treatment and care. ' In 
this sense, then, the current legislative framework could be said to constrain both 
professionals and patients at the local level (Jones 1993). 
But relations constituted between professionals and patients also contain a number of 
asymmetries. While professionals downplay the power relation, for example they are just 
"people" giving advice, it is the professionals who are framed as having the knowledge to 
give that advice, and patients who do not have sufficient knowledge to make decisions 
about their treatment. It is also the professionals who invoke and frame the meaning and 
Emerson (1981) makes a similar point in his discussion of last resorts. He suggests that last resorts are 
practical accomplishments providing a "justificatory decision logic" (pg. 19) but he also refers to broader 
"prevailing law and policy recommendation" since deinstitutionalisation whereby compulsory admission has 
come to be seen as "at best a limited, partial response" which should be made "reluctantly and only in 
extreme instances" (pg. 2). 
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limits of compulsion and rights and seek patients' agreement to this framing, not the 
patients. And it is the professionals who invoke and assign the range of responsibilities 
for patients. As such, while professionals do attempt to engender responsibility in patients 
within interactions (Miller 1986; Rose 1986b; 1989; Lunbeck 1994), limits are also 
placed on the extent of self-regulation. Responsibility is framed in terms of what patients 
should bring to and take from the professionals. This somewhat circumscribed notion of 
self-regulation operating under the auspices of professional regulation suggests that 
professionals are retaining ultimate responsibility whilst simultaneously building 
responsibility into the professional/patient relation. " 
However, the uncertain extent of professional power and patients' rights, played out 
interactionally in local encounters, has the potential for creating local difficulties for 
professionals. Or, to put it another way, if patients are not forced to take their medication 
how do professionals manage the problem of persuading and encouraging them to do so? 
The next section looks at the ways professionals invoke and assign patient responsibility 
in the areas of taking medication and attending appointments, areas that are potentially 
contentious and uncertain, through the discourse of forgetting. 
3 Responsibility: "forget" 
The previous sections have detailed a number of ways that professionals invoke and 
assign patient responsibility; through discourses of "help" and "advice" responsibility is 
framed in terms of patients knowing what their problems and needs are and being 
responsible for bringing them to the attention of the professionals, and being responsible 
for seeking and taking advice. However, "forget"ing is a further important means through 
which professionals attempt to assign patient responsibility, particularly in the areas of 
taking medication and attending appointments. A number of writers have explored 
expressions of remembering and forgetting as discursive productions, deployed in specific 
contexts to accomplish social actions such as justification, claiming credibility and 
attributing responsibility (Edwards & Potter 1992). In particular, forgetting can involve 
situated moral claims; members of particular categories are not allowed to forget certain 
matters and hence forgetting can implicate issues of responsibility (Coulter 1985; Lynch 
1° The argument that patients should be responsible for seeking and accepting treatment while "absolute 
responsibility falls... on... the doctors" has been made by a number of writers (Scott 1973: 47; Parsons 1952; 
Baruch & Treacher 1978). 
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& Bogen 1996). In turn, avowals of forgetting can be used as an evasion strategy, for 
example to obstruct lines of questioning during an interrogation, but "it cannot be 
assumed that all failures to recall are feigned" making such avowals particularly effective 
(Lynch & Bogen 1996: 183 & 199). 
In this section I trace the way that professionals invoke "forget" to assign responsibility to 
patients for taking medication and keeping appointments, and how patients deploy 
avowals of forgetting in talk about the same topics. In the first extract the doctor is 
discussing with Diane, the patient, the possibility of taking oral medication rather than her 
present injection of medication. This is part of a longer discussion regarding the side 
effects that Diane is experiencing, and why she did not take her oral medication in the 
past. The extract begins with the doctor raising the possibility of Diane taking "a tablet" 
which is framed as a matter of necessity rather than choice "you would have to ta:: ke it" 
Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane 
171 Dr. N.: you could take a tablet that might do you (0.7) just as much good as 
172 well= 
173 Diane: =yes= 
174 Dr. N.: =but you would have to ta:: ke it 
175 Diane yes 
176 Dr. N.: not just (0.4) forget to take it 
177 Diane: no I wouldn't forget to take it doctor 
The necessity for taking the medication is then contrasted with an alternative of not taking 
the medication which is framed in terms of forgetting, "not just (0.4) forget to take it" 
(line 176). The deployment of "forget" here could be a literal reference to the difficulty of 
remembering to take tablets everyday and/or positioning Diane as someone with a poor 
memory who is prone to forgetting to take her medication. However, framing the taking 
of medication in terms of necessity and the alternative as "forget"ting suggests that this 
activity is something Diane, as a patient (with a diagnosis of schizophrenia), is not 
allowed to forget. As such, the doctor is attempting to assign responsibility for tablet 
taking to Diane; it is an activity that Diane cannot "just (0.4) forget". The employment of 
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"forget", then, enables the doctor to impress upon Diane that she must take the tablet, it is 
her responsibility. 
In the above extract, the doctor is attempting to invoke and assign responsibility for taking 
medication prospectively ("would", line 174), however in the following extract it is 
assigned retrospectively. In the second extract "forget" is invoked in relation to a missed 
outpatient appointment. Matthew, the patient, and the doctor have been discussing the 
numerous activities that Matthew is involved in and the doctor has expressed some 
surprise at how much he does. The extract begins with the doctor framing Matthew's other 
activities in terms of "planning" and not "forget"ting, "you must be quite good at planning 
things" and "you don't forget to go" (lines 375 & 378). This framing suggests that 
Matthew is well-organised and responsible, and his agreement to this characterisation is 
easily solicited. But the doctor uses this framing, and Matthew's agreement, as an 
opportunity to reintroduce the problem of Matthew not coming to his last out-patient 
appointment with her. 
Meeting 3 (main meeting) : Matthew 
375 Dr. N.: you must be you must be quite good at panning things if you've been 
376 getting to all these places? 
377 Matthew: mm 
378 Dr. N.: you don't you don't forget to go:: 
379 Matthew: no 
380 Dr. N.: well why did you forget to come to see ME:::? then ((said in bantering 
381 tone of voice)) 
382 Matthew: I don't know [I just] 
383 Dr. N.: [h h h] you'd better write it down have you got a diary or a 
384 calendar or something have you? 
385 Matthew: I had it pinned up on my wall 
386 Dr. N.: and you still forgot 
387 Matthew: I thought it was after this meeting you see 
While having so much to do could be a mitigating excuse for a missed appointment, the 
doctor has already established, and elicited Matthew's agreement to, the notion that he is 
organised and responsible in other areas of his life. Thus, the missed appointment 
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becomes problematised and reprehensible. The bantering tone and laughter (lines 380 & 
383) suggest that she is put out about the missed appointment but is attempting to press 
Matthew on the issue while keeping it on a light note. Matthew begins what appears to be 
a non-committal response at line 382 but he is interrupted by the doctor. She provides a 
three-part list of aides-memoire, "a diary or a calendar or something" (lines 383-4) which 
connects up memory, organisation and responsibility and which also now becomes 
prospective, "you'd better write it down" (line383). The generalised list completer ("or 
something") implies that there may be many more relevant aids (Jefferson 1990), placing 
the activity of attending appointments in the realm of something that is easily organised 
and therefore one that patients should not forget. Responsibility for keeping appointments 
is thus placed on Matthew. 
However, Matthew makes use of the generalised list completer, "something", to provide 
an alternative aide-memoire ("pinned up on my wall"), thus denying his inability to 
organise and the inference of irresponsibility. But the consultant continues to press him 
forcing Matthew to invoke an alternative explanation in terms of a misunderstanding, "I 
thought it was after this meeting" (line 387). In this way, keeping appointments is 
assigned retrospectively and prospectively by the doctor as Matthew's responsibility; it is 
his responsibility that he missed his previous appointment and that he keeps future 
appointments. Matthew's alternative formulation of a misunderstanding does not 
undermine the assignment of responsibility but merely provides mitigation for the missed 
appointment on this particular occasion, thus affirming that he is responsible for keeping 
appointments. 
Therefore, professionals use the discourse of "forget" to invoke and assign patient 
responsibility for taking medication and keeping appointments. In turn, patients also make 
claims about forgetting in relation to the same activities. In the next extract Nicola, the 
patient, has not attended her last out-patient appointment with the doctor and the doctor is 
remonstrating with her. Dr. North begins with the suggestion that the appointment may 
not have been "right" and that Nicola "ignored" it (line 9) which suggests lack of volition 
and thus irresponsibility on Nicola's part, she should have changed it. But Nicola 
immediately claims a failure of memory, "I didn't remember" (line 11), interrupting the 
doctor to do so. 
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Meeting 5 (main meeting) : Nicola 
9 Dr. N.: if you have an appointment and its not right don't just igno:: re it but 
10 ring up and [change it] 
11 Nicola: [I did ]n't remember it honestly um 
12 Dr. N.: you didn't remembe:: r don't you write it down in your calendar then? 
13 Nicola: sometimes 
14 Dr. N.: yeah OK because you you >really do need< to to do that because 
15 otherwise () you you don't keep the appointment °you forget° (1.3) 
16 alri::: ght um (1.1) OK:: 
The use of "honestly" following Nicola's avowal of forgetting appears to acknowledge 
that such an avowal could be read as evasive whilst founding this particular claim as a 
genuine instance of failure to recall the appointment. As such it is particularly difficult for 
the doctor to tell whether it is being used evasively and enables Nicola to make an 
effective claim of "no definite responsibility" (Lynch & Bogen 1996: 199) for the missed 
appointment. However, as Lynch & Bogen (1996) point out, responsibility can still be 
assigned for "recalling what "anybody" (in a relevant category) should recall under the 
circumstances" (pg. 200, emphasis in original). And, as we have already seen, patients 
should recall their appointments. The doctor's repeat of Nicola's claim at line 12 followed 
by the invocation of an aide-memoire, framed as a question, suggests that the doctor is 
challenging the believability of the claim (Mellinger 1995). " In a similar fashion to the 
previous extract, the doctor assigns responsibility via the aide-memoire and solicits 
Nicola's agreement. 
However Nicola avoids a straightforward agreement or disagreement with her response, 
"sometimes" (line 13), and thus manages the difficulty, occasioned by the doctor, of 
neither admitting irresponsibility nor undermining her previous avowal of forgetting. The 
doctor does not pursue this equivocal response but instead founds the necessity of keeping 
appointments as Nicola's responsibility, "you >really do need< to do that because 
otherwise... °you forget°" (lines 14-15). The two pauses suggest that the doctor is waiting 
for some form of agreement from Nicola but when they are not forthcoming she moves 
" Mellinger (1995) suggests that psychiatrists use partial repeats to challenge the "unbelievable" responses 
of patients. - 
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on. Avowals of forgetting by patients, and the (re)assignment of responsibility by 
professionals works in a similar way for talk about medication. " 
Therefore, professionals use the discourse of "forget" to invoke and assign patient 
responsibility in the particular areas of taking medication and keeping appointments, and 
patients also deploy "forget" in terms of avowals of non-recall in the same contexts. 
However, while such avowals by patients are ambiguous and temporarily ward off 
"definite responsibility", professionals use patients' avowals of forgetting to re-establish 
responsibility. The theme of "forget"ting was only mobilised by professionals in relation 
to these two topics suggesting that these are the particular activities that patients are not 
allowed to forget. The contexts in which "forget" is deployed suggest connections both to 
professionals' background understandings of schizophrenia and the broader mandate of 
community care. Assigning patient responsibility in these particular areas is especially 
salient for patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, given media and public concerns 
regarding 'dangerous' schizophrenic patients in the community, suggesting that 
professionals' background understandings of schizophrenia are operating here. 
The theme of "forget" is consonant with the aim of engendering responsibility for mental 
health initiated in the 1959 Mental Health Act and the move to community care (Rose 
1986b). As such, the mandate of community care, and the associated uncertainty of the 
limits of compulsion and rights are played out in terms of responsibility in local 
interactions. Professionals' attempts to build responsibility into their relation with 
patients, therefore, are the localised outcome of wider legislative discourses; professionals 
do not compel patients to take their medication and attend appointments, it is a question 
of understanding their responsibilities. And patients do not refuse treatment, it is a 
question of lapses of memory. In this way, the deployment of "forget" circumvents 
compulsion and rights and reframes them in terms of responsibility. It is in the potentially 
difficult contexts of medication and appointments, where self-regulation meets the 
exigencies of broader discourses of psychiatry's own responsibilities, that instilling a 
"desire for self-control, a desire to discipline themselves" (Lunbeck 1994: 181) is 
particularly important. 
12 For example, when Matthew makes a negative claim about his medication, "the times when I forget to 
take my medication it doesn't make any difference", the doctor replies, "if you didn't remember to to take it 
(. ) for a long time then it probably would make a difference". 
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The themes of "help", "advice", "persuade", and "forget" suggest that psychiatric practices 
at the level of local encounters involve going through the patient and attempting to secure 
patients' agreement, compliance and self-regulation through discourses of benevolence, 
persuasion and responsibility. Equally, in many instances, as we have seen in the extracts 
above, patients go along with and/or utilise these discourses themselves. However 
psychiatric practice is also framed in terms of another discourse which is somewhat 
contradictory to the practices discussed so far. Themes of professional supervision of 
patients are regularly deployed in meetings constituting a different kind of 
professional/patient relation and suggesting that engendering self-responsibility is an 
imperfect and limited endeavour. 
4. Supervision: "see" and "monitor" 
The previous sections have discussed a number of ways in which professional/patient 
relations are constituted interactionally in terms of benevolent, persuasive psychiatry/ 
participatory, responsible patient. A key feature of patients' responsibility for their mental 
health concerns medication and appointments, although asymmetries in 
professional/patient relations imply that patient responsibility remains under the auspices 
of professional regulation. However, professionals regularly employ supervisory 
discourses in meetings which indicate that this is an important aspect of psychiatric 
practice. Supervisory discourses both constitute an alternative coexistent 
psychiatric/patient relation and suggest that professionals may, in turn, be attending to the 
possibilities of their own surveillance. In this section, I explore the way professionals 
deploy the themes of "see" and "monitor" in their discussions with patients and other 
professionals. Seeing is not simply a matter of cognitive perception. As Coulter & Parsons 
(1990) have demonstrated, seeing is embedded in practical action, its meaning varying 
according to the context of its use, and does not necessarily connote perceptual activities 
per se. 
In the first extract Sarah, the CPN, is going over what will be written in Matthew's new 
care plan. Discussion preceding this extract has concerned Matthew, the patient, claiming 
that his medication "doesn't make any difference" and the doctor stating "we should 
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continue with the care plan", implying that the medication will not be changed. The 
doctor has then requested that Sarah "go through the care plan" (text not included here). 
The extract begins with Sarah presenting her account as a summary of what they have 
agreed in the meeting, implying a consensus which belies the disagreement over 
medication between the doctor and Matthew, "what we've got so far" (line 284). However, 
she then amends this to a personal framing suggesting, perhaps, some uncertainty, "how I 
see the care plan" (lines 284-5). 
Meeting 3 (main meeting) : Matthew 
284 Sarah (CPN): if I could just go through what we've got so far from the meeting >how 
285 I see the care plan would be< is that um just to monitor your mental 
286 state overall you'll still have to see me every two weeks for the depo 
287 so the depo will be the same (. ) is that right to continue with that? 
The care plan is framed in terms of what the professionals will do, "monitor", and what 
Matthew has to do, "see me" (lines 285 & 286). "Monitor" carries the notion of 
supervision, suggesting regular surveillance of Matthew's "mental state", although the 
force of this surveillance discourse is downplayed by the preceding qualifier, "just", which 
suggests it is really only a minor matter. 13 In contrast, Matthew "see"ing Sarah seems to 
indicate regular contact with the CPN for the purposes of administering his injection 
(depo is the term used for an injection of medication). The imperative "have to" before 
"see me" conveys the sense that seeing the CPN for his injection is a matter of necessity 
rather than choice, mirroring discourses in Diane's meeting regarding "have to take" the 
tablet (section 3). The use of "still" (line 286) reiterates the doctor's implication that the 
medication will not be changed, an understanding that Sarah checks with the doctor. 
The themes of "monitor" and "see" in this extract, then, appear to have little to do with, 
and run somewhat counter to, notions of patient responsibility. Together with other 
instances of professional talk such as "checking out" a patient's ability to mother, and 
"keep an eye on" a patient's side-effects (see Appendix V), these themes indicate that a 
major part of psychiatric practice is the supervision of patients. Supervisory discourses 
imply that while patients should be responsible for their mental health, they are not very 
"A similar diminishing of the force of surveillance discourse occurs in Diane's meeting, where "monitor 
your mental state" is amended to "make sure you're alright" (see first extract, Appendix V). 
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responsible or entirely trustworthy. They constitute a different kind of professional/patient 
relation of supervisory psychiatry/untrustworthy patient which coexists with benevolent, 
persuasive psychiatry/responsible patient. In turn this indicates that the project of 
engendering self-responsibility and self-regulation (Rose 1986b; Lunbeck 1994) is a 
troublesome endeavour that requires professional supervision at the local level. 
Moreover, while Rose (1986a) suggests that community psychiatry has extended medical 
scrutiny "beyond the hospital and into the home" (pg. 75), supervision is formulated in 
regular but partial terms (administering medication, checking mental state), or particular 
terms (mothering a new baby, side effects of medication), rather than panoptic 
surveillance. In addition, professionals' supervisory practices may also be attending to the 
possibility of their own supervision: patients should be "seen" to have been "seen". In the 
second extract, Robin, the patient, is in the process of being transferred to another Health 
Authority and much of the discussion in his CPA concerns arrangements for his transfer. 
In the sequence before the extract begins, the doctor has been indicating that she will be 
responsible for referring Robin to the consultant at the new hospital but "they'll take time 
before they see you" (text not included here). The time delay between referral and being 
"seen" sets up a problem of supervision and professional responsibility for that 
supervision in the "meantime" (lines 358 & 370). 
Meeting 14 (main meeting) : Robin 
358 Dr. G.: meantime til they (0.9) completely to take care of of you in future (. ) 
359 we will not I will not discharge you from Treetops hospital um II will 
360 see you in the outpatient 
361 Robin: yes= 
362 Dr. G.: =in six weeks time from now 
363 Robin: yes thank you doctor North= 
364 Dr. G.: =OK 
365 Robin: yes thank you 
366 Sam (ASW): every six weeks 
367 Dr. G.: er I'll see him six weeks er from now on I'll make an appointment and 
368 give 'it to you OK"? = 
369 Robin: =yes= 
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370 Dr. G.: =°after the meeting° (. ) meantime um if a CPN could see you once a 
371 month (1.2) and er once a month er Sam you're going to see him 
The doctor begins by establishing where professional responsibilities lie; Robin is their 
responsibility, he will not be "discharged", until the new health authority "completely to 
take care of of you" (lines 358-9). She goes on to list a number of different professionals 
who will be "see"ing Robin, "I will see you in the outpatient" (lines 359-60), "I'll see him 
six weeks from now" (line 367), "if a CPN could see you once a month" (lines 370-1), and 
"once a month Sam you're going to see him" (line 371). The sheer number of "see"ings in 
this extract suggest some anxiety on the doctor's part that in the process of transfer no one 
will be "see"ing Robin and he will be left unsupervised - despite the fact that he is now 
living in a staffed Mind hostel. In this way a series of regular professional contacts with 
Robin is established for the interval before the new health authority take over "complete" 
responsibility. As such, it would seem that it is not just a question of Robin's supervision 
but also of professional responsibility for that supervision. Further, given that these 
detailed professional responsibilities will be written up in the care plan document, it 
appears that the doctor is also attending to the possibility of her own surveillance and 
protecting herself and the other professionals against a future charge that Robin was left 
unsupervised. In this way, professional supervisory responsibilities are documented in the 
care plan record and Robin is "seen" to have been regularly "seen ". 14 
Therefore, themes of "see" and "monitor" constitute an alternative, more asymmetric, 
relation of supervisory psychiatry/untrustworthy patient which coexists with benevolent 
psychiatry/responsible patient and suggests that patients are not sufficiently responsible 
for their mental health and require professional supervision. In addition to establishing 
supervisory practices, professionals also seem to be attending to the possibility of future 
supervision of their own work and responsibilities. This alternative relation of supervisory 
psychiatry/untrustworthy patient and professional concerns to establish and document 
their supervisory practices is accomplished in local interactions. But documentary records 
have a life beyond particular interactions (Garfinkel 1967). Thus supervisory discourses 
14 Garfinkel (1967: 186-207) makes a similar point in his analysis of "Good organizational reasons for'bad' 
clinic records". He suggests that clinical records are designed to protect staff from contingent readings, 
including "occasions under which the record may be used as part of the ongoing system of supervision and 
review" (pg. 194). 
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could also be regarded as the localised outcome of broader media and government 
concerns regarding 'dangerous' (to others or themselves) community patients, such as the 
Zito case, and Ben Silcock who famously climbed into the lion's enclosure at Regent Park 
Zoo, and was killed. Such examples of community patients who "fell through the net" 
(Jones 1993: 245) were cited by the CMHT manager as the impetus behind the 
introduction of CPAs. In this sense then, CPA meetings in general, and supervision 
discourses within meetings in particular, could be said to be means for 'stitching the net'. 
And documenting such practices are the means to be "seen" to be doing so. 
The relation of supervisory psychiatry/untrustworthy patient indicates the discursive limits 
of patient responsibility and thus the limits of governmental psychiatry. However, 
governmental psychiatry also incorporates the notion of a co-participatory patient who 
volunteers for and participates in her/his treatment and care. In the final section, I explore 
the extent and limits of patient participation. If supervisory discourses frame the limits of 
patient responsibility, paradoxically, discourses of choice and consumerism point to the 
limits of patient participation. 
5. Restricting Patient Participation: "choice" and "give it a try" 
In the previous section, I have discussed the ways that participants, particularly 
professionals, frame psychiatric practices within interactions to constitute 
professional/patient relations along two dimensions. On the one hand, benevolent 
psychiatry requires a responsible, voluntary, participatory patient, and on the other, 
supervisory psychiatry suggests that patients are not sufficiently responsible, indicating 
the limits of patient responsibility. I have already detailed the ways benevolent psychiatry 
incorporates the notion of a co-participatory patient and I have suggested that professional 
formulations of voluntarism and participation as preferred psychiatric practice may be 
related to the wider legislative framework. In this respect, the Mental Health Act 1983 
Code of Practice (DoH&WO 1993: 2& 107) makes specific reference to the requirement 
for professionals to "involve" patients in their treatment and care, and "consider" their 
"wishes and needs". Consumerism and choice are key means through which patients may 
participate and be involved in their care, consonant with a governmental psychiatry which 
is said to seek to restore patients to "the status of a choosing individual" (Rose 1989: 
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228). However, patient consumerism and choice may not be in the interests of a powerful 
psychiatric profession (Thomas 1997). In this section I explore the way that discdurses of 
choice and consumerism are deployed within local interactions and their practical effects 
in terms of limiting, rather than encouraging, patient participation. 
The discourse of "choice" is frequently employed by professionals within CPA meetings 
and can be associated with a range of topics from arrangements for future meetings to 
medication and activities. The extracts below concern three different areas of patient 
"choice": the position for having an injection of medication, which medication, and which 
activity at which community centre. But in each case patient "choice" is formulated in 
terms of fixed choices. In the first extract, professionals are discussing Diane, the 
patient's, previous CPN as part of a longer discussion between the three professionals 
regarding why Sarah the CPN will be "good for" Diane (text not included here). In this 
extract, "choice" is presented in terms of how Diane has her injection. 
Meeting 2 (post-meeting) : Diane 
833 Dr. N.: well II ye::: s well actually II don't think her last CPN was really quite 
834 (1.1) compatible personality wise= 
835 Betty (CSW): no [I don't think he was] 
836 Dr. N.: [I think he was prob]ably rather (0.6) domineering [so ] obviously 
837 that doesn't 
838 Betty (CSW): [yes] 
839 Sarah (CPN): so that made it worse for her y'see I give patients the choice how they 
840 want their injections standing up laying down I mean thats their home 
841 and thats their choice if they're relaxed its easier for me 
This "choice" (twice, lines 839 & 841) is not just Diane's but formulated in general terms 
of "patients" (line 839) suggesting that it is given to all (this CPN's) patients. The choice 
of "standing up laying down" (line 840), is associated with "home" (line 840) conveying 
the notion that people should make their own choices in their own homes, and is framed 
as good professional practice that benefits the patient and the professional, "if they're 
relaxed its easier for me" (line 841). The second extract concerns Tony, another patient, 
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choosing between two different types of medication, "either I take **** or ****I couldn't 
take both / ya but you chose****" (lines 431-3). 
Meeting 6 (main meeting) : Tony (**** denotes name of medication) 
429 Dr. N.: and at one time you were taking the **** but that °didn't suit or 
430 something°? 
431 Tony: I got a message from you that um either I take **** or **** I couldn't 
432 take both 
433 Dr. N.: ya but you chose **** 
434 Tony: yes I did= 
435 Dr. N.: =so presumably **** didn't do much for you or you would've chosen it 
436 wouldn't you? 
The formulation of choice between types of medication is used to support the doctor's 
claim that the dispreferred medication "didn't suit", "didn't do much for you" (lines 429 & 
435), the implication being that the preferred choice of medication does suit/did do 
something for him. And in this extract, the doctor solicits Tony's agreement that he made 
a choice. Finally, the extract below is from Michelle's meeting and is related to 
professionally organised activities at two different community centres. 
Meeting 11 (main meeting) : Michelle 
150 Michelle: () their their their meeting clashed with with the um () Castle 
151 °on Tuesday° and another thing its like that meeting on Wednesday I 
152 went to that meeting its full of elderly ladies but I thought that I'd 
153 rather be like () y'know like cookery at the Castle because of the 
154 elderly ladies 
155 Dr. N.: well you've got a choice= 
156 Michelle: =yeah= 
157 Dr. N.: you can go to one or the other 
158 Michelle: yeah exactly I'd rather be at the Castle 
Unfortunately the tape was inaudible prior to this sequence but Michelle's response is 
framed in a way which suggests that she is promoting one venue and rejecting another 
("their meeting clashed... on °Tuesday°, lines 150-1), and one activity over another in a 
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contrast between "meeting... full of elderly ladies" and "cookery at the Castle" (lines 152 
& 153). The doctor sums this up as "choice... one or the other" (lines 155 & 157). Once 
again the doctor solicits Michelle's agreement that it is a matter of her choice (line 155). 
These three extracts, then, present professional discourses of three different areas of 
patient "choice". However, in each case it is formulated in terms of fixed choices. Not 
only is "choice" fixed, it is also extremely limited so that psychiatric discourse of patient 
"choice" enables professionals to found the notion that patients have choices while at the 
same time limiting the extent of choice. In this way, the discourse of "choice" covers over 
the limitations of patient participation; Diane can choose the position in which she has her 
injection, but not whether she has it; similarly, Tony can choose which type of medication 
but not whether he has medication; and Michelle can choose which organised activity she 
attends at which community centre, but not whether she attends activities at all. 
Therefore the discourse of "choice" simultaneously founds and limits patient 
participation. In deploying "choice" in this way, professionals maintain the semblance of a 
participatory, choosing patient while controlling the extent of choice/partcipation. Patients 
are not only given "choice" but are also encouraged to be informed consumers. The 
discourse of "give it a try" suggests that patients are consumers of psychiatric services and 
can pick and choose, try things out, and most importantly, not do things if they have tried 
and do not like the activity, medication, or whatever. In the following two extracts, 
professionals are framing a course of action for the patients in terms of trying an activity 
or medication. In the first extract, Betty, the CSW, is attempting to persuade Diane to 
attend the women's group at the community centre, something that Diane has been 
reluctant to do. 
Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane 
303 Betty (CSW): its finished at twe::: lve really (. ) I mean it it y'know if you came for 
304 just one or two sessions and see how you feel and if you really feel its 
305 not for you well then fine but you've never really given anything at 
Betty formulates her persuasion in terms of informed consumer choice, "if you reall feel 
its not for you well then fine" (lines 304-5), combined with two extreme formulations 
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which suggest that Diane is not making an informed choice, how can she know if she has 
not tried it, "you've never really given anything at" (line 305). Moreover, if Diane 
has "never" tried "anything" this suggests a person with a closed mind and a closed 
existence. This formulation carries a number of implications; that Diane has a choice, 
choices should be informed, and if Diane does not like women's group she can choose not 
to go. The second extract concerns medication; the doctor frames an additional or 
alternative medication as a matter of trying, "you're giving it another TRY::: " and "if you 
want to give it a try" (lines 398 & 401). 
Meeting 6 (main meeting) : Tony (**** denotes name of medication) 
396 Dr. N.: and um what about the medicatio::: n are we happy with tha:: t? 
397 Tony: the **** 
398 Dr. N.: but you're giving it another TRY::: if if you felt like it but I think you 
399 need to think about it 
400 Tony: yes theres no hurry is there= 
401 Dr. N.: =no hurry no so you >if you if you< want to give it a try again you let 
402 me know 
Formulating "try"ing the medication in terms of "if you felt like it"/"if you want to" 
conveys the notion that it is Tony's choice. The theme of "try" suggests, as in Diane's 
extract, that if Tony does not like the medication he can choose not to take it. The theme 
of "give it a try", therefore, founds the notion that patients are consumers of psychiatric 
services. In the above extracts it seems to be deployed as a means of persuading patients 
to do something they are reluctant to do and to solicit their agreement that they have a 
choice. However, consumerism, like choice itself, is somewhat limited. The following 
extract is an example of what happens when a patient attempts to be a consumer. As in 
Diane's extract above, the professionals have been trying to persuade Christine, the 
patient, to attend professionally organised activities at the community centre. They have 
been suggesting to Christine a number of activities that she could attend and are 
attempting to co-ordinate these activities with days when Christine's son is at the 
childminder. At this point Christine asks for a "programme" in order to "do something 
that fits" (lines 479-80). 
117 
Meeting 1 (main meeting) : Christine 
479 Christine: do you have a programme of what goes on? then I can (. ) do something 
480 that fits 
481 Claire (CPN): well what we have to do Christine is yes I can give you a programme 
482 but (. ) I have to (0.5) sort of discuss it with whoever is running it in 
483 terms of y'know actually what the numbers are etc etc 
Christine's request positions her as a consumer of services, much like one might ask for a 
programme of events from a leisure centre. However, Claire, the CPN, immediately 
makes it clear that Christine is not a straightforward consumer. In a disclaimer that 
suggests that Christine can, of course, have a programme ("yes I can give you a 
programme but... ", lines 481-2), the CPN then undermines the usefulness of such a thing 
by invoking organisational constraints in terms of others who are not present, but have to 
be consulted by the professional ("I have to... discuss it with whoever is running it"), and a 
three-part list of "numbers", "etc", "etc" (lines 482-3). The paucity of the three-part list 
leaves the nature of what has to be discussed somewhat vague but is sufficient to found 
the inference that Christine cannot simply pick and choose between activities. 
Organisational constraints are thus invoked to undermine consumerism and place control 
back in psychiatric hands. 
The above extract is suggestive of the limits of "give it a try" consumerism. It would seem 
that patients can "try" activities and medication from a (very) limited subset of options 
suggested and controlled by the professionals. Moreover, the extent to which patients can 
decline things they have "tried" is not entirely clear. The CSW claims that Diane can 
reject the women's group ("if you really feel its not for yot well then fine", lines 304-5), 
and Tony "try"ing an alternative form of medication suggests an option to decline one of 
the alternatives. However, this might be less than straightforward if the patients decline 
the course of medication or activity preferred or desired by the professionals. 
Consumerism is not only deployed as a means of persuasion, it can also be used to cover 
over the limits of choice and defer patient disagreement. In the final extract, the 
professionals have been discussing how Robin, who is being transferred to another health 
authority, will get his injection of medication ("depo") in the intervening period, given 
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that he no longer lives in the Worthington NHS Trust area. In this extract Robin is offered 
a similar kind of fixed "choice" as in the earlier extracts; this time it is which day he has 
his injection of medication. Robin raises an objection framed in terms of combining 
travelling and the injection: 
Meeting 14 (main meeting) : Robin 
844 Robin: its a bit much isn't it on the medication it remains to be seen (. ) when I 
845 travel 
846 Sam (ASW): : you won't have the medication til you're going home= 
847 Robin: =yeah (1.0) yeah 
848 Sam (ASW): what do you think 
849 Robin: I haven't got much say in it really 
850 Sam (ASW): >no no< you have a choice (. ) do you want to have the injection the 
851 same day as the sports? 
852 Robin: well thats what they're saying innit I have to 
853 Sam (ASW): do you want to ! Ey it and if its not suitable we could change it back to 
854 the Monday or another day= 
855 Robin: =yeah yeah try it and see see what happens 
856 Sam (ASW): see what happens tomorrow 
Robin is invited to say what he thinks (line 848), and responds by undermining the notion 
that he has a say ("I haven't got much say in it really" line 849). The social worker 
immediately asserts that he does have a choice between having the injection on the same 
day as sport, or, unsaid but implied, not. But Robin builds on his "not much say" 
argument, countering "choice" with the notion of compulsion, "thats what they're saying 
innit I have to" (line 852). The claim of "not much say" and "I have to" explicitly 
challenges, and threatens to expose, the limitations of "choice". The social worker's 
response however puts the genie back in the bottle; he invokes consumerism, "Lry it" (line 
853) together with an explicit suggestion that if Robin "tries" and does not like it ("if its 
not suitable"), then he can decline to have his injection on a Friday and choose from a 
further subset of options, "change it... to the Monday or another day" (lines 853-4), and 
Robin goes along with this idea of consumerism. Notice that in dealing with the 
"problem" in terms of combining injection and sports, the professional is able to ignore 
that of injection and travel. In this way, then, Robin's challenge to the professional 
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discourse of "choice" is countered by that of consumerism, "try", which covers over the 
limitations of choice and works to close down, or at least defer, any further disagreement. 
Therefore the themes of "choice" and "give it a try" severely restrict the extent of choice 
and consumerism at the same time as they found it. As such, professional talk about 
patient choice and consumerism does not 'mean' the exercise of either and suggests the 
limits of governmental psychiatry in much the same way that supervisory discourses point 
to the limits of patient responsibility. Contra Rose (1989: 228) it does not seem to be a 
case of restoring these particular patients to "choosing individuals"; talk of choice 
obviates meaningful choice. 
Conclusion 
Psychiatric practices are accomplished within local CPA interactions and constitute two 
professional/patient relations. Themes of "help", "advice", and "persuade" constitute a 
relation of benevolent, persuasive psychiatry/responsible, voluntary, co-participatory 
patient. In this framing patients should know what their needs are and bring them to the 
attention of professionals, be responsible for seeking and taking advice, and volunteer for 
and co-participate in their treatment. Professionals do their best to meet patients' needs, 
dispense advice, work with patients, and generally encourage patient responsibility and 
participation. This formulation is reinforced by themes of "I'm not forcing you" and 
"having to section" which frame compulsion as a last resort. The discourse of "forget" is a 
particularly important means by which professionals assign patient responsibility in the 
areas of medication and keeping appointments, activities that patients are not allowed to 
forget. In turn, patients' avowals of forgetting are sufficiently ambiguous to ward off 
"definite responsibility" (Lynch & Bogen 1996: 199) in the same contexts, but are used by 
professionals to re-establish responsibility. 
This professional/patient relation suggests that contemporary psychiatric practices are 
more concerned with governmentality, engendering self-responsibility and self-regulation 
(Miller 1986; Rose 1986b; 1989; Lunbeck 1994) than social control (Laing 1967; Szasz 
1973; 1974; 1976; Chesler 1974), although it is an asymmetrical relation in which the 
professionals accomplish knowledgeability and ultimate responsibility. 
120 
While benevolent psychiatry/responsible patient relations are accomplished interactionally 
within meetings, I have also suggested points at which broader legislative concerns are 
incorporated into interactions. The uncertain limits of professional compulsion and 
patients' rights (Gostin 1983; Mental Health Act 1983; Jones 1993) are played out in local 
interactions in terms of formulations of compulsion (last resort), patient rights 
(voluntarism and participation as preferred practice) and soliciting patients' agreements 
that they are not compelled to take their medication. Similarly, professionals' assignments 
of patient responsibility and patients' avowals of forgetting in the particular contexts of 
medication and keeping appointments, circumvent the indeterminacy of compulsion and 
rights and appear to be related to the broader mandate of community care. 
However, discourses of supervision and restricted choice constitute an alternative, more 
controlling, relation of supervisory psychiatry/untrustworthy patient. Themes of "see" and 
"monitor" suggest that while patients should take some responsibility for their mental 
health they are not very responsible and/or trustworthy, requiring professional 
supervision. Supervisory discourses both establish the need for regular contact with 
patients and a documentary record that professionals are meeting their own 
responsibilities, once again pointing to wider concerns regarding 'stitching the net' (Jones 
1993). Similarly, patient participation is circumscribed through themes of "choice" and 
"give it a try" consumerism. Consumer discourses found the notion of patient choice, and 
are deployed as a means of persuasion for reluctant patients or to defer patient 
disagreement, while simultaneously closing down meaningful choice. Supervisory and 
restricted consumer discourses, therefore, indicate the limits of patient responsibility and 
participation and thus of governmental psychiatry for these particular patients. They 
suggest that psychiatric power incorporates elements of control alongside 
governmentality. 
Schizophrenia as a category is not articulated explicitly in the accomplishment of 
professional/patient relations but this should not be taken to mean that it is irrelevant. 
Rather, the limits of governmental psychiatry for this group of patients suggests that 
background understandings of schizophrenia are operating here: when professionals make 
efforts to , assign patient responsibility in the specific contexts of medication and 
appointments; when they establish that patients must be "seen"; and when patient choice 
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is kept under strict professional control. In other words, when the encouragement of 
self-regulation is framed as so necessary but so limited. A number of background 
understandings appear to be underpinning this framing: notions that if schizophrenic 
patients do not take their medication they will become 'psychotic'; that if they do not 
attend appointments and are not supervised they could become dangerous or vulnerable; 
that if they are allowed more choice they will choose to abandon treatment with the same 
results; that these particular patients are not likely to be fully restored to responsible, 
choosing individuals. Thus the limits of governmental psychiatry, accomplished within 
local encounters, suggest that professionals' background understandings of schizophrenia 
are being played out here in terms of schizophrenia as a delusional disorder where 
complete recovery is "probably not common" (American Psychiatric Association 1994: 
282). 
This chapter has established an initial understanding of how contemporary psychiatric 
power relations unfold within clinical interactions, providing a framework for the chapters 
that follow. The analysis suggests that co-existing relations of benevolent 
psychiatry/responsible patient and supervisory psychiatry/untrustworthy patient are 
accomplished within local encounters, but broader discourses are also played out within 
interactions. Contemporary psychiatry at the local level is more concerned with 
governmentality than social control, yet patient responsibility and participation is limited, 
and supervision is imposed. I have argued that background understandings and 
assumptions about schizophrenia underpin and intersect with professional discourses of 
responsibility, supervision and choice. But gender understandings do not appear to do so: 
notions of patient responsibility and choice are not differentiated by gender. 
Contemporary psychiatry at the local level involves professionals working with patients to 
secure their agreement and compliance, which involves considerable professional 
persuasion and negotiation and suggests that opportunities are likely to open up for 
negotiating and contesting the meanings of gender understandings and experiences. 
However, the limitations of responsibility and participation, encapsulated in supervisory 
discourses and restricted consumerism, imply that professionals may be less benevolent 
when faced with versions that run counter to their own understandings and preferences. 
In the next chapter I explore contemporary professional/patient relations further through 
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an examination of where points of resistance occur in the promotion of patient 
responsibility and participation, and points of reassertion of psychiatric authority at this 
local level. And I consider the way that understandings of gender and schizophrenia may 
be invoked as a means of reasserting professional authority. 
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Chapter Four 
Localised Resistance to and Reassertions of Psychiatric Power 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed two co-existing professional/patient relations 
accomplished within local clinical encounters. Discourses of psychiatric benevolence and 
persuasion, and patient responsibility and participation constitute psychiatric practices in 
terms of encouraging self-regulation in patients. However, discourses of professional 
supervision and patient consumerism indicate the limits of responsibility and participation 
suggesting a more controlling, supervisory psychiatry. I suggested that professionals 
incorporate broader legislative concerns into interactions which are played out in terms of 
framings of compulsion as a last resort, patient voluntarism as preferred practice and 
assigning patient responsibility for taking medication. I argued that the simultaneous 
encouragement and limitation of patient responsibility and participation was indicative 
that professionals' background understandings of schizophrenia were operating, even 
though schizophrenia was not articulated as a category. I concluded that understandings 
and assumptions about schizophrenia, but not gender, intersect with professional 
discourses of responsibility, supervision and choice. I suggested that as professionals 
attempt to gain patients' agreement and compliance, opportunities are likely to arise for 
negotiation and contestation, but it is not clear how professionals might respond to 
patients' interpretations and preferences that do not accord with their own. 
This chapter continues the focus on power and is concerned with patient resistance and 
professional reassertions of power in localised interactions. I begin with a short discussion 
of three different frameworks for understanding psychiatric power: in terms of social and 
gender control (Scheff 1966; Goffman 1968; Rosenhan 1973; Chesler 1974; Szasz 1976); 
a Foucauldian understanding of power and resistance at the micro-level (Foucault 1984; 
1990; Widdicombe 1995; Kingfisher 1996); and a CA approach that views power and 
resistance as a situational accomplishment produced through turns of talk (Mellinger 
1995). I draw on these frameworks to raise questions about contemporary psychiatric 
power and patient resistance in local encounters. 
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The main part of the chapter uses extracts from CPA meetings to explore 
accomplishments of power and resistance. I argue that patients draw on the framework of 
benevolent psychiatry/responsible patient to resist psychiatric control of patient 
participation and responsibility. Patient appropriations and reformulations of professional 
discourses of choice, and responsibility temporarily disrupt psychiatric control of 
decision-making and assessment but ultimately reaffirm these dominant discourses. While 
these small-scale disruptions are not likely to affect broader power relations they are 
significant in terms of securing professionally dispreferred practical outcomes for 
patients. I trace how power and resistance are accomplished turn-by-turn within 
interactions as professionals attempt to control access to and the distribution of talk, use 
partial repeats to challenge the unbelievable claims of patients and position themselves as 
more knowledgeable. And patients accomplish resistance through interrupting 
professionals, defending claims that have been challenged and initiating their own 
interpretations. However I suggest that wider legislative and rights discourses are played 
out within interactions in terms of professional concessions to dispreferred decisions and 
reluctance to engage with topics that undermine the benefits of medication. 
In the second part of the chapter I discuss professional reassertions of power in response 
to patient resistance. I argue that the intra-professional post-meeting is a powerful 
institutional practice, determined by broader discourses, which affords professionals an 
"off-stage" context (Scott 1990: 14) in which to reassert power through (re)ascriptions of 
pathology; ascriptions which foreground and draw upon understandings of schizophrenia. 
However, while such reassertions of power suggest that patient disruptions are only 
temporary, they do not impact upon professionally dispreferred decisions secured by 
patients. Finally, I suggest that understandings of femininity (but not masculinity) are an 
occasional, rather than consistent, resource in professionals' responses to patient 
resistance. However, contra feminist accounts such as Chesler (1974), I argue that 
motherhood is framed as a burden, patients are pathologised without recourse to 
gendering and professionals override gender understandings if useful for the activity at 
hand. I conclude that localised professional/patient interactions involve disruptions and 
reassertions of professional power in which professionals draw on understandings of 
schizophrenia and occasional feminine genderings but they also concede to dispreferred 
decisions in the face of patient resistance. 
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From a feminist perspective writers have drawn on labelling theory to argue that the 
(usually male) therapist has substantial power over the passive and pathologised (female) 
patient, and uses it to enforce gender-role conformity (Chesler 1974; Al-Issa 1980; Barnes 
& Maple 1992). However, this understanding of psychiatric power as hierarchical and 
repressive was not borne out in my analysis of contemporary psychiatric/patient relations 
in the previous chapter. But it is not clear from this initial analysis whether and how 
patients may resist psychiatric power, nor how professionals might respond to such 
resistance. Goffman's (1968) account of the asylum is suggestive of the likely professional 
response to patients who are disruptive and uncooperative: 
... higher management may construe this alienative expression as 
just the sort 
of symptomology the institution was established to deal with and as the best 
kind of evidence that the patient properly belongs where he now finds himself. 
(Goffman 1968: 268). 
Attempts by patients to resist psychiatric power may be met with imputations of 
pathology, but it is not evident whether gender understandings may be a resource in 
professionals' responses to patient resistance. 
Foucault (1979; 1984; 1990) provides a different understanding of power and resistance. 
In his conceptualisation power is relational so that resistance is present in every power 
relation and a condition of its operation: it is "through the articulation of points of 
resistance" that power spreads but it is also through resistance that "power is disrupted" 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 147). However, notions of resistance can be "opaque" in 
Foucauldian accounts (Kitzinger 2000: 175); for example, in Rose (1986b; 1989) and 
Miller's (1986) analyses of contemporary psychiatric power it is not clear where points of 
resistance may occur in the promotion of patient responsibility. Nevertheless Foucault's 
conception is theoretically productive for understanding the local capillaries of power 
even though he does not provide a methodology for analysing localised negotiations of 
power and resistance: 
... it is precisely in the mundane contexts of interaction that institutional power 
is exercised, social inequalities are experienced, and resistance is accomplished. 
(Widdicombe 1995: 111). 
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In such 'everyday forms of resistance' (Scott 1985; 1990), accommodation and resistance 
may be better understood as a continuum rather than a dichotomy; resistance often 
involves the appropriation and ultimate reproduction of dominant discourses whereas 
seeming accommodation may be a form of resistance (Kingfisher 1996). These kinds of 
everyday resistances do not necessarily impact upon broader power relations but "this 
does not mean... that they are insignificant" (Moore 1988: 182). 
An attention to the micro-politics of power and resistance has also been taken by a CA 
approach which views power as a situational accomplishment; that is, power and control 
are viewed as "micropolitical achievements... produced in and through actual turns of talk" 
(Mellinger 1995: 394). In this framework psychiatric power is accomplished through a 
range of interactional moves which control access to and the distribution of talk, for 
example: asking direct questions, evaluating patients' answers and propounding 
alternative explanations (Scheff 1968; Mehan 1990); selectively reinforcing or ignoring 
patients' responses (Scheff 1968); interruptions (West 1984); using partial repeats to 
challenge the 'unbelievable' responses of patients (Mellinger 1995); and positioning self 
as more knowledgeable (Burman 1995). Whilst psychiatrists and therapists have the 
discursive and interactional advantage, as it were, patients and clients may resist by 
reconfirming a prior claim that has been challenged and defending that claim (Mellinger 
1995), or by setting their own agenda, commenting on the therapist's explanation, or 
initiating their own interpretation (Burman 1995). 
Contemporary psychiatry attempts to obtain patients' agreement and compliance in 
decision-making regarding their future treatment and care within local interactions, 
suggesting that opportunities are likely to open up for patients (and significant others) to 
resist and disrupt professional power. The frameworks outlined above raise questions 
about psychiatric power and patient resistance in local encounters. In what ways do 
patients resist psychiatric power and how do professionals respond? Are gender 
understandings a resource in the reassertion of professional authority? And how are 
understandings of schizophrenia relevant to these activities? I use a range of extracts from 
CPA meetings to explore these issues looking at where points of resistance occur in the 
professional promotion and limitation of patient responsibility and choice, and where 
points of reassertion of professional authority occur. And I explore how gender 
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understandings are invoked and deployed as an occasional, rather than consistent, 
resource for re-establishing professional authority. 
1. Resisting Psychiatric Power : Patient Appropriations and Reformulations 
of Discourses of Choice and Responsibility 
In the previous chapter I discussed the way that relations of benevolent, persuasive 
psychiatry/responsible, participatory patient are constituted within interactions through 
themes of "help", "advice" and "forget" which frame professionals as people who 
dispense expert help and advice and encourage patient responsibility and participation. In 
turn patients are assigned responsibility for seeking and taking professional advice, taking 
medication and keeping appointments, and co-participating in their treatment. But 
professional discourses of supervision and choice limit patient responsibility and 
participation accomplishing an alternative relation of supervisory, controlling 
psychiatry/untrustworthy patient. In this section I explore the way that patients appropriate 
and reformulate the discourses that constitute relations of benevolent 
psychiatry/responsible, participatory patient. In reformulating the meanings of choice and 
responsibility, and benevolence, patients attempt to resist the plans, preferences and 
assessments of the professionals, thus disrupting psychiatric power. 
1.1 Reformulating Choice: "I need a couple more weeks to make up my mind" 
Professionals simultaneously found and limit patient choice in such a way that they retain 
control through formulations of fixed and limited choices. Further, "give it a try" 
consumerism may be deployed as a means of persuading reluctant patients but I raised 
doubts about the extent to which patients could decline a course of action preferred or 
desired by the professionals. In the extracts that follow the professionals are trying to 
persuade the patient to return to living in his flat, rather than with his parents, a course of 
action that is desired by the professionals but which the patient is reluctant to do. In the 
course of the interaction professionals' invocation of discourses of choice and "give it a 
try" consumerism are counterposed with an alternative formulation of the meaning of 
choice, deployed by the patient. 
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Colin is about to be discharged from the day hospital and attends the meeting with his 
parents, Mr. and Mrs. Epsilon. Mr. Epsilon has introduced the subject of where Colin is 
"staying" and the doctor takes up this topic. The extract below begins with her question to 
Colin, which, though framed as a request for confirmation, suggests she is seeking an 
explanation (Queensgate is where Colin has a supported accommodation flat). 
Meeting 13 (main meeting) : Colin (notes only) 
72 Dr. N.: don't you want to live at Queensgate Colin 
73 Colin: I get more support at home 
74 Dr. N.: you'd have your own place be independent 
75 Colin: if I had a full time job 
76 Dr. N.: well you can't keep it as back-up 
77 Colin: I prefer to live with my parents 
78 Basil (HSW): I'm concerned hes been staying at his parents and the viability of that 
79 we're not giving him the support because hes not there 
80 Dr. N.: should we encourage him to go back 
81 Basil (HSW): its up to Colin 
82 Dr. N.: but you're not helping because hes not there why don't you give it 
83 another try 
84 Mrs. Epsilon: hes high on the list for a place of his own 
85 Dr. N.: is that going to work out 
86 Mrs. Epsilon: I don't know I get the feeling its the people moving in and out of 
87 Queensgates 
88 Brian (PN): its quietened down now its fairly stable 
89 Basil (HSW): stable 
90 Colin: I need a couple more weeks to make up my mind 
Colin provides a justification for living at home rather than at the flat, however the doctor 
counters "support" with "independent" suggesting that Colin would be more autonomous 
if he lived in the flat and implying, perhaps, that needing support from your parents is 
overly-dependent. In response Colin counterposes the doctor's understanding of 
independence, having "your own place" (line 74) with an alternative one, "a full time job". 
In making living at the flat conditional on a full-time job, something which is not likely at 
present, he is placing it in an indefinite future. The doctor completely ignores the notion 
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of a full-time job but Colin's reformulation of independence elicits a stronger response in 
terms of a warning that he cannot live with his parents and keep the flat, inferring that a 
decision needs to be made. And Colin gives her a decision, framed as a preference. 
But it is not simply a matter of Colin making a choice when his preference does not 
concur with that of the professionals. Now the practicability ("viability") of Colin living 
with his parents is raised as a matter of concern suggesting that there is some unnamed 
problem associated with this, followed by the notion that he will have as much, if not 
more, support (from a professional) if he does live on his own, "we're not giving him the 
support because hes not there" (lines 78-9). Dr. North reiterates Basil's argument followed 
by consumerism, "why don't you give it another try" (lines 82-83). As in the previous 
chapter this works to suggest that Colin can choose (even though he has already chosen 
the professionals' dispreferred option), and need not do it if he has tried (or on this case 
tried again) and does not like it. And once again it is an attempt to persuade the patient to 
comply with the professionals' advice. Colin's mother also enters the conversation here 
and brings in a new element which covertly suggests that Queensgate is not a real "place 
of his own" (line 84) but more like a transit camp, "its the people moving in and out of 
Queensgates" (lines 86-7). In the process Mrs. Epsilon frames Queensgate as the problem 
rather than Colin. The psychiatric nurse and housing support worker join forces to counter 
the implication that Queensgate is a problem and undermine Mrs. Epsilon's attempt to 
support Colin. At this point, possibly feeling under pressure to give the professionals the 
answer they are seeking, Colin defers agreement, "I need a couple more weeks to make up 
my mind", thus warding off, at least temporarily, the need to comply and resisting the 
professionals' desired plan for him. 
In the next extract the professionals continue to press Colin to agree to their preferred 
plan. In the intervening discussion between the previous extract and the one below, the 
doctor has changed tack and attempted unsuccessfully to elicit the support of Colin's 
parents. This extract takes up where the doctor is turning back to Colin with a direct 
question about "Queensgate", signalling that she is continuing to pursue the professionals' 
preference that he live in the flat. And, given that Basil has undermined Colin's objection 
in terms of "support" and Mrs. Epsilon's regarding "people moving in and out" (previous 
extract, lines 79 & 89), the doctor's question at line 99 presents a problem for Colin. 
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When Colin does not provide any objections to Queensgate, the doctor reiterates the 
consumerist discourse of "give it a try", explicitly elaborating that he still has a choice but 
if he does not act that choice will no longer be available, the inference being that it should 
be an informed choice and, by implication, that the choice Colin has made is not an 
informed one (lines 101-102). 
99 Dr. N.: is there anything wrong with Queensgates 
100 Colin: no 
101 Dr. N.: why don't you give it a try for a month and then make up your mind 
102 otherwise you'll lose it and then you'll have no choice 
103 Mr. Epsilon: I'd rather Colin was independent but what do you do if he wants to 
104 come home 
105 Dr. N.: give it a try Basil can't help if hes not there 
106 Colin: can I give it a couple of weeks 
107 Dr. N.: of what [. ] thinking [. ] what [. ] 
108 Colin: well I sort of I haven't put in my mind what I want to do 
109 Dr. N.: why a couple of weeks 
110 Colin: because I'm getting better all the time 
Under even more pressure to agree to this persuasive argument of choice and 
consumerism, Colin recirculates his previous strategy of deferring agreement, "can I give 
it a couple of weeks" (line 106). This time the doctor confronts this response with a series 
of direct questions; note the number of pauses here indicating that she is expecting an 
explanation from Colin which he is very slow to provide, "of what [. ] thinking [. ] what 
[. ]" (line 107). The final pause suggests that she will wait until she gets an answer. The 
doctor's reference to "thinking", sandwiched between two questioning "what"s, appears to 
be reorienting to Colin's previous claim that "I need a couple more weeks to make up my 
mind" (previous extract, line 90), and it seems to be uttered as a result of Colin's silence 
and as a means to press him for an answer. But it also provides an opening for Colin to 
recirculate his claim, this time formulated rather oddly, "I haven't put in my mind what I 
want to do". When the doctor presses him further, questioning the idea that thinking will 
take "a couple of weeks", Colin brings in the notion of improving health, "I'm getting 
better all the time" (line 110). This response works in a number of ways; it is a positive 
self-assessment of his health which carries the covert suggestion of positive treatment, but 
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it also provides a good justification for deferring agreement and support for a 
reformulation of what choice means. 
Therefore, the professionals have a particular plan for Colin, living at the flat, which 
Colin resists. They deploy a number of persuasive arguments in terms of "independence", 
"support", and "help" he will receive if he concurs with their plan (lines 74,79 & 105). 
But the chief means through which they attempt to solicit his agreement is the 
employment of discourses of "choice" and "give it a try" consumerism (lines 82-3,102 & 
105). The professionals, therefore, are attempting to persuade Colin to do something 
which he is reluctant to do. ' And it is not a simple matter of choice between two options 
when the patient does not choose the one desired by the professionals. The doctor 
instigates a series of direct questions to Colin (lines 99,107 & 109) in the second extract 
which accomplish control of the talk (Scheff 1968) and attempt to secure Colin's 
compliance. As such, the doctor can be said to be 'doing' power here. 
However, accomplishing psychiatric power through control of the talk does not achieve 
agreement. Colin employs a number of arguments to resist the desired plan, for example 
discourses of parental "support" (line 73), and reformulating the meaning of 
"independent" (line 75). However his main strategy is deferring agreement through the 
appropriation and reformulation of the discourses of "choice" and "give it a try" 
consumerism. The themes of "I need a couple more weeks to make up my mind" and "can 
I give it a couple of weeks... I haven't put in my mind what I want to do", (lines 90,106 & 
108) reformulate the meaning of choice from a simple informed choosing between two 
options to notions that choice requires thought, thought takes time, and the better he feels 
the more able he will be to think about it and make a decision. Thus "choice" is no longer 
about giving something "a try" but about giving it considerable thought? 
Therefore Colin appropriates and reformulates the professional discourses of choice and 
consumerism to effectively resist professionals' attempts to gain compliance to their 
The same sort of response to patients' reluctance was deployed in the extracts in chapter three, section 2.5 
when Diane, Tony, and Robin are similarly persuaded. 
Z Given that CPA meetings are convened every three to six months, and that patients usually only see the 
doctor once between CPA meetings, the practical effect of reformulating the meaning of choice in this way 
is to defer agreement, or more likely disagreement, to a time and place outside of the meeting and, in 
particular, outside of the doctor's domain. 
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desired plan for him. By effective I mean simply the practical effects in terms of where 
Colin lives and who decides. As such, this localised everyday resistance temporarily 
disrupts psychiatric control and is not insignificant (Moore 1988). But this kind of 
resistance is unlikely to impact upon broader power relations; in drawing on the 
professional discourse of choice, Colin also reinforces the notion that patients have 
choices (Kingfisher 1996). Moreover Colin's disruption of psychiatric control does not 
free him from power but, rather, further enmeshes him in governmental power. In effect, 
Colin has momentarily extended the limits of governmental psychiatry in terms of his 
capacity to be a "choosing individual" which is more consonant with Rose's (1989: 228) 
conception of governmentality. In the following section, I explore patients' appropriations 
and reformulations of responsibility, which similarly disrupt psychiatric control of 
decision-making and assessments of patients. 
1.2 Reformulating Responsibility: "I worry about the long term effect" and "sorting what 
I'm thinking" 
There are a number of ways in which professionals invoke and assign patient 
responsibility. Benevolent psychiatry requires a patient who is responsible for bringing 
their problems and needs to the attention of professionals, and seeking and taking 
professional advice. In particular, patients should be responsible for taking their 
medication and keeping appointments, activities they are not allowed to forget. But 
professionals retain ultimate responsibility for patients' mental health and the extent of 
responsibility is limited by discourses of supervision. In this section, I discuss 
reformulations of responsibility deployed by patients to resist the doctor's assessments and 
preferred plans. 
The first extract are taken from the meeting for Diane, a community patient, who attends 
the meeting with her husband George Yellow. One of the main topics discussed during 
the meeting is why Diane does not take her medication and the necessity for Diane to take 
her medication has been framed by the doctor in terms of "forget"ting, thus assigning it as 
Diane's responsibility? The doctor has suggested that Diane has the wrong attitude ("so 
really its your attitude that you've got to think about", text not included here). But the 
reason for Diane having the wrong sort of attitude to her medication has been left 
Parts of this extended discussion are in chapter three, sections 2 and 3. 
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unexplicated. The extract below begins with the consultant moving to provide a reason; it 
is about what Diane "believes" (lines 555,559 & 563). A number of inferences are 
founded in this sequence. Firstly, "you've gotta" is articulated twice (line 554) lending the 
discourse an imperative quality which reinforces the notion that it is Diane's 
responsibility. Responsibility here is assigned in terms of trusting and believing the 
professionals, "you've got to trust" and "really believe" (lines 554-5). Secondly, the use of 
"people" at line 555 deprofessionalises the "help"; it positions the professionals as general 
caring sorts of people who want to help and have Diane's best interests at heart (see 
previous chapter, section 1). Thirdly "help" is juxtaposed with "poison". 
Meeting 2 (main meeting): Diane 
554 Dr. N.: because I think its a matter of trust really you've gotta (. ) you've got to 
555 trust the people trying to help you and really believe they're trying to 
556 help you [not ] 
557 Diane: [oh ]I do believe that= 
558 Dr. N.: =poksoning you when this happens because its not its not poison but if 
559 you beLIEVE its poison then you're not going to want to take it= 
560 Diane: =yes 
561 Dr. N.: so y'know I think you need to to to just discuss it and see 
562 Diane: yeah 
563 Dr. N.: what you really belie:: ve (1.6) do you sometimes think maybe this is a 
564 bit of poison [they're giving you] 
Within this short sequence the doctor employs "believe" three times and each time it is 
emphasised (lines 555,559 & 563), and "poison" four times (lines 558 twice, 559 & 564). 
In this psychiatric context, beliefs are not necessarily a matter of personal ideas and 
convictions, but rather are potential candidates for being judged as part of the "grammar 
of schizophrenia" (Coulter 1991: 161); professional judgments may be made regarding 
whether a patient's beliefs are harmless or delusional 4 Thus beliefs may be invoked by 
professionals to denote something as unbelievable and thus delusional and psychotic. In 
designating "poison" as a belief, and contrasting "people trying to help you" with "not 
poisoning you", Dr. North is ascribing to Diane a delusional belief; the belief that 
` For example, the community centre runs a group called "living with your beliefs" which is specifically for 
patients whose hallucinations and delusions are not entirely controlled by their medication. 
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professionals would poison their patients is bizarre, unbelievable and thus delusional. In 
this way the doctor foregrounds an understanding of schizophrenia, in terms of delusional 
beliefs, as an explanation for why Diane does not take her medication. Diane interrupts 
Dr. North at line 556 to attempt to confirm that she has the right kind of beliefs but the 
doctor is mid-way in producing a contrast structure between a rational belief (that people 
are trying to help Diane) and a delusional one (poisoning her). In ignoring Diane's 
response and attempt at affirmation at line 557, the doctor continues to control access to 
the talk (Scheff 1968; Mehan 1990) until she has completed her assessment. 
The next extract follows on from the previous one. Having founded her explanation in 
terms of a delusional belief, in the next extract Dr. North provides an opening for Diane in 
the form of a request for her to confirm the doctor's explanation. But instead of the 
preferred response Diane resists the doctor's formulation and presents an alternative 
interpretation, interrupting the doctor to do so. What makes this alternative framing so 
effective is that Diane draws on the notion of "poison", introduced by the doctor, to 
reformulate the explanation in terms of poisoning her own body, the long term effects of 
taking medication. 
565 Diane: [no no I don't] I just think to myself (1.6) I worry about the long term 
566 effect of tablets and injections (0.7) y'know what its doing to my body 
567 do you know what I mean doctor? 
568 Dr. N.: ye:: s= 
569 Diane: =1 worry about the long term effect thats all 
570 Dr. N.: well but you can find out about the long term effect I mean when 
571 Sarah could get you some information from the pharmacy and things 
572 like that I mean you can () ask questions 
573 Diane: yes 
574 Dr. N.: and you can be told the answers 
575 Diane: yes 
576 Dr. N.: y'know you maybe you need to find out more about it 
577 Diane: yes 
578 Dr. N.: um but its its been around for a long time I mean with this 
579 medication that you're o: n so that people do know the long term 
580 effects its not a mystery 
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581 Diane: yeah 
582 Dr. N.: yeah:: 
Diane reformulates poison from a delusional belief into a legitimate and rational concern, 
"I worry about the long term effect... what its doing to my body" (lines 565-6). Whilst the 
doctor has positioned Diane as delusional, Diane has re-positioned herself as someone 
who is aware of and concerned with her health. After initial hesitation (the holding 
response at line 568) Dr. North launches into a long sequence which avoids giving Diane 
any explanation of what the long term effects might be. Dr. North places responsibility 
squarely on Diane again, it is her responsibility to find out, "you can find out" (line 570), 
"you can (. ) ask questions" (line 571), and "you can be told answers" (line 574). Diane is 
repositioned, this time as someone who has not asked, has not bothered to find out about 
something that "people do know", and thus as worrying unnecessarily and acting without 
knowledge. The doctor undermines Diane's claim that she is concerned with her health 
somewhat, by suggesting that Diane has been rather foolish, but Diane has successfully 
shifted the discourse from the realm of delusional belief to one of legitimate concern. 
And, while the doctor has used this as an opportunity to further impress upon Diane 
where her responsibilities lie, there is also a sense here that the doctor does not really 
want to deal with this topic in the meeting beyond assigning responsibility; that is, it 
could be argued that she spends quite some time not telling Diane what the side-effects 
are. 
Therefore, the doctor is attempting to assign responsibility to Diane for taking her 
medication through exhorting her to trust and believe in the professionals. In the course of 
doing so, Diane's past behaviour of not taking her medication is explained in terms of an 
ascription of pathology/delusional belief. Such an ascription may decrease the degree of 
Diane's irresponsibility in the past but not her untrustworthiness. The doctor ignores 
Diane's affirmation of having the right kind of belief and evaluates Diane's claim that she 
worries about the long-term effects of medication. In turn, Diane interrupts the doctor 
(West 1984) and initiates her own interpretation of why she does not take her medication 
(lines 566-7) (Burman 1995). Diane's interpretation resists a potentially damaging 
assessment; the reason why she does not take her medication is not down to a delusional 
belief but a reasonable and legitimate concern for her health. It is a formulation that the 
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doctor can only partially counter, rather than dismantle, by claiming that Diane is 
worrying unnecessarily and acting without knowledge. 
The effectiveness of Diane's interpretation comes from her appropriation and 
reformulation of the professional discourse of responsibility which exploits a tension 
between medication having therapeutic effects and having adverse side-effects. In the 
process the meaning of responsibility as trusting and believing in the professionals and 
responsibility for taking her medication, is transformed into a more wide-ranging 
self-responsibility for general long-term health, a framing which pits one responsibility 
(for taking medication) against another (for long-term health). In this way, Diane is 
drawing on a dominant discourse and thus, like Colin in the previous section, ultimately 
reaffirms the discourse that patients should be responsible for their mental health. 
However, the practical effects in terms of overturning a psychiatric ascription of 
delusional beliefs carries significance for Diane's past, present and future 
(un)trustworthiness and (un)believability. Once again Diane's resistance is formulated 
within and draws upon benevolent psychiatry/responsible patient relations but it 
temporarily resists psychiatric power to ascribe (a feature of) pathology and in so doing 
disrupts a controlling psychiatry that takes ultimate responsibility for an untrustworthy 
patient; it is Diane who is taking responsibility over the longer term regarding the costs 
(rather than benefits) of medication for her health. 
However, the meaning of a reformulated responsibility for mental health varies according 
to the context and purpose for which it is deployed and it can be mobilised pre-emptively 
rather than in response to a professional assessment. In the next extract Matthew, another 
patient, provides an alternative reformulation of responsibility to further a course of action 
which, it becomes clear, is dispreferred by the doctor. Matthew utilises the discourse of 
"help" to dispute the therapeutic effect of medication and reframe responsibility in terms 
of self-help and self-understanding in order to pursue a request for psychotherapy. 
Moreover one of the professionals forms a temporary covert alliance with the patient to 
resist the doctor's assessment and plan. Matthew is a community patient who attends the 
meeting alone. The first extract occurs very near the beginning of the meeting. The doctor 
is questioning Matthew about his medication and Matthew interrupts the doctor's second 
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question with a response which appropriates the discourse of "help" to negate the benefit 
of the medication. 
Meeting 3 (main meeting) : Matthew (**** denotes name of medication) 
5 Dr. N.: so did they did they help you? (0.9) have you been taking [them]? 
6 Matthew: [um ]I don't 
7 feel the medications helping me at all 
8 Dr. N.: you don't think ay of the medications helping you (0.6) well what 
9 about these these **** tablets do you think (. ) think they did anything? 
10 Matthew: not really 
11 Dr. N.: so tell me what you're taking now in the way of medication 
The doctor responds with a partial repeat, "you don't think as of the medications helping 
you" (line 8) which challenges the believability of Matthew's claim, heightened by the use 
of the extreme formulation "any" which is emphasised (Mellinger 1995). While perhaps a 
certain medication might not be "help"ful, she implies that a claim of "any" is 
unbelievable. Framing her question in this way appears to be an attempt to elicit a 
modifying response from Matthew. However, again, Matthew's response is not 
forthcoming forcing Dr. North to frame yet another more specific question together with 
another extreme formulation "anything" (line 9). Matthew reconfirms his prior claim, but 
it is modified ("not really") and the doctor moves into a series of direct medical questions 
which enable her to take control of the talk (Schell 1968). Having done so she presents 
him with a fixed 'Catch 22' sort of choice; either he is feeling better or he is not, which 
takes him back to the "stra:: nge (. ) thoughts and feelings" (lines 47-8). It has been set up 
in such a way that Matthew can only respond in the positive (or risk being discredited), 
which he does initially at line 51. 
47 Dr. N.: um (2.9) well because you see um you did have stra:: nge () thoughts 
48 and feelings at one time didn't you >when I saw you in< Jules um you 
49 said you were feeling a lot better:: so do you feel differently now do 
50 you or do you still feel you're doing OK::: 
51 Matthew: um I'm doing a lot better than I was (. ) um (1.0) 
52 Dr. N.: ye:: s (1.3) so but you see (1.7) wouldn't that perhaps be due to to 
53 having the the medication 
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54 Matthew: naah I don't think so= 
55 Dr. N.: =°well what do you think it's due to°? 
56 Matthew: sorting out my head sorting what I'm thinking 
57 Dr. N.: you're thinking yourself into being better 
58 Matthew: yes 
59 Dr. N.: °I see° (4.8) ((sound of papers rustling)) 
But when Dr. North moves to link feeling better with "having the medication" and invites 
Matthew to agree with her explanation (lines 52-3), he explicitly denies that this is the 
case, "naah I don't think so" (line 54). Dr. North pursues Matthew's denial by requesting 
an alternative explanation, which I would suggest is probably in order to give her 
sufficient purchase to undermine his claim. Matthew places the reasons for "doing a lot 
better" inside himself with self as the agent of change rather than the medication or the 
professionals, "sorting out my head sorting what I'm thinking" (line 56). The doctor's 
rephrasing of what he has said may well be another challenge to the believability of his 
claim but it is not effective: Matthew reconfirms the claim and the doctor is stumped. The 
long pause and rustling of papers suggests that the doctor does not want to engage in a 
discussion about self-healing versus medication. 
Therefore, Matthew has appropriated the psychiatric discourse of "help" to undermine the 
therapeutic effectiveness of his medication. The discourse of "sorting what I'm thinking" 
suggests that self-help is what makes you better, and the notion of self-help suggests a 
responsibility for his own mental health in terms of a self-healing which runs counter to 
professional formulations of patient responsibility in terms of seeking and taking 
professional advice, and taking the medication the professionals prescribe. Moreover, this 
formulation of help and responsibility stops the doctor in her tracks. While in the previous 
sections patients' reformulations were mobilised to resist professional plans and 
assessments, Matthew's reformulation of help and responsibility appears to be 
pre-emptive. As the discussion continues a reformulation of responsibility as self-help and 
self-healing is turned towards a request by the patient for psychotherapy. The extract 
below runs directly on from the previous one. After a long pause and much rustling of 
papers, Sarah, the CPN, fills the silence with a reference to Matthew's last CPA. In filling 
the silence, Sarah provides another opening for Matthew. She names the medication as an 
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"issue" with a history as a disclaimer to forward the inference that Matthew was 
persuaded to "stay on" it. Notice also that Sarah has read Matthew's pre-emptive 
interactional moves as related to furthering a cessation of his medication. But Matthew 
interrupts Sarah, using the history to introduce a new agenda, "one to one" therapy (line 
63). 
60 Sarah (CPN): yes I think we had this discussion when we had the CPA meeting in 
61 April (1.0) with Dr. South then you wished to come off all medication 
62 that was the issue but we convinced [you to stay on it ] 
63 Matthew: [yeah I wanted one] to one 
64 Sarah (CPN): sorry? 
65 Matthew: I think I wanted one to one with someone 
66 Dr. N.: well you've had an assessment by the psychotherapist by Louise and 
67 and you didn't seem to know what it was all abou::: t and it never got 
68 off the rog u: nd (. ) um (2.3) ya I mean she theres a letter here from 
69 Louise so you she wanted to see you November'96 and she said she'd 
70 written to you befo::: re but you you hadn't kept the appointment or 
71 somethi: ng and then she arranged another appointment for you:: and 
72 you didn't come and you didn't get in touch with he:: r (1.3) um 
73 Matthew: I was in a bad way then y'know 
74 Dr. N.: ya well what kind of >wha'd'you wah'd'you< mean by one to one? what 
75 d'you think you want to talk abou:: t (1.0) because you would've had 
76 quite a bit of talking in the day hospital wouldn't you? 
77 Matthew: I didn't really use the time when I was there I don't think I really um 
78 (2.3) the time in the day hospital when I was in the day hospital I 
79 wasn't well (0.9) tuned in to what I was feeling (1.4) 1 wasn't 
The doctor re-enters the conversation with what could be termed a chronicle of failed 
opportunity. Two three-part lists are sandwiched either side of documentary evidence. The 
initial three-part list of "you've had an assessment by the psychotherapist ... and you 
didn't 
seem to know what it was all abou::: t and it never got off the rog u::: nd" (lines 66-8) 
founds the claim that Matthew has already had this opportunity but it was a complete 
failure because of his inadequacy. The middle item in the list is particularly damning and 
provides the explanation as to why it was unsuccessful and whose fault this was; 
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Matthew's not knowing "what it was all abou::: t" suggests that he was insufficiently aware 
to benefit from psychotherapy. The second three-part list provides an actual chronology 
which again suggests that Matthew has had this opportunity and failed to take it up, "you 
hadn't kept the appointment or somethi:: ng and then she arranged another appointment for 
you:: and you didn't come and you didn't get in touch with he:: r" (lines 70-2). In this 
chronological list, the psychotherapist is depicted as going to some efforts to see Matthew 
while Matthew inexplicably did not bother, or was not able to attend or contact the 
therapist. 
The documentary evidence sandwiched between the two three-part lists provides weight 
to the doctor's claims, "theres a letter here from Louise... she wanted to see you in 
November 96" (lines 68-9), founding the claim that Matthew has had this opportunity 
already, it was a complete waste of time, and it was all his fault. As such it is a strong 
indictment of Matthew and counter to his claim that he "wanted one to one". However, 
rather than denying what the doctor has claimed, Matthew responds with a justification 
which firmly places those actions in the past , "I was in a bad way then" (line 73), thus 
providing an alternative interpretation. Not only does this provide a justification for his 
past failure but it also carries with it the implication that this past should not be used as an 
indicator of his future capabilities. As such it attempts to undermine the relevance of his 
past behaviour for the present discussion. 
Matthew's justification and denial of relevance leaves the doctor floundering ("ya well 
what kind of >wha'd'you wha'd'you<", line 74) and her response suggests that his counter 
has been (at least partially) effective. It forces the doctor towards a slightly different line 
of questioning which nevertheless pursues the notion that psychotherapy is a waste of 
time. She frames a question to Matthew which challenges what he is asking for and why 
he thinks he wants it, "wah'd'you< mean by one to one? what d'you think you want to talk 
abou:: t" (lines 74-5). The question subtly infers that he does not know what he is talking 
about and presses Matthew to provide a convincing justification. The pause suggests she 
is waiting for an answer but when he does not respond the doctor formulates another 
example of an opportunity Matthew has already had, "quite a bit of talking in the day 
hospital " (line 76). This time it is not a failed opportunity but one which suggests he has 
already had therapy so why should he need more. But Matthew recirculates and elaborates 
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his previous explanation which ignores and circumvents the, potentially more difficult, 
first half of the doctor's question. 
But this merely prompts the doctor to reiterate the first part of her question. The next 
extract follows on again from the previous one. In repeating her question, the consultant 
also attempts to undermine, to some extent, what Matthew is asking for. Her use of "one 
to one as you put it" (lines 80-1) suggests that Matthew is using pop psychology 
terminology, it is not the correct word, and once again implies that he does not know what 
he is talking about. It is also clear by this point in the discussion that the doctor does not 
agree with or want to grant Matthew's request for therapy. Moreover, in the next extract it 
appears that Matthew is trying to bring pressure to bear to get what he wants but he does 
not want to talk about whatever he wants to talk about with the doctor. ' 
80 Dr. N.: OK but you haven't actually said what it is you think that one to one 
81 as you put it will do for you 
82 Matthew: well I just need to get a lot of things out of my system 
83 Dr. N.: like what? 
84 Matthew: disturbing thoughts 
85 Dr. N.: can you tell me about them? 
86 Matthew: um sexual abuse (1.7) um (1.2) schizophrenia (1.4) things about my 
87 parents (1.9) () 
88 Dr. N.: they're a lot of different things that you're ju:: st () °sort of () >putting 
89 all< to°gether can you explain a bit about that? 
90 Matthew: I had a nervous breakdown when I was seven (1.2) and I didn't deal 
91 with it (1.8) so over the years my thoughts have just got worse and 
92 worse 
93 Dr. N.: and what what is this about sexual abuse? 
94 Matthew: that's what caused my er breakdown when I was seven 
95 Dr. N.: and who from who was the sexual abuse from 
96 Matthew: my father (8.5) 
97 Dr. N.: I mean is this something that was discussed in the day hospital Sarah? 
98 Sarah (CPN): well we discussed that didn't we Matthew 
99 Matthew: I don't remember 
Given that Matthew gets "one to one" of sorts in outpatients with the doctor, he is also, to some extent, 
indirectly undermining her expertise. 
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Matthew provides a general reason at line 82, "I just need to get a lot things out of my 
system", which works in a number of ways. Firstly, it founds the inference that he has "a 
lot of things" that he needs to talk about while at the same time keeping it sufficiently 
vague to prevent the doctor undermining his claim. Secondly it carries the same sort of 
connotations to the reformulation of help and responsibility accomplished earlier in the 
meeting. Now responsibility for mental health is formulated in terms of 
self-understanding with the help of the professionals. But this is not help in the form of 
medication or advice from the professionals. Rather it reformulates the professional 
version of help to mean help to help yourself. And it brings a problem and need to the 
attention of the professionals but at the same time suggests that these particular 
professionals cannot meet that need. However the doctor pushes to elicit more 
information at line 83, and again at line 85. Finally Matthew names in a list of "sexual 
abuse", "schizophrenia", "things about my parents" and something, unfortunately, 
inaudible on the tape (lines 86-7). This is a shocking move on Matthew's part which has 
been forced by the doctor; a claim of sexual abuse in itself is disquieting and 
schizophrenia is rarely named in meetings, even by the professionals. 
The doctor immediately attempts to undermine Matthew's claim by, again, suggesting that 
he does not know what he is talking about. In a series of increasingly direct questions 
(lines 89,93 & 95) she attempts to take interactional control and elicit sufficient 
information to undermine Matthew's claim and his request for therapy. However, 
Matthew provides a rationale which places the explanation for schizophrenia in his 
childhood and links his claims together. The very long pause (8.5 seconds) suggests that 
Dr. North is stumped again; she cannot undermine what Matthew is claiming without 
dealing with the topic and it seems that she does not want to deal with it, at least not in the 
meeting. She responds, then, by attempting to off-load the problem onto Sarah (line 97). 
But Matthew refuses to engage with Sarah; his avowal of forgetting here appears to be 
deployed to obstruct this line of questioning (Lynch & Bogen 1996) and thus force the 
issue back to the doctor. 
In the following extracts I trace the effectiveness of Matthew's resistance in terms of 
achieving a dispreferred referral for therapy. The extract below begins with the doctor 
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appearing to concede to Matthew's request for therapy. I noted in the previous extract that 
the doctor did not want to engage with the topic of sexual abuse and now she avoids 
naming it, it is "the problem" (line 148). The resolution is presented as a fixed choice 
between the psychologist, "Lucy Oran:: ge", and "living with your beliefs (. ) grou:: p" 
(lines 153 & 157). However it becomes clear that the beliefs group is the preferred option 
in the fixed choice as Dr. North goes on to reiterate that it is a "group" seven times (lines 
156,157 twice, 160,162,163 & 165). 
146 Dr. N.: but now you're saying you want something different um (. ) yeah? 
147 Matthew: yeah= 
148 Dr. N.: =what you had hasn't solved the problem and now you want something 
149 different (. ) °yeah OK° (0.6) well perhaps I think theres two avenues 
150 because I'm not very clear and I don't think the CPAs the right place to 
151 have a proper discussion because y'know >we're supposed to be talking 
152 about< care plans not sort of trying to (0.9) find out what your 
153 problems a:: re um so (. ) its either that you see Lucy Oran:: ge um and 
154 she will have that discussion with you and then she will () suggest 
155 somethi:: ng so I think we could go for tha::: t or the other alternative 
156 would be to ask Alan Purple because he he runs a group and it could be 
157 a group situation and its called living with your beliefs () grou:: p and 
158 that that could possibly be helpful for you has that been discussed? = 
159 Sarah (CPN): =um 
160 Dr. N.: the possibility of that group? 
161 Matthew: no I've never heard of it 
162 Dr. N.: you've >never heard of< it well what d'you think of joining a grou:: p is 
163 that something (1.0) you you would like to do? a (. ) therapy group 
164 Matthew: I don't mind 
165 Dr. N.: uha (. ) well its a group= 
166 Sarah (CPN): =1 can talk to you about that 
167 Dr. N.: mm where people talk about (. ) y'know the sort of beliefs that are 
168 troubling them y'know trouble troublesome beliefs and how to live 
169 with them () and I think that might be a possibility mightn't it= 
170 Sarah (CPN): =mm (3.3) well maybe when you come for your next depo Matthew 
171 because you always seem to be rushing to college () you might come a 
172 bit earlier and we could spend about half an hour discussing it 
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The fact that the doctor keeps repeating this aspect of the group gives the appearance of 
elaboration and providing more information without actually doing so and effectively 
continues to press this option despite Matthew being non-committal, "no I've never heard 
of it" and "I don't mind" (lines 161 & 164). However, it now becomes clear why the 
doctor did not appear to want to give Matthew's claim credence and why she is not really 
elaborating on what the group is. The "living with your beliefs" group is specifically run 
for people whose hallucinations and delusions are not fully controlled by their 
medication; in effect the 'beliefs' that patients 'learn to live with' in this group are 
delusional beliefs. Thus in introducing the beliefs group and framing it as the preferred 
option, the doctor is also intimating that Matthew's claim about sexual abuse is a 
delusional belief. 
However Sarah re-enters the conversation here and exerts influence on which option is 
finally taken. In placing discussion with Matthew in the future, it carries the covert 
implication that she could be managing the discussion out of the doctor's domain. In 
effect, she is placing Matthew's commitment to the beliefs group as a matter between her 
and Matthew, and deferring it to some time in the future, thus helping Matthew not to 
make a commitment to it in the meeting. " It is suggestive that Sarah could be forming a 
covert alliance with Matthew. But Dr. North presses on with her 'sell' of the beliefs group, 
now providing another elaboration which has a similar effect to her previous reiterations 
of "group". Her use of "troubling", "trouble", and "troublesome" "beliefs" (line 168) 
allows the doctor to continue to press this preferred option whilst providing little 
additional information. In the process Matthew's claim of sexual abuse is reframed as 
"troublesome beliefs", a depiction which is sufficiently vague to cover over the difference 
between troubling memories and delusional beliefs and thus avoids engaging with 
Matthew over the veracity of his claim. 
The CPN's response, followed by a pause (line 170) suggests little enthusiasm for this 
option. She goes on to elaborate on her previous suggestion, once again placing Matthew's 
commitment into her domain and the future. Note also that Matthew is repositioned here 
from someone with "troublesome beliefs" to a busy college student, "you always seem to 
6 All decisions agreed in the meeting are written up in the care plan document and reviewed at the next CPA. 
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be rushing to college" (line 171). After this the doctor changes the subject but later in the 
meeting she returns to the topic. In the next extract the effect of Sarah's intervention and 
alliance with Matthew is reflected in the doctor's re-ordering of the options. Whilst in the 
previous extract the beliefs group was the preferred option, now the psychologist is 
presented as the first option with the beliefs group relegated to a back-up option. 
277 Dr. N.: alright well I think in that case really um we should continue (. ) with 
278 with the care plan perhaps other than chan just saying that you could 
279 see the psychologist and if the psychologist () can't (1.9) give you the 
280 help you want then maybe Alan Purple and the living with your beliefs 
281 group () so shall we just go through the care plan 
The statement that they will "continue (. ) with the care plan ... other than... ust saying" 
appears to be covertly referring to the issue of medication raised early on in the meeting 
and implies that an assessment for therapy is the only concession the doctor is going to 
make. As such, Matthew's early linkage between medication and therapy could have been 
a means for "striking a deal". Now the beliefs group is subsumed under the psychologist 
in a syllogistic framing, "if the psychologist (. ) can't (1.9) give you the help you want 
then... " (lines 279-80). The emphasis on "want" indicates that this is what he, not she, 
wants and together with the deployment of "help" draws on and re-establishes benevolent 
psychiatry and participatory patient. Notice also how the whole endeavour is now 
surrounded by doubt, "perhaps", "could", "maybe" (lines 278 & 280), which could be read 
in a number of ways: that the doctor is signalling her reluctance; that the referral is not 
likely to be successful; or, in the case of "maybe" that Sarah is not likely to refer Matthew 
to the beliefs group. My reading of Sarah's intervention as a covert alliance with Matthew 
to resist the doctor's preferred plan is supported by the doctor's re-ordering of the options. 
Therefore Matthew is attempting to achieve a referral for psychotherapy. In what appears 
to be a pre-emptive move, rather than a response to a professional plan or assessment, he 
mobilises and exploits the psychiatric discourse of "help", to negate the therapeutic 
effectiveness of the medication. Help and responsibility are no longer about professional 
dispensation and limited patient responsibility but about helping patients to acquire the 
(self-)knowledge to help, heal and understand themselves, a much more wide-ranging 
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formulation of responsibility for mental health. Matthew's naming and interpretation of 
the links between childhood, schizophrenia and sexual abuse lead to a temporary 
interactional standstill. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the doctor does not refuse his 
request outright. It becomes clear that the doctor is attempting to undermine Matthew's 
request for therapy by forwarding a number of justificatory arguments for not referring 
him. By turn she suggests that therapy is a waste of time because of failed opportunities in 
the past, that it is not necessary because he has already had therapy at the day hospital and, 
finally, that he does not know what he is talking about thus attempting to undermine 
notions of self-understanding. 
The doctor also attempts to accomplish and reaccomplish control through direct 
questioning and controlling access to and the distribution of talk (Scheff 1968; Mehan 
1990), using partial repeats to challenge the believability of Matthew's claims (Mellinger 
1995) and positioning herself as more knowledgeable (Burman 1995). In turn Matthew 
resists the doctor's control of the interaction. For example, he sets the agenda on the 
ineffectiveness of medication and request for therapy (Burman 1995), selectively ignores 
the doctor's questions (Scheff 1968), interrupts the doctor and the CPN (West 1984), 
defends claims that have been challenged (Mellinger 1995) and initiates his own 
interpretations (Burman 1995) (lines 55,72 & 78, & 91-6). As such the doctor and 
Matthew are producing power and resistance through the turns of talk. It can be said that 
the doctor does not have full control of this meeting and her attempts to reaccomplish 
control are not always effective. However, it is also the case that it is the substance of 
Matthew's reformulations of help and responsibility and his interpretations that create 
trouble for the doctor and thus disrupt psychiatric power. In turn, the CPN's covert 
alliance with Matthew assists him in attaining a referral for therapy. Through managing 
the discussion about the beliefs group out of the doctor's domain and thus undermining 
this option, the CPN also subverts the doctor's assessment and preferred plan for 
Matthew. 
Once again, achieving a course of action which runs counter to the doctor's assessment 
and preferred plan is not insignificant. As such, Matthew temporarily disrupts the power 
of the doctor both to control the interaction and, with the aid of the CPN, to control 
decision-making 
. about 
his future treatment, in this case access to psychotherapy. 
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However, not only do Matthew's reformulations reinforce dominant discourses of 
psychiatric benevolence, patient responsibility and participation, but they are also firmly 
situated within the "psychotherapeutics" of self-help and self-understanding that 
characterise governmentality and the management of the self (Rose 1989: 227). 
In summary, patients appropriate and reformulate professional discourses of choice and 
responsibility deployed to resist the plans, preferences and assessments of the 
professionals. Patients employ the framework of benevolent psychiatry/responsibile, 
participatory patient to disrupt professional control of decision-making and patient 
participation, and ascriptions of pathology. While these are 'everyday forms of resistance' 
(Scott 1985; 1990) at the local level, which are unlikely to impact upon broader power 
relations, they are significant (Moore 1988) for their temporary disruption of professional 
power and their practical effects (for example, where Colin lives, whether Diane is 
trustworthy and believable, and whether Matthew gets psychotherapy). As such these 
reformulations are directed against a more controlling psychiatry. But patients ultimately 
reproduce dominant discourses (Kingfisher 1996) that patients have choices and should 
be responsible for their mental health. 
Professionals and patients accomplish control and resistance through the turns of talk 
(Mellinger 1995) and professionals do appear to have the interactional advantage, 
particularly in terms of controlling access to and the distribution of talk (Schell 1968; 
Mehan 1990) which was accomplished in all the three meetings discussed, particularly 
through direct questions and interactions between professionals. Doctors also, at times, 
use partial repeats to challenge the unbelievable responses of patients (Mellinger 1995) 
and position themselves as more knowledgeable (Burman 1995). However, these 
interactional moves are not always effective in (re)accomplishing professional control and 
patients resist in a variety of ways, for example, interrupting the professionals (West 
1984), defending claims that have been challenged (Mellinger 1995) and initiating their 
own interpretations (Burman 1995). 
Professionals do not directly refuse patients' requests or force patients' agreement to 
preferred plans. Rather, they attempt to go through patients and negotiate decisions with 
them and, when they are unable to elicit their compliance, professionals do concede to 
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dispreferred options. Moreover, patients can produce reformulations which professionals 
avoid engaging with, as occurred in Diane's framing of the adverse effects of medication 
and Matthew's formulation of self-healing; features which it is difficult to account for 
entirely in terms of the interactions themselves. Therefore broader legislative and rights 
discourses appear to be subtly in play within these interactions. The professionals' 
concessions are a further playing out at the local level of the wider legislative framework 
which produces the uncertain limits of professional compulsion and patients' rights, and 
which specifies patient involvement in their treatment (Jones 1980; 1993; DoH&WO 
1993; Jones 1994). And media and public concerns regarding 'dangerous' patients may 
account for professionals' reluctance to engage with patient formulations which run 
counter to the therapeutic benefits of medication. In effect, there appears to be an 
increased potential for negotiation at the local level, rather than outright conflict (Jones 
1980; 1993), and resistance to the controlling aspects of psychiatric power which is 
temporarily disruptive. However, as patients resist psychiatric control, they become 
further enmeshed in a more productive power of the choosing, responsible well-managed 
self (Miller 1986; Rose 1986a; 1989). 
In this section, I have explored instances of patients' resistance to professionals' plans and 
assessments and the interactional moves and persuasive talk through which professionals 
attempt to (re)accomplish control and forward their preferences. I have argued that 
patients are effective in terms of the practical outcomes for themselves and in disrupting 
the controlling aspects of psychiatric power. In the following section I turn to a major 
means by which professionals reassert power in response to patient resistance through 
(re)ascriptions of pathology in the intra-professional post-meeting. 
2. Reasserting Psychiatric Power: The Post-Meeting and Discourses of 
Pathology 
The post-meeting, after patients have departed, is an intra-professional event which 
affords professionals the opportunity to discuss what has occurred during the main 
meeting. In this respect the post-meeting is a "hidden transcript": 
... discourse that takes place "off-stage"... elaborated among a restricted "public" 
that excludes - that is hidden from - certain specified others. (Scott 1990: 4& 14). 
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Hidden transcripts usually contain "practices and claims... that cannot be openly avowed" 
(Scott 1990: xii) and, in the case of post-meetings, provide occasions to reframe, 
undermine or counter any discourses established during the meeting. In this section I draw 
on two post-meetings for patients whose resistance has already been discussed above, 
Diane and Matthew, and trace how psychiatric authority is reasserted. Both Diane and 
Matthew accomplished effective resistance during their main meetings; Diane's 
reformulation of responsibility was left to stand at the end of her meeting; and Matthew's 
reframing of help and responsibility was instrumental, with the CPN's assistance, in 
achieving a referral for an assessment for therapy despite the doctor's disapproval. In both 
meetings, the doctor ascribed a pathological feature to the patients in terms of delusional 
beliefs which Diane overturned and the CPN in Matthew's meeting undermined. In this 
section I discuss professional imputations of pathology as part of the "hidden transcript" 
(Scott 1990: 4) of post-meetings and the means by which professionals reassert power in 
response to patient resistance. 
2.1 Re-establishing Pathology: "she just doesn't believe theres an illness" and "still 
psychotic" 
In Diane's meeting she resisted and reformulated the reason why she does not take her 
medication; it is not due to a delusional belief about her medication being poison but a 
reasonable and legitimate concern for her long-term health. In this way Diane 
reformulated the meaning of responsibility for her mental health in order to counter a 
potentially damaging ascription of delusional beliefs, and one which has implications for 
her past, present and future trustworthiness and believability. Now the professionals 
discuss her and the main meeting amongst themselves. 
The extract below begins near the start of the post-meeting and the problem of Diane's 
medication-taking behaviour is reintroduced by Sarah, the CPN, drawing on a very 
generalised version that Diane does not take her medication ("she's not good at taking 
things", line 645). This provides an opportunity for Dr. North to selectively draw upon 
discourses from the meeting to reinforce her definition of the problem. The doctor begins 
by invoking Diane's husband as someone who "knows her quite well" (line 646); George 
knows that Diane does not take her medication but he does not necessarily know what is 
best for her, reflecting the tenor of the meeting. Diane not taking her medication is 
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presented in the first instance as wilful but inexplicable, "for some reason she just doesn't 
(0.8) want to take an hing" (line 647). 
Meeting 2 (post-meeting) : Diane (**** indicates name of medication) 
645 Sarah (CPN): shes shes shes not good at taking things 
646 Dr. N.: well I think her husband (. ) knows her quite we:: ll and she she really 
647 (1.0) for some reason she just doesn't (0.8) want to take an hing I 
648 mean I think she just doesn't believe theres an illness and all that or 
649 y'know she didn't in the past () because it was a cycle that repeated 
650 itself every year but I suppose the different thing is that (. ) I think 
651 people have got to know her a bit better and maybe shes trusting 
652 people more 
However the doctor immediately proceeds to her evaluation: Diane lacks insight into her 
illness, "she just doesn't believe theres an illness" (line 648). Belief is reintroduced but 
this time it is not associated with poison but the whole "illness" and, in a 'Catch-22' 
manner, if she does not believe she is ill then this in itself is evidence of illness. 
Moreover, this lack of insight is inscribed over a long past in an extreme formulation that 
attributes it as the cause of Diane being a revolving door case, "because it was a cycle that 
repeated itself every year" (lines 649-50). The theme of "she just doesn't believe theres an 
illness" situates the reason why Diane does not take her medication firmly back in the 
pathological realm. In effectively resisting the discourse of poison as delusional belief, 
Diane has forced the doctor to formulate an alternative discourse of pathology in terms of 
lack of insight. It is a discourse which, because it is not voiced in the public domain, the 
patient does not have the opportunity to counter. 
But Dr. North tempers her definition reinvoking trust to suggest optimism for the future; 
Diane may have lacked insight into her illness in the past but trusting "people" suggests 
the possibility for change. Nevertheless the definition of why Diane did not take her 
medication is due to her lack of insight into her illness, overturning Diane's reformulation 
of concern for her long-term health. Thus Diane's resistance now becomes encompassed 
within pathology; "she just doesn't believe theres an illness" can encompass anything 
Diane says about taking her medication, including her carefully reformulated discourse 
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about the "poison"-ous effects of medication. Therefore a discourse of pathology, that the 
patient lacks insight into her illness, is invoked and deployed by professionals in the 
post-meeting to redefine why Diane does/did not take her medication. It counters Diane's 
alternative reformulation without having to engage with it, and re-establishes a 
(redefined) imputation of pathology. As such it is a means for reasserting professional 
authority in an "off-stage" (Scott 1990: 4) context where the patient has no opportunity to 
counter it. 
In Matthew's post-meeting his resistance meets the same fate. Matthew's resistance to the 
consultant effectively gained for him an assessment for therapy, with the covert assistance 
of the CPN, and against the preference and assessment of the doctor. Matthew 
appropriated the discourses of help and responsibility, reformulating them as self-help, 
self-healing and self-understanding. The doctor responded to Matthew's claim of sexual 
abuse with an intimation of pathology in terms of delusional belief but the CPN's alliance 
effectively downgraded the beliefs group option preferred by the doctor, thus undermining 
her assessment. Unfortunately, I was unable to audiotape Matthew's post-meeting because 
the consultant asked me to turn off the tape recorder as soon as he had left the room. This 
in itself is indicative of the amount of tension generated within the meeting which was 
palpable when Matthew produced his list of "sexual abuse (1.7) um (1.2) schizophrenia 
(1.4) things about my parents". But I stayed in the post-meeting while the consultant and 
the CPN discussed Matthew and made notes about what had been said as soon as the 
meeting ended. What follows is an extract from my fieldwork diary. ' 
Meeting 3 (post-meeting) : Matthew (fieldnotes only) 
Dr. North and Sarah discussed Matthew's request for therapy and Dr. North said it was a 
"waste of time" "he has had therapy before and stopped going': The doctor said that as 
he had requested therapy they would have to put him forward for psychological 
assessment but her tone and manner supported her statement that it was a waste of time. 
She said to Sarah that she thought he was "still psychotic" and Sarah agreed. The doctor 
raised the question of child abuse and was fairly dismissive suggesting that he had 
'probably made it up': 
I have used italics to differentiate fieldnotes from audiotape transcription and notes taken within meetings 
but quotation marks indicate verbatim speech. 
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While this fieldnote entry lacks the detail of Diane's audiotaped post-meeting, it is clear 
that the doctor is reasserting her definition of Matthew and assessment of his claims. 
What she says supports my earlier readings of sequences in the main meeting which 
suggested that the doctor's chronicle of failed opportunity was inferring that referring 
Matthew for therapy was a "waste of time". As such this is quite a damning moral 
judgment, and completely undermines Matthew's reinterpretation that he was "in a bad 
way" in the past, which carried with it the notion that he was capable of change for the 
better in the future. Here this becomes doubtful, at best. Unlike Diane, whose past lack of 
insight into her illness is contrasted with the possibility of a more optimistic relationship 
with the professionals in the future, Matthew's past behaviour becomes an indicator of 
likely future behaviour; if he "stopped going" before then he will do so again and thus 
referring him for therapy is a "waste of time". 
The doctor's assertion that psychiatric professionals have to respond to patients' requests 
suggests that she is orienting to and incorporating broader legislative concerns and 
"rights" discourses here, thus acknowledging the wider constraints of "the new legalism" 
(Jones 1993: 197). At the same time she makes it clear that this is contrary to her 
assessment of what should be done. My reading of the doctor's avoidance of the sexual 
abuse topic (thus not giving Matthew's claim credence) and the reasons for her preferred 
option of the beliefs group, is also confirmed; her assessment is that he is "still psychotic" 
and "probably made it up". Thus in the post-meeting the consultant reasserts professional 
authority by reaffirming her assessments and definitions. Her assessment that Matthew is 
"still psychotic" has the same effect as Diane "doesn't believe theres an illness". If 
Matthew is "still psychotic" then anything he has said, about medication, therapy or 
sexual abuse, becomes pathological and Matthews reformulations of self-help and 
self-understanding are effectively undermined. Once again, re-establishing an imputation 
of pathology off-stage, this time much more directly than in the main meeting, places it 
out of bounds of contestation by the patient. And, given the covert alliance formed 
between Sarah, the CPN, and Matthew, the doctor is also reasserting authority over the 
other professional. 
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The doctor's discourses of pathology bear a resemblance to Goffman's (1968) analysis of 
the fate of patient resistance in the asylum where disapproved actions/interactions were 
assigned a psychiatric cause and uncooperative behaviour was viewed as evidence of 
pathology. As such, Diane and Matthew's reformulations related to medication could be 
construed as uncooperative behaviour. Certainly, effective patient resistance in these local 
encounters appears to elicit an imputation of pathology, or rather a reascription of 
pathology. However in the cases above, we cannot say that this is a straightforward 
exercise in repression. The patients were effective in disrupting psychiatric power within 
these meetings and, in Colin and Matthew's cases, resisted the professionals' control over 
decision-making, achieving a professionally dispreferred practical outcome which the 
professionals can undermine but cannot undo. 
But professional ascriptions of pathology are an effective means of reasserting 
professional power. If a patient lacks insight into their illness or is psychotic, then 
whatever discourses they have deployed within the main meeting are undermined in such 
a way that professionals can ignore them. In this respect, the post-meeting is a powerful 
institutional practice which enables professionals to reassert their authority through 
discourses of pathology. It is also an indicator of broader power relations which specify, 
for example, who stays in the room after the 'official' meeting has ended, who writes in, 
holds, and has access to files about the patient etc.. In other words, who has the last word. 
In effect: 
The capacity of dominant groups to prevail - though never totally - in defining 
and constituting what counts as the public transcript and what as off-stage 
is... no small measure of their power. (Scott 1990: 14). 
In addition, professionals' background understandings of schizophrenia are a resource in 
accomplishments and reaccomplishments of power. It is not the case that these patients' 
claims and beliefs are treated in the way any 'ordinary' person's would be. For example, 
notions that someone was not taking their medication because they believed it was poison, 
or that they had made up a claim of sexual abuse would probably be a final option when 
all other possible explanations had been explored, rather than a first option. Moreover, 
explanations in terms of lacking insight or psychosis would not even be readily available 
for patients with a diagnosis of neurosis, although they could become options. As such, 
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professionals' background knowledge that these particular patients have a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, and associated understandings, are readily available for foregrounding 
within interactions to assess and undermine patients' claims and interpretations. In other 
words, any claim by patients which runs counter to professionals' assessments and 
preferred plans is a potential candidate for being judged as part of "the grammar of 
schizophrenia" (Coulter 1991: 161), and this "grammar" is a ready resource for the 
reassertion of professional authority. 
It is also noteworthy that professional ascriptions of pathology, which are relatively 
carefully formulated in face-to-face interactions with patients (a belief that the medication 
is "poison", a suggestion that Matthew attend the "living with your beliefs (. ) grou:: p") are 
more "openly avowed" off-stage (Diane lacks insight into her illness, Matthew is 
psychotic) (Scott 1990: xii). In this way, professionals strongly reassert their authority to 
make such ascriptions but in a domain where patients cannot counter them. 
The discussion of professionals' and patients' accomplishments of power and resistance 
suggests that points of resistance occur in the psychiatric control of patient participation 
and responsibility and points of reassertion of professional authority occur in the 
institutional practice of post-meetings and reascriptions of pathology, which draw on 
background understandings of schizophrenia. Therefore accomplishments of power and 
resistance in local encounters largely occur without recourse to gender understandings. 
However, gender understandings can be mobilised as a resource for reaccomplishing 
professional authority. In the final section I explore the way that gender understandings 
are deployed as an occasional resource in response to patient resistance. 
3. Gender Understandings as an Occasional Resource for Countering 
Resistance 
There has been little evidence to support Chesler's (1974) contention regarding the power 
psychiatry wields over passive and pathologised female patients. Patients have 
accomplished resistance through reformulations of dominant discourses of choice and 
responsibility. And professionals have deployed various persuasions and dissuasions, 
again without invoking gender understandings. Moreover, discourses of pathology were 
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ascribed without reference to gender, and in response to patient resistance. However, this 
is not to say that professionals do not draw on gender understandings to reassert their 
authority. In this section, I explore the way that professionals invoke understandings of 
femininity, but not masculinity, as an occasional resource that is deployed when useful 
and overridden when not. 
3.1 Genderina, Degendering, and Re eng dering. "frightened lady". "everybody likes to do 
things" and "its just hard being a single Mum" 
In the extracts below, professionals explicitly invoke gender understandings and make 
them relevant to the activity at hand, that is countering patient or carer resistance and 
reasserting authority. But professionals may also degender their argument in response to a 
patient and carer's invocation of a gendered category which has been deployed to resist the 
professionals' plans. 
In the first extract I return to Diane's post-meeting. Her main meeting has been concerned 
with two main topics: why she does not take her medication and an attempt to persuade 
her to attend activities at the community centre. Diane has resisted the professionals' 
persuasions regarding activities through not giving them a definite agreement. In the 
previous section a reascription of pathology was effective in countering Diane's 
reformulation of responsibility in relation to medication and reasserting professional 
authority. But it is less so in connection with Diane's resistance to attending activities. In 
the extract below the doctor moves to a different discourse that draws on gender 
understandings. The extract begins with Sarah, the CPN, formulating a contrast between 
"building" and "badger" to characterise her relationship with Diane, followed by an 
extreme formulation of what will happen if she does the latter, "she won't agree to 
anything otherwise" (line 668). The notion of not agreeing to "anything" has the potential 
to encompass both problems: why she does/did not take her medication and why she has 
not agreed to attend activities. But the doctor goes on to suggest that it is not just a 
question of what the professionals do, it is also about Diane herself. 
Meeting 2 (post-meeting): Diane 
664 Sarah (CPN): mm and I've been building up the relationship with her 
665 Dr. N.: mm 
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666 Sarah (CPN) she doesn't want you to sort of badger her 
667 Dr. N.: yes 
668 Sarah (CPN) she won't she won't agree to anything otherwise= 
669 Dr. N.: no but shes also a very I think shes a very frightened lady isnt she 
670 Sarah (CPN): yes 
671 Dr. N.: shes very frightened 
672 Sarah (CPN) yes there was a virus that she asked me a lot of questions about °what 
673 if this what if that° 
674 Dr. N.: mm 
The doctor invokes an explicit gendering to position Diane as "a very frightened lady" 
(line 669). Now it is not just a case of gaining the trust of someone who lacks insight into 
their illness, it is a gendered problem: dealing with a woman who is "very frightened". 
This discourse undermines anything Diane has said during the main meeting while 
continuing the note of optimism about her future relationship with the professionals. 
Diane's concern about her medication and reluctance to attend activities now become 
responses generated by extreme fear. As such it is a discourse that can be deployed to 
explain any behaviour or discourse which runs counter to the professionals' assessments 
and plans. The explicit orientation to "lady" suggests that a gender understanding is 
relevant to the activity of undermining patient resistance and reasserting professional 
authority whilst maintaining that Diane can and should be helped. Gendering fear appears 
to enhance the notion of a person who is frightened of anything and so refuses everything, 
but can be helped. As such a "frightened lady" invokes different connotations from, say, a 
frightened person or a frightened man. 
The doctor solicits Sarah's agreement to this ascription, which she gives but the doctor 
reiterates her claim suggesting that she wants more than a simple agreement. Sarah 
provides an example of an instance when Diane was "very frightened", "there was a virus 
she asked me a lot of questions about". Thus the notion of fear and "anything" can 
encompass literally anything Diane does or says. Whilst under Diane's formulation of 
concern for her health, asking about a virus could be construed as an entirely legitimate 
question, now it is an example of her fear. Therefore the discourse of "frightened lady" 
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completely undermines Diane's resistance enabling the professionals to reassert their 
authority. 
However it is not the case that professionals routinely deploy gender understandings in 
this way. In the next extract it is the patient (and carer) who mobilise a gender 
understanding to resist the professionals' plans and the doctor who attempts to re-establish 
control and forward her desired plan through degendering her argument. The extract 
below is taken from a meeting for another community patient, Christine, who attends the 
meeting with her small son, Simon, and her mother, Anne Green! This extract occurs 
very near the beginning of the main meeting and begins with Dr. North introducing the 
topic of "activities". She provides an opening for Christine to talk about activities, 
although the extreme formulation "anything" and intimation of doubt ("I don't know if', 
line 391) implies that Christine may not have much, if "anything" to say on the subject. 
Meeting I (main meeting) : Christine (**** denotes name of medication) 
391 Dr. N.: so I don't know if you've got anything you want to say about that 
392 Christine: well I'll try and come to more of the events at Hillcrest I think 
393 Dr. N.: uha you'd like to do that= 
394 Christine: =because that was your advice to me last time I saw [you] 
395 Dr. N.: [yes ] 
396 Christine: and I think that's a good idea but er I've only just got my car on the 
397 road again so= 
398 Dr. N.: =uha 
399 Christine: ((to Simon)) come and sit on Mummys knee 
400 Anne: and Simon of course can he come along to these things? = 
401 Claire (CPN): =well Simon can't go to the () 
402 Dr. N. : no I thought maybe that he could come to the social group but it 
403 seems like that that thats not so:: I was wrong there 
Christine's answer infers that she has good intentions but may not succeed and covertly 
hints at possible obstacles. When the doctor presses for a more positive response, 
Christine suggests that it is what the doctor thinks she should do, "that was your advice" 
(line 394). But this is followed by the disclaimer, "I think thats a good idea but... " (line 
Anne Green is designated as Christine's official carer. 
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396) which wards off any suggestion that she is disagreeing with the doctor or being 
difficult/negative about activities while founding a practical complication, "I've only just 
got my car on the road again", which excuses any lack of activity between when she last 
saw the doctor and the present time. The doctor encourages Christine to continue and at 
this point she brings in Simon, her son, explicitly positioning herself as a mother, "come 
and sit on Mummy's knee" (line 399). That this is oriented to the interaction, rather than 
incidental, is supported in two ways. Firstly I noted in my fieldwork diary that Simon was 
settled on Anne Green's lap at the time. Secondly, Anne uses it as an opportunity to resist 
the professionals' plan by bringing in Simon, as if the professionals had forgotten him, 
"and Simon of course" (line 400). As such, Christine's invocation of the category of 
mother, "Mummys knee", covertly infers that the activities could be a problem because 
she is a mother with a small child. At this point the doctor is forced to admit that Simon 
cannot go to the social group, an admission of error that she has some difficulty making, 
"that that thats not so:: I was wrong there" (line 403). The doctor then turns to Mrs. Green. 
408 Dr. N.: um OK Christine what about you Mrs. Green what do you think () we 
409 should be doing (1.0) um to help Christine 
410 Anne: well first of all I want to say that since Christine came back from 
411 holiday and (0.9) it was like a normal thing really because coming back 
412 from holiday gets you down anyway (. ) because °she did enjoy herself 
413 she did have a good time°= 
414 Dr. N.: =ahnn 
415 Anne: and she does take em she doesn't (. ) change doesn't go too well with 
416 her= 
417 Dr. N.: =ahnn 
418 Anne: so obviously she took a bit of time to settle (. ) um (1.8) the medication 
419 I think you gave her in actual fact is too much medication I think it 
420 heightens her symptoms I think as opposed to °helping° 
421 Dr. N.: uhnn 
422 Anne: um possibly the effect of the **** is OK but () her **** I feel () is too 
423 much 
424 Dr. N.: uhnn 
425 Anne: because when she was in Ireland and she missed out a week (2.0) her 
426 mental (0.9) state was very °much better than usually° 
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427 Dr. N.: I see 
428 Anne: so thats what I reckon (0.9) I know she was on holiday and I know 
429 things were different (1.2) and obviously its not quite the same as 
430 being at home but (1.3) in herself and even my sisters family noticed 
431 the difference and II think her **** is actually too high perhaps the 
432 effect might even be (0.8) [( )] 
433 Dr. N.: [OK ] 
The doctor has made it clear that the discussion is about activities but Mrs. Green uses the 
opportunity to raise a different agenda. Anne Green begins with two explanations of why 
Christine is "down"; she has just come back from holiday which is a normal thing to be 
down about, "coming back from holiday gets you down anyway" (line 411-2), and it is 
part of Christine's personality, she does not like change. ' Mrs. Green moves from this 
general assessment to launch a resistance to Christine's level of medication. In a contrast 
between "heightens" and "helping" (line 420) she founds the claim not only that the 
medication is "too much" but it makes Christine worse rather than better. Like Matthew, 
she appropriates the professional discourse of "help", to negate the therapeutic 
effectiveness of the medication. This is followed with a justificatory example of an 
instance when Christine did not take it, "when... she missed out a week (2.0) her mental 
state (0.9) was very °much better than usually"" (lines 425-6). The three-part list of "I 
know she was on holiday and I know things were different (1.2) and obviously its not 
quite the same as being at home (1.3) but... " (lines 428-30) works as a disclaimer which 
appears to be a pre-emptive warding off of potential counters from the doctor whilst 
founding her claim regarding the deleterious effects of the medication. She finishes with 
an independent witness, "even my sisters family noticed the difference" (lines 430-1) and 
a reiteration of her claim that the level of medication is too high. 
The next extract follows on from the previous one. Dr. North ignores everything Mrs. 
Green has said and reorients the conversation back to activities, "but what about the 
activitie:: s" (line 433). Mrs. Green produces another disclaimer, very similar to Christine's 
earlier one, in which she infers that she has nothing against the activities per se, "I think 
I This appears to be referring back to Christine's claim at the very start of the meeting that she is "drudging 
on" (text not included here). 
160 
the activities are a good thing but... " (lines 435 & 437) while reconnecting Christine to 
Simon. 
433 Dr. N.: [OK] now but what about the activitie:: s (. ) what do you think we 
434 should be doing (. ) [to help Christine with with] 
435 Anne: [I think the activi ] [ties are a good thing] 
436 Dr. N.: [the activities ] 
437 Anne: but I don't think its very realistic to tell Christine to come to all these 
438 activities (0.7) when Christines got Simon and Simons not allowed to 
439 (0.6) come (0.6) 1 know shes got the childminder two days a week and 
440 thats °very helpful° () 
441 Dr. N.: well but Christine wants to go to the activities and I think Christine (. ) 
442 from what I gather gets bo::: red and fed u: p so I mean everybody likes 
443 to get out of the house and do things 
Anne Green suggests that the professionals do not understand the realities of Christine's 
life as a mother. Notice. also how she is interrupting the doctor to get control of the talk. 
Christine, then, has positioned herself as a mother and made it relevant to the issue at 
hand. And Mrs. Green is drawing on implicit understandings about activities associated 
with members of the category mother (Sacks 1972) in order to resist the doctor's plan that 
Christine should attend activities at the community centre. The doctor signals her 
disagreement, ("well but" line 441) and in a neat counter draws on the specific, "Christine 
wants to go to the activities... Christine... gets bo::: red and fed u. --P" (lines 441-2), and a 
general extreme formulation, "everybody likes to get out... and do things" (lines 442-3). 
Invoking what Christine "wants" suggests that Mrs. Green does not understand what 
Christine likes to do. It also infers that the professionals are not being unrealistic; rather 
they are acting in Christine's best interests based on what she wants and what anyone 
would want. Therefore, the doctor explicitly degenders the argument; it is not about being 
a mother, it is about what "everybody likes... to do". So in this case the patient and her 
carer have drawn on the gender category of "mother" and associated understandings to 
resist the doctor's plan and the doctor has degendered the argument, "everybody", in order 
to counter that resistance. 
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However, when it is useful, the doctor invokes those same gender understandings in the 
same meeting. In the final extract below, the meeting is coming towards a close and the 
doctor reintroduces the topic of medication. Her argument consists of a series of 
disclaimers, "I do understand what you're saying Mrs. Green... but... ", lines 765-6, 
">you're obviously very helpful< to her but... ", lines 768-9, "I'd like to cut it down as 
we::: ll (. ) but... ", lines 771-2, and "Simon's a lovely bPY um (. ) but... ", line 775). The 
disclaimers work to portray the doctor as "understand"-ing, to ward off any notion that 
Mrs. Green is not sufficiently "helpful", that the doctor would like to reduce the 
medication as much as she would, and that it is no reflection on Simon or his behaviour. 
She frames her counter in terms of normality; "recovering from her time in hospita:: l" 
(line 770) drawing on notions of convalescence rather than on-going mental illness. And 
"its just hard being a single Mum" draws on a general notion of (normal) single Mum's; it 
is hard because they are alone, do not have a partner to help them, again a "normal" 
difficulty. 
765 Dr. N.: about the medication I do understand what you're saying Mrs. Green 
766 that you think () Christine is on too much medication but II think we 
767 have to be very ca:: reful because () Christine (1.0) is is having to look 
768 after Simon and I think (0.9) um it is (0.8) y'know >you're obviously 
769 very helpful< to her but I think it is quite ha::: rd for Christi:: ne () um 
770 and I think she really is still recovering from her time in hospita: l (0.5) 
771 so I think that we've got to go very carefully with the medication I'd 
772 like to cut it down as we::: ll () but I just don't think (0.9) we're there 
773 }et >1 don't think the time is right< (. ) just yet to start cutting it dow:: n 
774 (0.9) because I think Christine is y'know finding it quite hard really 
775 (0.9) I mean Simon's a lovely boy_ um () but its just hard being a single 
776 Mum [isn't ] it really? 
777 Anne: [that's right] 
Whilst the doctor's counter is very carefully framed with disclaimers and what might be 
called 'normality' arguments, there are a number of covert references to Christine's 
position as a mother with a mental illness who is looking after a small child, "we have to 
be very careful" (twice lines 766-7 & 771). Thus woven into the argument are warnings 
which carry covert implications of potential danger for Simon if Christine's medication is 
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reduced. Also, the notion that "Christine is-having to look after Simon" (lines 767-8) 
infers that this is something of a burden for Christine. Dr. North's carefully constructed 
counter to Mrs. Green's resistance over Christine's medication ends with an invitation to 
Mrs. Green to agree, which she does. 
Therefore the patient, carer and doctor deploy the category of mother and related 
understandings associated with members of this particular category (Sacks 1972): such as 
notions that young children accompany their mothers to whatever activities they are 
engaging in; that mothers' responsibilities are such that they cannot easily get involved in 
activities if their children cannot accompany them; and that mothering is particularly 
arduous if the mother does not have a partner. These explicit orientations to the category 
of mother, and associated understandings are, therefore, also an explicit orientation to 
gender: "images of women are linked to images of mothering" (Ochs 1992: 337). This 
gendered category is made relevant to the activities at hand: resisting the professionals' 
plans that Christine should attend activities at the community centre and countering Anne 
Green's resistance to Christine's level of medication. However, the doctor also explicitly 
degenders the argument, positioning Christine as like "everybody" else, as a means for 
countering Anne Green's resistance and forwarding her preferred plan. The doctor's 
overriding and subsequent (re)invocation of gender is pragmatic and designed for the 
particular activity at hand. As such gender understandings are an occasional resource. 
Therefore, gender orientations and understandings of professionals are an occasional 
resource that can be invoked and deployed when useful for countering patient and carer 
resistance and overridden when not. That it is an occasional rather than consistent 
resource is supported by the doctor degendering the argument to counter Christine and 
Mrs. Green's invocation of "mother" and associated understandings. As such, Diane is 
gendered ("frightened lady") and Christine is by turns gendered ("Mummys knee"), 
degendered ("everyone"), and regendered ("single Mum") within the same meeting and 
according to the activity at hand. Thus professionals deploy gender understandings as an 
occasional resource to counter patient (and carer) resistance,, to reaccomplish authority, 
and it is feminine, not masculine, genderings that are deployed in this way. 
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This initial discussion of professionals' orientations to feminine genderings to counter 
patient resistance suggests a more complex picture than that proposed by Chesler (1974). 
The psychiatrist has (re)asserted authority over patients, and drawn on gender 
understandings to do so, but Diane and Christine cannot be depicted as passive victims; 
the discourses of "frightened lady" and "its just hard being a single Mum" are invoked to 
counter their resistance and reaccomplish professional authority. Moreover, the 
professionals appear to be as ready to degender patients as they are to gender them, as in 
"everybody likes to do things". Furthermore, whilst Diane is gendered she is also 
pathologised in a similar way to patients who are not gendered, as in Matthew's 
post-meeting. And while being a Mum becomes an important understanding for resisting 
a reduction in Christine's medication, it is difficult to interpret this as any form of gender 
conformity given that at other times the professionals de-maternalise her. In this respect, 
far from motherhood being perceived as necessary for mental health (Chesler 1974) it is 
framed as a burden; Christine is "having to look after Simon". 
Conclusion 
Psychiatric power is resisted and reasserted within local encounters between professionals 
and patients. Patients appropriate and reformulate professional discourses of choice and 
responsibility to accomplish resistance to professionals' plans and assessments. Themes of 
"I need a couple more weeks to make up my mind", "I worry about the long term effect", 
and "sorting what I'm thinking" draw on the relation of benevolent psychiatry/responsible, 
participatory patient to disrupt psychiatric control of patient participation and 
responsibility. Choice is reformulated from an informed choosing between limited options 
to something that requires time and thought. And responsibility takes on a number of 
alternative meanings: responsibility for long-term health or for self-healing and 
self-understanding, which run counter to professional discourses of limited patient 
responsibility. The discourse of "help" is appropriated by patients, particularly in relation 
to the therapeutic effects of medication, and reformulated in negative terms and/or as 
self-help. And, on occasions professionals may form temporary covert alliances with 
patients to assist their resistance to another professional's plan or assessment. 
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These localised 'everyday forms of resistance' (Scott 1985; 1990) are unlikely to impact 
upon broader power relations; in appropriating and reformulating dominant discourses, 
patients ultimately reproduce these discourses (Kingfisher 1996), reaffirming notions of 
choice and responsibility. However, they are significant in terms of the practical effects 
for patients' lives and on-going treatment (Moore 1988), and for the temporary disruption 
of psychiatric authority to control decision-making and make assessments. But I have 
argued that these small resistances and disruptions should not be viewed as empowering 
patients. Rather, reformulated discourses of choice and responsibility extend the scope of 
self-regulation, thus enmeshing patients further in governmental power (Miller 1986; 
Rose 1986b; 1989). 
Professionals and patients accomplish power and resistance turn-by-turn within 
interactions. Overall professionals do have the interactional advantage: controlling access 
to and the distribution of talk, particularly through direct questioning of patients (Scheff 
1968; Mehan 1990); using partial repeats to challenge unbelievable claims (Mellinger 
1995); interrupting (West 1984); and positioning themselves as more knowledgeable 
(Burman 1995). However, these strategies are not always effective. In turn, patients also 
interrupt the professionals; defend claims which have been challenged (Mellinger 1995); 
and initiate their own interpretations (Burman 1995). But professional concessions to 
dispreferred actions, and reluctance to engage with topics which undermine the benefits of 
medication, are indicative of broader discourses coming into play at the local level. In 
particular, the ambiguous limits of professional compulsion and patients' rights and 
involvement, produced in wider legislative and rights discourses (Jones 1980; 1993; 
DoH&WO 1993; Jones 1994), seem to be played out in local encounters in terms of 
professional concessions. And avoidance of talk about the adverse effects of medication 
or self-healing indicate some awareness on the part of professionals of broader concerns 
regarding 'dangerous' community patients. Moreover, professionals do incorporate wider 
legislative and 'rights' discourses into the interactions; concessions to dispreferred options 
are justified in terms of having to respond to patients' requests. 
However, professional imputations of pathology are an effective means of reasserting 
professional authority in response to patients' resistance. The post-meeting is an 
institutional practice which enables such reassertions and is a "hidden transcript" whereby 
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professionals can make more explicit (re)ascriptions than in face-to-face interactions with 
patients, and in an "off-stage" context where patients do not have the opportunity to 
counter them (Scott 1990: 4& 14). As such, broader discourses which specify this sort of 
institutional practice are a powerful determinant of who has the last word. Discourses of 
pathology, such as "she doesn't believe theres an illness" and "still psychotic" re-establish 
psychiatric authority to make assessments and undermine any discourses patients have 
deployed during the main meetings. Furthermore assessments that patients lack insight 
into their illness or are psychotic draw on professionals' understandings of schizophrenia 
which are an available resource for (re)accomplishing authority over these particular 
patients. Professional (re)ascriptions of pathology in response to patient resistance bear 
similarities to Goffman's (1968) analysis of psychiatric responses to uncooperative 
behaviour in the asylum. They also suggest that disruptions of psychiatric power are only 
short-lived. However, while patient resistance is small-scale, localised, and temporary, it 
does disrupt professional control over decision-making and in such a way that, despite 
professional reassertions of authority, professionally dispreferred decisions are made that 
cannot be undone. 
Localised disruptions and reassertions of professional power can also involve the explicit 
deployment of gender understandings but they are an occasional, rather than consistent 
resource. Themes such as "frightened lady" and the category of "mother", and associated 
gender understandings, make gender relevant to the activity of countering patient/carer 
resistance and reaccomplishing professional authority. But at the same time, professionals 
will explicitly override the same kinds of gender understandings to counter resistance to a 
preferred plan, as in "everybody likes to do things". This occasional deployment of gender 
does not accord in a straightforward way with traditional feminist accounts of psychiatry 
enforcing gender conformity and pathologising passive female patients (Chesler 1974; 
Al-Issa 1980; Barnes & Maple 1992). Rather, gendering is a response to resistance, 
patients are pathologised without recourse to gender understandings, and motherhood is 
framed as a burden. However, professionals do draw on gender understandings to reassert 
authority and it is understandings of femininity that are mobilised in this way. 
This chapter has discussed where points of resistance occur at the local level in 
professional control of patient participation and responsibility, and points of reassertion of 
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psychiatric authority in the institutional practice of post-meetings, where reascriptions of 
pathology are accomplished. Local encounters between professionals and patients involve 
considerable negotiation in which the meanings of participation and responsibility are 
reformulated and professionals sometimes concede to dispreferred courses of action. In 
these negotiations, professionals' understandings of schizophrenia are a resource for 
(re)ascriptions of pathology and thus reaccomplishments of psychiatric authority. 
However, gender, in terms of certain understandings of femininity, is an occasional 
resource deployed when useful to the activity at hand and overridden when not. In the 
next chapter I extend the focus on gender through an examination of intersections 
between professionals' gender understandings, discourses of autonomy and purpose, and 
schizophrenia. I consider the way that professionals' genderings and understandings of 
personhood inform talk about restoring patients' lives. 
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Chapter Five 
Restoring Lives: Intersections Between Femininity and (Masculine) 
Personhood, Schizophrenia, and Discourses of Purposes and 
Autonomies 
Introduction 
Chapter four explored the way that patients appropriate and reformulate professional 
discourses of choice and responsibility to resist the assessments and preferred plans of 
professionals, and disrupt psychiatric control. These localised resistances ultimately 
reaffirm dominant discourses but they are not insignificant for patients' practical on-going 
treatment. An important means for reasserting psychiatric authority in response to patient 
resistance occurs through the institutional practice of post-meetings where ascriptions of 
pathology are deployed in an "off-stage" (Scott 1990: 4) context and draw upon 
professionals' understandings of schizophrenia. Notions of femininity may also be 
deployed as an occasional resource for undermining patient resistance and reasserting 
authority. I concluded that local encounters involve considerable negotiation in which 
professionals may concede to dispreferred courses of action but professionals' 
understandings of schizophrenia and occasional feminine genderings are resources for 
reaccomplishing professional power. 
This chapter focuses more closely on professionals' gender understandings through 
consideration of professional/patient discussions about restoring patients' lives. I begin 
with a comparison between feminist literature on women/gender and schizophrenia 
(Chesler 1974; Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; Barnes & Maple 1992) and Rose's (1989) 
account of contemporary psychiatry in terms of re-making individuals back into 
purposeful and autonomous beings (Rose 1989). I raise questions about the relationship 
between professionals' understandings of gender and schizophrenia and restoring patients' 
lives to purpose and autonomy within local encounters. 
In the first part of the chapter, I discuss meetings for four patients who are framed as 
insufficiently purposeful. I argue that professionals position women as "women" and draw 
on associated understandings of femininity to formulate particular meanings of purpose 
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and autonomy. "Women" are problematised in terms of home, loneliness and emotional 
dependence and encouraged to do something independent from home and significant 
others and in the company of other "women", thus interweaving purpose and 
independence. In contrast other patients are depicted as practically dependent or in need 
of emotional support, but not emotionally dependent. And these patients are accorded 
autonomy in terms of self-regulation over how they spend their time, a different 
understanding of independence than that encouraged for "women". I suggest that it is not 
safe to assume that masculinity is necessarily irrelevant to professionals' ascriptions of 
self-regulating autonomy, arguing that professionals' understandings should be 
characterised as (masculine) personhood reflecting that the indexing of "people" is likely 
to be underpinned by a background understanding of masculinity. Throughout I include 
discussion of the ways that patients' past and present experiences are resources within 
clinical encounters, shaped according to the activity of restoring lives and in relation to 
understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood. 
Finally, I consider the way that professionals' assumptions about schizophrenia inform 
notions of purpose and autonomy. Purposeful activities for patients have a 
filling-in-for-the-real-thing quality which suggests a partial and delimited restoration. I 
conclude that contemporary psychiatry is more concerned with restoring patients lives in 
local encounters than gender conformity, however professionals' understandings of 
femininity and (masculine) personhood intersect with schizophrenia to differentiate and 
delimit restoration to purpose and autonomy. In this respect notions of activity, emotions, 
dependence and independence taken on a plurality of meanings as they are associated with 
these understandings. 
Feminist literature on gender/women and schizophrenia suggests that psychiatry holds a 
double standard of mental health for women and men. Clinicians are said to view 
mentally healthy women as less independent and more emotional, submissive and passive 
than mentally healthy men or adults, gender unspecified (Broverman et al 1970; Smyth & 
McFarlane 1985). One of the central claims of feminist writers has been that psychiatry 
pathologises gender deviation and seeks to help women come to terms with their female 
role, including marriage and motherhood, thus enforcing gender-role conformity (Chesler 
1974; Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; Barnes & Maple 1992). It has been claimed that gender 
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understandings continue to permeate contemporary psychiatry; the person being assessed 
is "always a gendered subject" and is likely to be assessed on the performance of gendered 
tasks (Busfield 1996: 114; 1989). However, gender may have become less salient as 
psychiatry has extended out of the hospital into the community; Allen (1986) argues that 
social coping in the community does not require adjustment to gender-role. 
In contrast, or in addition, feminist researchers have emphasised that schizophrenia may 
be the product of the stress, oppression and traumas women experience in their daily 
lives, particularly in their roles as housewives and mothers (Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; 
Barnes & Maple 1992). However, there is little consideration of how the meaning of 
experiences are formulated interactively and intersubjectively. As such, the meanings of 
patients' experiences are likely to be negotiated and shaped within encounters between 
psychiatric professionals and patients (Barrett 1988), and interpreted in the light of 
professionals' understandings of schizophrenia (Schell 1966; Rosenhan 1973). Moreover 
those understandings, according to Szasz (1976), are likely to be informed by notions of 
femininity, in terms of incompetence, dependence and unemployability, for both women 
and men. 
However, Rose (1989) suggests a different conception arguing that contemporary 
psychiatry seeks to re-make individuals back into purposeful, autonomous subjects: 
... the rationale of psychotherapies - and this applies equally to contemporary 
psychiatry - is to restore to individuals the capacity to function as autonomous 
beings in the contractual society of the self. Selves unable to operate the 
imperative of choice are to be restored through therapy to the status of a 
choosing individual. Selves who find choice meaningless and their identity 
fading under inner and outer fragmentation are to be restored, through therapy, 
to unity and personal purpose. (Rose 1989: 227-8). 
But it is not evident from Rose's analysis what kinds of gender understandings are 
produced within the psychiatric project of restoring lives. 
In contrast to Rose, the feminist literature above suggests that psychiatric notions of 
purpose and autonomy are likely to be shot through with gender differentiated 
understandings of what constitutes purposefulness and autonomy in terms of notions of 
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(in)dependence, emotionality and activity. Alternatively, Szasz's account is suggestive 
that restoration may be partial and feminised. But it is not apparent from the literature 
how patients' experiences are played out in relation to understandings of gender and 
schizophrenia. The literature raises questions about the relationship between 
professionals' understandings of gender and schizophrenia and the restoration of patients' 
lives in local encounters. Do psychiatric professionals enforce gender conformity or 
restore lives to purpose and autonomy? Do understandings of femininity and masculinity 
inform what it means to be purposeful and autonomous? How are the past and present 
experiences of patients negotiated in relation to restoring patients' lives? And how are 
understandings of schizophrenia relevant to these aspects of professional/patient 
interactions? I use extracts from CPA meetings to discuss these questions focusing on the 
intersections between professionals' understandings of gender and schizophrenia, and 
discourses of purposes and autonomies. And I explore how professionals' understandings 
of gender, personhood and schizophrenia are played out in negotiations and 
decision-making about patients' future activities. 
1. Restoring Women's Lives: Interweaving Discourses of Purpose and 
Independence 
Discussions about "activities" are one of the main features of CPA meetings: what 
activities patients have or have not been engaged in since the last meeting, and what 
activities they should do in the future. As such, activity talk is the cornerstone of these 
meetings, for example: 
Meeting 1: Christine 
388 Dr. N.: °uhum (. ) OK° (1.0) OK well I think (. ) the main thing is for this 
389 meeting (0.7) to for us all to get our heads together and see () what you 
390 should be doin:: g (1.0) um y'kno:: w? in the way of all these activities 
391 that (0.9) might be helpful to you? (1.1) um 
Meeting 10 : Natalie (notes only) 
38 Dr. S.: now in terms of ways to occupy you during the day Erica do you have 
39 any thoughts 
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Activities are framed as being therapeutic for patients ("helpful" line 391), filling their 
time and keeping them busy ("occupy" line 38). Psychiatric professionals are specifically 
concerned with daytime activities (line 38) suggesting that people should not be at a loose 
end particularly during the day. ' Purposeful activity, in this initial framing, is therapeutic, 
fills the patient's time, keeps her/him busy, and takes place during the day. But when 
patients' biographical details and professionals' gender understandings come into play, 
purposeful activity, or the lack of it, takes on a number of different meanings. In this 
section I discuss meetings for two patients who are framed as insufficiently purposeful, 
looking at the discourses deployed to frame the problem and the proposed solution. 
1.1 Problems of Home, Loneliness and Dependence: "shes stuck in the house", "she 
doesn't have any friends" and "she does get dependent" 
In the extracts below, professionals invoke and shape patients' biographies and 
experiences to support the problem that they are insufficiently purposeful. In the process, 
certain understandings of home and friendship are accomplished which position these 
patients as lonely and dependent. Christine and Diane are both community patients. 
Christine has a young son (Simon) and attends the meeting with him and her mother 
(Anne Green). Diane is married to George, and she and George attend the meeting 
together. The first extract comes from Christine's meeting where the doctor frames a 
question to Jane, the community support worker, which suggests that she is seeking 
information about what sort of "things" Jane does with Christine. But Jane uses the 
opening as an opportunity to introduce a problem. The CSW begins by framing 
Christine's problem as not having any adult friends. Her "lack" (line 2) suggests a 
deficiency, she should have friends, and the contrast between "Simon" and "friend" (line 
3) infers that it is adult friendship that she needs, that small children are not friends, and 
that a friend would enable Christine to do things "without Simon". 
Meeting 1(pre-meeting) : Christine 
1 Dr. N: you do things do you? 
2 Jane (CSW): ye:: s but I've I've (0.8) felt that she has a lack of friends y'know that's 
3 the sort of thing she'd like to do without Simon (0.7) with a friend she 
This is suggestive that professionals are drawing on the assumption that 'normal' people are occupied 
during daytime. In this sense activities also stand in, in some way, for what 'normal' people do during the 
day. 
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4 says she finds it difficult making °friends° 
At the same time Jane positions herself as a professional friend rather than a real friend. 
The problem of lacking friends is supported by verbatim reporting, "she says" (line 3), 
which not only adds veracity to Jane's claim but also sites the problem firmly within 
Christine. Later in the pre-meeting the professionals go back to the problem of Christine's 
"lack of friends", shaping it further, together with a proposed solution. The extract below 
begins and ends with an ascription of Christine as "dependent". Dr. North begins with the 
claim that Christine is "dependent" on Jane (line 315) which is not "helpful", and ends 
with the suggestion that she is "dependent" on "me:: ", a state of affairs that is "not very 
healthy" (line 329-30). Christine's dependency on the professionals is framed as 
untherapeutic, unhealthy and, it would seem, inappropriate when it involves the 
consultant. Between these ascriptions of dependency the professionals shape the problem 
of Christine's lack of purposeful activity to support the proposed solution at lines 312-3, 
coming "here" to meet a "wider group of people", that is, Christine should come to 
professionally organised activities at the community centre. 
312 Dr. N.: well I would suggest that we use the childminder and and Jane as 
313 well if you're happy to be used that way to to get Christine to come 
314 here because that way she meets a wider group of people otherwise she 
315 just becomes dependent on you::: = 
316 Jane (CSW): =mm yeah= 
317 Dr. N.: =which isn't very (. ) helpful= 
318 Jane (CSW): no thats right= 
319 Claire (CPN): and she gets out of the house because I think shes stuck in the house 
320 and (1.4) y'know its a lovely house its a nice area but there is just no:: 
321 (1.7) () so she just sits and broods () 
322 Dr. N.: no well its obviously not good for anyone much less someone with a 
323 mental illness to be sitting at home with a young chi:: ld I mean its its 
324 (1.1) y'know I think quite difficult for for absolutely healthy young 
325 Mums= 
326 Claire (CPN): =thats true= 
327 Dr. N.: to be () isolated like that (0.8) um so I think anything that gets her in 
328 with a group of people I think is good because otherwise she she she 
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329 does get dependent >1 mean the fact that< she rings me:: its not very 
330 healthy ... but y'know she seems not to have (. ) anyone e:: Ise to tur:: n to 
The CPN's suggestion that Christine is "stuck in the house" (line 319) and "just sits and 
broods" (line 321) is shaped by the consultant into "sitting at home with a young chi:: ld" 
(line 323) and "isolated" (line 327). The doctor's contrast between anyone, someone, and 
Mums works up the vulnerability and isolation of Christine, thus justifying the necessity 
of getting her out of the house and to the community centre. The notions that it is "not 
good for" and "quite difficult for" are vaguely formulated but are sufficient to found the 
inference that if it is not healthy and beneficial for "anyone", and quite hard even for 
healthy Mums, then it is even more so for "someone with a mental illness". Notice also 
that age is made salient here; in flagging up "young child" and "young Mums", 
youthfulness appears to increase the sense of vulnerability on both sides. A gendered 
category appears to be invoked here to infer associated understandings about the normal 
difficulties faced by young mothers, such as stress and isolation, and thereby amplify the 
problematic status of Christine's situation. 
Therefore Christine's problem is that she is dependent on the professionals, stuck at home, 
has no friends, and the situation is made worse by the fact that she has a young child. She 
is insufficiently purposeful in that she just sits at home with her son and broods. The 
invocation of a generalised pathology ("mental illness") in combination with the category 
of mother facilitates a contrast with normal difficulties as a means of amplifying the 
problem and making the proposed solution more necessary. This solution, that she should 
attend activities at the community centre with "a group of people" (lines 313 & 326), will 
get her out of the house, give her something to do without Simon and provide an 
opportunity to meet people, make friends and thus be less dependent on the professionals. 
The inference is that Christine's dependence is not just practical but also, and mainly, 
emotional in that she needs a friend not just to do things with but "to turn to" (line 328). 
In this way Christine's dependency and lack of purposeful activity are linked together to 
inform the problem and the solution. In framing the solution for Christine in terms of 
getting out on her own (without Simon) and becoming less dependent, what constitutes 
purposeful activity is gaining some independence; independence is the purpose. 
174 
In the next extract I turn to Diane's meeting where different biographical details are 
shaped towards the same kind of problem and the same proposed solution. In this extract 
the professionals are discussing Diane in the intra-professional post-meeting and the 
extract begins, once again, with the CSW (Betty this time, not Jane) framing the problem 
as lack of friends, "she doesn't have any friends" (line 745). The proposed solution is also 
coupled with the problem; loneliness and lack of friends would be ameliorated if Diane 
were to "come to the meeting" (line 746), a reference to a professionally organised activity 
at the community centre. 2 
Meeting 2 (post-meeting) : Diane 
745 Betty (CSW): shes said shes quite lonely because she doesn't have any friends (. ) 
746 which is why I wanted her to come to the meeting= 
747 Dr. N.: =mm 
748 Betty (CSW): I haven't been able to persuade her but I'll try::: 
749 Sarah (CPN): and he does taxi work doesn't he so he must be out for long hours 
750 Betty (CSW): yes I mean hes actually out of the house quite a lot 
751 Sarah (CPN): mm and shes just at home cleaning= 
752 Betty (CSW): =yeah (4.0) cleaning seems to be the focus of her life 
753 Dr. N.: °yes well its not healthy is it° (1.2) well if you could make a start to get 
754 her= 
755 Betty (CSW): =1,11 try 
756 Dr. N.: to do something in the community then (. ) it would be 
Sarah, the CPN, and Betty, the CSW, continue to shape the problem of loneliness by 
bringing in Diane's husband George and the type of work he does, magnifying her 
loneliness by the amount of time she spends at home alone. Not only does she not have 
any friends, she does not even have her husband for company, producing a picture of 
extreme isolation. In addition, George being "out of the house" (line 750) for "long hours" 
(line 749) is contrasted with Diane who is "just at home cleaning" (line 751). While 
Christine was just sitting at home with a small child, Diane is just at home cleaning, a 
similarly purposeless domestic activity. Thus professionals in both meetings establish that 
patients' lives should not revolve solely around home, housework and childcare. 
2 Getting Diane to this activity appears to be an on-going project of professional persuasion, suggesting 
some reluctance on her part, "I haven't been able to persuade her but I'll fly" (line 748). 
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Moreover, while Christine and Diane may be occupied during the day, with childcare and 
housework respectively, these activities are characterised as at best insufficiently 
purposeful, and at worst psychologically unhealthy. 
After a brief digression Dr. North reintroduces the problem. While Christine is stuck at 
home because she has a small child, and the doctor draws on a generalised pathology and 
the gendered category of mother to amplify the problem, the cause of Diane's problem is 
shaped rather differently. Betty has just suggested that if she cannot persuade Diane to go 
to the community centre she will continue to visit her at home but Dr. North signals her 
disagreement and reiterates what is "important" in a contrast between "doing something 
outside the home" and "you coming i:: n" (lines 779-80 & 782). 
779 Dr. N.: but um I do think y'know its the the doing something outside the 
780 home thats [impor]tant 
781 Betty (CSW): [it is ] 
782 Dr. N.: rather than you coming i:: n y'know (1.1) 1 think thats where the fear is 
783 the fear I mean in her home shes at ease 
784 Betty (CSW): yeah 
785 Dr. N.: but the fear is (1.0) going out >because I mean she was sort of< phobic 
786 for years wasn't she >sort of real< agoraphobia () its a psychotic 
787 agoraphobia I think she felt people were= 
788 Betty (CSW): =paranoid= 
789 Dr. N.: =°ye:: s >talking about her or something°< so um:: I think if you can 
790 get her to break that the fear that if she goes out they're going to to to 
791 talk about her because shes Irish or not like her because shes Irish 
Dr. North continues with another contrast between "ease" at home and "fear" of going out 
together with a sequence of psychiatric terminology. In a three-part list of psychiatric 
naming, "fear" of "going out" is quickly worked up from "sort of phobic" to "real 
agoraphobia" to "psychotic agoraphobia" (lines 785-7) so that Diane not going out 
becomes framed as irrational and pathological. The consultant goes on to provide an 
explanation that draws on an earlier narrative of a reported conversation supplied by Betty 
(text not included here). Diane's ethnicity, being "Irish", becomes the cause; her 
pathological fear of leaving her home is underpinned by a pathological fear of racism. 
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Such a framing presents the problem in such extreme terms that getting Diane out of the 
house becomes vital for her mental health. Whilst the aim to "break that the fear" is 
perhaps a rather harsh means to cure a pathology, it has been introduced here by the 
consultant to add force and weight to the necessity of getting Diane out of the house and 
is a direct response to the other professionals' suggestion that it may not be possible to 
persuade Diane to do so. 
Diane's biography has been invoked and shaped to add force to the necessity of restoring 
her life to purpose. In this case, the doctor ascribes a specific kind of pathology and a 
category of ethnicity to amplify the problem and the necessity of the proposed solution. 
But these different biographies are shaped towards the same problem. Like Christine, 
Diane is stuck at home, engaged in purposeless domestic activity, and does not have any 
friends. And it is the same proposed solution, to do something at the community centre. 
The professionals' concern regarding dependency is less acute with Diane than with 
Christine. Nevertheless, in the next extract Diane is framed as dependent on her husband 
(rather than the professionals). Betty has just raised the possibility that it could be George 
who does not want Diane to go out without him, a very different discourse to the one 
raised regarding Diane's pathological fear of racism. The doctor draws on Betty's 
suggestion to position Diane as dependent. 
705 Dr. N.: its hard for him to (0.7) to to sort of see her as independent he 
706 doesn't really want to (5.0) but I think once a week maybe they could 
707 both manage that 
In framing George as unable to see Diane as "independent", together with the notion that 
they could "both manage" once a week (line 707), this sequence positions Diane as 
dependent on George, George as dependent on Diane being dependent on him and the 
need for Diane to be more "independent" (line 705). In this way, getting Diane out of the 
house and to the community centre includes the notion that Diane should do something 
independent from her home and husband; the purpose of the activity is to get her out of 
the house, do something without her husband, meet people and make friends, and be less 
dependent on her husband - and breaking her pathological fear of racism adds weight to 
these restorative moves. 
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The themes of "stuck at home", "lacks friends" and "dependent" position these patients as 
insufficiently purposeful and autonomous even though their biographical details are 
drawn on and shaped in different ways to support the problem. Therefore, patients' 
experiences and individual histories are resources which professionals draw upon and 
shape interactively within meetings. It is noteworthy that all the extracts in this section 
occurred in an intra-professional pre-meeting or post-meeting. Thus professional accounts 
of patients' experiences, replete with ascriptions of pathology, are largely part of the 
professional "hidden transcript" (Scott 1990: 4); in these cases what counts as a valid 
experience is established amongst the professionals in a context where patients are unable 
to contest the professional version. And the professionals' authority to decide the meaning 
and import of these experiences is determined by the powerful institutional practices of 
pre- and post-meetings. The discourses related to home, domestic activities and 
dependency are suggestive that professionals' background understandings of femininity 
could be operating here. In the following section, I trace the way that professional notions 
that Christine and Diane should do something at the community centre are shaped towards 
a specific activity which explicitly positions these patients as "women" and makes 
understandings of femininity relevant to the activity of restoring lives and particular 
notions of purpose and autonomy. 
1.2 Independence and Friendship in the Company of Other Women: "its just all women" 
Up until now the actual activity/environment proposed for Christine and Diane has been 
formulated in very broad terms, "anything that gets her in with a group of people" 
(Christine, lines 327-8) and "something in the community" (Diane, line 757). But the 
professionals have a particular, preferred environment in mind that is one of several 
suggested to Christine but the only suitable environment for Diane. Professional 
understandings of home, friendship and (in)dependence inform and feed into the preferred 
environment for their proposed solution to the problem. The first extract is taken from 
Christine's meeting. Laura, the ASW, has just suggested that Christine could attend the 
beliefs group and Christine has counterposed Laura's suggestion with the notion of 
stimulation, "I would like some stimulation" (text not included here). The extract below 
begins with Anne Green introducing "computer classes" (line 737) in response to 
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Christine's invocation of "stimulation". However, this suggestion is ignored by the 
professionals who instead raise "womens group". 
Meeting 1 (main meeting) : Christine 
737 Anne: I thought you were going to do some (. ) computer classes 
738 Christine: oh yeah at night school yeah 
739 Laura (ASW): on Friday Claire is going to visit on Fridays 
740 Claire (CPN): and also on Fridays the womens group (. ) which is on Friday morning 
741 that is vyy popular 
742 Laura (ASW): I think you'd enjoy that 
743 Claire (CPN): the womens group (. ) would you be interested in that? = 
744 Christine: =yeah I would I would be yeah I would be interested yeah >it doesn't 
745 mean I'd have to come< every week does it 
746 Claire (CPN): I don't think so I think y'know its its sort of reasonably 2--pen (. ) but 
747 obviously thats something you'd have to discuss with whoevers 
748 running it 
749 Christine: yeah 
750 Claire (CPN): and from week to week they have different topics that they cover and 
751 guest speakers come in and (. ) they do some interesting topics 
752 Christine: thats right and you can socialise at the same time can't you? 
753 Claire (CPN): yeah its a very good group yeah very good 
Women's group is framed as pleasurable, "you'd enjoy that" (line 742) and stimulating, 
"different topics", "guest speakers", and "interesting topics". The notion that it is "yy 
popular" and "very good" (lines 741 & 753), suggests not only that it is beneficial for 
women but women who go agree. The amount of discursive effort put into selling this 
group to Christine presents women's group, a gendered environment, as particularly 
suitable for Christine. The solution of "womens group", therefore, explicitly positions 
Christine as a 'woman' and makes this the most salient feature about her (Edwards 1998). 
Moreover, despite the way women's group is formulated for Christine, it becomes clear 
that its salience is not stimulation but rather that it is a women's group. The following 
extract is from Diane's meeting and consists of Betty, the CSW, selling the women's 
group to Diane. Betty's approach consists of four inter-related parts which present 
women's group as an undemanding and safe environment for a woman. 
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Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane 
273 Betty (CSW): right its only an hour and a half 
274 Diane: right 
275 Betty (CSW): its only half ten to twe:: lve 
276 Diane: yeah 
277 Betty (CSW): its not a lo^: ng= 
278 Diane: =yeah 
279 Betty (CSW): sort of session (0.8) and by the time you arrive and have a cup of tea a 
280 cup of coffee its ten to eleven= 
281 Diane: =yeah= 
282 Betty (CSW): =so really and then we have a little break and have another cup of 
283 coffee 
284 Diane: yeah 
285 Betty (CSW): so really in total y'know and its ay sort of gentle group= 
286 Diane: =yeah 
287 Betty (CSW): er you're not under pressure to do anything er and someone comes 
288 along from the college to talk about make-up (. ) someone came last 
289 week to talk about nai:: ls 
290 Diane: yeah 
291 Betty (CSW): so its that kind of group um theres about (1.9) eight or nine women 
292 and you will kno::: w some of them from the ward 
293 Diane: yeah 
294 Betty (CSW): and its all its just all women >its nothing< its very relaxing and I 
295 don't think you'd feel pressured or or um= 
296 Diane: no 
297 Betty (CSW): um (. ) uncomfortable in any way 
Betty's 'sell' of the women's group is accomplished in four three-part lists. Firstly she 
presents the women's group as not requiring very much of Diane or her time, "its not a 
lo::: ng ... sort of session (0.8) and 
by the time you arrive and have a cup of tea a cup of 
coffee its ten to eleven... and then we have a little break and have another cup of coffee" 
(lines 277-283). In moving from the length of the session to a chronology of coffee 
breaks, the women's group is presented as a short amount of time that is not much to ask 
of Diane and little will be required of her beyond drinking coffee, thus founding the 
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notion that it is undemanding. In the second list, Betty builds on the notion that it is 
undemanding by linking it with beauty activities, "you're not under pressure to do 
anything er and someone comes along from the college to talk about makeup (. ) someone 
came last week to talk about nai:: ls" (lines 285-289). The first item in the list, "you're not 
under pressure", forms a bridge between the previous list and depictions of the sort of 
activities involved. In the third list Betty presents the women's group as an environment 
specifically for women, "theres about (1.9) eight or nine women and you will kno::: w 
some of them from the ward... and its all its just all women" (lines 291-4). The small 
numbers, the fact that Diane will "know some of them", and the emphasis that it is only 
women works to suggest that it is safe and undemanding because it is "just all women". 
The final list reiterates and expands the notion that the group is undemanding, "its very 
relaxing and I don't think you'd feel pressurised or or um... um (. ) uncomfortable in any 
way" (lines 294-7). Therefore, women's group is undemanding because it takes up little 
time and little is required beyond drinking coffee, because it is about beautifying 
activities, because it is a safe, women-only environment. Women's group in this 
formulation is for the kind of 'woman' who cannot manage to do very much, if anything, 
and who feels happiest and safest with other women. Nothing is required, just for Diane 
to be there. It is a small step from home to women's group. Therefore each discursive 'sell' 
of the women's group is furnished with constituent parts that are aimed to appeal to the 
particular woman concerned. But what is most salient, and what traverses both depictions 
is that it is a group with women for women. And whilst these women may have different 
biographical details and predilections, they are women who need to do something outside 
the home, make friends and be more independent and the best place for that is a 
professionally organised activity that is "just all women". 
The four themes explored so far, "shes stuck in the house", "she doesn't have any friends", 
"she does get dependent" and "its just all women" suggest that psychiatric professionals 
are drawing on understandings of femininity in their decision-making regarding patients' 
futures in terms of their purposefulness and autonomy. Being stuck at home, friendless 
and dependent is framed as insufficiently purposeful while doing something outside the 
home, independent of significant others and in the company of other women is framed as 
the solution. In this way, purposeful activity and a certain understanding of independence 
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are interwoven and feminised. But there is little sense in these meetings that women are 
being assessed on the performance of gendered tasks per se (Busfield 1989; 1996), nor 
that psychiatry is enforcing gender-role conformity (Chesler 1974; Warren 1987) in any 
straightforward or traditional way. In fact traditionally feminised tasks such as childcare 
and housework are deemed insufficiently purposeful, if not downright psychologically 
unhealthy, supporting Allen's (1986) contention that social coping in the community does 
not require adjustment, in any simple sense, to gender-role. 
However, Busfield is right to the extent that the patient is "a gendered subject" (1996: 
114), or rather, these patients are feminised subjects. The gender thinking of psychiatric 
professionals positions women as "women", informing what constitutes lack of purpose, 
what purposeful activity should consist of and what kind of independence "women" 
should be restored to. Moreover, while contemporary psychiatric understandings eschew 
the idea that 'a woman's place is in the home', home becomes, paradoxically, a 
problematic place for women: somewhere where they engage in purposeless activities and 
a place they need to get away from. Furthermore, when the meaning of patients' histories 
and experiences are analysed as interactive accomplishments, rather than pre-given, it is 
apparent that they are shaped according to the activity at hand. Different biographies and 
experiences, such as "single Mum" with a "mental illness", "Irish" patient with "psychotic 
agoraphobia", can be shaped and informed by understandings of femininity to support the 
same problematisation and the same proposed solution? Furthermore, much of this work 
occurs in an intra-professional domain where professionals have the authority to decide 
what patients' experiences mean and in a context where patients do not have the 
opportunity to contest these professional versions. 
Thus re-making individuals back into purposeful and autonomous subjects (Rose 1989) is 
informed by professionals' understandings of femininity. However, from the analysis so 
far it is not apparent whether professionals also make understandings of masculinity 
relevant to discussions about patients' activities, nor what kinds of understandings are 
accomplished and to what effect. In the next section, I discuss meetings for two patients 
who are also framed as insufficiently purposeful. I explore a different professional 
This includes the meanings of experiences related to motherhood and housework which are constituted 
interactively and according to the activity at hand. 
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formulation of autonomy which, I argue, is informed by an understanding of personhood 
which is not explicitly masculinised. And I raise issues about whether a background 
understanding of masculinity could be operating. 
2. Restoring People's Lives: Understandings of Personhood and Ascriptions 
of Autonomy 
There has been a tendency in feminist writings on gender and schizophrenia to focus 
chiefly or wholly on women. The result has often been a reliance on an implicit 
comparison or assumed knowledge about men (Busfield 1996) while leaving the 
interrelationships between femininity and masculinity largely unexplored. For example, 
while Chesler (1974) claims that men who are passive and dependent are likely to be 
diagnosed schizophrenic, it is women who are the focus of her account. As I have argued 
above, in contemporary psychiatric encounters women are explicitly positioned as 
"women" in talk about restoring patients' lives and understandings of femininity inform 
what it means for "women" to be purposeful and autonomous. In this section I discuss two 
further meetings where patients are framed as insufficiently purposeful and I examine the 
way the biographies and experiences of these patients are shaped towards framing the 
problem(s) and the proposed solution. In these meetings professionals' understandings of 
a generalised person are informing a different understanding of purpose and autonomy to 
that constituted for "women". And it is likely that professionals' understandings of 
masculinity are operating as a background relevance. 
2.1 Problems of a Difficult Relationship, and Home and Dependence Revisited: "he'll 
need some support" and "dependent on us feeding you" 
This section focuses primarily on meetings for two patients. As in the previous section, I 
trace the way professionals invoke and shape the patients' biographies to frame them as 
insufficiently purposeful. However, understandings of a difficult relationship for one 
patient, and home and survival for the other, position these patients in ways that suggest 
that professional notions of dependence and sociability can take on a number of different 
meanings. Tony is a community patient and has recently ended a long-term relationship 
with another patient. Henry is a patient at the day hospital who is about to be discharged 
into the community. They both live alone and attend the meetings alone. In 'the first 
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extract the professionals are discussing with Tony the recent break-up of his relationship 
with Wendy, another patient. The extract begins and ends with "all his time taken up" 
(lines 144 & 150), an extreme formulation which is sandwiched either side of a narrative 
of how Tony used to be before he took up with Wendy. The solicitation of Tony's 
agreement problematises the situation with Wendy as Tony's framing rather than a 
professional one. 
Meeting 6 (main meeting) : Tony 
144 Martin (CPN): I think Tony's time's all taken up by Wendy isn't that right (. ) its its 
145 become (. ) aa problem in a sense for him (. ) and I think that time when 
146 he said y'know he was pleased to break up with her if he felt he can get 
147 time for himself its a pity before I knew him so many years that 
148 although he was quite ill at ti:: me but when he LIKES to believe he has 
149 his own routine and go out on his own and do things and it seems now 
150 all his time taken up by Wendy's sort of (. ) y'know um preoccupations 
Martin, the CPN, provides a contrast between a before, when Tony had "his own routine" 
and went "out on his own and do things" (line 149), and a recent state of affairs when "all 
his time taken up" with Wendy's "preoccupations" (line 150). The assessment is warranted 
by how long the CPN has known Tony, "so many years". In a three-part list, Tony is 
framed as formerly purposeful, independent and active "he has his own routine and go out 
on his own and do things" (lines 148-9), even when he was "quite ill" (line 148). This 
contrast sequence suggests that Tony used to be purposeful and independent, is no longer 
so, but he is not to blame, it is Wendy's fault. In the next extract, the professionals go on 
to discuss what the future role of those involved in Tony's care should be. The first point 
to note is the sheer number of professionals involved with Tony, four plus the consultant. 
Tony is positioned as someone who requires necessary but understandable support; again 
it is not quite his fault it is because of the "relationship"! Additionally, it would seem to 
be emotional support that he needs because of the "area" it is related to. 
° The consultant also appears to be reluctant to accord Tony and Wendy's association the status of a 
relationship; she pauses before using the term (line 170) and then moves to using "that area" (twice lines 
171-2). This reluctance is suggestive that, perhaps, the doctor is subtly inferring that it was not a 'real' 
relationship in some way. 
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169 Dr. N.: I think y'know Tony will need some suppo:: rt because um 
170 its not been easy and its been quite a long (0.7) relationship so I think 
171 Kathryn Maroon can continue maybe to support you (0.6) in that in that 
172 area and along with Lucy cos Lucys been involved in that area too but I 
173 think that leaves Celia Beige and Martin to discuss (. ) your your own 
174 needs 
However, despite the number of professionals involved, and Tony's need for (emotional) 
support there is no discourse of dependency invoked here. He may need the professionals 
for emotional support but he is not dependent on them. The need for emotional support 
arises out of his biographical circumstances and is reasonable given those circumstances, 
a difficult association with a preoccupied co-patient. Thus Tony is not positioned as 
dependent in the way that Christine was in the previous section. ' In the next extract, the 
professionals begin to formulate a solution to the problem which they frame initially in 
broad terms. The extract begins with the consultant introducing the notion that 
"activitie:: s" are central to the care plan and consist of more than one activity. Tony 
makes the claim that "I do go out everyday anyway" (line 253), an extreme formulation 
that attempts to found the claim that he is sufficiently active. 
250 Dr. N.: uhn OK so shall we start >sort of making< the care plan so lets say the 
251 heading activitie:: s and you say that social group would be one activity 
252 (1.7) um 
253 Tony: I do go out every day anyway 
254 Dr. N.: where do you go to 
255 Tony: local towns (. ) like Crick or Farrington [or Borley ] 
256 Dr. N.: [what you just] wander around 
257 the sho:: ps 
258 Tony: yeah 
259 Dr. N.: but wouldn't it be better to do something (1.5) more purposeful and 
260 with other people 
261 Tony: yeah 
I Christine could be framed in the same way as Tony; her need for emotional support could also be 
understandable given that she is a single mother living alone with a small child. However, Christine is 
positioned as overly dependent on the professionals and needing someone "else to turn to". 
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A short interrogation by the doctor enables her to quickly differentiate between aimless 
activity ("just wander around the sho:: ps" lines 256-7) and "something (1.5) more 
purposeful and with other people" (lines 259-60). Purposeful activity is overtly 
formulated as the solution for Tony, but has not yet been given any substance, and this 
activity should involve contact with others. The doctor solicits Tony's agreement to this 
formulation, which he gives. Therefore Tony's problem is that he has been embroiled in a 
long and difficult association with another patient. He is insufficiently purposeful in that 
Wendy takes up all his time but it is not his fault. He used to be independent and 
purposeful and his need for emotional support is understandable given the situation, but 
he is not emotionally dependent. And the proposed solution is that Tony should do an, as 
yet, vaguely formulated "something more purposeful" and do it "with other people". 
In the following extract, I turn to Henry's meeting. Henry's problems are formulated in 
much more extreme terms than Tony's and ones that bear similarities to discourses 
deployed in the meetings for Christine and Diane. In the extract below, the professionals 
are discussing the arrangements for Henry's discharge from the day hospital, along with 
potential problems and how they will be addressed. Henry himself has introduced the 
main problem at the start of the meeting (Henry: "I still have a problem going out on my 
own", text not included here) which threads through the whole of the meeting. The extract 
begins with the consultant listing off what needs to be done to "help" Henry with his 
"problems and difficulties" (line 72), writing in the file as she talks. In a three-part list, the 
last item of which is itself a three-part list (Jefferson 1990), Henry's problems and thus 
professional intervention is framed as "help maintain your mood help you get out so you 
don't get trapped in the house... help you get out for shopping doctors appointments and 
collecting prescriptions" (lines 75-77). 
Meeting 9 (main meeting): Henry (notes only) 
72 Dr. S.: ... list of problems and difficulties... how are you in your spirits and 
73 your mood 0 
74 Henry: at the moment I would say not bad, 
75 Dr. S.: we need to help maintain your mood help you get out so you don't get 
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76 trapped in the house... help you get out for shopping doctors 
77 appointments and collecting prescriptions ((Dr. South writes in the 
78 file))... need to encourage you to socialise a bit 
The first point to note is that "getting out" has two components: a general sort of getting 
out so that Henry is not "trapped in the house", and a specific "getting out" as a means of 
survival. Secondly, the notion that he should "socialise" implies general contact with 
others, in a similar fashion to Tony. The qualifier of "a bit" implies they do not expect 
very much of him and/or he is not likely to be very sociable. In this initial framing then, 
the problems are implied by, and incorporated into, the proposed solutions. Henry is 
insufficiently purposeful in two respects. He is "trapped in the house", unable to go out, 
and he is also insufficiently purposeful at the most basic level of necessities for living, an 
even more extreme depiction. And the proposed solution is framed in terms of psychiatric 
help and encouragement; Henry should "get out" in a general way, "get out" for basic 
necessities, and "socialise a bit", and the professionals will "help" and "encourage" him to 
do this. 
The problem of Henry being "trapped in the house" has a very similar resonance to 
Christine and Diane being "stuck in the house" and, in particular, his problem of "getting 
out" appears to be the same as Diane's, that is, based on fear. However "stuck" and 
"trapped" are not necessarily synonymous and can convey subtly different meanings. For 
example, "stuck in the house" implies that Christine and Diane remain there when they 
could and should be doing other things, as in 'I was stuck indoors all day because it was 
raining'. But "trapped" suggests a way in but no way out, a lack of means of escape. In this 
sense then, being "stuck" implies a lack of volition which being "trapped" does not. The 
subtle difference in meanings are elaborated and differentiated in this context according to 
the solutions attached to the problems. So for Diane the solution is to "break that fear" 
conveying the sense of prising her out of the house, much like a clam from a shell, and for 
Christine it is to get her in with a group of people, the implication being that if she has 
something better to do she will not stay at home all the time. But for Henry it is a matter 
of help and encouragement to enable him to escape, at least in order to get what he needs 
for survival. 
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However, the psychiatric nurse goes on to frame the problem in terms of dependence. In 
the following extract, the doctor has just referred again to the problem of collecting 
doctors' prescriptions. The extract begins with Lynne, the PN, asking a direct question to 
Henry in a rhetoric of argument construction of "if you got a taxi" then "what would 
happen" (line 98). This question incorporates a proposed solution to the problem but 
Henry resists this proposal implying a distinction between what might work on an 
occasional basis but not as a general solution, "regular basis" (line 99), together with the 
vaguely formulated claim that it is "not appropriate". 
98 Lynne (PN): what about if you got a taxi somewhere what would happen 
99 Henry: I don't feel I could get a taxi on a regular basis its not appropriate 
100 Lynne (PN): in what way [. ] 
101 Henry: if I get a taxi shopping I think and taxis to get prescriptions and go to 
102 the chemist its the expense really 
103 Dr. S.: : it wouldn't have to be for everything ((checks how often he would 
104 need to get prescriptions))... Michael can you talk to Dr. Beta so he can 
105 have his prescription for as long as possible 
106 Lynne (PN): you could get one when you go shopping at Tescos... it would give 
107 you some independence.., on a weekly basis otherwise you're going to 
108 be dependent on us feeding you I thought it might give you some 
109 control over it 
However, Lynne challenges Henry's claim and demands an explanation. The pause at the 
end of line 100 suggests that she is waiting for Henry's answer. Eventually he provides a 
three-part list of the things he would have to use taxis for, "a taxi shopping. .. and taxis to 
get prescriptions and go to the chemist" (lines 101-2). The list items work up the extent to 
which he would have to take taxis, thus supporting and justifying his previous claim that 
it is "not appropriate" because of the "expense" (lines 101-2). In this way, a strategy for 
getting out that could be used occasionally becomes, by sheer volume of what "regular" 
would entail, impractical. But the doctor undermines Henry's implied claim regarding 
volume and impracticality, "it wouldn't have to be for everything" (line 103), followed by 
a practical suggestion of how the volume of taxi rides can be decreased. Having dispensed 
with two parts of Henry's list ("prescriptions" and "the chemist"), Lynne takes up the third 
part, shopping, and reiterates her proposal. This time she provides a justification in the 
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form of a strong and evocative contrast between "independence" and "control" on one 
hand and extreme dependence on the other, "otherwise you're going to be dependent on us 
feeding you" (lines 107-9). In depicting Henry's situation as one of such severe 
dependence, his very life depends on it, the PN has formulated a strong counter to Henry's 
resistance. However, despite the severity of Henry's dependence, it is of a specific 
practical nature related to everyday acquisitions of food and medicines, rather than the 
more internal emotional dependence associated with Christine and Diane. 
Therefore the formulations of "all his time taken up" and "trapped in the house" position 
Tony and Henry as insufficiently purposeful, but in very different ways. Tony has been 
embroiled in a difficult relationship and his lack of purpose is not his fault. The difficulty 
of his association with Wendy is deployed to support professional assertions that Tony 
needs support and to do something more purposeful, while at the same time excusing him 
of blame for this state of affairs. Henry cannot get out of the house but professional plans 
to remedy this situation meet with resistance from Henry which in turn elicits a discourse 
of dependence from one of the professionals. 
Nevertheless there are some commonalities. Tony will "need some support" but he is not 
dependent, and Henry is practically, rather than emotionally dependent, he is "dependent 
on us feeding you". There is no sense that either patient needs someone "else to turn to"; 
despite the fact they both live alone this aspect of their biographies is not made relevant to 
the discussions. And both patients should have contact with other people implying a 
general sociability but they are not framed as having a "lack of friends" or "lonely". 
Furthermore, "home" is not problematised and associated with domestic activities in the 
way it was for Christine and Diane; Henry in particular and Tony could be framed as "just 
at home", but they are not. Thus different understandings of dependence and sociability 
from those associated with "women" are formulated by professionals for these patients 
suggesting that some kind of unexplicated background understanding could be operating 
here. In the next section, I trace the way professional solutions to Tony's and Henry's lack 
of purposeful activity are played out in the course of the interactions, and in such a way 
that a particular understanding of independence is constituted and accorded to these 
patients in terms of a self-regulating autonomy which differs from professionals' 
understandings of independence for "women". 
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2.2 Autonomy: "he'll do what he wants to do" 
The proposed solutions have been formulated in very general terms for Tony ("something 
more purposeful and with other people") and in very basic terms for Henry ("help you get 
out" and "encourage you to socialise a bit"). However, as professionals go on to furnish 
these solutions with more detail, a particular understanding of independence feeds into the 
direction that the discussions take. The first extract is taken from Tony's meeting. Doctor 
North is suggesting to Tony a range of purposeful and sociable activities organised by the 
professionals at the community centre. But Tony directly and emphatically resists each of 
the doctor's suggestions, "no" (lines 272,274 & 287). However, despite the doctor 
pursuing some of these refusals, her response in terms of her amusement and laughter 
(lines 273,277, & 283 twice) is very different from the sort of professional responses to 
patient resistance discussed in the previous chapter. It suggests that it is acceptable for 
Tony to refuse. 
Meeting 6 (main meeting) : Tony 
270 Dr. N.: so what about (. ) theres a relaxation group Tuesday isn't there does that 
271 sound like your thing? relaxation? (4.9) °no° sports? 
272 Tony: no 
273 Dr. N.: sports group? hhhhh 
274 Tony: no 
275 Dr. N.: why not? 
276 Tony: well= 
277 Dr. N.: =can you swim? ((still sounding amused)) 
278 Tony: no I can't swim 
279 Dr. N.: you can't swim? 
280 Tony: no 
281 Dr. N.: how did you manage not to learn? at school didn't they make you 
282 Tony: I stayed away from sport 
283 Dr. N.: hhhhI don't think I believe you um alright so no sport er hh we're 
284 running out of things [living ] 
285 Martin (CPN): [the Drop] In the Drop in do you do you like the 
286 Drop In 
287 Tony: no I've been there before 
190 
In allowing, and even encouraging, Tony's resistance to all these professionally organised 
activities, the doctor appears to be reinforcing and colluding with his resistance. As such, 
an independence of spirit/will is implicitly accorded to Tony in the professional's 
responses. The next extract consists of the doctor 'selling' another activity to Tony, this 
time "computers". The initial introduction of "computers" by the doctor has met with no 
interest from Tony but she presses on. The extract begins with a piece of flattery from the 
doctor, "you have a good brai:: n Tony" (line 343). The first point to note here is the sheer 
amount of effort that goes into 'selling' this activity to Tony. Working with computers is 
framed as an activity for "people" (lines 350,352,357 & 361), together with a number of 
mechanical metaphors, "tune it up", "really riveted" (lines 345 & 352), mirrored by Tony's 
"sparked" (line 358), which could suggest that she is covertly masculinising the activity 
(Hopper & LeBaron 1998). 
343 Dr. N.: you have a good brai:: n Tony? 
344 Tony: its a clapped out brain now 
345 Dr. N.: no well you've got to tune it up again and start using it (1.9) I'm 
346 surprised that computers don't (0.8) interest you (4.4) no? (2.5) 
347 Tony: I might 
348 Dr. N.: ah ah well how about [looking at tha:: t cos ] 
349 Martin (CPN): [you see Downs College] is 
350 Dr. N.: Downs College has got courses for sort of introducing people to 
351 computers (. ) that you might get into that you might like it I mean 
352 people get really riveted by by computers and (0.8) the web and all that 
353 kindof stuff do you know anything about that? 
354 Tony: no 
355 Dr. N.: well y'know you you get into this (0.8) THING and you can read 
356 noticeboards or y'know through this (0.7) internet and you can (1.4) 
357 communicate with people through it and (1.0) stuff like that 
358 Tony: you've sparked off a bit of interest= 
359 Dr. N.: =ahhhhhh 
360 Martin (CPN): good good 
361 Dr. N.: no its its some people are really y'know into it its quite exciting for 
362 them and it could be your thing cos I mean y'know, its sortof 
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363 Martin (CPN): working on your own and [and] 
364 Dr. N.: [ya ] 
Having positioned Tony as someone with "a good brain", his disinterest in computers 
becomes surprising, "I'm surprised that computers don't (0.8) interest you" (lines 345-6). 
Thus while the doctor seemingly gives Tony permission to refuse again, and an opening to 
do so, tying his intelligence to this activity is a tactic which is likely to elicit a more 
positive response. The doctor builds on her persuasion, with the help of Martin. In three 
three-part lists the doctor works up how "interesting" and suitable computers are. The first 
two lists present computers as interesting for other people and reasons for this, "people 
get really riveted by by computers and (0.8) the web and all that kindof stuff' and "you 
can read noticeboards... and you can (1.4) communicate with people through it and (1.0) 
stuff like that" (lines 352-3 & 355-7). The generalised list-completers in each list suggest 
that there are "many more relevant nameables" (Jefferson 1990: 68) thus increasing the 
extent and sense of interest. 
Having established how interesting computers are for others, and why, and having elicited 
an even more positive response from Tony (line 358), the doctor finishes with another list 
which acts as a bridge from her depiction of others to Tony, "some people are really 
y'know into it its quite exciting for them and it could be your thing". Therefore, getting 
involved in computers is presented by the doctor in terms of interest bordering on passion, 
"interest" (line 346), "like", "riveted" (351-2), "get into" (lines 351 & 355) and "exciting" 
(line 361). This is combined with the notion of suitability which suggests that computers 
are "something" with purpose and "something" which could be purposeful for Tony, "it 
could be your thing" (line 362). The last point to note is Martin's interjection at line 363. 
He presents computers as an independent activity, something purposeful to do "on your 
own" (line 363). But this also carries the implication that computers are the "thing" for 
someone who is not good with people. "Something-with other people" (previous extract, 
lines 259-60) is reconfigured to other people at a distance; he can "communicate with 
people" (Dr. North, line 357) but "working on your own" (line 363). 
Therefore the solution for Tony is an interest/passion in the activity of computers, an 
activity that is associated with "people" but partially worked up through the use of 
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mechanical metaphors which could carry connotations of masculinity. Computers will be 
a purposeful activity for someone with a good brain who can communicate with other 
people, but at a distance. While Christine's mother raised the possibility of computer 
classes and Christine talked about stimulation, the professionals used the notion of 
stimulation to position Christine as a "woman", and frame the solution for Christine in 
terms of the company of other women. Yet despite Tony's disinterest and counter-claim of 
a "clapped out brain" the consultant goes to some lengths to frame the solution of 
computers in terms of interest and suitability; the discourses of "good brain" and "your 
thing" suggest that Tony has talents and he should engage in activities that use those 
talents. However, a certain understanding of independence is woven into the discussion. 
Not only is Tony encouraged to get involved in an independent activity, "working on your 
own", but his resistance elicits an implicit discourse of independence which is very 
different from that proposed for women. The notion of independence implied here is a 
sense of free will and self-government; Tony is allowed, even encouraged, to refuse to do 
what he does not want to do and thus the implication is that he will do what he wants to 
do and will not do what he does not want to do. 
This covert framing of autonomy is explicitly invoked in Henry's meeting as it is 
juxtaposed with a discourse of dependence, and deployed to override it. In the following 
extract, Henry's meeting is drawing to a close. Henry has suggested that he is 
"apprehensive very about going out on my own" (text not included here) and the extract 
below begins with the doctor responding to Henry, whereupon the meeting suddenly takes 
a different turn. The doctor's acknowledgement of Henry's feelings suggests that she has 
listened to what he has said and she understands. This is followed by a sequence that 
undermines much of what has gone before. She presents a worst case scenario that 
conveys the notion that he will not be made to take taxis if he will not or cannot do so and 
that they would not let him starve; the CSW will provide the means for his sustenance if 
necessary. 
Meeting 9 (main meeting) : Henry (notes only) 
203 Dr. S.: I acknowledge your apprehension... if the worst comes to the worst 
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204 Jane can do the shopping I think you'd feel a bit less trapped indoors or 
205 you don't feel that do we want to get you out more than you want to be 
206 got out 
207 Lynne (PN): but there may be times when he needs to go out 
208 Dr. S.: I think Henry'11 do what he wants to do 
The doctor follows this worst case scenario with a contrast between her opinion ("I 
think") regarding his feelings about the problem of being "trapped indoors" and Henry's, 
perhaps different, feelings. It founds the inference that she is concerned about his feelings 
and problems but at the same time it suggests that there may be more than one way to see 
the problem; she thinks he would feel "less trapped indoors" if he took a taxi to get his 
shopping but perhaps he does not. Finally, the consultant frames a question that appears to 
be rhetorical in that Henry does not answer. While previously the doctor's opinion was 
juxtaposed with Henry's feelings, now an equivalence is founded in which what the 
professionals "want" is contrasted with what Henry "wants", "do we want to get you out 
more than you want to be got out" (lines 205-6). In this way, what Henry "wants" is given 
equal weight and value to what the professionals "want". As such it gives what Henry 
"wants" credence and provides tacit support for his resistance. 
This reframing of equivalence occasions disagreement from Lynne who contrasts "want" 
with "needs". It is not a question of desires or preferences, but basic life sustaining needs. 
However the doctor's response to the PN explicitly accords Henry autonomy, "I think 
Henry'll do what he wants to do" (line 208). As in the discussion between Dr. North and 
Tony, the patient's resistance to the professionals' plans and suggestions elicits, this time 
an overt, discourse of autonomy. Henry is accorded a free will and self-government which 
shuts down resistance from the PN and in the process affirms Henry's resistance. 
Moreover, this ascription has the potential to undermine all the proposed professional 
solutions forwarded earlier in the meeting. However in the post-meeting the PN raises the 
problem and her disagreement again. She re-invokes her previous discourse of Henry's 
dependence on the professionals combined with an extreme formulation which infers 
severe lack of purpose and activity almost to the point of lifelessness, "hes so dependent 
on us and he won't do anything" (line 211). And'once again the PN's resistance elicits an 
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overt affirmation of autonomy, "yep but he won't do it if he doesn't want to do it" (line 
212). 
((Henry leaves)) 
209 Dr. S.: I think his mood has improved hes more spontaneous 
210 Michael (CPN): its a good time to encourage him 
211 Lynne (PN): hes so dependent on us and he won't do anything 
212 Dr. S.: yep but he won't do it if he doesn't want to do it OK HONOS 
213 ((consults small booklet)) I think he does still have some delusions 
214 Lynne (PN): fear of going out 
215 Dr. S.: but its much more vague now 
This time, the discourse of dependence is explicitly counterposed with, and overridden by, 
a discourse of independence construed as autonomy; Henry will do what he wants to do 
and he will not do what he does not want to do. The doctor then shuts down the 
discussion, and the PN's disagreement, by abruptly changing the subject. ' Lynne makes 
one more attempt to raise the subject at line 214 but the doctor frames Henry's "fear of 
going out" as not such a problem as it used to be, "but its much more vague now" (line 
215). In working Henry's fear down, the suggestion is that it is not a severe problem, and 
that it will perhaps sort itself out and continue to get increasingly "vague". Thus Henry's 
fear of going out, which could be understood in very similar terms to that of Diane, is 
pathologised ("he does still have some delusions", line 213) but it is worked down rather 
than worked up to extreme pathology. As such this framing of his "fear" and the 
underplaying of its severity and importance is a consequence of the disagreements that 
have occurred during the meeting. 
Therefore, while the solutions to Tony's and Henry's problems of insufficient activity are 
different, Tony should do something that uses his brain, Henry should just survive, they 
are both accorded an independence construed in terms of autonomy; whether implicitly 
inferred or explicitly stated, both patients will "do what he wants to do". And autonomy is 
accorded to them as the direct result of patient and professional resistance. These implicit 
and explicit ascriptions of autonomy, therefore, work to affirm patient resistance. 
6 HONOS is the Health of the Nation Survey that has been incorporated into the CPA documentation. 
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However, this meaning of autonomy is not dependent upon resistance. In the last part of 
this section I look at an extract for a patient who is not framed as insufficiently 
purposeful, and who is not resisting the professionals' definitions and plans. Ian is an 
informal in-patient but one who is using the bed for "respite" (the doctor's term) and 
seems to come and go from the ward as he pleases. He attends the meeting with his 
mother, Mrs. Peach. The consultant is trying to establish "how much" Ian is on the ward 
and the extract below begins with Ian's reply which incorporates the claim that, even 
when he is there, he does not do "anything" (line 637). This extreme formulation, and 
introduction of what he does not do, orients the conversation to activities. Ian, assisted by 
Mrs. Peach, provides a three-part list of what could be termed leisure activities, or 
perhaps the kind of things an unemployed person might fill their time with, but certainly 
not professionally organised activities, "I just go round the charity shops listen to some 
sounds"/"comes round my house" (lines 639-40). The doctor summarises these activities 
as "so you do your own thing" (line 643). 
Meeting 16 (main meeting) : Ian 
635 Ian: I'm here normally sometime Monday most of the nights if I'm having 
636 problems or um (. ) a couple of the days I stayed but I don't do the 
637 therapy occupational or anything 
638 Dr. N.: no you do:: n't so what do you do 
639 Ian: I just go round the charity shops listen to some sounds 
640 Mrs. Peach: comes round my house 
641 Ian: come round me Mum's 
642 Mrs. Peach: he has his therapy at my place hhhhh 
643 Dr. N.: so you do your own thing 
644 Ian: Ido yeah 
645 Dr. N.: so how does that fit in with the old care plan is that= 
646 Ian: =I go to Kickstart and um 
647 Dr. N.: uha so we'd better whizz through the old care plan hadn't we ((sound 
648 of paper rustling)) 
Doing his "own thing" carries the sense both that Ian does things that are not connected 
with professionally organised activities, they are his things rather than the professionals' 
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things, and that he does what he wants to do. As such this can be read as another variant 
of the autonomy discourse. When Ian agrees with this summary the doctor raises the care 
plan, suggesting not disapproval or insufficient purpose, but more the sense that the care 
plan requires certain official activities to be written into it and these "own things" are not 
the sort of thing you can write in a care plan. Ian certainly reads it this way and provides 
the doctor with an official activity, "Kickstart" (line 646), which seems to be sufficient for 
the doctor. 
The extract from Ian's meeting suggests that while autonomy may be accorded to certain 
patients as a result of their resistance, it is not dependent upon it. Ian is playing by the 
rules, as it were, and providing the consultant with the kinds of responses she is seeking 
(for example, line 646). The phrase "so you do your own thing" encapsulates a sense of 
free-wheeling self-government that does not arise in meetings for patients who are 
positioned as "women". The extent to which these patients are self-governing, however, is 
not all-encompassing. Autonomy, as self-government only extends to notions of activities, 
that is, how these patients spend their time. One of the key components of Rose's (1989) 
concept of autonomy is that selves should be restored to "the status of a choosing 
individual" (pg. 228) but as we saw in chapter three, patient choice is severely limited, 
particularly when it comes to decisions regarding medication. ' Thus, autonomy as 
self-regulation is itself differentiated; some patients are accorded self-regulation when it 
comes to how they spend their time, but not whether they take their medication. 
Therefore, professionals formulate differentiated meanings of dependence and 
independence in their talk about restoring patients' lives. Tony is framed as needing 
emotional support and Henry as dependent on the professionals for his very survival, but 
neither is positioned as emotionally dependent. And independence for these patients is 
formulated in terms of a self-regulating autonomy over how they spend their time, they 
will "do what they want to do", "won't do what they don't want to do" and generally "do 
their own thing". Moreover, this understanding of independence is accorded regardless of 
the patient's level of (in)activity, as we saw in Henry's extreme case. In this sense, then, 
these particular patients are not to be restored to autonomy, they are accorded autonomy 
I included extracts from Tony's meeting in chapter three where talk about choice and medication was 
discussed. 
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whether they are engaged in purposeful activity or not. Independence is disconnected 
from purpose. 
However this presents a conundrum: if femininity is foregrounded and made relevant to 
restoring "women's" lives, what understandings are relevant to restoring these other lives 
that are not feminine? Remaining within the bounds of professionals' explicit orientations 
suggests that professionals' understandings of femininity are relevant to restoring patients' 
lives but understandings of masculinity are not. 8 However, resting upon such assumptions 
risks falling into the trap of privileging "the man as unproblematic or exempted from 
determination by gender relations" (Flax 1987: 629). And it is not clear that men are 
indeed "exempted" in professionals' talk about restoring patients' lives. 
A number of potential relevancies might be operating here such as age, ethnicity, 
education, stage of illness/recovery and level of activity or previous level of activity. But 
these categories do not appear to be relevant. For example, age is made relevant to 
Christine ("young Mum"), and ethnicity to Diane ("Irish"), but neither is oriented to in 
Tony and Henry's meetings. Tony has "a good brain" but this is not relevant to proposals 
for Henry. Christine and Diane are pathologised, but Henry is too, although his 
"delusions" are downplayed, and Tony is "not all that well" (text not included in this 
section). They are all positioned as insufficiently active/purposeful and whilst Tony's 
previous purposefulness is made relevant in his meeting, it is not in Henry's meeting. 
Each patient therefore has singular details to their biography and situation but 
biographical details and experiences are made relevant, developed, or downplayed as 
professionals shape the problems and the solutions. Thus different biographies can be 
shaped towards the same problem and solution (Diane and Christine), towards different 
problems but the same solution (Tony and Henry), or very similar biographical details can 
be made relevant to different problems and solutions (Diane and Henry). Further, 
mechanical metaphors such as "tune it up" and "riveted", deployed in Tony's meeting to 
persuade him of the interest and suitability of the activity of computers, could be covertly 
This stance could then be taken to support a long-held feminist view that man is the universal human being 
and there is only one gender, the feminine (e. g. de Beauvoir 1979). It could also support the view of 
feminist writers that psychiatry is particularly concerned with femininity and the gender conformity of 
women (Chesler 1974; Al-Issa 1980; Barnes & Maple 1992), even if psychiatric understandings of 
femininity have changed. 
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indexing masculinity (Hopper & LeBaron 1998). But there is nothing intrinsically 
masculine in terms such as "tune it up" and "riveted" (Stokoe & Smithson, in press). 
Discounting a range of other possible category terms increases the likelihood that an 
understanding of masculinity is informing the professional ascription of autonomy for 
these patients, but I cannot demonstrate unequivocally that this is the case. Professionals 
are making at least two understandings relevant to the activity of restoring patients' lives 
to purpose and autonomy: an understanding of "women" and related notions of femininity, 
and an understanding of a generalised person. However, while understandings of 
femininity are made overtly relevant, this does not necessarily or automatically mean that 
notions of masculinity are not relevant for professionals. Given that a range of other 
potential category terms do not appear to be relevant, it is likely, but not conclusively so, 
that a background understanding of masculinity could be informing professionals' 
formulations of dependence and independence for these generalised "people" - hence this 
understanding is best characterised as (masculine) personhood. 
This raises the question of whether contemporary psychiatry continues to view mentally 
healthy women (and thus what women should be restored to) as less independent and 
more emotional than mentally healthy men or adults unspecified (Broverman et al 1970; 
Smyth & McFarlane 1985). But it is not necessarily the case that women are positioned as 
more emotional and less independent. Rather, emotion, dependence and independence 
take on a number of different meanings as they are associated with "women" and 
(masculine) "people". Thus when dependence is informed by understandings of femininity 
it takes on an emotional and internalised character: "women" "get dependent" and need 
someone "to turn to". Whereas emotions and dependence can be associated with 
understandings of (masculine) people but emotions are attributed to understandable 
external causes, "a long and difficult relationship", or dependence is associated with 
practical matters even when extreme, "feeding you". As such, it is not so much the case 
that the category of emotion is associated with femininity (Hekman 1990; Edwards 1997) 
but that emotion takes on different meanings in association with femininity and 
(masculine) personhood. 
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Professionals' understandings of femininity are also associated with concerns about 
loneliness and lack of friendship, ameliorated by the company of other women, whereas 
understandings of (masculine) people appear to elicit notions that patients should have "a 
bit" of general contact with "other people", notions that are undermined somewhat by 
ascriptions of autonomy. Moreover, while understandings of femininity are an occasional 
resource deployed to undermine patient resistance, as we saw in the previous chapter, it 
would appear to be the case that ascriptions of autonomy, informed by understandings of 
(masculine) personhood, work to affirm patient resistance. 
However it is not that "women" should be less independent per se, rather independence is 
understood as independent activity away from home and significant others, whereas 
(masculine) personhood is associated with self-regulation over how patients spend their 
time. The differences turn on what dependence/independence mean to the professionals in 
the context of restoring lives, which take on a diversity and complexity when a discursive 
approach is taken to psychiatric understandings, particularly as they are played out within 
clinical encounters. A focus on language as interactive and productive enables a better 
understanding of the plurality of meanings of (in)dependence that are produced by 
professionals in the intersections between restoring lives and understandings of femininity 
and (masculine) personhood. It also suggests a more diversified picture than that 
presented by Rose (1989). Moreover, it is apparent that patients' experiences do not have 
pre-defined meanings but are shaped within interactions to support particular formulations 
of problems and proposed solutions, in association with notions of femininity and 
(masculine) personhood. 
Having explored the way that professionals' understandings of "women" and (masculine) 
"people" inform what it means to be purposeful and autonomous, in the final section I 
turn to considering activities and the restoration of lives more generally. At the beginning 
of this chapter, I highlighted the way activities for patients are framed by professionals 
with a particular focus on keeping them occupied during the daytime. In the next section I 
explore this issue further in relation to professionals' understandings of schizophrenia. 
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3. Daytime Activities: Partial Restoration and Understandings of 
Schizophrenia 
Rose's (1989) analysis of the "psychological sciences" could be taken to imply that all 
"fading" selves will be restored to "unity and personal purpose" (pg. 228). Or to put it 
another way, there is little exploration of what happens to selves who are not completely 
restored or restorable. There is also little consideration that the restoration project could 
be informed or delimited by individuals' diagnoses. As such, schizophrenia is regarded as 
one of the most severe disorders; for example DSM-IV (APA 1994) states that 
schizophrenia varies in its course but complete recovery is "probably not common" (APA 
1994: 282). Miller (1986: 32) suggests that "when all else fails" individuals are "provided 
with just enough support to enable them to cope", but the analysis in the previous two 
sections indicates that contemporary psychiatry brings a number of different 
understandings to restoration/coping. In this section I explore whether restoration to 
purpose is not only informed by understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood 
but also by professionals' understandings of schizophrenia. 
3.1 Filling-In-For-the-Real-Thing: "its unlikely but perhaps in the future" and "this 
gentleman can't have paid employment because he has schizophrenia" 
Professionals' concerns with daytime activities for patients appear to be drawing on the 
assumption that 'normal' people are occupied during the day and their proposed activities 
for patients are framed in terms of being therapeutic, keeping patients busy and filling 
their time. Activities therefore have a filling-in quality; they not only fill-in patients' time 
but also fill-in for 'normal' activities. But it is not apparent from the analysis so far 
whether the purposeful activities that patients are encouraged to undertake are steps on the 
way to fully restored lives or indicative of partial restoration. That is, do activities 
fill-in-for-the-real-thing and are these framings of purposefulness informed by 
professionals' understandings of schizophrenia? 
There are many ways that "normal" people might occupy themselves during the daytime9 
but it is axiomatic in our society that purposefulness includes employment for healthy 
For example, young people may be in further or higher education; elderly people who have retired from 
employment may be pursuing leisure activities; unemployed people may be seeking work; and those with 
the time, means and inclination may be engaged in voluntary work. 
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adults of working age who do not have independent incomes, " although this may now be 
an activity through which we "produce, discover, and experience our selves" rather than 
seek "financial advantage" (Rose 1989: 103). In this section, I focus on talk about 
employment to explore whether professionals' understandings of schizophrenia delimit 
restoration to purpose as Szasz (1976) has suggested, and in a similar way to the 
limitations of choice and responsibility discussed in chapter three. In the first extract, we 
return to Tony's meeting. Tony has been positioned as a (masculine) person by the 
professionals and implicitly accorded autonomy in relation to talk about purposeful 
activity. However, in the following extract the possibility of "work" is introduced. The 
sequence before this comprises a fairly long stretch of talk by Tony which, unfortunately, 
was inaudible. But from the doctor's response it seems that Tony has raised the issue of 
future employment. She begins with an extreme formulation and denial that he is 
expected to work, coupled with the suggestion that, anyway, it is his choice, ">nobodys 
expecting you to go out to work< not unless you yourself want to" (lines 232-3). 
Meeting 6 (main meeting) : Tony 
232 Dr. N.: °no:: (. ) no >nobodys expecting you to go out to work< not unless you 
233 yourself want to (. ) u:: m y'know but I mean >it wouldn't be (. ) 
234 something you just do you (2.8) you'd have to be fit for it° (3.4) so um 
235 it doesn't sound like you're very ft Tony really not not to go to 
236 wo:: rk and all tha::: t (1.3) um and I think its unlikely perhaps (. ) but I 
237 mean y'know (1.0) °perhaps in the future° 
However, the notion that it is Tony's choice works as a disclaimer as the doctor goes on to 
frame the decision in terms of fitness. The claim that "you'd have to be fit for it" along 
with the evidence that "it doesn't sound like you're very fit" (lines 234-5) is somewhat 
ambiguous in that it could be read that he is not in sufficiently good health or that he is 
not suited or not competent in a more vague and generalised way. Moreover, working is 
not just about going out to work but also now contains other vague and mysterious 
components, "and all tha::: t". Having established that Tony is not "fit" enough to go out to 
work at present, the doctor moves to the likely prospects for the future; the discourse of 
10 For example, recently the government has put in place legislation to encourage single mothers to go into 
paid employment rather than stay at home with their young children and receive welfare benefits. 
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"its unlikely... but... °perhaps in the future°" (lines 236-7) defers the likelihood of Tony 
working to an indefinite future without discounting it completely. 
Therefore the notion of paid employment is deferred to an indefinite future in a very 
similar way to questions regarding coming off medication altogether; in both cases the 
doctors appear to be working with a 'never say never but... ' philosophy. " As such it is 
possible that the potential for the future, whether related to employment or medication, is 
informed by assumptions about the likely prospects for someone with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. This potential background relevance is rarely explicitly foregrounded but 
in the next extract paid employment is not only explicitly linked with schizophrenia but 
also with masculinity. The meeting is for Colin who is being discharged from the day 
hospital into the community and the extract is taken from the intra-professional 
pre-meeting. The professionals are discussing potential purposeful activities for Colin and 
the extract begins with Martin, the CPN, suggesting Saw and presenting it as "job 
training" (line 60). While Martin has framed the suggestion in terms of something Colin 
"needs", Dr. West reframes it as a question of preference and one that Colin does not 
prefer. The consultant's alternative suggestion of "Phil Grey" seems to be a reference to 
"Job Club" and suggests that she is going along with Martin's notion of job training. 
However, in a disclaimer that wards off any notion that it is Phil Grey's fault, the CPN 
founds the notion that Phil does not cater for people who are "not interested" and Colin is 
likely to be "not interested" (line 63). 
Meeting 13 (pre-meeting) : Colin (notes only) 
60 Martin (CPN): what about Saw... he needs some form of job training 
61 Dr. W.: he doesn't like Saw 
62 Dr. N.: what about Phil Grey 
63 Martin (CPN): I'm not criticising Phil but if Colins not interested he'll just let him go 
64 Dr. N.: ... 
65 Martin (CPN): one of my clients went on the course... he needs some employment 
66 prospects 
67 Dr. W.: this gentleman can't have paid employment because he has 
68 schizophrenia outpatients and support would be the best package 
" For example, in Dawn's meeting the notion of 'never say never' is explicitly invoked when she questions 
how long she will be on the medication: Dr. N. "no its not for life I never say for life". 
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Unfortunately there is some missing talk here, but the CPN goes on to reiterate his claim 
that Colin "needs some employment prospects". But this reiteration elicits a strong and 
damning counter from Dr. West who explicitly names and links together masculinity, 
schizophrenia and a negative framing of paid employment, "this gentleman can't have 
paid employment because he has schizophrenia" (lines 67-8). The notion of "can't" and 
"has" carries with it the implication that this is an ongoing state of affairs that is unlikely 
to change. The relevance of the links between masculinity, paid employment and 
schizophrenia are not elaborated but nonetheless carry inferences of an association 
between masculinity and paid employment which is discursively undercut by 
schizophrenia. As such it is an explicit depiction of the assumptions informing 
professionals' talk about the future prospects of patients. 
Invoking schizophrenia to negate an association between masculinity and employment 
could be taken to support Szasz's (1976) claim that schizophrenia is feminised in terms of 
unemployability. However, while Colin is positioned as unemployable, this does not 
necessarily mean that he is feminised. Rather, Colin is positioned as a man with 
schizophrenia who therefore cannot have employment. Colin retains his positioning as a 
man but now he is a man with schizophrenia. Nevertheless, schizophrenia is made 
explicitly relevant to talk about employability and suggests that the extent of restoration is 
limited by professionals' understandings of schizophrenia. The doctor's contrast between 
"paid employment" and his preference, "outpatients and support", provides a strong 
distinction between full and partial restoration. Therefore, when the issue of paid 
employment is raised it is either deferred indefinitely or framed negatively and these 
discourses appear to be underpinned by professionals' background assumptions about 
schizophrenia. 
Restoration of patients' lives is not only informed by understandings of femininity and 
(masculine) personhood. What it means to be purposeful and independent is also 
informed by assumptions about the likely prospects for someone with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia which delimit the extent of restoration. Looking at the kinds of purposes 
proposed for patients, women's group, for example, is a professionally organised 
environment for being in the company of other women and making friendships, while 
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independence from home and significant others only reaches as far as this 
professionally-made environment. Activities for (masculine) "people" are formulated in 
terms of interests and talents that are consonant with leisure activities, or at the extreme, 
simply survival. Thus daytime activities have a filling-in-for-the-real-thing quality. The 
kinds of purposes and autonomies delineated in psychiatric/patient encounters could be 
steps on the way to full restoration but there is a sense that this is not likely. Instead, the 
professional aim appears to be partial restoration that stands in for the 'normal'. In this 
way, professionals' background understandings of schizophrenia, made explicit in the last 
extract above, intersect with understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood. 
Conclusion 
Psychiatric professionals' understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood, 
subtly inform what constitutes lack of purpose, what purposeful activity should consist of, 
and what kind of independence patients should be restored to or accorded in case 
conferences. And background assumptions about schizophrenia intersect with these 
understandings to delimit the extent of restoration. 
Professionals position women as "women" and draw on understandings of femininity in 
discussions about restoring "women's" lives. Themes of "shes stuck in the house", "she 
doesn't have any friends", and "she does get dependent" frame the problems for "women" 
in terms of home, loneliness, and (largely) emotional dependence. In turn a professionally 
organised environment/activity that is "just all women" will enable "women" to do 
something independent from home and significant others, and make friends in the 
company of other women. In this way gaining some independence, so construed, is the 
purpose; purpose and independence are interwoven. In contrast, discourses of "he'll need 
some support" and "dependent on us feeding you" attribute emotions to external causes 
(rather than internal) and dependence as practical (rather than emotional) for other 
patients. And these patients should have general contact with others rather than 
friendships. Furthermore, solutions to lack of purposefulness which are superficially very 
different are informed by a particular understanding of independence for these particular 
patients. They "will do what they want to do", an ascription of autonomy which suggests a 
free-will and self-government which is very different from the independent activity 
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desired for "women". Moreover, autonomy is accorded regardless of whether these 
patients are purposeful or not; it is disconnected from purpose. And, while understandings 
of femininity are an occasional resource deployed to undermine patient resistance (as 
discussed in chapter four), ascriptions of autonomy appear to be invoked to affirm patient 
resistance, although they are not dependent upon resistance. 
However, professionals' foregrounding of femininity in relation to restoring "women's" 
lives presents a conundrum regarding what understandings may be relevant to restoring 
other patients' lives. I argued that it is not necessarily the case that masculinity is not 
relevant (despite not being explicitly indexed in professionals' talk). Professionals appear 
to be drawing on the notion of a generalised person which may be informed by 
background understandings of masculinity, given that a range of other potential 
relevances can be discounted. Hence, this understanding is characterised as (masculine) 
personhood. 
Patients' biographies and experiences are made relevant, developed or downplayed as 
professionals shape the problems and solutions. But different experiences can be shaped 
towards the same problem and solution, and similar biographical details can be made 
relevant to very different problems and solutions when understandings of femininity and 
(masculine) personhood come into play. The analysis suggests that experiences, including 
those associated with motherhood and housework, do not have pre-defined singular 
meanings but are formulated and reformulated interactively. Patients' past and present 
experiences are a resource in clinical encounters, shaped according to the activity at hand 
and in relation to understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood. '2 In 
particular, the intra-professional post-meeting is a context in which professionals have the 
authority to decide what patients' experiences mean in a domain where they cannot be 
contested by patients. 
`Z In effect, the meanings of patients' experiences are likely to have been formulated, reformulated and 
shaped on many prior occasions both within the psychiatric context and outside of it. A range of other 
professionals and lay persons are likely to come into contact with the person before they arrive at the 
psychiatrist's door. During this phase the 'pre-patient's' experiences are likely to be an important resource in 
judging whether the person is a suitable candidate for psychiatric treatment (Goffman 1968; Emerson & 
Messinger 1977; Busfield 1989; 1996; Coulter 1991; Hak 1992). 
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However, it is not a case of assessment of performance on gendered tasks (Busfield 1989; 
1996), nor enforcing gender-role conformity (Chesler 1974; Al-Issa 1980; Barnes & 
Maple 1992) in any traditional or straightforward way. Neither is there a sense that all 
patients are feminised in terms of incompetence and dependence (Szasz 1976). Rather, 
professionals' understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood subtly inform 
notions of purposes and autonomies within interactions. Moreover, contemporary 
psychiatry actively eschews traditional associations of women and home; home is framed 
as psychologically unhealthy and somewhere to be got away from, rather than the 
converse. However, in the process home becomes problematised for "women" in a way it 
is not for (masculine) "people". Viewing these understandings in terms of women being 
more emotional and less independent than men or adults (gender unspecified) is 
somewhat oversimplified (Broverman et al 1970; Smyth & McFarlane 1985) and 
underplays the plurality of professionals' understandings. Instead, emotions, dependence 
and independence take on a diversity of meanings as professionals go about the business 
of restoring patients' lives. Taking a discursive approach to these questions, therefore, is 
productive for elucidating the complexity of these meanings. 
Contemporary psychiatric professionals are more concerned with restoring lives and 
coping in the community than gender conformity (Allen 1986; Rose 1989). But a focus on 
a local interactive context suggests that the psychiatric project of re-making individuals 
back into purposeful autonomous individuals is informed and differentiated by 
understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood. Further, professionals' 
assumptions about schizophrenia are relevant when looking at restoring lives more 
generally. In particular the discourse of "its unlikely but perhaps in the future" defers 
employment indefinitely while the theme of "this gentleman can't have paid employment 
because he has schizophrenia" formulates an explicit association between masculinity and 
employment that is undercut by understandings of schizophrenia. Thus understandings of 
schizophrenia also inform what it means to be purposeful and independent. Daytime 
activities become partial restoration rather than steps on the way to full restoration and 
have a filling-in-for-the-real-thing quality. 
In this chapter I have argued that understandings of femininity and (masculine) 
personhood intersect with assumptions about schizophrenia to inform, differentiate and 
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delimit the psychiatric project of restoring patients' lives to purposes and autonomies. In 
particular, notions of dependence and independence, emotions and activity take on a 
complex of meanings in association with these understandings and assumptions. I also 
argued that experience is a resource shaped and played out in relation to femininity and 
(masculine) personhood, and according to the activity of restoring lives. In the next 
chapter, I extend the exploration of experience as an interactive accomplishment with a 
focus on discourses of care and negotiations of experiences between patients and 
significant others within psychiatric encounters. I consider the way that patients are 
located in interrelationship with significant others and experiences become complex 
resources for negotiating who is to blame for a particular problem and who should be the 
focus of professional intervention. And I examine how these interrelated experiences are 
formulated in relation to understandings of femininity and masculinity. 
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Chapter Six 
Interrelated Lives: Experiences, Gender Relational Understandings and 
Attributions of Blame 
Chapter five explored the way that professionals' understandings of femininity and 
(masculine) personhood inform the psychiatric project of restoring patients' lives to 
purpose and autonomy. Notions of independence for "women" are intertwined with those 
of purpose whereas (masculine) "people" are accorded an autonomy, construed in terms of 
a discourse of self-regulation over how they spend their time, regardless of level of 
purpose. I argued that this is not a case of enforcing gender role conformity, nor that 
women are simply construed as more emotional and less independent than men. Rather, 
emotions, activity, dependence and independence take on a number of different meanings. 
Further, patients' experiences are resources within interactions, informed by notions of 
femininity and (masculine) personhood and shaped according to the activity at hand. I 
suggested that professionals' assumptions about schizophrenia intersect with restoring 
patients' lives to delimit the likely degree of restoration: daytime activities become partial 
restoration. 
This chapter extends the focus on gender understandings and experiences as interactional 
accomplishments through exploring how notions of 'care' and experiences between 
patients and significant others are negotiated in clinical encounters. I begin with a short 
discussion of literature on care as a gender issue (Banton et al 1985: Showalter 1987; 
Ussher 1991; Gorman 1992; Fisher 1997; Graham 1997), feminist literature on the 
relationship between schizophrenia and women's experience (Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; 
Barnes & Maple 1992) and analyses of problems and troubles in psychiatric/therapeutic 
settings (Emerson & Messinger 1977; Buttny 1990; 1996). I go on to draw on CA/DA 
work on membership categories, standardized relational pairs and attributing blame in talk 
(Sacks 1972; 1974; Watson 1978; Edwards & Potter 1992). I raise questions about how 
'care' and experiences between patients and significant others are played out in clinical 
interactions, and in relation to gender understandings and schizophrenia. In the first part 
of the chapter I focus on the way care and carers are framed within interactions. I argue 
that professionals draw on membership categories and standardized relational pairs of 
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mother-father, husband-wife (Sacks 1972) to gender carers and locate them in 
interrelationship with patients. Carers' experiences of care are interactional resources, 
shaped, interrelated with those of patients and gendered to accomplish problematisations, 
blamings and excusings. Care is framed as helping and not hindering professionals' plans 
for patients; professional care takes precedence and professionals know what is best for 
patients. Professional discourses appear to draw on, but do not necessarily reinscribe, 
notions of caring as a traditionally feminine activity to frame masculine care in more 
positive terms than feminine care. 
In the second and major section of the chapter, I trace reconfigurations of definitions of 
trouble through the course of two meetings for patients who are in relationships with 
significant others. I discuss how paired relational categories, such as boyfriend-girlfriend, 
mother-child, wife-husband, which are also gender categories, are invoked and deployed 
by professionals, patients and others, to accomplish definitions of relational troubles. I 
argue that parties to trouble are gendered in particular ways to give sense to definitions 
and to blame and excuse. Drawing on the notion of gender as an omnirelevance 
(Garfinkel 1967) and "transportable identity" (Zimmerman 1998: 90), I argue that gender 
relational identities, having been made relevant by participants, are transported across 
subsequent stretches of talk as an unrestated relevance. On this basis I suggest that 
complex and contradictory understandings of femininity and masculinity are produced as 
troubles, blamings and excusings are accomplished. However, a preponderance of 
negative understandings are linked with femininity (e. g. submissive, frightened, 
dependent, selfish, using) to accomplish an association between femininity, blame and 
changeability. Concomitantly and relationally, positive attributes are associated with 
masculinity (awareness, honesty, caring, responsible), or negative understandings are 
reconfigured or extenuated, to accomplish excusings and attributions of unchangeability. 
I argue that the notion of women's experience is more complex than the traditional 
feminist literature has conceived. Rather than having intrinsic meaning, experiences are 
complex and fluid resources (re)configured, interrelated and gendered within interactions 
and according to the activity at hand. Finally, I suggest that schizophrenia is not applied as 
a label within these discussions, nor does it produce an individualisation of trouble or 
automatically relieve those close to the patient of blame. Instead, generalised notions of 
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'mental illness' may be deployed, much like any other experience, to blame and assign 
wrongdoing or to excuse and allocate victim status. I conclude that professional 
understandings of femininity and masculinity, not schizophrenia, inform definitions of 
trouble, blame and change. 
A traditional feminist approach has viewed women's experiences, particularly as mothers 
and housewives, as productive of mental distress, including schizophrenia (Al-Issa 1980; 
Warren 1987; Barnes & Maple 1992). This view suggests that (women's) experiences 
have intrinsic meanings which are reflected in language. However, the previous chapter 
has detailed the way that patients' experiences, including those related to motherhood and 
housework, are resources in clinical encounters, negotiated and shaped within interactions 
and informed by professionals' understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood 
and assumptions about schizophrenia. The previous chapter focused on the individual 
biographies and experiences of patients, but in the era of community care patients are 
rarely leading atomised individual lives, rather they are surrounded by significant others. 
Many, but not all, patients have a "carer"; someone who is officially recognised and 
designated as the person who cares for the patient. ' Carers and significant others attend 
CPA meetings and have to be taken into account in interactions and professionals' plans? 
Thus professionals have to contend with carers and significant others and, in turn, these 
significant others come within the scope of professional discussion and consideration. 
The general view appears to be that carers are an economic and emotional 'good'; people 
who take much of the caring burden off of professional services (Gorman 1992). 
Community care has also been framed as a gender issue. Women are said to bear the 
burden of care, confining them to a traditional caring role (Banton et al 1985; Showalter 
1987; Ussher 1991; Gorman 1992); community care is a "euphemism for an 
under-resourced system which places a heavy burden... on individual women" (Gorman 
1992: 14). Moreover, it may be the case that male carers receive a different and more 
positive response from professionals than female carers (Gorman 1992; Fisher 1997). 
However, the literature on gender and community care has been accused of marginalising 
'A carer may be a relative or anyone close to the patient who is willing and able to take on the role. 
Normally official carers are invited automatically to the patient's CPA meeting and the patient can also 
invite any other friend or relative s/he wishes to. 
2 An aspect that is clearly stated in the Code of Practice Mental Health Act 1983 (DH&WO 1997). 
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the experiences of both patients and male carers (Graham 1997; Fisher 1997). And, as 
with the feminist literature on women and schizophrenia, there is little consideration of 
the way the experiences of carers are formulated within interactions with professionals. 
There is some evidence that professionals' understandings of carers' experiences may be 
important in professional decision-making about admitting a patient to hospital (Barrett 
1988; Jones 1993), but it is not apparent how notions of care are generally understood 
within clinical encounters, nor how discourses of care may be gendered. 
Further, it is not clear how professionals' understandings of patients (and their 
experiences) may be constituted in relation to those of carers and significant others. The 
interrelated nature of patients' lives and the requirement for professionals to take carers 
and significant others into account in their interactions and plans suggests a potential for 
relational understandings. As such, a "personal trouble" can be reframed as a "relational 
one, and vice versa" (Emerson & Messinger 1977: 124). In therapeutic/psychiatric 
settings, problems become the object of professional scrutiny, evaluation and possible 
redefinition (Buttny 1996). It has been suggested that a psychiatric diagnosis 
individualises relational and social troubles (Chesler 1974; Davis 1986; Warren 1987), 
relieving those close to the patient of blame (Emerson & Messinger 1977; Warren 1987), 
however, in CPA meetings professionals are dealing with the ongoing troubles of patients 
living in the community with significant others and it may not necessarily be the case that 
significant others are always and automatically the victim. Emerson & Messinger's (1977) 
framework suggests that the meaning of trouble, the attribution of blame and the proposed 
solution are interactional processes. But we do not know how experiences between 
patients and significant others may be drawn upon and shaped within contemporary 
psychiatric interactions to define troubles and allocate blame, nor how gender 
understandings may be relevant to these activities. 
Sacks' (1972; 1974) work on membership categories and membership categorization 
devices may be useful here. ' Membership categories are common sense equivalent kinds 
' For example, in Barrett's (1988: 277) analysis, the understanding of the psychiatrist that the carer, as a 
mother and a nurse, was "caring in spite of the difficulties" was crucial in obtaining admission to hospital 
for her son. While Barrett does not explore the relevance of membership categories such as "mother" and 
"nurse" for the activity at hand (a psychiatric decision on whether the patient was sufficiently unwell 
to be 
hospitalised), it is suggestive that professionals may draw on membership categories such as "mother" as 
resources within interactions. 
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such as mother or husband (Sacks 1972; 1974; Antaki & Widdicombe 1998; Silverman 
1998). Membership categorization devices (MCD's) are collections of categories that go 
together, for example, the MCD 'family' includes mother, father, child etc. (Sacks 1972; 
1974). If one category from an MCD is used then another category from that MCD may 
also be relevant, what Sacks (1972: 219) calls the "relevance rule", e. g. mother is relevant 
given the use of child and vice versa. Categories within a collection may also be paired 
relationally in "standardized" ways, e. g. husband-wife, parent-child (Sacks 1972: 37). 
People not only draw on common sense knowledge about activities associated with 
members of particular categories, e. g. babies cry, but also a whole range of characteristics 
and features that might be expected of particular category members and relational pairs. 
Membership categories can be deployed to accomplish many different kinds of 
interactional tasks. For example, a paired relational category "constitutes a locus for a set 
of rights and obligations concerning the activity of giving help" (Sacks 1972: 37), and 
membership categories can be deployed to negotiate and attribute blame in talk (Watson 
1978, Potter & Wetherell 1987). As conversation and discourse analysts have 
demonstrated, blamings are one of the social actions that people accomplish in talk (e. g. 
Austin 1962; Watson 1978; Atkinson & Drew 1979; Edwards & Potter 1992). Moreover, 
when blame is attributed to one person, it can also excuse someone else as Edwards & 
Potter (1992) demonstrate in their analysis of Chancellor Lawson's resignation and 
Margaret Thatcher's response. It might be thought that if anyone is to be framed as a 
problem by professionals during meetings then the most likely candidates would be 
patients themselves, by dint of being patients. But the inclusion of significant others in 
professional discussions widens the scope for framing problems or troubles in relational 
terms, and for drawing upon the experiences of significant others as well as patients to do 
so. 
This discussion about care, experience and relational troubles raises questions about how 
'care' and experiences between significant others and patients are played out in the context 
of contemporary psychiatric case conferences, and in relation to understandings of gender 
and schizophrenia. What understandings of care are constituted in clinical interactions? 
How are experiences between, patients and significant others formulated, within 
interactions and in relation to gender understandings? How are troubles defined and 
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blame allocated, and are understandings of schizophrenia relevant to these activities? I use 
extracts from CPA meetings to explore these questions, focusing on the way that patients 
are located in interrelationship with significant others and experiences become complex 
resources for formulating notions of care, defining troubles, allocating blame and deciding 
who should be the focus of professional intervention. I discuss how these interrelated 
experiences are framed in terms of gender understandings through the deployment of 
gendered membership categories and relational pairings. 
1. Relational Understandings, Gender and Discourses of Care 
I have suggested that community care as a gender issue should not be understood solely 
on the basis of who bears the burden of care and the experiences of women who do so 
(Banton et al 1985; Showalter 1987; Ussher 1991; Gorman 1992), but also in terms of 
how care, carers and their experiences are understood interactively within clinical 
encounters and how gender understandings may inform these discussions. In this respect, 
clinical encounters are an important site for producing and negotiating meanings of 'care', 
both in terms of how experiences of care are understood and for professional 
decision-making regarding future treatment for patients (Barrett 1988; Jones 1993). In this 
section, I discuss meetings for two patients whose carers are problematised by 
professionals, drawing out what 'care' means in this context, how carers' experiences and 
characteristics are shaped to support the problem, and the deployment of gendered 
membership categories and relational pairs to attribute blame for an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs. 
1.1 The Mother is not Doin Enough: "the mother could be more helpful than she is" 
The extracts in this section are taken from a meeting for a patient who has what could be 
termed a standard and traditional carer. Anne Green is the mother of Christine, a 
community patient, and they both attend the meeting along with Christine's young son 
Simon. However the extracts that follow are all taken from the intra-professional 
pre-meeting. In the first extract below the consultant explicitly frames Anne Green, 
"mother", as a problem in a sequence that begins and ends with "a bit of a problem" (lines 
231 & 238). Sandwiched between these claims, the doctor provides evidence for the 
problematisation. Mother is depicted in terms of having ' an all-pervasive, 
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behind-the-scenes influence over Christine, she is "the force behind (0.7) everything" (line 
232). The extreme formulation, "everything", suggests that absolutely anything that is 
occurring can be attributed to "mother". This becomes even more problematic as "mother" 
is ascribed the wrong or, at best, grudging beliefs about Christine's illness. The 
problematic status of mother's disbelief about Christine's "mental illness" is predicated on 
the unexplicated assumption that the professionals know otherwise. And characterising 
this wrong belief as "deep in her heart" (line 233) suggests that it is deeply ingrained and 
strongly felt. The alternative ascription, "or if she believes it she believes it very 
grudgingly" (line 234), softens the preceding claim, but founds the notion that, either way, 
mother is a "problem". 
Meeting 1 (pre-meeting) : Christine 
231 Dr. N.: well I think theres a bit of a problem because I think honestly that the 
232 kind of (1.8) force behind (0.7) everything is her mother and her 
233 mother really still deep in her heart does not believe that Christines got 
234 a mental illness or if she believes it she believes it very grudgingly and 
235 1 think she she doesn't really he:: lp (0.8) um I think the mother could 
236 help mo:: re but I think the mother really is very ambivalent about () 
237 encouraging Christine to be (0.9) y'know (1.0) under our sort of ca:: re 
238 () I think thats a bit of a problem 
239 Claire (CPN): I 1= 
240 Dr. N.: =the mother could be more helpful than she is 
241 Claire (CPN) :I agree I think the mothers quite a problem 
Having established that mother is a problem, the doctor goes on to articulate the effect in 
terms of "help". As with the depiction of Anne Green's beliefs about Christine's illness, 
the degree to which mother does not help is worked down from not helping at all to the 
notion that she does help, but not enough. At the same time, mother's insufficient 
helpfulness is attributed to opposing feelings about the professionals' 'care' for Christine. 
This could be related to mother's wrong or grudging beliefs or a covert inference about 
Mrs. Green's attitude towards the professionals. Either way, the consultant founds the 
claim that mother has extensive influence over Christine, wrong or grudging beliefs about 
her illness and opposing feelings about professional care that prevent her from helping the 
professionals to help Christine. The doctor's reiteration that "mother" is insufficiently 
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"helpful" (line 240) appears to be soliciting agreement from the other professionals and 
Claire, the CPN, not only concurs but strengthens the problematisation; mother is more 
than "a bit of a problem", she is "quite a problem" (line 241). 
A number of inferences and attributions are founded in the doctor's problematisation. 
Firstly, that the role of carers is to help the professionals to care for the patient. Secondly, 
that the professionals, rather than the carer, know what is best for the patient. Thirdly, that 
mother is preventing, in some unspecified way, the professionals providing care for 
Christine; mother is to blame for whatever unsatisfactory state of affairs is pertaining. 
Finally, the problematisation is specifically gendered. In moving from "her mother" (line 
232) to "the mother" (twice, lines 235 & 240, and mirrored by the CPN, line 241), Mrs. 
Green is not just a problem carer/mother but is a problem as a mother. Thus professional 
assumptions about the category of "mother", and associated activities expected of a 
member of that category (Sacks 1972; 1974) are incorporated into the doctor's assessment 
and add force to it; mother is not doing what mothers should do and that is to "help" those 
who are caring for her child. The problematisation of Anne Green is further enhanced in 
the next extract as the consultant formulates her understanding in relational terms. The 
doctor provides a depiction of mother that relies upon a specific contrast with father, 
although now her account moves back from the generic "mother" to "Mum" and "Dad", a 
move which personalises her assessment and suggests that she has personal knowledge. 
Her claim that she does not know Dad, mitigated by the fact that she has "spoken to him 
(. ) a couple of ti:: mes" (lines 278-9) works to suggest that she knows enough to make an 
assessment of him whilst reinforcing the notion that she does know what she is saying 
about Mum. 
275 Dr. N.: I think Mum is (. ) y'know I don't know Dad stays in the background so 
276 we don't kno::: w 
277 Claire CPN: mm 
278 Dr. N.: what hes like (0.5) um (1.8) when I've spoken to him (. ) a couple of 
279 ti:: mes and he seemed qui:: et but sensible whereas Mum talks an awful 
280 lot and is not always sensible and °often is very (. ) lacking in good 
281 sense° (2.0) so 
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The notion of Dad as a shadowy figure, "Dad stays in the background" (line 275), 
provides a strong contrast with the doctor's previous depiction of Mum as a "force" 
(previous extract, line 232). The doctor goes on to contrast Dad who is the strong, silent, 
reasonable type, "he seemed qui:: et but sensible" (line 279) with Mum who is 
over-talkative, silly and nonsensical. In a three-part list which moves from "talks an awful 
lot" to "is not always sensible" to "often is very lacking in good sense" (lines 279-8 1), the 
list items work up Mum's lack of sense. In effect Mum is characterised in terms of the 
saying, 'empty vessels make the most noise'. The contrast between "sensible" Dad and 
"very lacking in good sense" Mum founds the relation of sense versus non-sense. 
The doctor's depiction of mother in relational terms provides force to her assessment and 
problematisation; mother becomes nonsensical and thoroughly problematic through and in 
relation to father's sensibleness. The pause at line 281 followed by "so" leaves the other 
professionals to draw their own conclusions which the doctor feels no need to state. 
Whilst mother has been problematised and is to blame for an unsatisfactory state of affairs 
with Christine, it has not been made clear what it is exactly that "mother could help more" 
with. However, in the next extract the doctor specifies what mother should be doing more 
of, which draws on traditional assumptions of what mothers are for. The extract begins 
with the doctor's statement that "we could... discuss this endlessly... but" (lines 289-90) 
suggesting that the discussion has gone on too long and she wants to move things along. 
Now it becomes clear that what mother is not doing enough of is "caring for Simon", 
Christine's young son, and thus mother is to blame for the fact that "Christine can't do any 
of the things" (line 294-5). 
289 Dr. N.: what I think what we need to do in this mee:: ting because >we could 
290 sort of discuss this< endlessly () um but what we need to do is say 
291 look () these are the things you should be doing:: and what is going to 
292 happen to Simon while you're doing them and Mums here so I think 
293 we've gotta maybe get Mums commitment that she will (0.8) at least 
294 help out in caring for Simon because otherwise Christine can't do >any 
295 of the things< because shes gotta look after Simon 
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The "things" that Christine "should be doing" (line 291), are vaguely formulated but 
undoubtedly refer to professionally organised activities at the community centre. While 
Mum as a mother should "help out in caring for Simon", Christine's position as a mother 
is absent. The notion that "shes gotta look after Simon" conveys the sense that this is 
something of a burden and an impediment, an inference that also occurs in the main 
meeting! Moreover, the claim that "she will (0.8) at least help out" (line 293-4) suggests 
that mother could be doing a lot more but this is the "least" she can do. Also, the 
problematisation and blaming of mother includes the notion that she must change her 
ways, "we've gotta... get Mums commitment that she will... help out" (lines 293-4). 
Therefore the discourse of "the mother could help more" problematises Anne Green and 
draws upon gender understandings of the category of mother, and associated expectations 
and understandings regarding what mothers do in terms of caring for (grand)children and 
the obligation to "help" (Sacks 1972; Watson 1978; Potter & Wetherell 1987). This 
problematisation is enhanced by relational understandings of mother and father, 
non-sense/sense. In addition the problematisation of Anne Green is deployed to attribute 
blame to her; it is her fault that Christine does not attend activities at the community 
centre. In the process both Christine and Mr. Green are excused (Edwards & Potter 1992). 
Therefore Christine is located in interrelationship with her mother, and her mother with 
her father and these interrelationships are played out discursively to accomplish a 
problematisation and blaming in which professionals produce and make relevant gender 
understandings about mothers and mothering. Further, the professionals invoke and shape 
the beliefs, feelings and characteristics of Anne Green to support the problematisation and 
blaming. 
In this account, 'care' is formulated as doing whatever is required to "help" the 
professionals care for the patient. As such, it is not so much a question of taking the 
caring burden off of the professionals (Gorman 1992) but rather of relieving the patient of 
a burden/impediment to enable the professionals to do more for Christine. However, in 
invoking the category of "mother" and associated understandings, the professionals are 
drawing upon a traditional notion of mothers as carers (Banton et al 1985; Showalter 
The depiction of motherhood as a burden occurs when the doctor is countering Anne Green's resistance to 
the level of Christine's medication (see chapter four, section 3.1). 
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1987; Ussher 1991; Gorman 1992). Moreover, blame for the problem that Christine "can't 
do any of the things" is attributed to Anne Green so that she becomes the "wrongdoer", 
Christine the "victim" (Emerson & Messinger 1977: 130) despite the fact that Christine 
has "got a mental illness". In the next section, I explore the problematisation of another 
carer, this time the husband of a patient, where gender and relational understandings are 
also made salient but the apportioning of blame is less straightforward. 
1.2 The Husband is Overdoing It: "her husbands become overprotective" 
The professionals positioned Anne Green as a mother and made associated gender 
understandings about mothering relevant to problematising her as a carer. However, care 
is not understood solely in terms of insufficiency, nor does it necessarily rely upon 
associations with mothering. George Yellow is the husband of Diane, a community 
patient, and they attend the meeting together. As in the last section however, all the 
extracts below are from intra-professional discussions, this time in the post-meeting. The 
first extract is taken from a longer conversation regarding the problem of getting Diane 
out of the house (see previous chapter, section 1.1). Betty, the CSW, raises the possibility 
that it could be George Yellow who is the problem, initially framed in terms of 
insufficient encouragement. 
Meeting 2 (post-meeting) : Diane 
684 Betty (CSW): I'm not sure really that he encourages her to go out without him when 
685 he said there oh shes not one for coffee mornings (1.4) um she did say 
686 >to me once< oh George doesn't really like me to go out without him 
687 Dr. N.: mm well I think hes overprotecti:: ve I mean I think he is 
The CSW's claim is supported by two contrasting verbatim reports of he says it is her, she 
says it is him. The first is a recirculation of something George has said during the main 
meeting and in response to Betty's attempts to persuade Diane to go the women's group. 
Betty's recirculation of George's discourse suggests that it is, in fact, Diane who does not 
like "coffee mornings" (a rather old-fashioned and perhaps trivialising term for women's 
group). However, Betty contrasts George's version with a reported conversation between 
herself and Diane which acts to counter George's version. The claim that "George doesn't 
really like me to go out without him" (line 686) suggests that George is a problem because 
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he does not want Diane to go out, it is not Diane. Doctor North picks up Betty's 
problematisation of George and names it as "overprotective". The notion of 
"overprotective" changes the nature of the problematisation; it retains the idea that George 
is a problem but it reformulates what the problem is. The notion of "overprotective" 
suggests that George is overdoing it; he cares for and protects Diane, he means well, but 
he is taking it too far. Thus George is still problematised but the problem is reframed from 
a negative characterisation to one that is more positive. 
After a short interlude, the doctor returns to the problem of George which is presented in 
terms of further mitigation. The next extract opens with Doctor North invoking the 
membership category "husband" (line 699) which makes this category relevant to what 
follows and gives sense to it. She provides a series of mitigating factors which formulate 
George's experiences in such a way that the problematisation is worked down even 
further. This sequence begins with a reiteration of "overprotective" followed by "hes... not 
able to... let g2:: ", "he... sees himself as looking after her", and "he gave up his job... to 
look after her" (lines 700-702). The effect is to frame George as a good but misguided 
carer who is standing in the way of what is best for Diane but he cannot help himself. 
Giving up his job to look after her, the final part of the sequence, is a framing of George's 
experience which acts as a testament to his care, concern and self-sacrifice. 
699 Dr. N.: I think her husband because she has been (1.6) really quite unwell over 
700 over the years I think hes become overprotective and hes also (0.9) not 
701 able to sort of (0.7) let I mean he sort of sees himself as looking 
702 after her he gave up his job really [to look of ]ter her 
703 Betty (CSW): [yes he did] 
704 Dr. N.: so its hard for him to (0.7) to to sort of see her as independent 
The invocation of the category of "husband" carries with it the inference of the relational 
pairing of "wife" and associated gender understandings; the force of George giving up his 
job to look after Diane works through the assumption that it is unusual for husbands to 
give up work to look after their wives, rather than vice versa. George may be a problem 
but he is framed as a worthy carer (Gorman 1992; Fisher 1997). Moreover this sequence 
also shifts the attribution of blame. The assessment of George is preceded by an 
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accompanying assessment of Diane which suggests that she has been ill for a long time, 
"she has been (1.6) really quite unwell over the years" (lines 699-700). Now it is not 
simply that George "is overprotective" (previous extract, line 687), rather he has "become 
overprotective" (line 700, emphasis added) "because" (line 699) of Diane's long-term 
illness. The paired relation accomplished here is that of overprotective 
husband/chronically ill wife. The effect is to suggest that George is not to blame for this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs; he is wrong-headed and overdoing it but it is 
understandable given the situation, "so its hard for him" (line 704). In this way, blame is 
shifted away from George back to Diane and her illness. 
Therefore the doctor problematises George Yellow through the discourse of 
"overprotective", but a series of mitigations downplays the extent of the problematisation, 
presenting George as a worthy carer whose behaviour is understandable. In a relational 
contrast between a caring, self-sacrificing husband and a chronically ill wife, gender 
assumptions about what might be expected of husbands and wives, who protects whom, 
who looks after whom, who gives up their job, shift the blame away from George and 
back to Diane; he is overdoing it but her illness is to blame. Thus Diane is a problem as 
well as George, Diane's illness is to blame for George being a problem, and George is 
largely excused (Edwards & Potter 1992). 
The analysis of professionals' problematisations of carers suggests that 'care', in this 
psychiatric context, is not formulated in straightforward terms of taking the burden off of 
professionals (Gorman 1992). Rather, the formulations of "the mother could help more" 
and "her husbands become overprotective" suggest that carers do not always do what 
carers should (either not enough or too much) and therefore inhibit the treatment process 
and plans of the professionals. The role of community carers is framed in terms of helping 
the professionals to help patients and not impeding professional care. In the cases 
analysed here, that is construed in terms of taking a burden off of the patient or being less 
protective to enable patients to engage in professionally organised activities and be more 
independent. Moreover, carers are gendered within interactions in ways that draw upon 
but do not necessarily reinscribe caring as `a feminine activity., Whilst 'care' is not 
formulated as the province of women, understandings of mothers and wives as traditional 
carers explicitly or tacitly inform professionals' definitions of the problem and attributions 
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of blame for an unsatisfactory state of affairs; "mother could help more" but "its hard for 
him". In the process, and as a result of these gender understandings, George Yellow is 
framed in different and more positive terms than Anne Green (Gorman 1992; Fisher 
1997). 
Professionals' problematisations and blamings also deploy paired relational categories and 
associated understandings (Sacks 1972; 1974); mother lacks sense in relation to father 
being sensible, and is insufficiently helpful in relation to her mentally ill child burdened 
with a child of her own, and the husband is caring and self-sacrificing in relation to a 
chronically sick wife. In this way blamings and excusings are accomplished (Watson 
1978; Edwards & Potter 1992); mother is blamed while father and Christine are excused 
and, through a series of mitigating factors, blame is shifted to Diane and her husband is 
excused. Thus problematisations are defined in relational terms in which the patient is not 
necessarily the "wrongdoer" and the carer the "victim" (Emerson & Messinger 1977: 
130); in the case of Anne Green this relation is reversed whilst for George Yellow it is 
largely reinscribed. A generalised notion of "mental illness" or being "really quite unwell" 
is invoked and made relevant to the problematisations but in different ways and with 
different effects. Christine's "mental illness" is deployed to ascribe the wrong or grudging 
beliefs to mother in order to support the problematisation that she is insufficiently helpful. 
Whereas framing Diane as "unwell" works to shift George from wrongdoer to victim, in 
the way Emerson & Messinger (1977) suggest, and thus to excuse him of blame. Finally, 
included within these problematisations are intimations of who should change; Mrs. 
Green should change her ways and help to care for Simon, Mr. Yellow should let go, and 
Diane should be more independent. 
Carers' experiences of care are resources within these interactions, invoked and shaped, 
understood in relational terms, and gendered to support problematisations, blamings and 
excusings. And this interactional work is largely accomplished in the "off-stage" context 
of intra-professional pre- and post-meetings where professionals' versions of carers' 
experiences are established in a domain where carers and patients do not have the 
opportunity to contest them, and problematisations and blamings can be "openly avowed" 
(Scott 1990: xii & 4). The discourses of care and problematisations discussed so far have 
focused on what Sacks (1972) calls standardized relational pairs, mother/father, 
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mother/child, husband/wife. However, patients also have relationships with significant 
others, principally girlfriends/boyfriends, who play an important part in their lives. In the 
following section, I discuss professional problematisations of patients and significant 
others, tracing professionals' and patients' configurations and reconfigurations of 
relational understandings and attributions of blame. And I consider the extent to which 
gender can be construed as an omnirelevance (Garfinkel 1967) or "transportable identity" 
(Zimmerman 1998: 90) within these discussions. 
2. Gender Categories, Experiences and Relational Troubles: 
(Re)Configurations of Problems and Blame 
In their framework for analysing troubles as interactional processes, Emerson & 
Messinger (1977: 128-9) discuss two ways that "troubleshooters" may respond to 
relational troubles as conflict or deviance. If the trouble is responded to as conflict, the 
troubleshooter "adopts a stance of nonalignment" (pg. 128) whereas if it is deviance the 
trouble becomes defined in terms of a "wrongdoer/deviant" and "victim" (pg. 130) and the 
relational core of the trouble may be dissolved. Furthermore, a "deviant" is not only 
"morally condemned, but also... sided against" (pg. 131). It has been suggested that a 
psychiatric diagnosis (Emerson & Messinger 1977), particularly that of schizophrenia 
(Warren 1987), can dissolve the relational nature of troubles, defining the diagnosed party 
as deviant and excusing the other party of blame (Emerson & Messinger 1977). As such, 
relational and social troubles become individualised (Chesler 1974; Davis 1986; Warren 
1987). However, the analysis in the previous section suggests that the fact that one party 
is a patient with a mental illness and the other a carer does not necessarily or 
automatically predefine who will be framed as wrongdoer and who as victim. 
In this section, I explore relational troubles further through focusing on meetings for two 
patients who are involved with significant others as girl/boyfriends. In these meetings 
professionals, patients and others formulate and reformulate relational understandings to 
accomplish problematisations, blamings and excusings, and reconfigure parties to the 
trouble as wrongdoer and victim. Experiences between patients and significant others 
become complex resources shaped and reshaped to support contested definitions of 
trouble, blamings and who should be the subject of professional intervention. I consider 
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what relevance understandings of schizophrenia, 'illness', and patient status might have 
for defining trouble and accomplishing blamings and excusings. And I draw on 
Garfinkel's (1967) notion of gender as an omnirelevance and Zimmerman's (1998: 90) 
more recent idea of gender as a "transportable identity" to argue that relational gender 
categories such as girlfriend and boyfriend, once invoked and made relevant to the 
interaction, do not necessarily have to be re-established turn-by-turn in order to continue 
to be relevant across a stretch of interaction. 
2.1 Formulating Experiences and Configuring Problems: "he can be verbally abusive and 
physically intimidating.. . she 
doesn't feel confident enough" and "him as the patient not her 
as the patient" 
In this section, I discuss how experiences between patients and significant others are 
formulated by professionals in relational terms which are gendered. And I explore how 
these experiences are deployed to provide an initial definition of the nature of trouble, and 
associated blamings and excusings. As Buttny (1990: 231) demonstrates in relation to 
couple therapy, "telling problems" also involves allocating blame and responsibility. I 
focus on meetings for Natasha and Ian. Natasha is a community patient who is in a 
relationship with Laurence, who is also a patient. She lives alone in supported housing 
and attends the meeting alone. Ian is an informal in-patient, although he is using the bed 
for "respite" (the doctor's term) and when he is not in hospital, he lives with his girlfriend 
and carer, Harriette. However Ian has refused to allow Harriette to accompany him to the 
meeting and instead attends with his mother, Mrs. Peach. The first extract is taken from 
Natasha's main meeting. The preceding discussions have focused primarily on Natasha's 
pregnancy. The extract below begins as Dr. South is coming to the end of reading out a 
report sent by Celia Beige, Natasha's housing support worker, who is unable to attend the 
meeting. Celia's report introduces the relationship with Laurence as a problem for 
Natasha, "her relationship with her boyfriend continues to cause concern for Natasha" 
(lines 301-2). However, flagging this section of her report as "areas of conCERN" (line 
301) suggests that it is a problem for the professionals as well as Natasha. 
Meeting 12 (main meeting) : Natasha 
301 Dr. S.: areas of conCERN (1.3) her relationship with her boyfriend continues 
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302 to cause concern for Natasha on an occasional basis at times there can 
303 be a few problems (. ) he can also be verbally abusive and °physically 
304 intimidating* (1.1) she has said she would like the relationship to end 
305 but doesn't feel confident enough to finish it as in the past when she 
306 has tried (. ) to hes been intimidating and persistent 
However, the report downplays the extent of the problem, it is intermittent rather than 
constant, whilst also hinting that there are other problems that the author is not naming. 
The nub of the problematisation is formulated within the report in relational terms. The 
membership category "boyfriend" is explicitly invoked here and coupled with "her 
relationship" (line 301) sets up and makes relevant the paired relation of 
boyfriend/girlfriend. This is followed by characterisations of Laurence which are 
sandwiched either side of an assessment of Natasha, which is presented as a verbatim 
report of what Natasha herself has said. Thus Laurence is abusive, intimidating and 
persistent ("verbally abusive and °physically intimidating"" and "intimidating and 
persistent", lines 303-4 & 306), and Natasha is insufficiently confident and in the 
relationship against her wishes ("she would like the relationship to end but doesn't feel 
confident enough" lines 304-5). 
In this way, the report quickly moves from an initial formulation of the relationship as the 
problem to one in which both parties to the relationship are problematised, although one 
more than the other. The categories of girlfriend/boyfriend makes a gendered relational 
pairing relevant to the definition of the problem and provides sense to the experiences that 
are formulated: he is an abusive, intimidating and persistent boyfriend in relation to an 
insufficiently confident girlfriend who is in the relationship against her wishes. There is 
also an initial intimation of blame in Celia's report (Buttny 1990); both Natasha and 
Laurence are to blame for the unsatisfactory state of their relationship but the blaming is 
mitigated for Natasha, she has at least tried but is daunted by Laurence's response. Thus 
experiences between Natasha and Laurence are formulated in gendered and relational 
terms to support a definition of trouble in which Laurence is allocated the role of 
wrongdoer, Natasha as victim (Emerson & Messinger 1977). 
225 
However, in Ian's meeting an initial formulation of relational conflict is quickly 
reconfigured in a way which attempts to dissolve the relational nature of the trouble to 
position one party as deviant (Emerson & Messinger 1977). The extract comes from early 
on in the pre-meeting and begins with the doctor formulating the relationship between Ian 
and Harriette as a problem and the problem as being one of "conflict" between them. 
However, sandwiched either side of this problematisation are intimations that Harriette 
could be more to blame for this "conflict" than Ian. The claims that "shes (. ) got all these 
ideas about Ia:: n" and "she ... wants to (2.4) be in charge of treating him almost" (lines 19 
& 23-24) suggest that Harriette's ideas and behaviour are somehow inappropriate. 
Meeting 16 (pre-meeting): Ian 
19 Dr. N.: she shes (. ) got all these ideas about Ia:: n and yet (0.5) lies not very 
20 (1.0) WE:: lcoming of these ideas is he 
21 Erica (ASW): no °not really° 
22 Dr. N.: I think thats the problem of their relationship is (1.4) founded on this 
23 conflict I mean she sort of wants to (2.4) be in charge of of treating him 
24 almost= 
25 Erica (ASW): =°yeah° (1.1) but his violence is there anyway (3.5) she she doesn't (2.0) 
26 trust him to to tell us um (1.4) °whats° (1.2) its actually lost sight of 
27 the fact that >that you know< its him as the patient and not her as the 
28 patient (1.2) um () what I've suggested to her is that we have () 
29 about it 
30 Dr. N.: HA h well that sounds a good idea yes= 
31 Erica (ASW): as part of his care plan hhhhhhhh 
The notion of "all these ideas" tacitly conveys a sense that Harriette's ideas are foolhardy, 
further warranted by the fact that they are not acceptable to Ian. And the inappropriateness 
of Harriette being in charge of treating Ian is predicated on the unspoken assumption that 
this is the role of the professionals, not Harriette. This initial formulation, therefore, 
presents the problem as conflict, but also intimates that Harriette is to blame for the 
"conflict" in the relationship. But at line 25 Erica counters the doctor's framing with a 
reconfiguration; Ian is violent, he is violent regardless of whatever Harriette does, and he 
is untrustworthy, "°yeah° (1.1) but his violence is there anyway (3.5) she... doesn't (2.0) 
trust him to... tell us um (1.4) °whats° (1.2)" (lines 25-26). Erica's reconfiguration 
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explicitly problematises Ian and attributes the blame to him, excusing Harriette. The 
notion of "his violence" not only situates the violence as belonging to Ian but also 
potentially masculinises it (Hopper & LeBaron 1998). This sequence is left unfinished but 
there is also an intimation here that the professionals are only hearing Ian's side of the 
story and may not know what is really going on. Further, as Erica appears to be speaking 
on behalf of Harriette, the inference could be that it is the doctor who does not know. 
This is followed by an ambiguous claim about who is the patient. The ambiguity lies in 
who has lost sight of who is the patient. Framed as "its", it could be Harriette (who is 
behaving like a patient), the professionals generally, or it could be a covert criticism of the 
doctor's formulation of the problem. However, this sequence founds the inference that 
Harriette is behaving like or is being positioned as a patient but Ian is the patient, not 
Harriette. Further, Erica's invocation of the gendered pronouns "him ... not 
her" (line 27), 
produces a relational understanding in which the gender identities of the parties may be 
relevant. As such, this framing introduces a number of potential relevancies for the talk; 
that Ian and Harriette should be understood as a relational pairing, that this pairing is 
gendered, that the assignment of patient status has become blurred, that Harriette could be 
a potential patient, but that she should not be the patient in this relation where Ian has 
already been assigned that status. However, the doctor's exclamation at line 29, "HA", 
appears to use the ambiguity of Erica's statement to infer that Harriette may not be the 
patient but perhaps she should be; Harriette is tacitly positioned as a potential patient. In 
response Erica attempts to reinforce her previous claim regarding who is the patient ("as 
part of his care plan", line 31). The doctor's exclamation and Erica's laughter are similarly 
ambiguous; they could signal amusement at playing with the reversible identities of 
patient and carer and/or be a sign of some tension between them over their opposing 
interpretations. 
The gender pronouns "its him... not her" are invoked to emphasise the patient status and 
gender of one party to the trouble in relation to the non-patient status and gender of the 
other and are deployed to claim that someone (although it is not made, clear whom) has 
been wrongly reversing the patient/non-patient relation. This claim is occasioned within 
the interaction in response to the doctor's framing of Harriette as the problem and as part 
of redefining Ian as the problem: it is "his violence" and it is "him as the patient". The 
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assigning of patient status and the gender pronouns are made relevant to Erica's 
redefinition; while Harriette may be controlling, have foolhardy ideas and want to be a 
co-colleague, when reconfigured in relational terms that are gendered he is violent and he 
is the patient, she is the non-patient. Thus, patient status in combination with a masculine 
identity accomplishes the allocation of Ian as wrongdoer and Harriette as victim. Erica has 
attempted to dissolve the relational nature of the trouble and position Ian as deviant. 
Therefore, professionals deploy paired relational categories (Sacks 1972; 1974) such as 
boyfriend/girlfriend, and other relational understandings such as him/her, 
patient/non-patient, to accomplish definitions of the nature of trouble. Gender 
understandings are produced and made relevant to problematisations through the 
invocation of gender categories and pronouns so that Natasha is an insufficiently 
confident girlfriend in relation to an abusive and intimidating boyfriend, and Ian is a 
violent and untrustworthy masculine patient in relation to a feminine non-patient. 
Experiences between patients are interactive resources, invoked, defined and gendered to 
support a particular definition of the problem and accompanying blamings and excusings. 
As such, patients are located in interrelationship with significant others; significant others 
and their experiences become resources for understanding patients and their experiences, 
and vice versa. 
Thus the formulation of "he can be verbally abusive and physically intimidating... she 
doesn't feel confident enough" configures the trouble as relational and allocates the role of 
wrongdoer to Laurence and role of victim to Natasha (Emerson & Messinger 1977). And 
discourses of "his violence" and "him as the patient not her as the patient" invokes a 
relational understanding in order to dissolve the relational core of the problem and 
position Ian as deviant, Harriette as victim. In this latter definition, patient status is 
explicitly deployed to assign the role of deviant in the way Emerson & Messinger (1977) 
suggest. However, the doctor's response infers that the distinction between patient and 
non-patient (carer) statuses may not be so clear-cut. It is suggestive that the assignment of 
categories of patient and carer, which might be thought to be clearly understood and 
differentiated, can take on a fluidity as the distinction between the two is accomplished 
and then blurred within the interaction. 
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In this section, I have discussed the way in which professionals formulate patients' and 
significant others' experiences to accomplish initial configurations of trouble and 
accompanying allocations of blame. In the next section, I continue with these two 
meetings in order to track the way that experiences are reconfigured in gendered relational 
terms to support redefinitions of trouble and alternative allocations or mitigations of 
blame. 
2.2 Reconfiguring Experiences to Redefine Troubles: "maybe he'll grow up" and "they 
have a difficult relationship" 
In this section, I continue with Natasha's and Ian's meetings to trace the fluidity and 
complexity that experiences and relational understandings can take on when definitions of 
relational problems are contested, and I discuss how differing versions implicate 
particular allocations of victim and wrongdoer (Emerson & Messinger 1977). I also 
consider how gender identities and categories may be "transportable identities" 
(Zimmerman 1998: 90) which, once invoked and made relevant, are transported across a 
number of turns of talk. 
Firstly, I return to Natasha's meeting. As the meeting proceeds Natasha contests Celia's 
version of her experiences with Laurence, reformulating the nature of the problem and 
undermining the intimation of blame. The extract below begins with Natasha orienting 
back to Celia's report and attempting to counter it through her recirculation of "physically 
intimidating" (previous extract, lines 303-4, this extract, line 340). Natasha directly 
repudiates Celia's claim that Laurence is physically intimidating but reinforces the notion 
of verbal abuse. However, she is treading carefully here, moving from "hes hes" to "its" 
and back to "hes" which suggests some reluctance to attribute even verbal abusiveness to 
Laurence. 
Meeting 12 (main meeting): Natasha 
340 Natasha: hes not exactly () physically intimidating hes hes but its more verbally 
341 hes very verbally abusive 
342 Dr. S.: yes= 
343 Natasha: =y'know its the sort of thing that gives you a headache 
344 Dr. S.: yes yes= 
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345 Natasha: you just wanna say go away Laurence you do= 
346 Dr. S.: =yes uha 
347 Natasha: y'know its:: not the sort of thing you want going on all the time= 
348 Dr. S.: =°no no I know° have your parents met him 
349 Natasha: yeah 
350 Dr. S.: well maybe he'll GROW UP (0.6) maybe (1.7) 
351 Natasha: °yeah° (1.6) 
From this initial partial repudiation Natasha goes on to downgrade Laurence's behaviour 
even further. The notion that it "gives you a headache" (line 343) infers that the effect is 
minor in comparison, say, with physical intimidation and that Laurence is a bit of a 
nuisance rather than an abuser. In addition she deploys "you" four times in this sequence 
(lines 343,345 & 347) which conveys the impression of an appeal to any general 
reasonable person. In this way Natasha reformulates and downgrades her experience with 
Laurence from abusive and intimidating to being with someone who is a constant 
nuisance, and would be viewed as such by anyone. The effect of Natasha's downgrading is 
to take much of the sting out of Celia's problematisation and blaming; Laurence is not 
much of a problem, just a nuisance who gives you a headache. And if Laurence is not 
such a problem then no one is really to blame; her response is what anyone's would be and 
there is little that is blameworthy. 
After a series of agreements and encouragements for Natasha to continue, the doctor 
brings in "parents" (line 348). This could be an attempt by the doctor to press the link 
between Natasha's problems with Laurence and her parents as an alternative (and 
preferred) source of support. However, reintroducing the category of "parents" raises the 
potential relevance of the category child (Sacks 1972). Dr. South uses this to move to her 
formulation of the problem with Laurence. Now Natasha's reframing of Laurence as a 
nuisance is summarised by the doctor as immaturity, Laurence is positioned as a child 
who has not yet grown up "maybe he'll GROW UP" (line 350). The two pauses and use of 
"maybe" (twice) clearly convey the idea that it is not very likely that he will do so. The 
reframing of the problem in terms of Laurence as immature founds the inference that 
whatever Laurence is doing it is childish, a thorough downgrading from Celia's initial 
formulation, and that the only change that can be expected of Laurence is maturational, 
230 
not something the professionals can do much, if anything, about. It is no longer clear at 
this point in the meeting, who, if anyone, is to blame if the problem is a maturational one; 
Laurence may be a nuisance but the notion of a child who has not grown up mitigates 
blame. 
Natasha's downgrading of Celia's initial framing of the problem, and the doctor's 
subsequent reformulation work to redefine the nature of the problem and allocation of 
blame. Celia's version allocates Natasha as victim, Laurence as wrongdoer, even though 
Natasha is partially to blame because she is not confident enough. And, while Natasha 
might be expected to press her claim as victim, she does not do so. Instead, her 
redefinition retains the semblance of the same allocation of victim and wrongdoer but 
downgrades the behaviour of the wrongdoer to a degree where it barely counts as 
wrongdoing at all. In turn, the doctor draws on Natasha's definition of her experience with 
Laurence to reformulate the trouble from wrongdoer/victim to one of conflict and 
non-alignment as one party is defined as a child and blame is mitigated. 
In Ian's meeting the meaning of experience is also reconfigured, this time to redefine the 
trouble as mutual and reciprocal. However, in this case the effect is not simply to mitigate 
blame for Ian but to shift blame onto Harriette. The extract below follows on directly 
from the extract in the previous section. The final exchange between the doctor and Erica 
in the previous extract appears to mark a turn in the talk. Firstly, the doctor takes control 
of the interaction for several turns (Erica, "yeah yeah", lines 35,38 & 40). Secondly, 
understandings of Ian and Harriette are now configured in relational terms as Harriette's 
experiences are framed in relation to Ian's and vice versa. As such, Erica's relational and 
gendered formulation of "him as the patient not her as the patient" has made relevant a 
relational understanding which is taken up in the subsequent talk. The extract continues 
with the doctor formulating an alternative assessment of Ian which counters Erica's 
version that Ian is untrustworthy. She draws on Erica's invocation of Ian's violence and 
shapes it to support a positive framing of Ian as aware and honest, "he is sort of aware that 
they have a difficult relationship" and "he admits to feeling quite violent towards he:: r" 
(lines 33-4 & 36-7). The doctor re-establishes the trouble as conflict with an overt sense 
of equivalence: it is the relationship that is the problem and both parties contribute, "they 
have a difficult relationship-they have a lot of ro:: ws" (lines 34 & 36). 
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Meeting 16 (pre-meeting): Ian 
32 Dr. N.: : no well is there any possibility of that because I think it is a real 
33 problem because we've talked to Ian about it and he sort of is awa:: re 
34 that they have a difficult relationship= 
35 Erica (ASW): =yeah yeah= 
36 Dr. N.: =they have a lot of ro:: ws he admits to feeling quite violent towards 
37 he:: r= 
38 Erica (ASW): =yeah yeah 
39 Dr. N.: and he hes even said things like one day I'm going to kill her 
40 Erica (ASW): yeah yeah= 
41 Dr. N.: =um= 
42 Erica (ASW): =and she understands the () as well she [wants to ] 
43 Dr. N.: [WELL BUT] then 
44 what is she doing still living with him because hes being up front 
45 about it= 
46 Erica (ASW): =yeah 
47 Dr. N.: um and he says its his flat and shes sort of living there because she 
48 can't afford [to live anywhere else ] 
49 Erica (ASW): [well that's the tension be]cause he feels he can't kick her 
50 out because () she she y'know she would then be rendered homeless 
51 Dr. N.: yes and then she can't [y'know afford to to rent a place or what ]ever 
52 Erica (ASW): [so that puts a lot of pressure on him yes] 
53 Dr. N.: and hes (1.9) got her living there because she sort of (0.7) well almost 
54 insisted o_n it I don't think he he doesn't seem willing to have her there 
55 but hes sort of got her there against his will 
However, this overt formulation of equivalence and conflict is accompanied by a positive 
assessment of Ian which covertly implies that, perhaps, Harriette is not so honest and 
aware. Moreover, Ian's violence is subtly reframed from being "there anyway" (previous 
extract, line 25) to something that is directed "towards he:: r" (Dr. N., lines 36-7) and as a 
result of the rows to which she is a party. The verbatim report of what Ian says, despite 
being an extreme statement, works to support the level of his awareness and honesty "he's 
even said things like one day I'm going to kill her" (line 39). In this way, Ian is 
reformulated from generally violent and untrustworthy to aware and honest about his 
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feelings of violence towards Harriette. The nature of the trouble, therefore, is subtly 
reframed as mutual, and there is an intimation that one party might be more aware and 
honest than the other, and that this other party may contribute to the violent feelings. The 
effect is to mitigate blame for Ian and, at the same time, tacitly infer that some blame 
should be allocated to Harriette. 
Erica does not attempt to undermine the doctor's assertion of Ian's awareness but seeks to 
accord it to Harriette too, "she understands... as well" (line 42). However, the doctor 
immediately responds with evidence to the contrary which she interrupts Erica to propose; 
if Harriette understands the situation then why is she living with him, founding the 
'Catch-22' inference that either Harriette is not aware (as the doctor has intimated) or she 
is aware (as Erica has claimed) but extremely foolhardy. This is followed up by a 
three-part list that begins with a reiteration of Ian's honesty, moves to a verbatim report 
that establishes Ian's rights of residence, and ends with a depiction of Harriette's 
behaviour as economic expedience, "hes being upfront about it... and he says its his flat 
and shes... living there because she can't afford to live anywhere else" (lines 44-8). The 
list items enable the doctor to reaffirm her assessment of Ian as honest whilst at the same 
time moving the topic away from Ian's violence and towards an alternative framing of the 
problem in which Ian has certain rights in relation to Harriette and Harriette's motives for 
living with Ian are cast in a dubious light. This relational reconfiguring of Ian's and 
Harriette's experiences strengthens the mitigation of blame for Ian and the reassignment of 
blame to Harriette. 
In response to the doctor's invocation of Ian's rights of residence, Erica brings in his 
responsibilities in relation to Harriette. Ian is repositioned as caring and responsible, "he 
feels he can't kick her out", and Harriette as economically dependent and powerless, 
"she... would then be rendered homeless" (lines 49-50). Notice how "can't afford" is 
reconfigured in such a way that economic expediency is refrained as economic 
dependence. But in the process Erica also subtly redefines the sense of blame. The notion 
that this is the cause of "tension" and "pressure" (lines 49 & 52), implies that the source of 
pressure/tension is Harriette although neither party to the trouble is to blame. But the 
doctor immediately reproblematises Harriette and re-attributes blame to her; Harriette is 
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demanding and forceful and it is actually Ian who is powerless, "she... insisted o: n it" and 
"hes... got her there against his will" (lines 53-5). 
Therefore, several reconfigurations of the problem and accompanying blamings and 
mitigations are advanced and countered between the two professionals. By turns, he is 
aware and honest in relation to her being unaware of the difficulties, he is honest and has 
rights of residency in relation to her economic expedience, he is caring and responsible in 
relation to her being economically dependent and powerless and she is demanding and 
forceful in relation to him being powerless. The doctor's formulation of "they have a 
difficult relationship" reconfigures the trouble as relational and mutual. However, while 
both parties are to blame initially ("they have a lot of rows"), Ian's honesty and awareness 
appears to mitigate blame. In the final exchange between Erica and the doctor (lines 
47-55), relational understandings, experiences and accompanying blamings and excusings 
are configured and reconfigured as firstly Harriette is blamed (his rights of residency 
versus her economic expediency), no one is to blame (his caring and responsibility versus 
her economic dependence and powerlessness), and finally Harriette is blamed again (her 
insistence versus his powerlessness). 
The doctor's redefinition of the problem deploys discourses and accomplishes blamings 
and excusings that have been found to occur in other settings. Men who are violent have 
been found to define, excuse or justify their violence in such a way that they neutralise or 
minimise the act and its consequences (Scully & Marolla 1984; Adams et al 1995; Hearn 
1996a) and staff in agencies that deal with abusive/violent men may recirculate the same 
excusing or justificatory discourses (Hearn 1996b). The discourse of "they have a difficult 
relationship... they have a lot of rows" portrays what is occurring as mutual and reciprocal, 
and works to minimise the violence and blame Harriette equally (Hearn 1996a), a blaming 
that is subsequently further mitigated for Ian and enhanced for Harriette. 
It is clear that problems in this setting become public phenomena as professionals 
scrutinise, evaluate and define problems (Buttny 1996), and patients and other 
professionals reformulate definitions of the nature of troubles. The experiences of patients 
and significant others, therefore, become complex and fluid resources as they are invoked 
and shaped, formulated and reformulated to support or undermine definitions' of the 
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problem. As such, it is not only the case that the nature of the trouble has no intrinsic 
meaning (Emerson & Messinger 1977) but neither do the experiences of the parties to the 
trouble. Each configuration of the problem accomplishes a particular blaming and 
excusing (Buttny 1990) and different permutations of conflict and deviance, wrongdoer 
and victim. 
But it is not immediately apparent whether the gendered relational pairings of 
boyfriend/girlfriend and him/her, invoked and made relevant to the initial definitions of 
the problems have continued across the interaction as unrestated relevances. As such, 
relevancies can be "manifested without being explicitly named or mentioned" (Schegloff 
1997: 182; West & Zimmerman 1987; Ochs 1992), particularly in the case of gender 
which is an omnirelevant category (Garfinkel 1967) or a "transportable identity" 
(Zimmerman 1998: 90-91). That is, gender identities "travel with individuals across 
situations" and are therefore "potentially relevant in and for any situation and in and for 
any spate of interaction" (Zimmerman 1998: 90). 5 Invocations of boyfriend/girlfriend and 
him/her simultaneously orient to a relational and gender understanding. As such it may 
not be safe simply to assume that gender ceases to be relevant while the relational 
understandings (now decoupled from gender) continue to operate. Rather, it is feasible 
that the relational understandings continue as gendered relations without the necessity of 
reinvoking the gender identities of the parties at every turn of talk. 
On this basis, as Natasha's and Laurence's experiences are reconfigured femininity is 
associated with reasonableness (rather than lack of confidence) and masculinity with 
being a nuisance and immaturity (rather than abusiveness and intimidation). In Ian's 
meeting, understandings of femininity and masculinity take on a number of contradictory 
meanings. Femininity is associated with lack of awareness, economic expedience, 
dependence, powerlessness and being demanding, and masculinity with violence, 
awareness, honesty, rights, responsibilities and powerlessness. The final exchange 
between the doctor and Erica becomes particularly interesting as they dispute who is 
powerless: masculine rights/feminine expediency is reconfigured as masculine 
responsibilities/feminine dependence and . then reconfigured again as 
feminine 
s However, Zimmerman adheres to the CA convention that participants may be aware of gender identities 
without orienting to them. And he distinguishes between this sort of transportable identity and what he calls 
"discourse" and "situational" identities which are accomplished in moment-by-moment interactions. 
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demands/masculine subordination. It is not that any of these understandings are inherently 
feminine or masculine but rather that they are accomplished within the interaction as 
troubles are configured and contested in relational terms which, I have argued, are 
founded on gendered categories and gender relational pairings. In the final section I track 
the fate of the competing discourses formulated to define and redefine the problems in 
Natasha's and Ian's meetings. I trace the way that discourses are reconfigured or 
reaffirmed to accomplish (for the time being) a resolution to the nature of the trouble, an 
understanding of who is to blame, and who should be the subject of professional 
intervention. 
2.3 Genderina, Blame and (Un)changeability: "she needs to stick up for herself .. unless 
he 
suddenly matures" and "you rub each other up the wrong way /she just wants to make 
use of the flat" 
From the analysis in the previous sections it appears that patient status can be invoked to 
allocate blame for a relational trouble but patient and carer statuses can also be blurred as 
professionals accomplish definitions of trouble. And whilst an understanding of 
schizophrenia could be deployed to configure the problem and ascribe wrongdoing 
(Warren 1987) it has not been made relevant by any of the participants. Rather, 
formulations of patients' and significant others' experiences which, I have argued, are 
gendered are accomplished and reaccomplished to define the trouble and assign blame. As 
such, patient status does not pre-determine who is "sided against" (Emerson & Messinger 
1977: 131). 
In this section, I continue with Natasha's and Ian's meetings to explore the trajectory of 
competing discourses deployed to define their troubles. I track these definitions from 
Natasha's main meeting (where she downgraded a professional definition) to the 
post-meeting when she is no longer present, and from Ian's pre-meeting (where one 
professional reformulated the definition of another professional) to the main meeting 
where Ian and his mother participate in the discussion. I draw out what configurations of 
relational experiences and, gender understandings are deployed, to accomplish a 
(temporary) resolution to the nature of the trouble. I discuss how definitions of trouble 
and ascriptions of blame include formulations of changeability and intractability. which 
inform who should be the subject of professional intervention. I also consider what 
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relevance schizophrenia, patient status and notions of 'illness' have for discussions about 
relational troubles and allocations of wrongdoing. 
I begin with an extract from Natasha's post-meeting where earlier themes of insufficient 
confidence and immaturity re-emerge together with other relational and gender 
understandings. The first point to note in the extract below is that a professional 
disagreement is occurring between Dr. South and Julia, the CPN, which started during the 
main meeting and has continued into the post-meeting. The disagreement can be glossed 
as whether Natasha should be referred to a social worker immediately or not. The extract 
below begins with the doctor providing evidence to justify her opinion that she should be. 
The doctor frames Laurence as an aggressive, noisy, disruptive child. The first depiction 
of Laurence as "very aggressive" is initially framed as something he is, and then corrected, 
to something he does ("he he is he does", line 813), an important distinction between 
something that is internal to and part of the person and an external behaviour. The second 
depiction of Laurence is constructed as a three-part list in which the list items enable the 
doctor to move from behaviours associated with being very aggressive, which in an adult 
person could be frightening and harmful, and behaviour associated with a child, 
"screaming and shouting and having tantrums" (lines 814-5). The effect is to accomplish 
an understanding of Laurence's behaviour as aggressive but to downgrade the implications 
of that ascription. 
Meeting 12 (post-meeting) : Natasha 
813 Dr. S.: he is he does get very aggressive and I mean I can imagine as a 
814 mother (. ) she doesn't want (1.2) Laurence screaming and shouting and 
815 having tantrums when shes got a child to look after= 
816 Julia (CPN): =yeah (0.9) 11 don't see it going that far 
817 Dr. S.: you don't see her having the baby? = 
818 Julia (CPN): no I do::: I do see her having it cos shes happy and she seems to be 
819 getting healthier and really better physically 
820 Dr. S.: yes yes 
821 Julia (CPN): °and OK° but I don't see their relationship °going (. ) through the 
822 normal y'know the normal sort of things' 
823 Dr. S.: °o:: h I don't kno:: w° I think actually Laurence could think this is quite 
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824 a novelty:: I mean hes latched onto Natasha hasn't he? = 
825 Julia (CPN): =mm 
Sandwiched between these two depictions of Laurence, Natasha is emphasised as a 
"mother" (line 814). The category of "mother" enhances the notion of Laurence as a child, 
producing the relational pairing of mother and child and conveying the impression that 
Natasha will have two children to look after. It makes gender overtly relevant to the 
problematisation; Laurence becomes problematised in relation to Natasha as a mother, "as 
a mother (. ) she doesn't want... " (lines 813-4). The category of mother suggests associated 
understandings in which Laurence's troublesome toddler-like behaviour becomes 
potentially disruptive to the true mother/child relationship and thus to Natasha's ability to 
be a good mother. What this relational pairing also accomplishes is a disappearing of any 
notion of Laurence as a father. 
However Julia responds with a counter assessment that undermines the problematisation 
by dissolving the relationship; neither of the parties to the relationship are a problem if 
there is no relationship and she suggests that the relationship simply will not last. This is 
followed by a reiteration which infers that the relationship, or the parties to it, are not 
"normal" in some unspecified way, "I don't see their relationship °going (. ) through the 
normal... sort of things°" (lines 821-2). Doctor South immediately counters this 
assessment by building on her previous relational formulation of Laurence and Natasha. 
The effectiveness of the counter relies on the paired relation of child/mother. Now 
Laurence's attitude to the pregnancy/baby is as a child to a toy ("novelty") and his 
relationship to Natasha is that of a child to its mother ("latched on"). Reworking it in this 
way conveys the notion that it may not be a "normal" adult relationship but that does not 
mean it will not last; it will be a mother-like and child-like relationship. 
In the next extract the doctor moves to close the post-meeting with a final 
problematisation and attribution of blame which also includes ascriptions of who can and 
cannot change. The CPN has introduced the information that Laurence is going away and 
Natasha is "looking forward to him going" (text not included here). This provides Dr. 
South with the opportunity to close the argument. The extract begins with the doctor 
claiming that this is further proof of the problem and support for the need for a social 
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worker, "thats why she needs some HELP" (line 831). Now Celia's report and original 
relational formulation is re-invoked, reformulated and combined with the doctor's own. 
Dr. South contrasts what Natasha should do with what she has been doing. Juxtaposing 
"stick up for herself' with "put up with" (lines 833 & 835) makes it clear that Natasha 
should "stick up" not "put up". The assessment appears to be drawing on Celia's earlier 
discourse of "she doesn't feel confident enough"; if Natasha is insufficiently confident 
then she needs help to be more assertive. 
831 Dr. S.: I think thats why she needs some HELP 
832 Julia (CPN): mm 
833 Dr. S.: some quite skilled help in actually () being able to stick up for herself= 
834 Julia (CPN): =mm 
835 Dr. S.: because she has put up with all sorts of abuse from him= 
836 Julia (CPN): =mm 
837 Dr. S.: I think she must be quite frightened of him (1.1) but I mean what was 
838 coming over from her is that she (1.3) she feels that um something 
839 inside her tells her that this isn't right and I think shes (. ) °shes right' 
840 Julia (CPN): yeah 
841 Dr. S.: unless he suddenly matures which 1 (2.8) 1 can't see happening 
Celia's initial framing of Natasha mitigated blame with the idea that she had tried to do 
something but Laurence was frightening, but now the need for her to change and be 
assertive is due to how she behaves towards and feels about Laurence rather than 
Laurence himself. In a subtle move, "verbally abusive" and "physically intimidating", 
terms which were contested and downgraded by Natasha, are incorporated under the all 
encompassing umbrella of "all sorts of abuse" and the fact that Natasha has "put up with" 
this places the onus on her rather than Laurence. The notion that she "puts up with" 
suggests that she submits to the abuse, or at the very least lack of appropriate action on 
her part. And, where Laurence was "intimidating", now she is frightened of him, a subtle 
difference that resituates the problem in Natasha, "she must be quite frightened of him" 
(line 837). 
Laurence has been problematised throughout the meeting, even if the problem has been 
downgraded and mitigated by his immaturity, but Natasha is finally the one who is 
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problematised, she has "put up with... abuse" and she is "frightened of him". Now it is not 
so much Laurence's abusiveness/aggression or even immaturity that is the problem, it is 
Natasha's inadequacy in dealing with it. This problematisation is sandwiched between two 
blamings/excusings and notions of who should change. If Natasha is the problem and she 
should "stick up for herself', then responsibility is attributed to her to do something about 
the situation, she is to blame and she is the one who should change. In contrast, the final 
reiteration of Laurence's immaturity not only reasserts his child-like status, suggesting that 
he cannot be held responsible, but also reinforces the idea that he is not likely to change. 
The problematisation and blaming works through reformulations of relational 
understandings: she is submissive, frightened and needs to be assertive in relation to 
Laurence who is abusive, immature and unchangeable. The formulations of "put up with 
all sorts of abuse", and "she needs to stick up for herself' suggest that she has 
"brought-it-on-herself" (Caplan 1995: 91). " In effect, the professionals have excused 
Laurence by invoking immaturity and intractability and excused whatever abuse is 
occurring through blaming Natasha (Scully & Marolla 1984; Hearn 1996a; 1996b). 
Therefore the definition of trouble is reconfigured in the intra-professional post-meeting 
in such a way that allocations of and distinctions between wrongdoing and victimhood are 
collapsed. Natasha appears to be allocated both roles as Laurence's child-like status and 
immaturity mitigate blame and preclude change. The formulation that she should "stick 
up" not "put up" retains the role of victim whilst also allocating blame and positioning 
Natasha as the one who can and should change (Buttny 1990). Thus Emerson & 
Messinger's (1977) distinctions are less clear-cut here. An alternative understanding might 
be that if he is abusive, then he is to blame and he should be the subject of professional 
intervention. However, through reconfigurations of relational understandings, 
responsibility is shifted away from Laurence and onto Natasha. Further, the initial 
gendered relational pairing of boyfriend and girlfriend is reconfigured: boyfriend becomes 
boy-child, girlfriend becomes mother. Natasha becomes framed as a frightened mother' 
who needs to be more assertive in relation to an abusive boy-child. In effect, his 
6 For example, Caplan (1995) argues that the psychiatric diagnostic category of Self-Defeating Personality 
Disorder (SDPD) in the appendix of DSM-IIIR, represents a "victim-blaming, she-brought-it-on-herself 
attitude" (Caplan 1995: 91). 
It is noteworthy that Diane was also framed as a "frightened lady" (see chapter four, section 3.1). Although 
this depiction was invoked for very different interactional purposes, it does appear to be a co-term that is 
associated with femininity in professionals' formulations. 
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immaturity and child-like status makes her submission and fear more reprehensible and 
less understandable. Thus femininity is associated with being frightened, lack of 
assertiveness and changeability and masculinity with aggression, childishness, 
abusiveness and intractability. 
In Ian's main meeting understandings of femininity are also associated with an attribution 
of blame and changeability as the professionals, Ian and Ian's mother reaffirm and build 
on the definition accomplished by the doctor in the pre-meeting. In the next extract, Mrs. 
Peach (Ian's mother), Ian and the doctor elaborate on, configure and reconfigure the 
problem and the doctor moves towards a resolution. The extract below begins with Mrs. 
Peach orienting to the relational trouble between Ian and Harriette. She makes a claim 
about Harriette presented as a verbatim report of what Ian has said, "Ian says (. ) she 
knows where to press the buttons to upset him" (line 549). This verbatim report enables 
Mrs. Peach to found a blaming of Harriette while at the same time not 'owning' what 
might be construed as a highly contentious statement: it is what Ian says, not what she 
says. It suggests that Harriette provokes Ian (Scully & Marolla 1984; Hearn 1996a), 
placing the blame squarely on Harriette. Mrs. Peach presents this situation in terms of an 
extreme formulation which both suggests that it is irremediable and carries connotations 
of a war zone, "its a no go situation" (line 550). 
Meeting 16 (main meeting): Ian 











Ian says (. ) that she knows where to press the buttons to upset him (0.9) 
its a its a no go situation shes a nice enough girl (. ) but I think she has 
a lot of problems herself (1.2) and it just isn't good at this point in time 
with his illness as he is at the moment for them to be together it would 
be nice if they could meet a couple of nights a week (1.4) and if it 
doesn't work out Ian says well I'm going home... 
wha'd'you think of what your Mum said Ian do you agree with her? 
or do you= 
=its er totally true theres a bit of friction there because (. ) I do love 
Harriette and I think she loves me deep down >its just that< we can't 
live together 
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569 Dr. N.: well that does seem to be the problem that you you you're not very 
570 good at living together that you rub each other up the wrong wa:: y? = 
571 Ian: =°mm° 
572 Dr. N.: so um has that been (0.8) agree:: d to be a problem by everybody like (. ) 
573 by you and Harriette >well I mean< thats [the main people] 
574 Ian: [Harriette isn't ] thinking like 
575 I am she still y'know she still wants to stay with me (. ) I don't know 
576 whether she wants to stay with me or whether she just wants to make 
577 use of the flat I don't know 
578 Dr. N.: well I think this is so I mean Erica do you feel you can have some 
579 useful discussions there because I think this has gotta be clear because 
580 1 mean nobody can tell you who you should live wi:: th 
The statement that "shes a nice enough girl (. ) but I think she has a lot of problems 
herself' (lines 550-1) works as a disclaimer which wards off in advance the suggestion 
that Mrs. Peach's assessment of Harriette may be based on personal feelings. It has the 
flavour of damning with faint praise, she is "nice enough", and the category and gender 
identity "girl" signals a possible downgrading of Harriette's status and the status of her 
relationship with Ian (Edwards 1998). As such it supports the notion of faint praise, and at 
the same time infers the gendered relational categories of girl and boy. The claim that "she 
has a lot of problems herself' implies what the doctor has inferred in the pre-meeting, that 
Harriette should or could be a patient. As such Mrs. Peach redresses a potential imbalance 
between the two parties, which could be a resource for allocating wrongdoing to Ian, 
without establishing equivalence. This subtle distinction becomes clear as she deploys the 
notion of Harriette as someone with problems to frame her as detrimental for Ian's 
wellbeing as someone with an "illness", "it just isn't good at this point in time with his 
illness as he is at the moment for them to be together" (lines 551-2). The qualifiers "this 
point in time", "at the moment" soften the force of her claim by suggesting it is only a 
temporary situation while at the same time founding the notion that Harriette is not good 
for Ian. She goes on to present an alternative and preferable arrangement. The potential 
relevance of "girl" and associated category of boy as a downgrading is put to work to 
frame their relationship in boy/girl terms, "it would be nice if they could meet a couple of 
nights a week" (lines 552-3). 
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Mrs. Peach's definition of the trouble is formulated in relational terms which make 
relevant the gender identities of the parties; Harriette is a girl with a lot of problems in 
relation to a boy with an illness. The not-quite-equivalence of Harriette's problems versus 
Ian's illness founds the irremediable nature of the problem and at the same time is 
suggestive that Harriette is to blame. However, Mrs. Peach's downgrading of Ian and 
Harriette's relationship occasions a response from Ian which reformulates the problem 
back to one of mutual reciprocity, for a time at least. ' The doctor provides an explicit 
opening for Ian to respond to his mother's account. He opens with a claim that creates the 
impression of complete agreement, "its er totally true", whilst at the same time 
downplaying the extent of the problem, "a bit of friction" (line 566). The notion of 
"friction" suggests it is conflict, a mutual problem, reaffirming the doctor's discourse in 
the pre-meeting of "they have a difficult relationship". The relationship is depicted in 
terms of I can't live with her, can't live without her, a formulation of an adult loving 
relationship that counters Mrs. Peach's version. 
However, there is a sense of non-equivalence encapsulated within this formulation; while 
Ian straightforwardly and openly declares his love for Harriette, "I do love Harriette", 
Harriette's love for him is hidden and more questionable, "I think she loves me deep 
down". In this way, he founds the can't live with/can't live without inference whilst 
presenting himself in a more favourable light than Harriette. In response the doctor 
affirms Ian's definition of the trouble. She draws on the notion of "friction" to summarise 
the problem in terms of conflict and mutuality, "you rub each other up the wrong wa:: y" 
(line 570), a summary that she elicits Ian's agreement to. The implication is that they are 
each as bad as the other and they are both to blame. The doctor follows this with a 
question which initially seems to be soliciting "everybody "'s agreement to her definition 
but also introduces the notion that Harriette's agreement is required and covertly infers 
that this could be a problem. As such she provides a potential opening for Ian to 
reproblematise Harriette. 
e The ten lines that have been omitted from this extract involve Mrs. Peach claiming that Ian is using the 
hospital to get away from Harriette but that he came into hospital because he was "heading for a breakdown" 
which is perhaps an attempt to reorient the conversation back to Ian's medication. And the doctor's response 
has dismissed this attempt to redirect the conversation, "it doesn't matter what the reasons are for you being 
here". 
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Now Ian builds upon his non-equivalence with Harriette, interrupting the doctor to do so. 
She is framed as wrong-headed ("Harriette isn't thinking like I am"), unable to move on 
("still" twice) and somewhat demanding and selfish ("wants", three times), (lines 574-6). 
He includes a stark contrast between loving and using which makes it even more doubtful 
whether she loves him and reaffirms the doctor's earlier formulation of Harriette in terms 
of economic expedience, "whether she wants to stay with me or whether she just wants to 
make use of the flat" (lines 576-7). Sandwiching this contrast between two proclamations 
of "I don't know" either enhances the notion of doubt thus working up the dubiousness of 
Harriette's feelings and motives and/or it is a "stake inoculation" (Potter 1997: 155) 
warding off what could be read as a motivated account. The effect is to undercut the 
definition of reciprocity and reformulate Harriette as the problem; a definition that the 
doctor affirms. 
The doctor's final ascription in this extract supports this reading as she accords a similar 
sort of autonomy to Ian to that identified in chapter five in relation to purpose: he is 
accorded self-regulation over whom he lives with. Moreover, the extreme formulation 
"nobody" covers absolutely anybody who might say or act otherwise; Harriette, Mrs. 
Peach and the professionals, "nobody can tell you who you should live wi:: th" (line 580). 
And Erica's discussions with Harriette are predicated on this autonomy, ("because" twice, 
line 579). Thus the doctor founds a notion of self-determination over living arrangements 
for Ian and a concomitant abrogation for Harriette: the professionals and/or Ian can tell 
Harriette whom she should live with. Moreover, this ascription establishes who can and 
should be the subject of professional intervention. Therefore, the problem is configured as 
mutual and reciprocal but Harriette is framed as the obstacle in the way of resolving the 
situation and thus she is the problem and she is to blame. The problematisation of 
Harriette is reformulated in relational terms; Harriette is reticent, not so loving, 
wrong-headed, unable to move on, selfish and using in relation to Ian who is open, loving 
and right-thinking and this understanding is endorsed by the doctor. In this formulation, 
any notion of Ian's "violence" is disappeared. Further, Ian's autonomy establishes who can 
be told who they live with (Harriette not Ian) and thus who should be the subject of 
professional intervention. At no time during this meeting has there been any discussion 
around the possibility that something could be done about Ian and "his violence". 
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In the final extract Mrs. Peach provides an explicit formulation of Ian's blamelessness 
which founds an accompanying understanding of intractability, and the doctor uses this to 
provide a final resolution of the problem. The extract begins with Ian attributing the idea 
of making Harriette homeless to his mother, suggesting that she does not understand his 
feelings or the nature of his relationship with Harriette. His use of "wife" (line 597) 
invests the relationship with depth of emotion and adulthood while simultaneously 
invoking a gendered relation in which he positions himself as husband in relation to 
"wife". Two paired relations are set up here: mother/son and husband/wife. The first pair 
sets up associated expectations of caring mother but reverses the association; mother is 
hard-hearted and she does not understand. The second pair of husband/wife sets up a 
number of associated obligations so that Ian's claim takes on the flavour of an appeal to 
any reasonable person, "you wouldn't see your wife on the streets" (lines 596-7). And the 
appeal is further heightened by the use of verbatim speech. The effect is to position 
himself as a caring and responsible husband in relation to a dependent wife. 
595 Ian: I wouldn't I mean as as my Mother said to me if it were me Ian she 
596 said I would've thrown her out a long time ago and I said yeah but you 
597 wouldn't see your wife on the streets and you wouldn't 
598 Mrs. Peach: it it the point is that at the moment its one good day and six bad its not 
599 a way to live is it () it it normal people probably could cope with it but 
600 lans got an illness he's a::: lways gonna have that illness= 
601 Dr. N.: =°alright° 
602 Mrs. Peach: I can't make him into a perfect pi person ypu can't and Harriette won't 
603 be able to (. ) hes got an illness you've gotta abide by that and you've 
604 got to (. ) help him when you can how you can= 
605 Dr. N.: =°mm° 
606 Mrs. Peach: not antagonise it (. ) and thats how I feel 
607 Dr. N.: alright well I think I think y'know we're all sort of agreeing about (1.0) 
608 tha:: t and if Harriette were here maybe >she would agree too< but she 
609 shes not here so its a >bit of a shame< she isn't but we'll have to leave 
610 it with Erica that you discuss with Harriette? that so we've agreed that 
611 it would be better for Ian if Harriette had her own place and then you 
612 can choose how much time you spend together it would be a choice 
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Mrs. Peach responds with a contrast between "normal people" and Ian's "illness" (lines 
599-600). Ian's depiction of a "normal" husband-wife relation is countered by an inference 
that neither the relationship nor Ian is "normal". The doubt surrounding whether normal 
people could cope with it ("probably") suggests that the relationship and or Harriette 
might be too difficult even for normal people. She goes on to formulate Ian's illness in 
terms which convey the notion that the illness is never going to change, "hes a::: lways 
gonna have that illness" (line 600). The effect is not only to undermine Ian's account of a 
normal husband/wife relationship but also to infer that Ian's illness mitigates 
responsibility for anything he does, including his violence (Scully & Marolla 1984). The 
notion that it will never change founds intractability; although it is the illness not Ian. The 
implication is that something/someone has to change and if it cannot be Ian then it will 
have to be Harriette. 
Mrs. Peach goes on to provide a three-part list of the consequences of an unchangeable 
illness. In moving from "I can't make him into a.. . perfect person" to "y u can't" and finally 
to "Harriette won't be able to" (lines 602-3), she founds the inference that if his mother 
and the professionals, who have his best interests at heart, cannot change it, then Harriette 
certainly will not. The order of items in this list, and the emphases, work to position Mrs. 
Peach herself as an emphasised first item, the professionals as the emphasised second 
item and Harriette as third. As such the inference is that she is the person with the greatest 
care and concern for Ian. This is reinforced by a contrast between accepting that Ian is ill 
and providing flexible "help", and "antagonise". The contrast suggests that Harriette is 
unrealistic and antagonises his illness. In effect, Mrs. Peach has unravelled Ian's relational 
understanding of husband/wife and formulated an alternative understanding in which Ian 
has an unchangeable illness and Harriette is unrealistic and makes the illness worse. In 
this reformulation, Harriette is clearly to blame and Ian is excused. 
Ian and Mrs. Peach are doing all the discursive work for the doctor, recirculating and 
elaborating the problematisation and blaming formulated in the pre-meeting. In this 
respect, all the doctor has to do is to provide the right sorts of openings and then agree 
with the claims that have been formulated. And while Ian and his mother are disagreeing, 
it is only in respect of the nature of the relationship, not the fact that Harriette is to blame. 
Sandwiched between two affirmations of agreement (lines 607 & 610) the doctor provides 
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a contrast with Harriette; it is unfortunate that she is not at the meeting, she might agree 
although some doubt is attached to this, and Erica will have to "discuss... that" with her 
(lines 608-10). The overall effect, and positioning within the sequence, suggests that 
regardless of whether Harriette agrees or not, she is completely outnumbered; they have 
all agreed. The solution is framed in terms of Ian's best interests and choice. Ian's 
well-being is prioritised and made contingent upon Harriette moving out, "if Harriette had 
her own place... it would be better for Ian" (line 611). And the notion of choice, "you can 
choose... it would be a choice" (lines 611-2) is ambiguous; it could be Ian's choice or both 
their choices although given the preceding discussion it is suggestive of it being Ian's 
choice. 
Therefore the problematisations, blamings and excusings in the main meeting, formulated 
by Ian, Mrs. Peach and the doctor, largely recirculate, reaffirm and build on the doctor's 
discourse in the pre-meeting. In turn, Erica's definition of "his violence" and associated 
blaming of Ian is absent. It is either that Harriette provokes Ian's violence and makes his 
illness worse, "she knows where to press the buttons to upset him" and she "antagonises 
it"; Harriette is clearly to blame and Ian is completely excused (Scully & Marolla 1984; 
Hearn 1996a). Or it is a question of mutual reciprocity encapsulated in the formulation, 
"you rub each other up the wrong way"; both parties contribute to the problem although 
not in equal measure. Finally Mrs. Peach provides a third alternative which enhances the 
allocation of blame to Harriette; whatever Ian does is excused by his illness (Scully & 
Marolla 1984). In effect, Mrs. Peach deploys Ian's illness to excuse him of any 
wrongdoing and to allocate Harriette as wrongdoer, Ian as victim. Ian on the other hand is 
attempting to manage the dual problems of accomplishing the same allocations whilst also 
presenting his relationship with Harriette, and thus himself, as loving and adult. And the 
doctor is attempting to provide a formulation that can be agreed on by all the participants; 
the discourse of "you rub each other up the wrong way" accomplishes a definition of 
mutuality but one in which Harriette can be framed as the wrongdoer (she is 
wrong-headed, selfish, using and antagonises Ian's illness) and Ian as the victim (he is 
right-thinking, loving, caring, responsible and has got an illness). 
Definitions of trouble, blamings and excusings are accomplished through (re)formulations 
of the parties' experiences which are framed in terms of relational understandings and 
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paired relational categories (Sacks 1972; 1974) which are gendered. Harriette is a girl 
with a lot of problems in relation to a boy with an illness; Mrs. Peach is a hardhearted 
mother in relation to a caring son; and Ian is a responsible husband in relation to a 
dependent wife. As such, these gender identities and associated understandings are made 
explicitly relevant and deployed to accomplish particular activities within the talk. 
However, and further to the notion of gender as a transportable identity, this does not 
necessarily mean that gender ceases to be relevant in the subsequent turns of talk. Rather, 
the understanding of a boyfriend/girlfriend relation is relevant throughout these exchanges 
and pertinent to the relational formulations accomplished. As such, the gender identities 
and gendered relation of the parties to the trouble may only be made explicitly relevant 
when a participant is attempting to reconfigure what the relation means. Thus 
boyfriend-girlfriend is reconfigured to girl-boy, then to husband-wife. On this 
understanding the girlfriend-boyfriend relation is a background relevance throughout and 
acts as a flexible resource whose meaning can be downgraded or upgraded according to 
the activity at hand. On this basis femininity and masculinity are associated with a range 
of understandings. Femininity is allied with reticence, being wrong-headed and selfish, 
using and dependence, and masculinity with being loving, right-thinking, caring and 
responsible. Finally, through these gendered relational pairings, it is Harriette who is 
identified as the subject of intervention/change and Ian who is positioned as 
unchangeable; either he cannot be changed because he has got an unchangeable illness, or 
he should not be changed because he is an autonomous being who cannot be told whom 
he lives with. A summary of this section will be included in the conclusion below. 
Conclusion 
In the era of community care patients lead interrelated lives. Significant others are a 
resource for professionals' understandings of patients in relational terms, and vice versa. 
Professionals' discourses of care, definitions of trouble and negotiations of blame are 
accomplished through the deployment of membership categories and standardized 
relational pairs (Sacks 1972; 1974; Watson 1978), which are gendered, and a whole range 
of gendered relational understandings. In these negotiations, experiences between patients 
and significant others are complex and fluid resources configured and reconfigured in 
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gendered relational terms to support definitions, blamings, excusings and implications of 
change. 
The formulations of "the mother could help more" and "her husband's become 
overprotective" configure these carers as not doing what carers should and accomplishes 
an understanding of the role of community carers as helping and not inhibiting the 
professionals to help patients. Care is framed in terms of doing whatever the professionals 
deem necessary to enable patients to follow the course of action the professionals 
prescribe, rather than taking the burden off of professionals (Gorman 1992). Professionals 
draw on membership categories (Sacks 1972; 1974) and associated understandings to 
gender carers within interactions; mother is not doing enough as a mother, and the 
husband is overdoing it but it is understandable for a husband. These discourses appear to 
draw on understandings of caring as a traditional feminine activity to inform definitions of 
an unsatisfactory state of affairs. The effect is to frame masculine care in more positive 
terms than feminine care (Gorman 1992; Fisher 1997) but contrary to the literature on the 
gendering of care (Banton et at 1985; Showalter 1987; Ussher 1991; Gorman 1992), care 
is not reinscribed as a feminine activity per se. 
Professionals deploy "standardized" relational pairs (Sacks 1972), mother/father, 
husband/wife, and associated gender understandings to enhance problematisations, and 
accomplish blamings and excusings (Watson 1978). Mother lacks sense in relation to 
father being sensible, and the husband is caring and self-sacrificing in relation to a 
chronically sick wife. When these gender understandings come into play, patient and carer 
statuses do not necessarily determine allocations of wrongdoer and victim (Emerson & 
Messinger 1977). Patients are therefore located in interrelationship with carers and 
significant others and these interrelationships are played out discursively within 
interactions. Gender relational understandings about mothers and fathers, husbands and 
wives are produced to accomplish problematisations, blamings and excusings. Carers' 
experiences of care are interactional resources formulated, shaped, interrelated and 
gendered by professionals to support the activity at hand. 
When significant others are girlfriends or boyfriends, and professionals' (re)configurations 
are traced through the course of, meetings, the interrelated and negotiated nature of 
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experience is even more evident. Once again paired relational categories and associated 
understandings (Sacks 1972; 1974), boyfriend/girlfriend, him/her, patient/non-patient, 
mother/child, girl/boy, wife/husband, most of which are also gender identities, are 
deployed to accomplish definitions of relational troubles. Natasha is an insufficiently 
confident girlfriend in relation to an abusive and intimidating boyfriend, or a nurturing 
mother in relation to an aggressive, disruptive child. And Ian is a violent, masculine 
patient in relation to a feminine non-patient, or a boy with an illness in relation to a girl 
with problems, or a responsible and caring husband in relation to a dependent wife. 
Parties to the trouble are gendered in particular ways, drawing on features that might be 
expected of such pairings, to give sense to the definitions and to accomplish blamings and 
excusings. The formulation of "he can be verbally abusive and physically 
intimidating... she doesn't feel confident enough" configures masculine abuse and 
intimidation as a problem in relation to feminine lack of confidence and suggests that both 
contribute to the problem but he is mainly to blame. Whereas, the notion of "his violence" 
and "him as the patient not her as the patient" frames a violent masculine patient as clearly 
to blame in relation to a feminine non-patient. 
Drawing on the notion of gender as an "omnirelevance" (Garfinkel 1967) and 
"transportable identity" (Zimmerman 1998), I have argued that the relational gender 
identities of the parties, once invoked and made relevant by participants, are transported 
across subsequent stretches of talk as an unrestated relevance. The relational formulations 
produced by professionals, patients and others are also accomplishing gender. Complex 
and contradictory relational understandings of femininity and masculinity are produced 
within the talk as troubles, blamings and excusings are configured and reconfigured. In 
Natasha's meeting feminine lack of confidence in relation to masculine abusiveness and 
intimidation is reconfigured as: feminine reasonableness/masculine nuisance and 
immaturity; then as mother/masculine aggression and childishness; and finally as 
feminine fear, lack of assertiveness and changeability in relation to masculine 
abusiveness, immaturity and unchangeability.. And in Ian's meeting an initial 
configuration of masculine violence and patient status ' in. relation to a feminine 
non-patient runs through a long series of reconfigurations: masculine awareness and 
honesty/feminine lack of awareness; masculine rights/feminine economic expedience; 
masculine responsibilities/feminine dependence , and powerlessness; masculine 
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powerlessness/feminine demands; masculine lovingness and right-thinking/feminine 
wrong-headedness, selfishness and usage; masculine care and responsibility/feminine 
dependence; and finally, masculine autonomy and unchangeability/feminine 
changeability. 
The meanings of femininity and masculinity are fluid and may even be reversed (as in 
who is powerless), but there is a preponderance of socially undesirable or derogatory 
characteristics associated with femininity (e. g. frightened, dependent, selfish, using) and 
positive attributes associated with masculinity (e. g. aware, honest, right-thinking, caring, 
responsible). ' Further, negative framings of masculinity are reformulated into positives or 
extenuated by notions of immaturity. Associations between femininity, dependence and 
being frightened, and between masculinity and self-regulation were also identified in 
chapters four and five, suggesting that these gender understandings are regularly deployed 
in this context although for a variety of different purposes. In this chapter, understandings 
of femininity are deployed to attribute blame for an unsatisfactory state of affairs or 
relational trouble (a mother not doing enough, a sick wife, a frightened and submissive 
mother, a wrong-headed, selfish, using girlfriend), and understandings of masculinity to 
mitigate or excuse (a caring and self-sacrificing husband, an immature boyfriend, a 
loving, right-thinking, and responsible boyfriend). Notions of femininity position certain 
patients and carers as the subjects of professional intervention/change and thus 
changeable (she should help more, be more assertive, move out). Concomitantly and 
relationally, notions of masculinity position other patients as unchangeable (he is unlikely 
to grow up, he cannot be told whom he lives with). 
Therefore interrelated lives are discursively constituted and played out within clinical 
encounters. The experiences of patients and significant others are (re)configured, 
interrelated and gendered to accomplish particular definitions of trouble, blamings and 
mitigations. Rather than having intrinsic meanings, experiences of care, understandings of 
mothers or wives, relationships between girlfriends and boyfriends are resources within 
interactions invoked, given meaning and deployed according to the activity at hand, 
suggesting a more complex picture of women's (and men's) experiences than in the 
9 While some of these positive notions of masculinity are produced by the patient, they are affirmed by the 
doctor and used to support the resolution of the nature of the trouble and what should be done. 
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traditional feminist literature (Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; Barnes & Maple 1992). As 
such, the very notion of who is and is not/should not be significant is constituted and 
negotiated within psychiatric interactions. 
Just as the experiences of patients and significant others have no intrinsic, pre-defined 
meaning, neither does the nature of trouble (Emerson & Messinger 1977). Allocations of 
wrongdoer and victim are (re)configured as the nature of trouble is (re)defined. In 
Natasha's meeting, an initial definition of trouble in which Laurence is the wrongdoer, 
Natasha the victim, is reconfigured via the discourse of "maybe he'll grow up" to one in 
which blame is mitigated. However the formulation of "she needs to stick up for 
herself... unless he suddenly matures" maintains the relational nature of the trouble but 
assigns the roles of both victim and wrongdoer to Natasha and excuses Laurence. In Ian's 
meeting the initial configuration dissolves the relational core of the trouble, assigning Ian 
as deviant and Harriette as victim. However, the notion that "they have a difficult 
relationship" re-establishes the relational nature of the trouble, redefines it as mutual, and 
shifts wrongdoing away from Ian. Finally, the formulations of "you rub each other up the 
wrong way" and "she just wants to make use of the flat" reverses the allocation of 
wrongdoer and victim. 
Thus definitions of trouble which initially draw on understandings of masculinity in terms 
of violence and abusiveness are reconfigured, via gendered relational understandings, to 
reverse the assignments of wrongdoer and victim. Notions that she brought-it-on-herself 
(e. g. "doesn't have the confidence", "put up with all sorts of abuse", "frightened of him", 
and "needs to stick up for herself) or that it is mutual (e. g. "they have a difficult 
relationship" and "you rub each other up the wrong way") attenuate or conceal earlier 
attributions of violence and abusiveness" and appear to circulate discourses identified in 
other contexts (Scully & Marolla 1984; Adams et al 1995; Caplan 1995; Hearn 1996a; 
1996b). Once again, professional pre- and post-meetings are a powerful institutional 
practice that enable professionals to assert their authority to decide what experiences 
1° However, while Ian's "violence" in relation to Harriette is disappeared and excused, it is reinvoked, 
reassigned and reproblematised in relation to the professionals in the post-meeting. For example, Dr. N: "its 
predictable once hes on the booze then hes going to start hitting people and and that includes me"/ Martin 
(CPN): "its not even he knows me when you walk in you you you can't you can't take that chance"/ Dr. N.: 
"no III know I've seen him very psychotic and and I mean I wouldn't even be y'know". Thus it is not the 
case that Ian either is or is not "violent" but how he is understood in relation to others. 
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mean. However, professionals may also contest definitions amongst themselves and 
patients may exercise power over significant others by refusing to allow them to attend 
meetings" and thus facilitate the founding of their version. In addition, as we saw in Ian's 
meeting, professionals may also collude with patients' definitions. 12 
Furthermore, professionals' understandings of schizophrenia are not made relevant to 
definitions of trouble or allocations of deviance and wrongdoing. Schizophrenia is not 
applied as a label at all within these discussions in the way labelling theory would predict 
(Rosenhan 1973). Nor does this diagnostic category produce an individualisation of 
trouble (Chesler 1974; Davis 1986; Warren 1987) or necessarily relieve those close to the 
patient of blame (Emerson & Messinger 1977). Rather, troubles are defined through 
relational understandings, distinctions between patient and carer statuses can have a 
certain fluidity and generalised notions of "mental illness" are an experience and resource 
much like any other. Such notions can be deployed to attribute blame and assign 
wrongdoing or to excuse and allocate the role of victim. 
In this chapter, I have argued that patients are located in interrelationship with significant 
others in psychiatric interactions. Experiences are complex and fluid resources, 
interrelated and gendered to accomplish definitions of trouble, blamings, excusings and 
decisions regarding change. In particular, negative discourses of femininity are deployed 
to accomplish an association between femininity, blame and changeability in relation to 
notions of masculinity which work to excuse and found unchangeability. However, 
understandings of schizophrenia do not intersect with definitions of trouble or 
assignments of wrongdoing. Rather, broader notions of "patient" and "illness" are 
resources that can be deployed either for blaming or excusing. As such, it is 
understandings of femininity and masculinity, not schizophrenia, that inform definitions 
of trouble, blame and change. In the next chapter, I draw together the conclusions of the 
thesis. 
" It is the patient's decision who is invited to meetings in a non-professional capacity. 
12 For example, in Ian's main meeting the doctor provided openings for Ian and Mrs. Peach and then agreed 
with their definitions of the nature of the trouble, and blaming of Harriette. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has used a discursive approach to examine contemporary psychiatric/patient 
interactions in CPA meetings for patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. I have 
identified co-existing relations of benevolent psychiatry/responsible patient and 
supervisory psychiatry/untrustworthy patient which produce considerable professional 
persuasion and negotiation, patient resistance and professional concessions to dispreferred 
options. But professional power is reasserted through discourses of pathology, the 
institutional practice of pre- and post-meetings and occasional understandings of 
femininity. Within these relations, professionals are more concerned with restoring lives 
than enforcing gender conformity, however understandings of femininity and (masculine) 
personhood inform and differentiate restoration to purposes and autonomies, as discourses 
of (in)dependence, emotions and activity take on a plurality of meanings. Within these 
negotiations, the experiences of patients and significant others become fluid and complex 
resources configured and reconfigured in gendered and relational terms to inform the 
restoration of lives, and to accomplish definitions of trouble in which understandings of 
femininity are associated with blame and change, those of masculinity with excusing and 
unchangeability. Finally, within CPA meetings, schizophrenia is not applied as a label and 
is rarely named at all, although it does operate as a background understanding. 
This suggests a more complex and differentiated picture of the relationship between 
gender, schizophrenia and contemporary psychiatric power than in the feminist and 
sociological literatures. My central argument is that the interplay between locally 
accomplished power and the broader mandate of community care produces co-existing 
practices of professional benevolence and control at the local level which have a number 
of implications for the relationship between gender and schizophrenia. Professional 
assumptions about schizophrenia, rather than gender, intersect with discourses of 
responsibility, supervision and choice producing a simultaneous encouragement and 
limitation of self-regulation for patients. In turn, professionals' discourses of femininity 
and (masculine) personhood intersect with understandings of schizophrenia to 
differentiate and delimit restoration to purpose and autonomy. However, professionals' 
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understandings of femininity and masculinity, rather than schizophrenia, are major 
resources for negotiating and defining trouble, blame and change. 
I began with an initial exploration of how contemporary psychiatric power unfolds within 
local encounters and the professional/patient relations that are constituted. I suggested that 
psychiatric practices are formulated in terms of "help", "advice" and "persuade" producing 
a relation of benevolent, persuasive psychiatry and responsible, voluntary, 
co-participatory patient, which was reinforced by discourses framing compulsion as a last 
resort. I identified the theme of "forget" as a particularly important means for assigning 
patient responsibility for taking medication and keeping appointments. However, 
professional orientations to "see"ing and "monitor"ing constitute an alternative, 
co-existent relation of supervisory psychiatry and untrustworthy patient and, together with 
consumer themes which restrict meaningful choice, indicate the limits of responsibility 
and participation for this set of patients. 
I explored these issues further through considering where points of patient resistance and 
professional reassertions of power occur within interactions. Patients appropriate and 
reformulate professional discourses of choice and responsibility to resist professionals' 
plans and assessments, temporarily disrupting psychiatric authority. Through formulations 
such as "I need a couple more weeks to make up my mind", "I worry about the long term 
effect" and "sorting what I'm thinking", choice is reconfigured as something that requires 
time and thought, responsibility becomes responsibility for long-term health or for 
self-healing and self-understanding, and self-help is prioritised over professional help. 
These localised everyday forms of resistance ultimately reaffirm professional discourses 
of choice and responsibility but are not insignificant in terms of the practical effects for 
patients' lives and securing professionally dispreferred outcomes. 
I identified intra-professional post-meetings as an important context and institutional 
practice for reasserting professional power in response to patient resistance. Post-meetings 
are a site for a professional "hidden transcript" enabling explicit ascriptions to be 
forwarded in an "off-stage" context where patients do not have an opportunity to contest 
them (Scott 1990: 14). In particular, (re)ascriptions of pathology are deployed which draw 
on professionals' understandings of schizophrenia, for example, "she doesn't believe 
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theres an illness" and "still psychotic", to undermine patient discourses and re-establish 
professional authority. However, while patient resistance is small-scale and temporary, 
and professional ascriptions of pathology bear a resemblance to Goffman's (1968) analysis 
of psychiatric responses in the asylum, dispreferred professional concessions elicited by 
patients during main meetings are not overturned. I also suggested that professional 
understandings of femininity, such as "frightened lady" and "single Mum", are an 
occasional resource for reasserting professional authority, deployed when useful, 
overridden when not. I argued that this occasional deployment of feminine gendering did 
not concur with traditional feminist accounts of psychiatry pathologising female patients 
(Chesler 1974; Al-Issa 1980; Barnes & Maple 1992). Instead, patients are pathologised 
without recourse to gender understandings, and feminine genderings are only an 
occasional response to resistance. 
Psychiatric power and patient resistance are accomplished within interactions and I traced 
some of the turn-by-turn interactional moves deployed by participants, such as 
interruptions, direct questioning, partial repeats and defending claims (Scheff 1968; West 
1984; Mehan 1990; Mellinger 1995). But I also argued that broader legislative concerns 
are incorporated into interactions. Professional discourses of compulsion as a last resort, 
patient voluntarism and participation and, in particular, patient responsibility for 
medication and appointments suggest that the uncertain limits of professional compulsion 
and patient rights (Gostin 1983; Mental Health Act 1983; Jones 1993) are played out 
within local encounters. Professional concessions to dispreferred actions and reluctance to 
engage with topics that undermine the benefits of medication are further indications of 
professionals incorporating wider legislative and rights discourses into interactions, and 
an awareness of broader concerns regarding community patients. Moreover, broader 
discourses which specify the institutional practice of intra-professional post-meetings are 
a powerful determinant of who has the last word. 
I argued that while schizophrenia is not explicitly articulated in association with core 
psychiatric practices and professional/patient relations it nevertheless operates as an 
important background understanding for professionals, intersecting with discourses of 
responsibility, supervision and choice to frame patient self-regulation as necessary yet 
limited. Further, understandings of schizophrenia are an explicit resource for 
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(re)ascriptions of pathology and thus reassertions of professional authority. As such, it is 
professional assumptions about and understandings of schizophrenia, rather than gender, 
that underpin these discourses; notions of patient responsibility, choice and supervision 
are not differentiated by gender. 
From the analysis of psychiatric practices and professional/patient relations I suggested 
that there is considerable professional persuasion and negotiation at the local level 
indicating that professional understandings of gender and patients' experiences will not be 
simply imposed on patients; opportunities are likely to open up for negotiating and 
contesting meanings. But professionals may be less benevolent and more controlling 
when patients' versions do not concur with their own, and intra-professional pre- and 
post-meetings are likely to be contexts where professionals (re)assert their definitions of 
gender and experiences. 
These psychiatric practices and professional/patient relations suggest that contemporary 
psychiatry is more concerned with encouraging self-regulation within local encounters 
(Miller 1986; Rose 1986b; 1989; Lunbeck 1994) than straightforward repression and 
social control (Laing 1967; Szasz 1973; 1974; 1976; Chesler 1974). Relations are not 
simply those of powerful psychiatrists and subjugated patients; patients resist professional 
plans and assessments and professionals concede to dispreferred options. Moreover, 
professionals seek to "invest" patients' subjectivity through the encouragement of 
responsibility and choice (Miller 1986: 32). However, at the same time they retain 
elements of social control through supervision of patients and restriction of meaningful 
choice. As such, contemporary psychiatry at the local level is a both controlling and 
persuasive discipline in relation to these particular patients. And while professionals 
largely retain their dominance, there are indications that psychiatric power is constrained 
in some measure by wider'rights' discourses. 
Having established what kind of relations are constituted between professionals and 
patients in local encounters, and where points of resistance and reassertion of professional 
authority occur, I turned to an explicit focus on professionals' gender understandings and 
intersections between gender and schizophrenia. I began by considering discussions about 
restoring patients' lives. I traced the way professionals position women as "women" and 
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draw on related understandings of femininity to interweave purpose and independence. 
Themes of "shes stuck in the house", "she doesn't have any friends" and "she does get 
dependent" problematise home, loneliness and emotional dependence for "women" and 
feed into the proposed solution: doing something independent from home and family in a 
professionally organised activity/environment that is "just all women". In contrast, other 
patients are positioned as (masculine) "people", and their emotions are assigned external 
causes and/or dependence is framed as practical. Through the theme of "he'll do what he 
wants to do", these patients are ascribed an independence construed as self-regulation 
over how they spend their time, which is disconnected from purposefulness. Such 
ascriptions of autonomy may be invoked in response to patient resistance, working to 
affirm that resistance, although they are not dependent on it. 
Professionals' understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood cannot be viewed 
as assessment of performance on gendered tasks (Busfield 1989; 1996), or enforcing 
gender conformity in a straightforward or traditional sense (Chesler 1974; Al-Issa 1980; 
Barnes & Maple 1992), nor as a feminisation of all patients (Szasz 1976). Rather, these 
understandings subtly inform and differentiate notions of purpose and autonomy. In the 
process, traditional associations between women and home are overturned as home is 
framed as psychologically unhealthy for "women" and somewhere to be got away from, 
although home remains problematised for "women" in a way it is not for (masculine) 
"people". Further, viewing these discourses in terms of women being more emotional and 
less independent than men or adults (Broverman et al 1970) underplays the plurality of 
professionals' understandings: emotions, (in)dependence and activity have a diversity of 
meanings in discussions about restoring patients' lives. However, while professionals are 
more concerned with restoring lives than gender conformity (Allen 1986), the psychiatric 
project of re-making individuals back into purposeful, autonomous subjects (Rose 1989) 
is finely differentiated by understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood 
within clinical interactions. 
Professionals' understandings about schizophrenia are also relevant to discussions about 
restoring lives. Formulations such as "its unlikely but perhaps in the future" and "this 
gentleman can't have paid employment because he has schizophrenia" suggest that 
assumptions about schizophrenia, in particular notions that complete recovery is unlikely 
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(APA 1994), inform and delimit purpose and autonomy. Daytime activities become 
partial restoration and have a filling-in-for-the-real-thing quality. In this way, professional 
understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood intersect with assumptions 
about schizophrenia to differentiate and delimit the psychiatric project of restoring these 
patients to purpose and autonomy. 
In effect, patients are "gendered subjects" within local professional/patient interactions 
(Busfield 1996: 114), supporting Busfield's contention that gender understandings remain 
salient to contemporary psychiatry in the era of community care. Moreover gender 
differentiations within clinical encounters are hidden beneath, and run counter to 
schizophrenia's gloss of gender neutrality at the level of statistical associations (Holstein 
1987). As such these differentiations are qualitative rather than quantitative (Smith 
1975a). These findings suggest that, contrary to some feminist writers' claims (Busfield 
1988; Pugliesi 1992: Russell 1995), schizophrenia is relevant for a feminist analysis, and 
perhaps more broadly, that there are gender issues to address in psychiatric categories 
other than those where women predominate. 
Patients' past and present experiences are an important resource in discussions about 
restoring lives; different experiences can be shaped towards the same problem and 
solution, or similar biographical details can be made relevant to very different problems 
and solutions as they are associated with femininity and (masculine) personhood. 
However, the meanings of patients' experiences are not necessarily imposed by the 
professionals (Barrett 1988; Mehan 1990; Soyland 1994; Ravotas & Berkenkotter 1998); 
meanings are negotiated and may be contested by patients within meetings, but 
professionals do assert their own understandings in intra-professional pre- and 
post-meetings. Experiences take on even more complexity and fluidity when patients are 
located in interrelationship with significant others in psychiatric interactions: significant 
others are a resource for understanding patients in relational terms, and vice versa. In 
particular, professional discourses of care, definitions of trouble and negotiations of 
blame and change are accomplished through the deployment of membership categories 
and standardized relational pairs (Sacks 1972; 1974; Watson 1978) and a range of 
relational understandings which are gendered. 
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Notions of "the mother could help more" and "her husbands become overprotective" 
frame care in terms of helping and not hindering the professionals and doing whatever the 
professionals deem necessary to enable patients to follow the course they prescribe. These 
discourses draw on understandings of care as a feminine activity (mother is not doing 
enough as a mother, the husband is overdoing it but it is understandable for a husband), 
but contrary to the literature on the gendering of care (Banton et al 1985; Showalter 1987; 
Ussher 1991; Gorman 1992), care is not reinscribed as a feminine activity per se. 
Professionals deploy standardized relational pairs (Sacks 1972) such as mother/father and 
husband/wife, and associated gender understandings to accomplish problematisations, 
blamings and excusings (Watson 1978). When associated gender understandings come 
into play, patient and carer statuses do not necessarily determine allocations of wrongdoer 
and victim (Emerson & Messinger 1977). Carers experiences of care, therefore, are 
interactional resources, shaped and gendered within interactions. 
The negotiated and fluid nature of experience is even more evident when significant 
others are girlfriends or boyfriends and professionals' configurations are traced through 
the course of meetings. Definitions of relational troubles are configured and reconfigured 
through the deployment of paired relational categories and associated understandings 
(Sacks 1972), many of which are also gender categories such as boyfriend/girlfriend, 
girl/boy, and wife/husband. The formulation of "he can be verbally abusive and physically 
intimidating... she doesn't feel confident enough" draws on the boyfriend/girlfriend 
relation to configure masculine abuse and intimidation as a problem in relation to 
feminine lack of confidence, suggesting that both contribute to the problem but he is 
mainly to blame. And the framing of "his violence" and "him as the patient not her as the 
patient" presents a violent masculine patient as clearly to blame in relation to a feminine 
non-patient. 
I argued that complex and contradictory relational understandings of femininity and 
masculinity are accomplished within interactions. However, there is a preponderance of 
negative or socially undesirable (Broverman et al 1970) characteristics associated with 
femininity (such as frightened, dependent, selfish, using), and positive characteristics 
associated with masculinity (such as aware, honest, caring, responsible). In turn, negative 
associations with femininity are deployed to attribute blame for an unsatisfactory state of 
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affairs or a relational trouble (a mother not doing enough; a sick wife; a frightened 
mother/girlfriend; a wrong-headed, selfish, using girlfriend). And understandings of 
masculinity are deployed to excuse or mitigate blame (a caring and self-sacrificing 
husband; an immature boyfriend; a loving and responsible boyfriend). Further, notions of 
femininity position certain patients and carers as the subjects of professional intervention 
and thus changeable (she should help more, be more assertive, move out) in relation to 
notions of masculinity which position other patients as unchangeable (he is unlikely to 
grow up, he cannot be told whom he lives with). 
Therefore, rather than having intrinsic meanings, experiences of care, understandings of 
mothers and wives, relationships between girlfriends and boyfriends are resources, given 
meaning within interactions and deployed to accomplish activities of defining troubles, 
blaming and excusing. This suggests a more complex picture of women's (and men's) 
experiences than in the traditional feminist literature (Al-Issa 1980; Warren 1987; Barnes 
& Maple 1992), where women's experiences are assumed to have relatively 
straightforward singular meanings which are reflected in language. In contrast, 
experiences become complex and fluid resources as interrelated lives are discursively 
constituted, gendered and played out within clinical interactions, including who is and is 
not or should not be significant. 
By the same token, the nature of trouble also does not have any intrinsic, pre-defined 
meaning (Emerson & Messinger 1977). As trouble is (re)defined, allocations of victim 
and wrongdoer are assigned and re-assigned; definitions of trouble which initially drew on 
notions of violent and abusive masculinity were reconfigured via formulations of "she 
needs to stick up for herself... unless he suddenly matures" and "you rub each other up the 
wrong way... she just wants to make use of the flat", to reverse assignments of victim and 
wrongdoer. Moreover, formulations such as these, which suggest that she 
brought-it-on-herself or that the problem is mutual, attenuate earlier attributions of 
violence and abusiveness, circulating, discourses and attributions identified in other 
contexts (Scully & Marolla 1984; Adams et al 1995; Caplan 1995; Hearn 1996a; 1996b). I 
suggested that the absence of the problematised person facilitated accomplishments of 
blame and, once again, intra-professional pre-, and post-meetings were a site for 
professionals to assert their authority to decide what experiences mean. However, I also 
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traced the way that professionals may contest definitions amongst themselves or may 
collude with patients' definitions. 
Throughout these meetings, schizophrenia is not applied as a label within discussions in 
the way labelling theory would predict (Rosenhan 1973); the past and present experiences 
and behaviour of patients are not interpreted in the light of schizophrenia in any 
straightforward way. It is rarely named at all. Rather, (background) understandings of 
schizophrenia inform discussions about patient responsibility and choice, and restoring 
patients' lives. However this does not appear to be the case when it comes to definitions of 
trouble and assignments of wrongdoing. As such, a diagnosis of schizophrenia does not 
produce an individualisation of trouble (Chesler 1974; Davis 1986; Warren 1987), nor 
necessarily relieve those close to the patient of blame. (Emerson & Messinger 1977). 
Instead, patient and carer statuses can take on a certain fluidity as troubles are defined 
through relational understandings and general notions of "mental illness" can be deployed 
as an experiential resource to attribute blame and wrongdoing or to excuse and assign the 
role of victim. Therefore, it is understandings of femininity and masculinity, not 
schizophrenia, that are major resources in local interactions for accomplishing definitions 
of trouble, blamings, excusings and decisions regarding change. 
In this respect, there is little evidence from these findings to support the contention that 
women with schizophrenia are perceived by psychiatry as over-active and assertive, men 
with schizophrenia as dependent and passive (Cheek 1964; McClelland & Watt 1968; 
Chesler 1974). However the findings do provide some support for the broader thesis that 
psychiatry holds a negative conception of femininity (Broverman et al 1970; Chesler 
1974). But in contemporary local encounters negative characteristics associated with 
femininity are not deployed to pathologise patients but rather are produced, negotiated and 
sometimes contested within interactions to accomplish blamings for relational troubles. 
From a feminist perspective, how should we place a value on these findings? 
Professionals' differentiated understandings of emotion, dependence, independence and 
activity do not connote greater or lesser value in and of themselves but rather according to 
what they are deployed to do and their practical effects. Arguably, and overall, discourses 
associated with femininity are more often framed as problematic than those associated 
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with masculinity or (masculine) people; notions of emotional dependence, loneliness, 
home, lacking confidence and economic expedience are all identified as feminine 
problems. In turn, feminine problems include the notion that something should be done in 
a twin movement of professional intervention coupled with feminine change. In contrast 
(masculine) people are also problematised in terms of practical dependence and needing 
emotional support but solutions are framed differently; professionals provide solutions in 
the form of "support" which enables these patients to cope in the community. While it 
could be argued that professionals are merely taking the shortest route to keeping patients 
out of trouble, it is clear from the analysis that this shortest route is informed by gender 
understandings about who can and should change and who cannot, and where 
professionals can intervene to facilitate change, and where they cannot. 
As such, the practical effect of these discourses is a greater professional intervention in 
the lives of women patients and carers than men/(masculine) people. In terms of, say, 
getting women out of the house, ameliorating loneliness, helping them make friends with 
other women, or to be more assertive, or move out of a violent home, it could be said that 
such aims are well-meaning if not laudable. If women are capable of change, making 
friends, being more assertive and purposeful, is this simply greater malleability or positive 
and life-enhancing attributes? On the other hand, if (masculine) people and men are 
simply provided with basic support to enable them to cope in the community, are excused 
from problematic situations and do what they want to do with their time are they being 
given greater control over their lives or being framed as intractable and unlikely to 
improve? There are no easy answers to these questions but if we take account of the 
finding that understandings of schizophrenia delimit restoration, then it is not clear that 
greater professional intervention, no matter how well-meaning, is preferable to being 'left 
alone'. 
Furthermore, there are areas of clear concern. Firstly, discourses of femininity, but not 
masculinity, are an occasional resource for reasserting professional authority whereas 
ascriptions of autonomy to (masculine) people are conferred in response to resistance and 
work to affirm it. In this way, understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood 
impact upon the extent to which patients can resist professionals' plans for restoring their 
lives. Secondly, and most importantly, negative discourses of femininity are deployed to 
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assign blame for problematic states of affairs and relational troubles; that women 
(mothers, wives, girlfriends) are blamed and given the onus to change, should be a distinct 
cause for concern, particularly when professionals' definitions attenuate masculine 
violence and abusiveness. The idea that nothing can or should be done to intervene in 
male patients' lives (beyond basic support and ensuring they take their medication and 
keep appointments) places an unacceptable weight on female patients and carers. 
These findings and their implications from a feminist perspective present a rather 
different understanding of the intersections between gender and schizophrenia than in the 
traditional feminist literature, and of how schizophrenia and contemporary psychiatric 
power are played out within local professional/patient interactions. As such, a DA 
approach which focused on psychiatric/patient interactions within a psychiatric institution 
has been productive for investigating these issues. In broad terms, conceiving and 
analysing language as constitutive of social reality enabled a focus on what knowledges of 
gender and schizophrenia were created in CPA meetings in this particular psychiatric unit, 
avoiding the conceptual confusions and contradictions between schizophrenia as social 
construct and/or social product. Approaching professionals' understandings as 
interactional achievements deployed to accomplish social actions in this context, allowed 
consideration of the practical social effects for patients in terms of blamings and 
excusings and, more generally, their future treatment and care. Further, a focus on 
'naturally' occurring clinical interactions between professionals and patients provided 
detailed insights into the "logic-in-use" (Coulter 1991: 167) of gender and schizophrenia 
in this context, insights which are unlikely to have been gained from interviews or textual 
materials. Professionals were there to accomplish the everyday business of CPA meetings 
rather than attend to the questions and concerns of a researcher. 
This approach allowed me to investigate psychiatric power as a more open question than 
when the direction of power is assumed in advance (Gill 1996) and facilitated an 
exploration of the way power unfolds within clinical encounters (Banton et al 1985). It 
enabled a focus on the way psychiatric practices and professional/patient relations were 
accomplished within interactions but at the same time to take account of points where 
participants incorporated broader discourses and concerns about community care into 
interactions, such as psychiatric compulsion and patients' rights. From this approach I 
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have attempted to draw out the way that psychiatric power at the local level is not solely 
an interactional accomplishment, but neither is it simply determined by broader 
discourses. 
Taking a DA approach to professionals' understandings also elucidated the plurality of 
meanings of emotion, activity and (in)dependence which previously had been conceived 
and measured as relatively simple and singular characteristics (Broverman et al 1970). 
From a discursive perspective these characteristics take on a diversity of meanings as they 
are associated with understandings of femininity and (masculine) personhood, and 
deployed to frame problematisations and solutions; for example, dependence can be 
emotional or practical, emotions can be internalised or externalised, and independence 
can mean independence from home and significant others or self-regulation over how 
patients spend their time. Further, analysing experience as an interactive accomplishment 
has highlighted the fluidity and complexity of patients' and significant others' experiences. 
Rather than having pre-defined meanings, experiences are configured and reconfigured to 
support particular formulations of problems and proposed solutions, definitions of 
trouble, and accomplishments of blame and change. Moreover, a DA approach which has 
focused on a clinical context has been particularly useful for understanding that 
schizophrenia is rarely invoked and named as a category within interactions, in the way 
labelling theories would predict (Rosenhan 1973; Chesler 1974). Rather schizophrenia 
largely operates as a background understanding in this clinical context, and one that does 
not inform all aspects of professional/patient discussions. 
Finally, conceiving and analysing gender as created within language and interaction and 
according to the activity at hand, rather than having an essential or stable meaning, has 
accentuated the way that women and (masculine) people and understandings of femininity 
and masculinity are produced within the talk, and the consequences of these assignments 
and meanings within the concrete practices of contemporary psychiatry (Flax 1987). 
Furthermore, a focus on gender (women and men, femininity and masculinity) rather than 
solely on women has enabled a better understanding of the intersections between 
femininity, masculinity and schizophrenia and a more dynamic picture of the 
interrelationships between them and the fluidity of meanings associated -with these 
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categories. The interrelated nature of professionals' gender understandings was 
particularly evident when defining troubles, assigning blame and excusing. 
I have attempted to remain within the bounds of participants' own understandings, 
particularly in relation to gender, rather than bringing in my own cultural knowledge. This 
has further highlighted the contingent and situated nature of gender meanings within 
psychiatric talk and, I hope, provided an effective critique of psychiatric understandings. 
However, this approach has also posed problems for demonstrating the relevance of 
gender when it is operating as a background understanding rather than being explicitly 
indexed within the talk (Frith 1998; Stokoe 1998; 2000; Kitzinger 2000; Stokoe & 
Smithson 2001). I drew on Garfinkel's (1967) notion of gender as an omnirelevance and 
Zimmerman's (1998) discussion of "transportable identities" to argue that the notion of a 
generalised person in professionals' talk did not automatically mean that masculinity was 
not relevant and that this understanding was best characterised as (masculine) 
personhood. I also suggested that gender identities, such as girlfriend/boyfriend, once 
invoked and made relevant by participants, could continue to have relevance for a stretch 
of interaction without being restated turn-by-turn. However, the question of the status of 
background knowledge within CA/DA remains and has been particularly apparent in the 
present research which has drawn data from a 'naturally' occurring interactive context, 
where gender is only one amongst a number of professional concerns. As such, what is to 
count as relevant to participants is more complex and less certain in this sort of context 
than when gender is "relevant to the... talk as a matter of recipient design" (Schegloff 
1998; 415), for example in interviews and focus groups. 
Nevertheless a DA approach has provided detailed insights into professional/patient 
interactions within contemporary clinical encounters: an understanding of how psychiatric 
power unfolds at this local level, how professionals accomplish gender understandings 
and to what effects, and a different understanding of the intersections between gender and 
schizophrenia. However the research was limited in a number of senses, each of which 
were related to the difficulties of access and ethics encountered when researching a 
psychiatric context. The research context was confined to one psychiatric unit in the 
South East of England serving a particular community. Other units serving different 
communities, in particular institutions with a greater number of patients from ethnic 
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minorities, might have introduced professional discourses of ethnicity which may have 
interacted with understandings of gender and schizophrenia. Given that 
African/African-Caribbean people in Britain are over-represented in the diagnostic 
category of schizophrenia (Mercer 1986; Littlewood & Lipsedge 1997), and gender is 
"conspicuous by its absence" in transcultural psychiatric research (Mercer 1986: 292), this 
is a regrettable absence in the present research directly attributable to the difficulties and 
lengthy process involved in gaining access to psychiatric contexts. There were indications 
in the data that professional understandings of ethnicity could interact with those of 
gender (for example Diane was described as an "Irish lady") but there were insufficient 
instances to form any firm findings. 
Further, CPA meetings were only one of a range of contexts within the psychiatric 
institution. The insights gained from the research could have been deepened with wider 
access to, for example, outpatient meetings between patients and the consultants and some 
of the professionally organised activities such as women's group. Again, this might have 
introduced additional or alternative discourses and provided a better understanding of the 
discourses and practices of the institution. In particular it would have enabled me to trace, 
say, how discourses of responsibility are played out in one-to-one discussions between the 
consultants and the patients in outpatients, and/or to pursue further discourses of 
femininity deployed at women's group. Furthermore, confinement to one context within 
the broader context of the psychiatric institution as a whole also confronts notions of the 
meaning of context itself (Tracy 1998) and thus what is to count as participants' relevance 
and the boundaries between intrinsic and extrinsic, micro and macro. 
In addition, although in principle I was given access to patients who were newly admitted 
under the Mental Health Act, in practice I was unable to gain consent from any of these 
patients. Therefore I was unable to consider how professionals' understandings of 
schizophrenia might be brought into play at this early stage in patients' 'careers'. Again 
there are indications from conversations I had with psychiatric nurses on the in-patients' 
ward that staff were both aware of problems associated with labelling people with 
diagnostic categories and that they engaged in some contestation over whether 
schizophrenia was a suitable diagnosis for a particular patient. It is possible then, that the 
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first CPA after a patient's admission to hospital could have produced more explicit 
discourses of schizophrenia than was the case in the meetings to which I had access. 
These limitations and the findings of the research suggest a number of future directions in 
which the research could be taken. However, such suggestions should be tempered by an 
awareness of the difficulties of gaining access to psychiatric settings. The intimation that 
professional discourses of ethnicity might interact with understandings of gender and 
schizophrenia, and the lack of research in this area, particularly in interactive psychiatric 
contexts, suggests that similar research in a psychiatric unit with a higher number of 
ethnic minority patients could contribute to filling this gap. On a more general level, the 
research could be extended by widening the focus from schizophrenia to other diagnostic 
categories, for example a category such as depression. I have argued that professionals' 
understandings of schizophrenia underpin the simultaneous encouragement and limitation 
of self-regulation for patients, and delimit their restoration to purpose and autonomy. In 
the latter case, these assumptions intersect with discourses of femininity and (masculine) 
personhood. A similar research approach and context would provide an interesting 
exploration of the continuities and disjunctures produced when the focus is professionals' 
understandings of the relationship between gender and depression within clinical 
encounters. 
A different direction that could be pursued, which was beyond the scope of the present 
study, would be a greater focus on patients' discourses. Although a great deal of patients' 
talk has been included here, and I have detailed the way that patients appropriate and 
reformulate psychiatric discourses of responsibility and choice to resist professionals' 
plans and assessments, the major focus has been on professionals' understandings. One 
aspect that I highlighted was the professional "hidden transcript" (Scott 1990: xii) 
whereby professionals make more open avowals in the context of pre- and post-meetings 
where patients are unable to contest their definitions. However, patients will also have 
"off-stage" (Scott 1990: 4) sites for producing a "hidden transcript": 
Every subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a "hidden transcript" that 
represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant. 
(Scott 1990: xii). 
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It is likely to be in contexts such as patient groups and organisations, or patient drop-in 
centres where patients produce their own "hidden transcript", discourses that resist and 
counter professional understandings of gender and schizophrenia/mental distress, and this 
would be an important and interesting future research direction. However, given that 
patients are not always told their diagnosis, this research would have to be widened out to 
a more general notion of mental distress. 
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Appendix I 
Patient and Staff Information Leaflets and Consent Forms 
Patients' Information Leaflet 
CAN YOU HELP WITH THIS RESEARCH PROJECT? 
WHO I AM AND WHAT THE RESEARCH IS ABOUT 
My name is Lin Williams and I am a research student from Brunel University. I am looking at the 
relationship between gender and mental distress. I want to consider questions such as: 
" does your gender affect the way you and your behaviour are understood by mental health 
professionals (e. g. psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric nurses and social workers)? 
" what influence, if any, does it have on your care? 
" does gender have any bearing at all? 
One way to explore these questions is to look at mental health professionals' talk when they are discussing 
your care. 
WHAT WILL IT INVOLVE? 
Can you help with the study by letting me sit in on your care-plan meeting? I will not take part in any of the 
discussions but I would like to tape-record what people say in the meeting. If you are worried about the idea 
of tape-recording, then you can say so on the form provided at the end of this leaflet, and I will take notes 
instead. If you wish, you are welcome to a copy of the audio tape after the meeting. Please remember that 
my focus is on the mental health professionals and what they say in the meeting, not on you. 
HOW WILL THE RESEARCH BE USED? 
The results of the research will be written up for the university. Parts of the research may be published in the 
future in academic journals. A summary of the results, made completely anonymous, will be given to the 
Trust. Your help with this research cannot benefit you directly or immediately. But it will increase 
awareness and understanding of the way gender affects mental distress and will be useful to users of mental 
health services, mental health professionals and organisations in the future. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Your right to confidentiality will be protected in the following ways: 
"I will change your name and take out all details which could identify you. 
"I will make these changes as I transcribe (make a copy in writing) the tapes or notes and destroy the 
original tapes/notes. 
"I will destroy all the original tapes/notes within a maximum of two years. 
" before this, I will keep all the tapes/notes locked away at my home. 
YOUR RIGHTS 
You have the right to decide to take part, or not to take part in this research project based on the information 
I have given you - this is your right to informed consent. 
" please make sure that you understand what the research is about and how you will be involved, 
before you agree to take part. 
" if you would like to know more before you decide, speak to .................... who will contact me and I 
will be happy to come and answer any questions you may have. 
" your decision, either way, will not affect your treatment or dealings with staff. 
CHANGING YOUR MIND 
You have the right to change your mind about taking part in this project at any time. If you change your 
mind, speak to ................ who will contact me. I will immediately cancel any plans to be at your care-plan 
meeting or destroy any tape-recording, transcription, or notes that I have made. Changing your mind about 
taking part in the project will not affect your treatment or your dealings with staff in any way. 
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Patients' Consent Form 
Please make sure that you understand what the research is about and how you will be 
involved before you sign this form. 
I agree to take part in the research project investigating the relationship between gender 
and mental distress. 
I do not object to a tape recording being made .......... 
Q 
I do object to a tape-recording being made ................ 
Q 
(Please tick which statement applies to you) 
Signed .................................................. Date ..................................... 
Please keep this leaflet for your information and return the signed consent form to 
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Staff Information Leaflet 
YOUR SUPPORT IS NEEDED FOR A NEW RESEARCH PROJECT 
WHO I AM 
My name is Lin Williams and I am a postgraduate research student from Brunel University. I have previous 
experience working in a child guidance clinic, and conducting research in a healthcare setting. 
THE RESEARCH : WOMEN, MEN, AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 
I am looking at the relationship between gender and schizophrenia. Women and men seem to be at equal 
risk of developing schizophrenia but recent medical research suggests that gender differences (such as in 
symptoms, response to treatments, age of onset) could be important for understanding the disorder. 
Gender is one of our most basic and important social categories, which we all use to make sense of our 
world, the people in it, and their behaviour. I want to explore how you, as a mental health professional, 
understand gender and its relationship to schizophrenia. It is important that research of this kind takes into 
account the everyday practicalities of a busy mental health unit, and the professionals who work there. I will 
be considering questions such as: 
" does gender influence the way you understand patients with schizophrenia and their behaviour? 
" what effect, if any, does it have on decisions regarding patients' care? 
" does gender have any bearing on schizophrenia at all in this context? 
I will be using a method called discourse analysis. This is a qualitative methodology which focuses on 
language itself, how it is organised and to what effects. This approach has provided exciting new 
understandings of a wide range of topics within psychology, sociology and anthropology. 
The research will be: 
"a positive exercise seeking to elucidate mental health professionals' understandings and meanings. 
" taking account of the practicalities of the clinical context. 
" looking at the complexity of gender which may have many different dimensions and take many 
different directions. 
The research will not be: 
" judgmental - in the vein of simplistic ideas about sexism and gender bias . " finding fault - this is not an investigation into something that is going wrong. 
HOW WILL STAFF BE INVOLVED? 
I would like to sit in on care-plan meetings for patients who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia. I will 
not participate in the meeting but I would like to observe and tape-record the discussions. I understand that 
people can feel uncomfortable with audiotaping, but it is important for the rigour and accuracy of the 
research that there is an exact record of what is said. Notes can only capture an impression and can lead to 
misunderstandings and misinterpretation. Previous research suggests that people quickly overcome their 
initial discomfort and become used to audiotaping. If you, or the patient, are unhappy about tape-recording, 
then I can take notes instead. 
272 
Appendix I 
HOW WILL CONFIDENTIALITY BE PROTECTED? 
Your confidentiality will be protected in the following ways: 
"I will change all names of staff participating in the research, and delete all identifying details, to 
ensure anonymity. 
"I will make these changes and deletions as I transcribe the tapes or notes, and destroy the original 
tapes/notes. 
"I will destroy all the original tapes/notes within a maximum of two years. 
" Prior to this, I will keep the tapes/notes locked away at my home. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESEARCH AFTERWARDS? 
My findings will be written up for the university and will form the basis of my doctoral qualification. A 
summary, in anonymised form, will be made available to the Trust. Parts of the research may be published 
in academic journals in the future. 
I hope that the findings will increase awareness and understanding of the ways gender impacts upon mental 
distress, and will be useful to mental health professionals, organisations and users of services. 
IF YOU WOULD LIKE MORE INFORMATION 
"I will be happy to arrange a group meeting where any questions or worries can be raised and 
discussed. 
" if you would prefer, we can meet on an individual basis. 
" if you would like a copy of the full research proposal, and the'information leaflet for patients' I will 
be happy to send them to you. 
YOUR INVOLVEMENT IS CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS PROJECT 
This is an opportunity to be part of a research study which takes account of professionals working in the 
front-line of mental health care. 
PLEASE GIVE THIS PROJECT YOUR SUPPORT 
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Staff Consent Form 
I agree to take part in the research project: "Women, Men and Schizophrenia" which will 
be investigating the relationship between gender and schizophrenia. 
Signed ................................................. Date ................................... 
Please return the signed consent form to Lin Williams or .................................. 
If you have any concerns about tape recording, please contact Lin Williams on "+"++ +++**+ 
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Ethical Guidelines and Practice 
I based my ethical guidelines and practice on Mind's Policy (1993) and Principles of 
Confidentiality (Mind 1994) and the British Sociological Association's Statement of 
Ethical Practice (1991). 
Patients' confidentiality was respected by changing all the names of participants and 
deleting identifying details to ensure anonymity. I made these changes and deletions as the 
tapes were transcribed. In terms of patients' rights, I undertook to give adequate and 
understandable information about the research, in writing, to all potential participants, 
avoiding jargon. I made it clear that agreement or refusal would be respected and would 
not affect their dealings with staff in any way. I made clear to patients how their 
confidentiality would be protected, but advised them that parts of the research might be 
published in the future. I took care to ensure that participants were sufficiently aware and 
understood the research before giving their consent. I also advised them, in writing, that 
they were free to change their minds and withdraw consent at any time. If patients were 
worried about the idea of audiotape recording they were given the option of note-taking 
instead. Following the advice of the medical ethics committee, I offered patients a copy of 
the audiotape if they wanted one. The same guidelines for confidentiality and consent 
were followed for professional staff. 
On the advice of Dr. North, the word "schizophrenia" was replaced by "mental distress" 
on the patients' information leaflet, in recognition that not all patients are made aware of 
their diagnosis. While this seemed to contravene the spirit of "informed consent" 
somewhat, Dr. North suggested that sometimes it is not "therapeutic" for patients to know 
their diagnosis and only those with "sufficient ego strength" to accept the diagnosis and 
not be frightened by it are told. In this sense she had given me an ethical reason for not 
disclosing diagnosis to the patient and I felt I should abide by her policy. 
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Data Sources, Participants and Background Information to the CPA 
and the Psychiatric Unit 
Data Sources 
My primary data source was audiotape recordings of Care Programme Approach (CPA) 
meetings for people diagnosed with schizophrenia in the borough of Worthington. The 
meetings lasted between 20 minutes and one hour, the average was 35-40 minutes. I 
tape-recorded eleven CPA meetings in total across the four sites that composed the 
psychiatric unit: seven at the community mental health centre, one at the residential 
rehabilitation hostel, one at the day unit and two at the acute in-patient ward. I used a 
Sanyo M-1 140 Compact Cassette Recorder and a miniature microphone. I made the 
decision to trade a good level of sound quality for unobtrusiveness given the setting and 
participants. When patients did not want to be tape-recorded, I took notes at five 
meetings, three at the community centre and two at the day unit. In these cases I attempted 
to take down segments of verbatim talk in written form, rather than writing for gist. In this 
way, notes formed a data source for analysis, albeit a less perfect source. 
In addition to audiotape recording and taking notes in CPAs, I also conducted 
semi-structured interviews with five professionals; one from each of the four research 
sites and one with the manager of the community centre. The consultant psychiatrist and 
the ethics committee had only given approval for me to attend CPA meetings and so I was 
unable to spend time freely in the psychiatric unit and associated sites observing their 
day-to-day workings. Because of this I had little idea how the CPA, as a certain kind of 
psychiatric event, fitted into all the other activities in the unit. The interviews were 
primarily for the purpose of obtaining background information about the sites and the 
activities that went on there from the professionals' perspective. Four interviews were 
recorded and in one I took notes. The interviews were conducted at the end of the research 
period at each site. The semi-structured interview schedules varied slightly according to 
the site, but a copy of one of the schedules is attached to the end of this appendix. 
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I also gathered a variety of secondary sources such as leaflets designed for patients about 
the CPA, the role of community psychiatric nurses and schizophrenia, as well as internal 
documentation and guidelines for staff on confidentiality, CPAs, and consent forms. 
These sources were also used to provide background information. 
Finally, I kept a fieldwork diary from the time I made initial contact with Dr. North until 
the end of the research. In this diary I noted and dated all phone calls (from mundane to 
long conversations), face-to-face conversations I had with professionals and patients, 
observational details from the meetings I attended and my thoughts and feelings about 
them. I took notes while I was engaged in phone conversations, and wrote down other 
notes as soon after the event as possible. Again, when noting conversations, I attempted to 
take down, or remember, verbatim segments of talk which seemed important. The 
fieldwork diary provided a valuable source of observational material, some verbatim talk, 
and a chronological account of the research process and my experiences. 
Participants and Programme of Research 
In effect, there were two main groups of participants in the research, the professionals and 
the patients (without whose consent the research could not go ahead), as well as their 
relatives and friends. Thirty-seven psychiatric professionals took part in the research, of 
which twenty-three were women and fourteen were men. Their ages ranged from early 
twenties to fifties. In terms of ethnicity, eighteen professionals were white, thirteen were 
African/African-Caribbean or Asian, six were Irish. In order to preserve anonymity I have 
given all participants English pseudonyms. In terms of professional affiliation and status, 
there were three consultant psychiatrists, one registrar, three psychiatrists and one junior 
doctor. From the team at the community health centre, nine community psychiatric nurses, 
five approved social workers, and two community support workers took part. Within the 
day unit and the ward, there were four psychiatric nurses. Other professionals involved 
were five housing officers, two managers, an occupational therapist and a social work 
student. 
The extent to which professionals participated varied greatly; one of the two female 
consultants, Dr. North and Dr. South, took part in all the meetings except one (ten 
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meetings and five meetings respectively), whilst the registrar attended four meetings and 
the male consultant, who was based at another unit, only attended one meeting. One 
community psychiatric nurse attended four meetings, another attended three, and one 
approved social worker and one community support worker attended three each. The 
other professionals mostly took part in only one meeting. Not all the professional staff at 
the psychiatric unit and associated sites participated although none of them explicitly 
refused. However, over the period of time I was at the unit, the vast majority of staff did 
become participants at some stage in the research. The five professionals who were 
interviewed were an approved social worker and four managers. 
Sixteen patients participated in the research, eight women and eight men. Their ages 
ranged from late teens to early fifties. Thirteen of the patients who participated were 
white, three were African/African-Caribbean, Asian or Irish. Once again I have given 
them all English pseudonyms for confidentiality purposes. Eight of the patients were 
accompanied by relatives/friends including mothers, fathers, husbands, brothers, sons, and 
girlfriends. Three women and five men attended alone. All patients participated in only 
one meeting each. I wanted as wide a range of participants as possible and also it did not 
seem fair to ask for their help more than once. Of the patients that participated, seven 
women and four men agreed to be audiotape recorded, one woman and four men opted for 
notes only. 
I provide brief descriptions of patients' background circumstances as they are introduced 
in the analysis but I did not have access to their medical biographies and so my 
knowledge about them was limited to a visual impression and the talk within the 
meetings. While I did include descriptions of all the participants in my fieldwork diary, I 
decided that this level of information could contravene my ethical obligations in terms of 
ensuring anonymity. But, at the same time, a more ethnographic sense of who these 
people are has been lost. 
Dr. North proposed a rolling programme of research which would begin at the community 
health centre and then move on to the residential hostel and day unit, and finally to the 
ward. Her rationale was that CPAs are "calmer" in the community centre than on the ward 
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which would give me an opportunity to get used to the meetings. I started my research at 
the community centre in October 1997 (eleven months after my initial contact with Dr. 
North) and finished there in early July 1998. Research at the day unit ran from November 
1997 to April 1998; at the residential hostel from February until July 1998; and on the 
ward from July 1988 until December 1998. In total I spent fifteen months conducting 
research at the psychiatric unit and associated sites. 
Background Information to the Care Programme Approach (CPA) 
The CPA was introduced by the government in 1991 as an adjunct to the Mental Health 
Act of 1983 (DoH&WO 1993) after some high profile cases of violent community 
patients. Although CPAs are part of the code of practice of the Mental Health Act, they 
have not been implemented in all areas of the country and where they have been 
introduced they are not uniform. CPAs were introduced into Treetops psychiatric unit in 
December 1995. Some CPAs may have taken place before this time, but at this point they 
were formalised across the Trust. As part of the CPA process the Government also 
introduced a Supervision Register in 1994, which was introduced into the psychiatric unit 
the same year, and is completed by the consultant towards the end of the meeting. The 
primary aim of the Supervision Register is "to reduce the risk of serious violence, suicide 
or self neglect" (quoted from Worthington Community & Mental Health Trust internal 
document of guidelines). A Health of the Nation Survey (HONOS) Score Sheet is also 
included in the CPA which lists twelve "problems" (e. g. behavioural, physical, mental) 
which are scored on a scale from zero to four. This is usually completed by the consultant 
or the keyworker, also towards the end of the meeting. 
The aim of the CPA is to co-ordinate care between different professionals involved in a 
case; to produce a care plan negotiated between the multi-professional team, the patient, 
and any significant others involved in the patient's care; and more broadly to prevent 
patients "slipping through the net". CPA meetings are attended by all the professionals 
involved in the care of the patient, the patient, and any friend/relative the patient wishes to 
invite. At the end of the meeting a plan is agreed which is written up on an official form, 
signed by the patient and her/his keyworker, and circulated to attendees. There are two 
tiers of CPA; the full CPA is convened for patients who have "complex needs", who need 
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multi-professional care, who are or have been formally detained under the Mental Health 
Act, or who are deemed "vulnerable" (taken from internal guidelines and "screening 
document"). Patients on minimal CPA have less complex needs and usually only need 
care from one professional. Meetings are only convened for patients on full CPAs. All 
new patients coming into contact with Worthington mental health services are "screened" 
to determine which level of CPA they require. 
Sample copies of the CPA Screening Document, the CPA form that is completed at the 
end of each meeting, and the Risk Assessment form are attached to the end of this 
appendix. 
Background Information to the Psychiatric Unit and Associated Sites 
I attended CPA meetings at four sites which make up the mental healthcare provision for 
the borough of Worthington, and over which the consultants, Dr. North and Dr. South, 
have responsibility. The borough of Worthington includes five towns and is a mixed area 
in terms of socio-economic status; it is predominately middle-class but there are also areas 
of poverty. 
There are several large council estates, housing association housing, and a large travellers 
community. I was told that the Asian community was increasing and that approximately 
one quarter of one of the social worker's caseload consisted of people from ethnic 
minorities including African-Caribbean. Each psychiatric site had a different staff 
complement and remit. 
The Acute In-Patient Ward 
The acute ward was opened in 1981, partially replacing an old mental institution. It is 
housed in prefabricated buildings built during the war, which are attached to Treetops 
General Hospital. This was viewed initially as a temporary measure until more permanent 
accommodation was found. There are nineteen beds, eighteen for mental health cases, one 
for alcohol detoxification. All the rooms are situated off of one long main corridor. They 
are all single occupancy and patients can lock their doors from the inside (although staff 
have keys for access). There are also various larger rooms such as a dining area, lounge, 
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smoking room and activity rooms, and the acute ward links via corridors with the day unit 
and the outpatient unit where the consultants have their offices. The ward usually has full 
bed occupancy requiring careful bed management. It is an acute ward and the aim is that 
patients should be short stay. Length of stay can vary from two or three days to a year, the 
average is forty-eight days. If patients remain too unwell to go home, they may be sent to 
the residential rehabilitation hostel (Applegate), if they are too violent/dangerous then 
they are sent to a secure unit. 
In this respect it is an open ward; I was informed that the locked door and keypad entry is 
to keep people out, not in. I was also told that patients generally do not try to leave. Those 
who are compulsorily detained are informed that if they leave, staff will implement a 
missing persons order. If patients are assessed as at risk (to selves or others) and likely to 
abscond, then they may be continually observed by a nurse. The general proportion of 
admissions is 30% compulsory and 70% informal. Patients do appeal against their 
compulsory admission, to the Trust Managers or the Mental Health Review Tribunal, 
quite often and, I was told, are sometimes successful. 
There are nine to ten nursing staff on the ward split between three shifts, a manager, and 
an occupational therapist. On a day-to-day basis there is a clinical associate specialist 
(registrar) and a senior house officer on the ward. Patients also see one of the two 
consultants at the weekly ward round and can be referred to a psychologist or 
psychotherapist. A variety of occupational therapy activities take place during the day, 
e. g. healthy living group, anxiety management group, cooking, run by the occupational 
therapist (OT). There is also a "women's group" run by the OT and one of the nurses 
which, I was told, deals with "women's issues" such as "relationship problems, hormone 
replacement therapy". There is no such group for men. In addition there are drug 
treatments, electroconvulsive therapy, and psychological assessments. According to the 
ward manager, interaction between nurses and patients is "encouraged" and it is policy 
that nurses do not wear uniforms in an attempt to "break down the nurse/patient barrier". 
Frequency of CPAs on the ward varies according to "level of need" but usually a patient 
will have one CPA shortly after, admission and another prior to discharge. While the 
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weekly ward round is concerned with "managing the care" of the patient on the ward and 
looking at what needs to be done to work towards discharge, CPAs involve the 
community care team and are concerned with care after discharge. 
The Day Unit 
The Day Unit was opened in 1985 and is housed in the same prefabricated buildings as 
the ward. It is open from 8.30 a. m. until 4.30 p. m., Monday to Friday. The day unit has a 
very similar layout to the acute ward, and appears to be a 'minor-image'. There is a long 
corridor with several small rooms off of it, including a room where team meetings and the 
CPAs are usually held, a small kitchen, a waiting room for patients, a medical treatment 
room and the manager's office. At the end of the corridor there is a large activities room. 
The numbers of patients attending the day unit varies but the average is thirty. The 
number of days or hours that patients attend also varies, depending on their needs, their 
treatment plan, and "what suits them". If they are very unwell, they are "encouraged" to 
attend for all five days. If they are close to discharge, it could be only one session a week. 
Length of stay again varies with an average of two months. 
The main aim of the day unit is to provide intensive support and assessment as an 
alternative to admission. It is, like the ward, an acute service. Referrals to the unit come 
from a variety of sources such as Accident and Emergency, the ward, outpatients and the 
community mental health (CMH) crisis team. Patients may move in either direction from 
the day unit; if they deteriorate, are a harm to themselves, or cannot cope at home alone 
out of hours, they may be admitted to the acute ward. Or they become community 
patients. The day unit often works closely with the CMH crisis team to provide patients 
with the support they need. Attending the day unit is an informal arrangement but if a 
patient does not attend, and staff are "worried about them", the keyworker or a community 
psychiatric nurse will visit them at home. 
There are two junior doctors, a senior clinical nurse, two nurses, two OTs, and a manager 
at the day unit, as well as additional sessional staff.. There is an "intensive group 
programme" on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays which consists of various activity 
groups focused towards treatment, e. g. support groups, relapse prevention, assertiveness, 
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anxiety management. On the remaining days, keyworkers work with individual patients 
using different approaches such as cognitive behavioural therapy or problem solving 
approaches. Patients can also be referred to a psychotherapist or psychologist. It is a 
hospital environment and the day unit offers the same treatments as on the ward. They 
have a meeting every morning to discuss all the patients and a weekly review with one of 
the consultants when the consultant usually sees the patient. The unit also liaises with the 
community mental health team (CMHT) and the ward. 
CPAs are usually scheduled at the day unit every two to three months, either when the 
patient is shortly to be discharged, or when a patient is "difficult to manage", or the 
patient is unsure of their treatment plan or not happy about it. 
Hillcrest Community Mental Health Centre 
The Community centre was opened in 1995. Before this, social services staff were based 
in the local council offices, and community psychiatric nurses were in General 
Practitioner practices. The Centre is based in a large converted house in a residential area 
several miles from the hospital. On the ground floor there is a reception area and room for 
administrative staff, a quite small room in which the CPA meetings are held, and a much 
larger room with kitchen off, for team meetings, activity groups etc.. There is also a large 
conservatory in which artwork is laid out. On the two floors above are the offices of the 
community psychiatric nurses (CPNs) and social workers (ASW & SW). The total case 
load for Hillcrest is 370-380 cases. The average case load for CPNs is 50-60 cases, and 
for social workers is 20-30 cases. The CPNs have more cases because a proportion of 
them are "just depo injections", that is injections of medication. Actual case loads are 
determined by weighting on a points system according to the amount of work involved. 
Weighting is based on the degree of complexity, level of risk, frequency of contact and 
intensity of contact where high intensity is over one hour per contact, and high frequency 
is more than once a week. 
When I began the research at Hillcrest the staff consisted of six CPNs, one OT, one 
psychologist, one senior social worker, five ASWs, one SW, four community support 
workers, one social work student, and five administrative staff. ASW refers to 'approved' 
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social workers, that is social workers who have undertaken extra training and are qualified 
to approve a compulsory admission to hospital. However there were a number of staff 
changes while I was there and the numbers of particular types of staff fluctuated. Apart 
from visiting clients in their own homes, CMHT staff also organise group activities at the 
centre, such as a living with your beliefs group for people with delusions and 
hallucinations, relaxation, sports group, social group etc. There is also a women's group 
run at Hillcrest by two community support workers but, while I was there, no men's 
group. However, I was told that one of the consultants had approached an ASW about 
starting a men's group, which may now be running. It may well be an effect of my 
presence there, and the gender focus of my research, that led the consultant to raise this 
issue. 
I was told that group activities are a "key area" where staff can "get information" about 
clients and may pass it on to other professionals. Group activities also "reduce the stress 
on key-workers, they have to make less visits, it helps spread responsibility and weight". I 
was also informed that if "difficult" clients attend even one group activity, this is a sign of 
"improvement, they have engaged". In addition there is a charity run day centre nearby, 
the Castle, offering activities such as cookery and woodwork, and a charity drop-in centre, 
as well as a local adult education college, Down's College, which runs the usual range of 
adult education courses but has a programme for people with learning disabilities and 
mental health problems. While I was conducting research at Hillcrest, the adjoining house 
was being renovated and the intention was that the Castle would move into this building 
and, together with the CMHT, they would be able to offer more choice of activities. 
CPAs are scheduled at intervals between three to twelve months. There is a minimum 
requirement of at least one CPA per year and community patients are seen by one of the 
consultants in outpatients between CPAs, as well as having regular contact with other 
CMHT professionals. If the patient is on the supervision register, they will have a CPA at 
least every six months and will be seen at least monthly by their keyworker or consultant. 
From the meetings I attended, CPAs were scheduled every three to six months for 
community patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
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Applegate Rehabilitation Hostel 
Applegate opened in 1994 as a temporary measure when a long-stay ward in one of the 
large metropolitan hospitals, which took patients from Worthington who were "treatment 
resistant", closed. It is situated in part of a modern, purpose-built, single-storey residential 
unit for people with learning disabilities near Hillcrest. There are five bedrooms for 
residents, a staff room, and several communal rooms including two lounges (one smoking 
and one non-smoking) and two kitchens. It is surrounded by a private garden. At the time 
of the research there were six residents; two of the residents were sharing a bedroom. The 
hostel is "just about always full". Applegate caters for patients who have been on the 
acute ward for some time but cannot be discharged into the community because it is 
thought they are unable to cope. They are patients who "have a residue of symptoms and 
disastrous relationships with carers". Their length of stay can vary between one month and 
two years, the average is ten months. From Applegate, they usually move on to supported 
accommodation, either somewhere that has a resident staff member or a housing 
association house with a visiting housing support worker. Some may return to their family 
home but this is rare because of previous marital or family conflict. 
Staffing at Applegate consists of two managers, two nurses, two psychiatric nurses and 
one support nurse, providing twenty-four hour cover. Social workers from Hillcrest are 
also involved in residential patients' care, particularly in facilitating the move on to 
supported accommodation. The aims of the hostel are "closely identified with social 
psychiatry". Treatment comes partly from the "milieu"; patients have to get along with 
each other and do their own cooking and shopping. At the same time staff "encourage" 
patients to "self-medicate" and teach them the skills they need to recover and live in the 
community, such as cooking. Patients can "come and go as they please" from the hostel 
but they are "strongly encouraged to announce their movements" through an in/out book 
and daily morning "activity" meetings. Most patients referred to the hostel are on full 
CPA, and there is a requirement of one CPA every six months. 
The residential hostel was due for closure soon after I completed the research. I was told 
that this was due to fiscal pressures. A housing association supported accommodation 
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facility was being built by the borough, although this would not provide the same level of 
support as Applegate, leaving "a service deficit for a while". 
286 
Appendix III 
Interview Schedule - In-Patient Ward 
Section 1- Ward 
l. When was the ward opened? 
Was it a replacement for other facilities? 
2. How many staff are there on the ward? 
What is their professional background? 
3. How many beds are provided here? 
Are they all single rooms? 
Are they usually all occupied? 
Who has final responsibility for the use of beds? 
What is the general proportion of formal and informal patients? 
4. How variable are patients' lengths of stay? 
How are they referred to you? 
What happens if a patient has been on the ward some time and they are not 
recovering? Are they moved to a longer stay unit? 
5. What kinds of treatment and activities are offered here? 
Section 2- CPAs 
1. How often do ward rounds occur? 
Do the consultants/Drs. see everyone every time? 
Do patients see a consultant or doctor at other times? 
2. What does the CPA achieve that cannot be done on the ward round? 
3. How often is a patient likely to have a CPA while they are on the ward? 
Section 3- General questions 
1. What kind of rules or guidelines are there for visitors? 
2. Given that many patients here are formal admissions: 
How are they prevented from leaving - the locked door seems more to keep people 
out than in? Containment? Monitoring? 
Are patients able to lock their bedroom doors from the inside? 
How do you cope with patients who are or may be violent? 
Do patients ever get moved from here to more secure units? 
Do many patients appeal against their formal admission? How successful are they? 
Do you ever get problems with male patients pestering female patients? 
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Care Programme Approach Screening Document 
A client's Care Programme Approach may be either FULL or MINIMAL. This form should be used to 





POSTCODE DATE OF BIRTH 
Indicate as appropriate if the client meets any of the following criteria: 
Clients who are admitted or who are resident in the community and may be 
vulnerable without a full health and social needs care plan YES/NO 
Place a tick in the appropriate box if you have answered "YES" above 
" Clients who have had more than one admission to hospital within the 
past year Q 
Clients requiring in excess of two professional visits per week Q 
" Clients with a chronic mental illness requiring continuing specialist Q 
community support and who may live alone with no identified carer 
" Clients with mental health needs requiring multi-professional input Q 
" Clients who meet the criteria for the supervision register Q 
Client is subject to Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Yes / No 
Client is being discharged following an admission of at least 6 months. Yes I No 
Clients whom a Multi-professional team member deems potentially appropriate Yes I No 
for the Full CPA, but does not meet any of the above criteria. 
Please specify the reason 
IF ANY OF THE ABOVE CRITERIA HAVE BEEN CIRCLED YES, THE CLIENT REQUIRES A FULL 
CPA. IF ALL OF THE ABOVE HAVE BEEN CIRCLED NO, A MINIMAL CPA IS REQUIRED. 
Occasions may arise when a client does meet the full CPA criteria, but only a minimal CPA Is 
required. If this is the case please indicate a minimal CPA below with an explanation in the 
box underneath. 
Please tick the box for the CPA level required: 
FULL CPA Q MINIMAL CPA Q 
Assessors Signature Date 
Assessor's Name 
Service Area: Outpatients Q Inpatient Q Day Hospital Q Social Services Q 




FULL CARE PROGRAMME APPROACH/SECTION 117 
OF THE 
MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983 

















Community Psychiatric Nurse 




Community Support Worker 
Case Manager 
Voluntary Services 






Rescreened for minimal CPA YES 13 NO 0 
IS THIS PATIENT SUBJECT TO SECTION 117 of NIHA 1983: YES/NO 
IS THIS PATIENT ON THE SUPERVISION REGISTER : YES/NO 
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OVERALL PROGRESS SINCE LAST CPA 
Comments 
HoNOS Score Sheet 
Rate 9 if not known or not applicable MDT C 
[1] Overactive. agresssrve. disruptive behaviour 0 12 3 4-1 1( 1 
(21 Non-accidental self injury 0123 4-[ 1[ 1 
(3] Problem-diming or drug taking 01234. ( ](1 
(4] Cognitive problems 0123 3-[ J( J 
(51 Physical illness or disability problems 0 12 3 4. (][] 
(6] Problems with hallucinations or delusions 01 234. (I(] 
(7] Problems with depressed mood 01 234-(J(I 
[8] Outer Mental & Behavioural Problems 01234-(I(I 
(specify disorder, A. B. C, D. E. F, GA IA ] 
[91 Problems with Relationships 0 12 3 4. (](] 
(10] Problems with activities of daily living 012 3 4- [J[1 
[11] Problems with living conditions 01 234-(J[J 
(12] Problems with occupation & activities J[J 01234. ( 
Any stem score of 3 or more should be 
TOTAL SCORE >>> addressed by thorough assessment & 
using appropriate tools and 
interventions 
Crisis contact: Out of Hours 
Kevworker Namen Tele hone Number Bleep 
GP TeLNo: 
Emergency Duty Social WYorkr TeLNo 
j 
l Derv Psychiasr st TeLNo: 
Keyworker Signature. Date: 
1 Client Signature: Dare. 
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CPA Rick Assessment Form - nny To SumvisioM&,. t 
Positive answers sborld be documented aid espeaded OverhaL A dhieal Jtwlgsmast w® be auch about 
ptaeiog the patient at to the Sapervidoa regte er. the Bwüºeod ISermhg with the camber of "yes- 
REPORM& 
Because it is the Consultants final decision to place the patient on the register or not, the Consultant will be 
responsible for signing and ensuring the full and correct completion of this form. 
Patient Name : Psymon No. . _. History 
Is there a previous history of violence (with potentially serious or fatal consequences, self harm or self neglect). 
Yes 0 No 0 
Is them a diagnosis of : Tick as appropriate 
- Schizophrenia Yes O No Q 
- Severe depression Yes O No Q 
- Morbid jealousy or erotomania Yes O No O 
- in addition to main diagnosis is there 
a history of substance misuse Yes 0 No 0 
Social Factors 
Has the patient experienced : Tick as appropriate 
- Recent loss of family support Yes 0 No Q 
- Recent deterioration in personal relationships Yes 0 No Q 
- Recent loss of accommodation Yes C No O 
Is there a lack of supportive relationships Yes O No C 
" Frequent changes of address, 
employment or partner Yes 0 No O 
Clinical Factors 
Are there : 
- Threats of violence or self harm Yes O No Q 
- Presence of active symptoms 
eg. command hallucinations, paranoid delusions Yes Q No O 
- Any signs of relapse Yes O No Q 
Management Factors 
In considering future management 
- Is the patient non-compliant with treatment regime Yes 0 No 
- Have attempts to engage engage the patient 
in a therapeutic relationship been unsucsesssfitl Yes 0 No O 
- Is there a history of deterioration without warning Yes O No O 
. Has the patient recently been 
discharged from hospital Yes 13 No O 
Stability 
In considenng the patients stability 
- Have any of the risk factors identified above 
deteriorated recently Yes Q No Q 
" Is the patient unpredictable Yes 0 No O 
- Has any improvement occured only in recent weeks Yes Q No Q 
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Any additionai commas : 
Gtegory Of Risk Ca rently Applicable : 
To Others Yes O No O 
SelfHarm Yes O No0 
Seif-eeglca Yes 0 No0 












IS THE PATIENT TO BE PUT ON TO THE SUPERVISION REGISTER 
YES 0 NO p 
Name 
Cont. Signawra .-..... _» _ _. _... 
Date ..... _...... _...... -.. »....... »...... _ý..... 
N. B. I) Keep this form in the patients notes 




Advi::: ce One or more colons indicate extension of prior sound; the more colons, the 
greater the extension. 
Hhh Marks laughter; proportionately as for colons. 
Did you? Question marks signal an upward questioning intonation, but not 
necessarily a grammatical question mark. 
Underline Indicates words or parts of words emphasised by speakers. 
[Overlap] Square brackets show the beginning and end of overlapping speech. 
((to Natalie)) Double parentheses contain comments from the transcriber. 
(1.5) Length of pause in tenths of a second. 
(. ) Micropause which is noticeable but less than one tenth of a second. 
[. ] Untimed pause in "notes only" transcriptions. 
= Marks no discernible gap between the end of one speaker's turn and the 
beginning of the next turn. 
°Quieter° Degree signs enclose speech that is quieter than the surrounding talk. 
LOUDER Words or parts of words which are capitalised show speech that is 
louder than the surrounding talk. 
>Faster< Enclose speeded up talk. 
(Doubtful) Single parentheses contain words and phrases that the transcriber is unsure 
about. Empty brackets indicate talk that is inaudible. 
house... help Three full stops indicate material that has been omitted either for reasons 
of brevity or because talk was missed during note-taking in'notes only' 
meetings. 
**** Four stars denote the name of medication. 
The original line numbering of transcripts is reproduced in the extracts to give the reader a 
sense of where the extract occurred in the meeting as a whole. 
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Background Analysis of Intra-Professional Relations: Articulating and 
Managing Professional Domains 
The number of professionals attending CPA meetings can vary from as many as eight 
professionals to as few as two, and areas of expertise range from consultant psychiatrists, 
psychiatrists, registrars and junior doctors, through psychiatric nurses, approved social 
workers, community support workers and housing support workers, to occupational 
therapists and managers. Professionals arrive at meetings with pre-designated roles and 
areas of expertise accorded to them, enshrined in their professional titles, but in coming 
together and negotiating decisions about patients' futures, different domains of expertise 
are also accomplished, managed and ranked within these interactions. The following 
analysis provides a background understanding of CPA meetings in terms of how 
professionals constitute and manage intra-professional relations interactionally within 
meetings. 
Differentiating Domains: The "mental" and the "social" 
The most basic differentiation between professional domains occurs at the level of the 
"mental" and the "social". Given the seeming "obviousness" of the distinction between the 
social and mental domains of expertise, it is perhaps surprising that professionals 
articulate this differentiation at all. In the first extract Sarah, a community psychiatric 
nurse (CPN), establishes her professional identity and differentiates her domain from that 
of Betty, a community support worker (CSW). 
Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane 
377 Sarah (CPN): so the care plan that we have at the moment is:: that your depo will be 
378 reduced to every three weeks so I'll come round every three weeks to 
379 do that and also to monitor your mental state [make sure] you're alright 
380 Diane: [yes right ] 
381 Sarah (CPN): and also I can check out see how you're getting on with your 
382 medication 
383 Diane: the new medication yeah 
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384 Sarah (CPN): um (. ) activities in the community Bettys gonna try (. ) to get you to the 
385 womens group 
Sarah provides a three-part list of her responsibilities, she will "come round every three 
weeks" to do the depo, "and also to monitor your mental state", "and also I can check out 
... your medication" (lines 378-382). In the process she establishes 
her professional 
identity as a community psychiatric nurse (CPN) which is reinforced by her use of 
medico-psychiatric language ("depo", "monitor", "mental state" and "medication"), 
although she amends "monitor your mental state" to "make sure you're alright", and 
"check out" to "see how you're getting on". In making these amendments Sarah succeeds 
in founding her professional domain whilst at the same time diminishing the force of 
supervisory discourses of monitoring and checking out, a theme I have discussed in 
chapter three. She goes on to differentiate her domain from Betty's, the community 
support worker (CSW), in a contrast between her medical mental domain and a social 
one, "activities in the community". And whilst Sarah's responsibilities are couched in 
terms of medical administrations and surveillance, Betty's are framed more in terms of 
encouragement and persuasion ("try (. ) to get you to", line 384) providing further 
differentiation. 
However, in the next extract it becomes clear that what constitutes a site of mental or 
social intervention is not always so clear-cut and is open to negotiation and reformulation. 
Nicola, the patient, has an on-going problem with noisy neighbours and Alan, the CPN, 
has been attempting to help her resolve the matter with her housing association. Alan's 
opening statement is related to the fact that he is leaving and another professional will be 
taking over from him. In this sense the "we" is not referring to himself but formulating the 
necessity for his successor and Dr. North to take the problem seriously. In a contrast 
between "support" and "helping", and "forgotten" (lines 371-2), Alan is countering a 
previous implication by Dr. North that the noisy neighbours may not be as serious or 
intentional as Nicola and Alan have claimed. At this point the doctor raises the possibility 
that this is more the domain of a social worker, rather than a CPN. 
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Meeting 5 (main meeting) : Nicola 
371 Alan (CPN): I'll be quite clear that I think its impo:: rtant that we (. ) um support you 
372 in helping to pursue the issue around the noise and its not (. ) °forgotten 
373 about er° 
374 Dr. N.: so is there a social worker angle to it at all? 
375 Alan (CPN): well ((sighs))= 
376 Dr. N.: =is Rose Turquoise still involved? = 
377 Alan (CPN): =no no um and >I I think that that thats< what we've actually been 
378 ging to do is to to highline the (. ) potential health risks (. ) er to to 
379 Nicola in the event that the matter is is not resolved 
380 Dr. N.: ya= 
381 Alan (CPN): =and it seems as though we've got a little bit further by using that 
382 rather than just er using it as [a social issue ] 
383 Dr. N.: [oh I think that yes] yes well I think thats 
384 right the health risk is there (. ) °yes yes° they ought to be more 
385 sympathetic 
The doctor's introduction of a social worker elicits a noncommittal response from Alan 
and his sigh at line 375 could be read either as a weary response to an argument he has 
heard before, or that perhaps a social worker could do it but has not. Dr. North continues 
to press the "social" by citing a named person together with the implication that a social 
worker has been "involved" in the past (line 376). But Alan responds with an argument 
that it is a "potential health risk" to Nicola (line 378), resituating the problem from the 
social realm back into the mental domain. This is followed up with a small and careful 
claim ("we've got a little bit further", line 381) in a contrast between what has been 
achieved from a health risk perspective rather than a "social issue" one. Although this 
claim is formulated carefully, in that the problem has not yet been resolved, Alan is 
founding the notion not only that the ostensibly social (as in a housing issue) can in fact 
be medical/mental, but also suggesting an order of gravity in which the medical/mental 
outweighs, or adds weight to, social factors ("just... a social issue", line 382) - an argument 
which receives the doctor's wholehearted support. 
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This preliminary analysis suggests that discursive differentiations between the "mental" 
and the "social" are routinely formulated by professionals and can be deployed to 
establish and differentiate professional identities and responsibilities, to (re)situate 
problems and thus interventions in one area of professional expertise rather than another, 
and to prioritise one professional domain over another. However, professional domains 
are also articulated and differentiated in terms of levels of expertise that cut across simple 
distinctions between the "mental" and the "social" and provide more explicit gradations. 
Ranking Expertise: "someone who knows what they're doing" and "ultra-therapeutic" 
In the following extracts professional domains are differentiated in ways that are not 
straightforwardly "mental" or "social". Rather, domains are constituted in terms of levels 
of expertise in which some professionals "know" more than others and provide better 
therapeutic value for the patient. In the first extract, Natasha is in a relationship with 
another patient, Laurence, and she is pregnant. During the main meeting she has raised 
issues about needing different accommodation and the dilemma of whether she should 
move in with Laurence or not. Also during the main meeting the consultant has raised the 
possibility of whether a social worker should be involved, framed as her preference, 
which has been blocked by Julia the CPN, and the consultant raises the issue again in the 
post-meeting. In the sequence preceding this one, the CPN has again attempted to block 
the consultant by claiming that it is "a child and families problem... and the child and 
families social workers don't come in until the childs... actually born". The extract begins 
with the doctor framing her disagreement to the CPN's claim. 
Meeting 12 (post-meeting) : Natasha 
766 Dr. S.: yes but I think I mean we don't actually I >don't think we have to< 
767 automatically bring them in 
768 Julia (CPN): right yeah 
769 Dr. S.: cos I mean if shes coping fi:: ne then there won't be a problem but I 
770 suspect we need probably a social worker (0.9) checking that out= 
771 Julia (CPN): =yeah 
772 Dr. S.: so its a matter of what point (. ) whether we ask Celia Beige (. ) to think 
773 about the accommodation but you see I don't think its fair for Celia cos 
774 Celias only a housing worker= 
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775 Julia (CPN): 





781 Julia (CPN): 
782 Dr. S.: 
783 Julia (CPN): 






a support worker I don't think shes gonna be ab it doesn't sound as if 
Natasha confides in her (1.4) in terms of the nuances of this 
relationship I mean obviously from the report she doesn't know (. ) but I 
think its going to be quite subtle as to (0.8) y'know I think shes gonna 
need quite a bit of counselling 
yeah 
in terms of whether she does want to move in shes very uncertain 
yeah 
um and I'm not sure who should be doing that III think it >probably 
should be one of the social workers< (0.8) unless you feel you want to 
do it (5.0) but I think it we can't just say to Celia (1.0) go for getting a 
different cou:: nselling I mean I think >theres gonna be< there needs to 
be someone who knows what they're doing 
The doctor frames her disagreement carefully. She begins by making the problem 
contingent, "if shes coping. .. there won't 
be a problem", rather than "automatic", however 
this works as a disclaimer as the doctor goes on to found the likelihood that it will be a 
problem. This is also formulated carefully in terms of "suspect" and "probably" (line 770) 
but nonetheless founds the claim that a social worker will be necessary, with the social 
worker's role articulated in terms of supervision and assessment, "checking that out" (line 
770). Up to this point the talk has concerned assessing Natasha's ability to mother but now 
the consultant brings in Celia Beige, a professional already assigned to Natasha, and 
begins to reformulate the problem. In another disclaimer Celia is brought in as someone 
who could "think about the accommodation" (lines 772-3) but is raised in order to be 
dismissed. Dr. South frames Celia as unsuitable for the job. Firstly it is not "fair" because 
she is "only a housing worker... a support worker" (lines 773-6) suggesting that it is too 
much to expect of Celia, given her (low) level of professional expertise, followed by an 
unfinished claim that such a level of expertise is insufficient, "I don't think shes gonna be 
ab" (line 776). The doctor then goes on to undermine the relationship between Celia and 
Natasha; Natasha does not "confide" in Celia, evidenced by the fact that Celia "doesn't 
know" Natasha is pregnant (lines 777-8). 
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The doctor finishes by reformulating what is required; it is no longer a question of 
checking out Natasha's ability to mother but rather "subtle... counselling" (lines 779-80), to 
decide whether she should move in with Laurence, and Dr. South brings in Natasha to 
support this reformulation, "shes very uncertain" (line 782). The doctor's reformulation of 
the problem is probably a pre-emptive move to prevent Julia blocking her again. Finally, 
the consultant moves back to her original claim but it is framed extremely carefully, "I'm 
not sure", "I think it probably" (line 784). Now Julia is presented with a fixed choice; 
either we get a social worker or you do it. The pause (five seconds) at line 786 is 
significant; Dr. South waits for Julia's response but when she does not respond the doctor 
is left to work further at her argument, reiterating her claim that Celia is not suitable for 
the job, and finishing with the assertion that it has to be done by a professional with 
sufficient level of expertise, "someone who knows what they're doing" (line 788). The 
doctor has worked up the problem to the point where the only real option is a social 
worker, and "we can't just say to Celia" (line 786) positions Julia with the doctor on a 
level of professional expertise that positions Celia on the other side of a professional 'us 
and them' divide. 
In the above extract professional domains are differentiated by levels of expertise that are 
not straightforwardly "mental" or "social". In this case "counselling" could be undertaken 
by a social worker or a CPN but what is made distinctive is that it should be by "someone 
who knows what they're doing", that is someone with a sufficient level of expertise. It is 
also apparent that the consultant does not consider that she should provide this 
counselling, suggesting further differentiations and gradations. 
Differentiating domains through levels of expertise can also be articulated in terms of 
therapeutic value for the patient. In the following extract the professionals are discussing 
the previous care plan for Christine, the patient, where it had been "agreed" that Christine 
would attend the beliefs group at the community centre. Claire, the CPN, has been 
explaining to Dr. North that Christine had attended ' for a while but "had trouble with her 
car", "then she went on holiday" and subsequently "just lapsed from it" (text not included 
here). At the start of this extract, Dr. North is attempting to obtain the professionals' 
agreement ("shouldn't we just say" line 162) in a rhetoric of argument construction that "if 
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shes going to go anywhere" then "this is what she should go to" (lines 162-3), suggesting 
that it does not matter what the reasons were, it is important that Christine should go to 
this group (out of "anywhere" this is the one thing she should attend) and they should all 
agree. 
Meeting 1 (pre-meeting) : Christine 
162 Dr. N.: well shouldn't we just say well if shes going to go anywhere this is 
163 what she should go (. ) to I mean could you maybe fit it in with your 
164 visits and sort of bring her >here or something because otherwise< 
165 shes having things that are ni:: ce but (0.6) er maybe SEMI-therapeutic 
166 but the sort of ultra-therapeutic thing of the (0.5) rg ou:: p shes not 
167 actually getting to 
168 Jane (CSW): what day is it on now Claire? 
169 Claire (CPN): its still on a Thursday but you'll have to check with Sarah () 
170 because I know () 
171 Dr. N.: so maybe you could combine that with bringing her here and then 
172 maybe () having a cup of coffee afterwards and then a chat or a stroll 
173 or whatever 
174 Jane (CSW): yeah possibly depending on whether I've already got something I 
175 regularly do on [tha:: t] 
176 Claire (CPN): [yeah ] 
Having established that this is the most important activity for Christine, the doctor moves 
to enlist the help of Jane, the CSW, to "bring her" followed by a damning contrast 
between what is of real value, "ultra-therapeutic", and a much less valuable alternative, 
"SEMI-therapeutic" (lines 165-6). The emphasis on each differentiation adds force to the 
contrast between something pleasurable ("nice") and something really important. And the 
pause and "maybe" between "nice" and "semi-therapeutic" implies it barely counts as 
therapy at all. The contrast is set up in such a way that it is clear which is the preferred 
alternative and in the process the beliefs group, and by implication the professionals 
involved in it, is framed as highly professional and expert in delivering ultra-therapy 
whereas Jane's domain ("your visits", lines 153-4) is formulated as barely, reaching the 
level of professional expertise. 
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Jane does not engage with the consultant but instead puts a practical question to Claire 
which suggests that she is considering the doctor's suggestion. Although some of the talk 
is inaudible here, it would seem that Claire is raising possible organisational constraints, 
signalled by the "but", and then bringing in someone who is not present but needs to be 
consulted. However, Dr. North ignores Claire and reiterates her argument reinforcing the 
insubstantiality of what Jane does in a three-part list of "a chat or a stroll or whatever" 
(lines 172-3). The first two list items suggest the sort of activities one might engage in 
with a friend (rather than a professional) and convey little sense of expertise or therapy, 
while the third item, as a generalised list completer, implies both that there are many more 
equally insubstantial activities and that these are something of a mystery to the doctor. In 
this way the doctor constitutes Jane's domain as a low level of expertise in order to further 
her plan for Christine; Jane could "combine" something useful and therapeutic with 
"whatever" it is she does. 
Jane attempts to refurnish her professional role by implying that it is contingent upon her 
other obligations and commitments, "possibly depending on whether I've already got 
something I regularly do" (lines 174-5). In turn, Claire's response at line 176 supports 
Jane's status as someone who does do valuable work which cannot be changed at the drop 
of a hat. It indicates that professional alliances may be formed which constitute domains 
that cut across both the mental and the social, and levels of expertise: in this case a 
differentiation, based on geographical location, between the hospital-based consultant and 
the community-based community mental health team. 
Therefore, the discourses of the "mental" and the "social", "someone who knows what 
they're doing" and "ultra-therapeutic" articulate, differentiate, prioritise and, in the case of 
the latter two, rank professional domains within interactions. Through these discourses, 
professional identities and responsibilities are established, and problems and interventions 
situated. But what constitutes a domain can be open to negotiation and professional 
alliances can cut across mental/social differentiations and levels " of expertise. The 
differentiation of professional domains is further accomplished through articulations of a 
chain of mediation. 
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Articulations of Chains of Mediation, Authority and Status: "tell Sarah and you can let me 
know" and "I usually say ring Claire" 
Chains of mediation between patients and professionals are articulated within meetings in 
such a way that professional responsibilities are accomplished and differentiated. In turn, 
differentiated responsibilities implicate a chain of authority; professionals do not have 
equal access to activities of supervising, informing, knowing etc.. The distribution of 
"status" and "competence" amongst professionals (Rose 1986b: 209), and thus who has 
authority over whom, is formulated at a broader level of discourse outside these meetings 
and this institution, and is reproduced and represented in designations such as 'doctor', 
'nurse' and 'support worker'. However, responsibilities, authority and status are also 
accomplished and managed interactively within meetings. In order to establish that this is 
the case, I have removed identifying designations in the extracts that follow. In the first 
extract, participants are discussing the problem of side effects from the patient's 
medication. The extract begins with "A" formulating the problem as a source of concern 
("what concerns me") which both works to frame it as a matter for professional concern 
and presents the speaker as a concerned professional. 
Meeting 2 (main meeting) : Diane (**** denotes name of medication) 
416 A: what concerns me is the side effects because I can see you've got it (. ) 
417 and that is a problem (. ) um and we can't ignore it 
418 B: yeah= 
419 A: =so y'know C really you need to keep an eye on that to make sure it 
420 doesn't get worse but it gets bette:: r u:: m (. ) so I mean hopefully with 
421 the injection cut down to three weekly you'll be doing just as we:: ll but 
422 the side effect will be less but I I'll wait to hear about that from C 
423 [but I] 
424 C: [yes we] had a discussion already about the **** when I noticed the 
425 shaking= 
426 A: =yeah 
427 B: yeah I mean sometimes even after my tablet C sometimes it's rea:: lly 
428 A: well I think if it's ba:: d I mean tell C and= 
429 B: =yes= 
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430 A: =and you can let me kno:: w 
"A" goes on to embed the "problem" in a three-part list of "I can see you've got it (. ) and 
that is a problem (. ) um and we can't ignore it" (lines 416-7). The positioning of items in 
the list enables "A" to shift the topic from her personal concern and naming as a problem, 
to a more collective responsibility. Her move from "I" to "we" ("can't ignore it") becomes 
clearer at line 419 when (some of) the responsibility is placed on "C". In framing it as "C" 
who "really you need to keep an eye on that", the implication is that C either did not see it, 
did not think it was a problem or ignored it. This reading is supported by "C"'s response in 
the form of a counter-claim, which she interrupts "A" to make, that she did see it ("when I 
noticed"), she knew it was a problem and she did not ignore it, "we had a discussion. 
already" (lines 424-5). At the same time, "A" lays out "C"'s professional responsibility as 
supervision in two contrasts between "get worse" and "gets bette:: r", and between "doing 
just as we:: 11" and "the side effect will be less". "A" finishes this sequence with a caveat 
"but I'll wait to hear about that from "C" (line 422) which establishes a chain of 
supervision and mediation which flows from "C" to "A"; "C" "needs" to supervise the 
effects of the medication and "make sure" there is improvement and "A" will "wait" to be 
informed about the patient's progress from "C". 
At this point B re-enters the conversation implying that "C" did have a discussion with her 
about taking the medication but also, perhaps, that that was not sufficient, "even" (line 
428). "A" uses "B"'s intervention to reinforce the chain of responsibility and mediation, 
"tell C and... you can let me kno:: w" (lines 428-30), in which "B" tells "C" and "C" tells 
"A". In this way a chain of mediation is established with "B" at one end, "A" at the other 
and "C" as the mediator between the two. In turn, different responsibilities are also 
established: "B" is responsible for informing "C" "if its ba:: d"; "C" is responsible for 
supervising the effects of the medication, making sure it gets better rather than worse and 
informing "A" of any progress or deterioration; "A" is responsible for "know"-ing, but not 
for actively pursuing that knowledge ("I'll wait to hear about that"), with the implication 
that she is also responsible for making adjustments to the medication. 
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From this we can see that who tells, who keeps an eye on and makes sure and who waits 
to hear and needs to know is accomplished and differentiated within the interaction. As 
such, the participants do not have equal access to the activities and responsibilities of 
informing, supervising and knowing. "B" only informs, "C" supervises and informs, but 
"A" needs to know. Thus the chain of mediation also implicates a chain of authority from 
"B" to "C" to "A". Moreover, the accomplishment of this chain of authority is reinforced 
by who ascribes and delegates responsibilities within the interaction; throughout this 
sequence it is "A" who establishes this 'right'. In addition, what is not apparent from the 
extract itself is that there is another professional, "D", present in the meeting who has 
regular contact with the patient. But "D" is excluded, by absence, from the chain of 
mediation and authority altogether. 
The chain of mediation constituted within interactions can also implicate differentiations 
of status. In the next extract I continue with the same identifiers of "A", "B", "C" and "D" 
which designate the same kinds of roles, although the actual participants may differ. In 
this extract the professionals have been having a discussion about the need to get the 
patient out of the house to take part in activities at the community centre. In the sequence 
immediately preceding this, "A" has suggested that the patient is "dependent" on the 
professionals evidenced by the fact that "she rings me" (text not included here). However, 
the emphasis on "me" suggests that it may be inappropriate for a patient to telephone "A" 
and signals a turn in the conversation. 
Meeting I (pre-meeting) : Christine 
329 A: she sort of rings me up (0.6) often (. ) well >most of the time< she 
330 doesn't get through to me but she gets through to Sandra and says oh 
331 y'know I've got to (0.5) speak its very important and its usually 
332 something y'know quite psychotic that she has to convey (1.1) but 
333 y'know she seems not to have (. ) anyone else to turn to (4.0) 
334 C: well she does that (. ) to all of us I think I get 
335 D: you get the phone calls [too ] 
336 A: [you] get them as well well I usually say ring C 
337 hhh 
338 C: that's probably what it is hhhh 
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339 A: well I mean I've learnt that its never I mean its sort of presented as 
340 y'know a terribly urgent (. ) problem and when I have spoken to her its 
341 just been the usual thing of can I come into hospital please because I 
342 think I need a rest (1.3) 
343 C: hh 
"A" begins by reiterating that Christine rings her, followed by the assertion that usually 
Christine speaks to someone else, not her, "she doesn't get through to me but she gets 
through to Sandra". The claim together with the emphases sets up the notion that "A" is 
important enough to have someone who screens her calls and too important to take calls 
from patients. The use of verbatim reporting gives her narrative an immediacy and 
veracity and the notion that it is "usually something... quite psychotic that she has to 
convey" (lines 331-2) appears to be founding the, perhaps surprising, inference that 
Christine only talks nonsense and it is a waste of time. The closing segment, "she seems 
not to have (. ) anyone else to turn to" (line 333) is double-edged; on one hand it supports 
her previous argument that Christine's mother is not sufficiently supportive (text not 
included here) and Christine is dependent on the professionals. But it also implies that if 
Christine is phoning her, then the other professionals are not being sufficiently supportive 
and perhaps are not doing their jobs properly: "anyone else" covers Christine's Mum and 
the other professionals. The long pause at the end suggests she expects a response from 
the other professionals. 
"U's response is in the form of a counter claim; her use of the extreme formulation "all of 
us" (line 334) counters the equally extreme "anyone else" and reformulates it as a problem 
for all the professionals, suggesting it is not a case of not doing their job. "D" enters the 
discussion here, supporting "C"'s formulation. However, "A" interrupts "D" to found a 
chain of mediation, "I usually say ring "C"" (line 336). "A"'s laughter and "C"'s response, 
"thats probably what it is" (line 338), followed by more laughter, lightens and defuses a 
potentially contentious exchange regarding who is, and is not, meeting their professional 
responsibilities. However, the shared laughter and exchange between "A" and "C" also 
excludes and discursively dismisses "W's claim that she gets calls as well. Finally "A" 
provides a further narrative with more verbatim reporting which reiterates her claim that 
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speaking to Christine is a waste of time, but this time the narrative is used to make a joke 
at Christine's expense. In formulating that it is "never... a terribly gent problem" it is 
"just" that she wants to come into "hospital" for "a rest" (lines 339-42), more nonsense on 
Christine's part it would seem, "A" restores the professional consensus. In this extract, a 
similar sort of chain of mediation and responsibility is established in which "A" should 
not be responsible for taking phone calls from patients, "C" is responsible for doing so 
and "D" is excluded. This time, the chain of mediation implicates and differentiates 
professional statuses; "A" is too high status to take patients' calls while, it is implied, "D" 
is not of sufficient professional status. And again, it is "A" who accomplishes and ascribes 
the chain of mediation and differentiations of status. 
Therefore chains of mediation and responsibility are discursively accomplished in 
meetings in such a way that a chain of authority is implicated and professional status is 
differentiated. It is not entirely surprising that "A" signifies "doctor", "B" patient, "C" 
community psychiatric nurse (and in other meetings social worker) and "D" community 
support worker. In effect, a chain of mediation is established which positions the doctor at 
one end, CPNs and ASWs between the doctor and the patient and CSWs are excluded. 
Furthermore, a chain of authority and status is also established in which: doctors need to 
know but do not directly supervise patients or take their phone calls; CPNs and ASWs 
supervise patients, inform the doctor of progress and take calls from patients; and CSWs 
are discounted. While such a chain of authority and status might be expected, given that 
relations between professionals are formulated at a broader level of discourses, the 
analysis suggests that professional authority and status also has to be accomplished and 
managed discursively and interactively within the meetings. It may become particularly 
salient when professional responsibility is framed as an issue. Doctors seem to invoke and 
deploy the chain of mediation and authority, and differentiations of status to attribute 
blame for a problematic - state of affairs to other professionals (e. g. side effects, 
inappropriate phone calls), while at the same time retaining ultimate authority and 
responsibility themselves. 
That CSWs are excluded' from the chain of mediation might be the most surprising 
outcome, given that they often have more contact with patients than the other 
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professionals. For example it might be thought that they would be positioned as mediators 
between the CPNs/ASWs and the patient. However this is not to say that CSWs are 
excluded from making judgments and contributing knowledge about patients within 
meetings. In the final part of this section, I turn to the ways in which professionals warrant 
their accounts in meetings, perhaps the most subtle way in which professionals 
differentiate their domains and status. 
Warranting Accounts : Opinion, Situational Knowledge and Reported Speech 
Warranting is a discursive device which speakers employ to justify the authenticity and 
veracity of their claims. Edwards & Potter (1992: 68) describe warranting as 
"accomplishments in the rhetoric of truth-telling". They suggest, for example, that a 
plethora of 'facts' and details may warrant an account and conceal contentious aspects of 
the narrative. Or the 'truth' of a statement can be warranted by "category entitlement" (pg. 
160), that is the category membership of the speaker who is presumed to possess certain 
areas of knowledge. In their analysis of Chancellor Lawson's memory they identify a 
range of warrants such as appeals to records, highly-coloured and detailed memories, 
independent sources and witnesses. In this section I use the notion of warranting to 
explore further the ways in which professionals differentiate their domains through 
strategies for warranting the truth and accuracy of their accounts. 
The use of "I think" preceding an opinion or judgment is routine within meetings in that 
everyone (including patients) uses it, but doctors use it to a far greater extent than other 
participants and more often in some sequences than others. In the first extract the 
conversation has been preceded by a long sequence in which Mrs. Peach (the patient's 
mother) has been complaining about the volume of medication Ian, the patient, is on and 
the fact that it is not very effective. The extract begins with Mrs. Peach mounting a direct 
attack on Dr. North's professional expertise by bringing in another doctor. 
Meeting 16 (main meeting) : Ian 
498 Mrs. Peach: he was doing very well (. ) Dr. Orange at the other place a ma::: rvellous 




500 know things can happen y'know er er er (0.7) his illness () but she sent 
501 him out of there () as good as gold (1.3) it was just right the aftercare 
502 brilliant everything (. ) you know and it was sad that it we tried to 
503 experiment if you like 
504 Dr. N.: we:: ll but >1 don't think< I don't think its its been a total failure because 
505 I think we've gotta listen to what Ian says and he says it does give him 
506 a clearer mi::: nd and I think that thats thats something worth havi:: ng 
507 () um I think its hard for [someone] 
The expertise of the other doctor, Dr. Orange, is formulated by Mrs. Peach in two 
three-part lists. The first list suggests a representative description of a caring and expert 
doctor as the list items move from the kind of person the doctor was, to her careful 
approach and the outcome for Ian, "ma::: rvellous lady (. ) and she took the time (. ) and got 
it 'lust right for him" (lines 498-9). The second list is deployed to support her claim that 
Ian was "as good as gold" after treatment from this doctor. The first item reiterates the last 
item of the previous list, creating a link between the two lists, and is accompanied by a 
further extreme formulation and a generalized list completer which suggests that there 
were many more praiseworthy and positive results for Ian, "it was just right the aftercare 
brilliant everything" (lines 501-2). Sandwiched between these lists is a disclaimer, "I 
know things can happen... his illness (. ) but.. " (lines 499-500) which makes her claim 
sound more reasonable but nevertheless founds the accusation that Dr. North is not 
marvellous and has not done these things. Her closing salvo, "experiment" (line 503), not 
only suggests tinkering with something that should have been left alone, but also implies 
that Dr. North did not really know what she was doing. The "we" seems to be an attempt 
to soften what is a strong accusation, bolstered by extreme formulations such as 
"marvellous", "just right" and "brilliant". 
Dr. North's response begins with a signal of disagreement ("we:: ll but") but her spluttering 
(">I don't think< I don't think its its", line 504) suggests she has been taken somewhat by 
surprise and is having trouble framing her counter-claim. However she goes on to name 
(and shame? ) what Mrs. Peach has implied but is loath to say outright, "total failure", 
countering with an equally extreme formulation. She then invokes Ian to challenge Mrs. 
Peach's definition of well, counterposing "good as gold" with "clearer mi::: nd" (line 506) 
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together with the suggestion that she listens to Ian, implying perhaps that Mrs. Peach does 
not, "we've gotta listen to what Ian says". The start of overlapping speech at line 507 is 
Ian interrupting the doctor to support and collude with her against Mrs. Peach. 
Therefore, the doctor's expertise is under attack, necessitating a strong defence, and her 
alternative judgment of the situation is warranted by a series of "I think's". The sheer 
volume, five "I thinks" in three and a half lines, suggests that she is warranting her 
account with her opinion, supported by an independent witness, Ian. Throughout these 
meetings, the doctors' most frequent mode of warranting is their opinion which increases 
when they are under pressure from others (patients, carers, or other professionals). A 
further example is provided in the first extract of the section on ranking expertise where 
the consultant is discussing and working up the necessity for Natasha, the patient, to be 
referred to a social worker but the CPN is attempting to block the consultant's preference. 
In that extract, the doctor warrants her account that the housing support worker is 
unsuitable (lines 773,776 & 786), and the need for a sufficient level of expertise (lines 
778,779,784 & 787) with her opinion, "I think". 
Opinion, as a means of warranting, is not only used as a defence when doctors are under 
pressure, but also when they are framing a course of action which they anticipate will be 
contentious. In the following extract, the doctor is under pressure from the patient and 
anticipates a negative response to her account. Early on in this meeting Matthew, the 
patient, has challenged the efficacy of his medication ("I don't feel the medications 
helping me at all", text not included here), and the matter has remained unresolved for 
much of the meeting. However, details of patients' medication and dosage are required on 
the CPA form and Sarah, the CPN, raises the issue again towards the end of the meeting. 
The extract begins with Sarah checking with the doctor that the medication will be 
unchanged. This occasions Dr. North to launch into quite a complicated sequence to 
justify the effectiveness of the medication and to elicit Matthew's agreement to remain on 
the medication, something she anticipates he will be reluctant to do. "Depo" is the term 
used for a regular injection of medication. ' '. 
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Meeting 3 (main mee ting) : Matthew 
294 Sarah (CPN): so the depo will be the same (. ) is that right to continue with that? 
295 Dr. N.: well yes I think (1.2) we'll continue with the medication um later on 
296 but you see (. ) I know you don't quite (. ) agree with me Matthew but I 
297 think that the medication has helped you and the fact that you're better 
298 is is (1.2)to do with the medication later on (0.8) we could (0.7) be 
299 cutting it do:: wn but I think at the moment as y you're saying things are 
300 getting better I think it would >be the wrong time< to cut it down (. ) 
301 because I think it is helping you 
302 Matthew: you think it is= 
303 Dr. N.: =1 think it is it's helping you to think (. ) more clearly and because you 
304 can think you can think out your problems better 
305 Matthew: °yeah° 
The doctor begins with a statement of intent to "continue" the medication, reiterating 
Sarah's word which suggests continuity, and prefaced with her opinion. She goes on to 
start framing what appears to be a promise of change in the future, picked up again at line 
298, "later on" (line 295), but changes tack to acknowledge Matthew's disagreement. This 
is presented in the form of a disclaimer, "I know you don't quite (. ) agree with me 
Matthew but... " (line 296), which works to suggest that she has listened to what he has 
said suggesting, in turn, that she anticipates that her definition of the situation is likely to 
be disrupted by Matthew. At the same time she founds her own, opposing judgment that 
"the medication has helped you", again warranted by her opinion, "I think" (lines 296-7). 
Her recirculation of Matthew's "help" and emphasis on "has" both strengthens the claim 
that she has listened and at the same time counterposes and promotes her opinion over 
his. 
Having founded this judgment, the doctor picks up the earlier aborted promise of change, 
presented as another disclaimer, "later on (0.8) we could (0.7) be cutting it do:: wn but... " 
(lines 298-9). The, second disclaimer. appears to be warding off the notion that she is 
inflexible and/or that medication is something permanent and unchangeable, while 
furthering her claim that it, should continue unchanged. It also , could 
be anticipating a 
potential counter-claim from Matthew that the medication should be reduced and places 
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this as a possibility, but one in the indefinite future. Her judgment is warranted, again, by 
her opinion sandwiched either side of an invocation of Matthew's own account of his 
progress, "as y you're saying things are getting better" (lines 299-300). The doctor finishes 
with a reiteration of her previous claim although now it is changed from the past, "I think 
that the medication has helped you" (lines 296-7) to the present, "I think it is helping you" 
(line 301), reinforcing the sense of, and need for, continuity. Throughout this sequence the 
doctor warrants her claim with opinion, "I think" (lines 295,296-7,299,300,301, & 
303). In particular, her opinion immediately follows the two disclaimers, suggesting that it 
is warranting a claim that she anticipates may receive a negative response. 
In response, Matthew picks up on and recasts the doctor's warrant, "you think it is" (line 
302). This has a certain ambiguity and could be read either as a request for more 
information or as suggesting it is only her opinion, and one that he does not agree with. 
Given the discussion on medication earlier in the meeting, and the doctor's anticipation of 
a negative response, I would suggest that the latter is more likely. Either way, the doctor 
has been attempting to elicit Matthew's agreement to remaining on the medication, and his 
response withholds such agreement and forces the doctor to work further at her claim. The 
doctor immediately reasserts her opinion, "you think it is=/="I think it is". She goes on to 
fold a previous claim of Matthew's ("sorting what I'm thinking"/ "thinking yourself into 
being better", text not included here but discussed in chapter four) into her own claim, and 
makes his contingent on hers, "its helping you to think (. ) more clearly and because you 
can think you can think out your problems better" (lines 303-4). In making Matthew's 
claim of thinking himself better contingent upon the medication, and having pre-empted a 
request for a reduction in medication, the doctor solicits the agreement she has been 
seeking. 
Therefore, the doctors' chief means of warranting their accounts is with their opinion, "I 
think", which appears to be put to use particularly when they are under attack, when a 
preferred course of action is being disputed and/or when they anticipate a negative 
response. It is noteworthy that opinion is used overwhelmingly by doctors as their main 
warrant (although occasionally it may be combined with an independent- witness) and 
suggests, I would argue, that it is professional opinion that is being mobilised. This 
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becomes clearer when compared with the ways other professionals warrant their accounts. 
In contrast to doctors, professionals such as CPNs and ASWs draw on their situational 
knowledge about patients in combination with opinion to warrant their judgments. In the 
next extract Alan, the CPN, has been directly asked for his assessment of Nicola, the 
patient, by Dr. North, "anything you want to say Alan" (text not included here), and he 
formulates a positive assessment of Nicola's health and progress. 
Meeting 5 (main meeting) : Nicola 
279 Alan (CPN): but at the same time I think that u:: m (1.3) 1 think cetainly:: (1.2) this 
280 year it's been quite noticeable that you are you are more assertive in 
281 yourself and you're actually managing (. ) your symptoms of like 
282 hearing voices in a lot more (. ) er constructive way than before because 
283 I can remember in the past >you'd have taken to your< be:: d and (. ) you 
284 become very isolated and I think you challenge and you fight back a bit 
285 more now and your confidence has im rp o:: ved (. ) and °that's helped 
286 you a lot° (4.7) 
287 Dr. N.: °well thats good thats good yeah° so shall we go through the 
288 medication 
Alan's assessment is constructed in terms of what could be called an opinion "I think" 
sandwich (lines 279 & 284) of two lists of positive attributes which Nicola possesses 
now, "more assertive", "managing (. ) your symptoms" and "constructive" (lines 280-2) 
followed by "you challenge", "you fight back" and "your confidence has im rp o:: ved" 
(lines 284-5). The filling is composed of a contrast with a past warranted by the CPN's 
memory of situational knowledge, "taken to your< be:: d" and "become very isolated". 
While the consultant used more opinion and the patient as an independent witness, here 
the CPN uses less opinion and combines it with an appeal to his memory of Nicola's 
behaviour at home to warrant his account. Although Alan is not under the kind of 
pressures faced by the doctors in the previous extracts, he has been asked directly for his 
judgment of Nicola, which could be surmised as putting him under some pressure-This 
reading is supported by the doctor's response to Alan's assessment; she does not engage 




In my final example in this section, situational knowledge combined with reported speech 
is the primary means of warranting. In the sequences preceding this, the three 
professionals have been making claims and counter-claims regarding why Sarah, the 
CPN, will be "good for" Diane, in which the doctor has formulated it in terms of 
personality and ethnicity, Sarah in terms of her professionalism and Betty in terms of 
gender, "a female CPN". Dr. North and Sarah have just reached consensus by agreeing 
that it is "changes" for the "better", but Betty is still attempting to press her claim, 
suggesting that Diane's previous, male, CPN led her to reject her treatment. At this point, 
to support her argument, Betty begins a highly vivid narrative of what happened just 
before Diane became ill and was admitted to hospital. 
Meeting 2 (post-meeting) : Diane 
865 Betty (CSW): 
866 
867 
868 Sarah (CPN): 




873 Sarah (CPN): 
874 Betty (CSW): 
875 Dr. N.: 
mm mm seems quite sad because she said to me (. ) the day before she 
was admitted (. ) um I know you're you Betty but she said you're an 
alien really aren't you 
ooh 
and I said I'm not Di she said oh you are she said and the television 
was on and she turned the sound down and she said I'm really 
frightened actually because you've you've got the message from there 
haven't you she said and you are an alien 
gosh isn't that psychotic= 
=yes 
oh dear oh dear hhh yes 
What is striking about this piece (and many others produced by CSWs) is the sheer 
volume of reported speech, "she said" (lines 865,866,869 twice, 870 & 872) and "I said" 
(line 869). In all there are seven instances in this short segment. It is clear that in order to 
warrant her account of. how ill Diane became, and thus further her argument, Betty is 
drawing on highly detailed situational knowledge which is heightened still further and 
made more effective by verbatim reporting which includes the bewailing "oh" (line 869). 
But it is Sarah who names it, "psychotic" (line 873), which Betty does not do, another 
common, feature of -meetings _ whereby 
CSWs do not employ medico-psychiatric 
terminology. The doctor's amused response at line 875 is also common and could be the 
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kind of 'gallows humour' that is said to occur amongst people working in difficult, 
hazardous, or life-and-death situations. But it could also be the case that the very 
bizarreness of such tales of the psychotic are what makes them funny and what marks 
them off from the 'normal', as in 'everyone' knows that aliens do not send messages 
through the television. 
Therefore there are distinctive differences between the ways professionals warrant their 
opinions, assessments and arguments. For the doctors, (professional) opinion in the form 
of "I think" is the chief means for warranting, although they may also combine this with 
other strategies. CPNs and ASWs regularly combine opinion with situational knowledge 
which is usually deployed to provide supporting evidence. In contrast, CSWs, who often 
have the most day-to-day contact with patients and are accorded the lowest levels of 
expertise (as we have already seen), warrant their accounts with situational narratives that 
are highly coloured by reported speech, increasing their immediacy and veracity. After all, 
who is going to say that, actually, the patient did not say that? In effect, CSWs' warrants 
in terms of narratives appear to be used to claim the right to "say something interesting, 
relevant, and appropriate to the immediate recipient(s)" (Lynch & Bogen 1996: 281). 
Therefore it would seem that these different ways of warranting professional accounts are 
both a reflection of the levels of expertise accorded to different professionals and, in turn, 
subtly and tacitly reinforce the differentiation and status of professional domains. 
In summary, in this appendix I have explored a number of discursive themes whereby 
professionals articulate and accomplish domains, expertise, authority and status within 
CPA meetings. The discourses of the "mental" and the "social", "someone who knows 
what they're doing" and "ultra-therapeutic", along with articulations of chains of 
mediation, authority and status, and different strategies for warranting accounts, suggest 
that professional domains are negotiated, differentiated and ranked within interactions. 
Despite broader discourses which establish relations amongst professionals, the themes 
discussed here suggest that status and competencies are discursively managed at a 
localised level. This may occur explicitly when issues of blame are at stake, or when 
professionals' expertise is challenged or more routinely during multi-professional 
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discussions about patients. The analysis suggests that relations between professionals are 
interactional accomplishments that are not just determined by external factors. 
However, it is difficult to sustain the notion that the doctors' authority and status, and their 
means for warranting their accounts, are solely the product of moment-by-moment 
interactional accomplishments. For example, when the doctor invokes "Sandra" this is a 
resource within the interaction used to further her accomplishment of status, but having a 
secretary to screen your calls is also determined by broader discourses and institutional 
practices. Similarly, the sufficiency of opinion to warrant doctors' claims cannot be easily 
explained within the interactions themselves, and once again is suggestive of the way 
broader discourses are productive at the local level. 
Nevertheless, a complex of relations between professionals is articulated along a number 
of dimensions in terms of mental, social, expertise, responsibility, authority, status and 
warranting distinctions; professional relations are accomplished and managed, constituted 
and reconstituted within interactions. In many instances, but not all, such differentiations 
produce asymmetries whereby some professionals have more expertise, authority and 
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notion that it is undemanding. In the second list, Betty builds on the notion that it is 
undemanding by linking it with beauty activities, "you're not under pressure to do 
anything er and someone comes along from the college to talk about makeup (. ) someone 
came last week to talk about nai:: ls" (lines 285-289). The first item in the list, "you're not 
under pressure", forms a bridge between the previous list and depictions of the sort of 
activities involved. In the third list Betty presents the women's group as an environment 
specifically for women, "theres about (1.9) eight or nine women and you will kno::: w 
some of them from the ward... and its all its just all women" (lines 291-4). The small 
numbers, the fact that Diane will "know some of them", and the emphasis that it is only 
women works to suggest that it is safe and undemanding because it is "just all women". 
The final list reiterates and expands the notion that the group is undemanding, "its very 
relaxing and I don't think you'd feel pressurised or or um... um (. ) uncomfortable in any 
way" (lines 294-7). Therefore, women's group is undemanding because it takes up little 
time and little is required beyond drinking coffee, because it is about beautifying 
activities, because it is a safe, women-only environment. Women's group in this 
formulation is for the kind of 'woman' who cannot manage to do very much, if anything, 
and who feels happiest and safest with other women. Nothing is required, just for Diane 
to be there. It is a small step from home to women's group. Therefore each discursive 'sell' 
of the women's group is furnished with constituent parts that are aimed to appeal to the 
particular woman concerned. But what is most salient, and what traverses both depictions 
is that it is a group with women for women. And whilst these women may have different 
biographical details and predilections, they are women who need to do something outside 
the home, make friends and be more independent and the best place for that is a 
professionally organised activity that is "just all women". 
The four themes explored so far, "shes stuck in the house", "she doesn't have any friends", 
"she does get dependent" and "its just all women" suggest that psychiatric professionals 
are drawing on understandings of femininity in their decision-making regarding patients' 
futures in terms of their purposefulness and autonomy. Being stuck at home, friendless 
and dependent is framed as insufficiently purposeful while doing something outside the 
home, independent of significant others and in the company of other women is framed as 
the solution. In this way, purposeful activity and a certain understanding of independence 
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